Abstract
One of the most important theological questions in the first Origenist controversy was that of the resurrection of the dead. Jerome accused both Origen and contemporary “Origenists” of speaking only of the resurrection of the body, and not of the flesh, and he claimed that an idea of resurrection without the flesh could not guarantee the identity between the body living on earth and the resurrected body. I argue that although Jerome attempted to maximize the difference between himself and Origen by speaking of flesh instead of body, and by emphasizing the sameness of the body, it is clear that he, too, thought that the resurrection would imply a profound change. At closer scrutiny, Jerome’s way of understanding this change, namely as the nature remaining the same while the glory increases, shows striking similarities to Origen’s explanation of change. I argue that Jerome was dependent on Origen’s ideas about the resurrection, even in his polemics against him. Jerome’s heresiological strategies, I argue, have had consequences for modern historical reconstructions of his eschatological thought, which is often presented in opposition to Origen’s more spiritual understanding. Awareness of the rhetorical strategies used by Jerome in the context of controversy is crucial, I claim, in assessing a continuing reception of Origen in his theology.
1 Introduction
In 396, Jerome wrote a letter to Vigilantius, a priest from Gaul who had earlier visited him in Bethlehem. The letter is of a special importance, since it is the first instance of Jerome clearly expressing the view that some of Origen’s ideas were heretical. Although siding with Epiphanius of Salamis in the conflict between him and John of Jerusalem, beginning in 393, Jerome had, apart from a translation of a letter by Epiphanius, not been involved in anti-Origenist polemics at all until now. The reason for this is clear: Vigilantius had obviously brought with him to the West information about Jerome holding Origenist views.[1]
Jerome writes: “Origen is a heretic. What does that have to do with me, who do not deny that on many points he is heretical?”[2] He also numbers such points, one of which concerns the resurrection of the body.[3] It is well known that this question was an important one in the conflict that has been called the Origenist controversy.
Jerome would return to this issue in his work Against John of Jerusalem, probably written in 397.[4] The immediate reason for the writing of this work was that the bishop of Jerusalem, because of the problematic situation in which he found himself, accused of Origenism by Epiphanius, had written a letter to bishop Theophilus of Alexandria, in which he had given his views on the situation and also, in a kind of apology answering the accusations of heresy, explained his views on the matters under debate. The letter is not extant, but can to a great extent be recovered from Jerome’s polemical treatise against John.[5] In this work, the question about the resurrection is presented as the most important one.[6]
In this article, I will focus on Jerome’s anti-Origenist polemics that concerned the question about the resurrection body, mainly from his Against John, but also from other writings from the time of the Origenist controversy. In my analyses, I will examine Jerome’s heresiological presentation of Origen, as well as his orthodox self-presentation. With the concepts of orthodoxy and heresy, which will thus be important in the examination, I am not referring to actual ideas as being orthodox or heretical, but to rhetorical presentations of heresy and orthodoxy. Following insights in this subject made by Alain le Boulluec and others,[7] I see orthodoxy and heresy as contingent and mutually constructed.
The heresiologists’ rhetorical constructions of their own orthodoxy often meant a maximizing of difference to the heretic or heresy constructed, a rhetorical strategy that may mislead us to see them as more different from the writer/groups they polemicized against than they actually were. Besides focusing on Jerome’s constructions of Origenist heresy and of his own orthodoxy, I will ask to what degree he differed from Origen in these matters, and to what extent the difference he marks is a rhetorical strategy to hide an actual closeness. As Jonathan Smith, among others, has argued, in the marking of difference, it is the “proximate other,” the one who is actually very close, that demands the most extreme distancing.[8] When examining the reception of Origen in Jerome, it is of great importance to take account of the workings of heresiological rhetoric. There is a methodological risk of being trapped in simplifying heresiological categorizations, which may make us blind to an actual closeness between heresiologist and heretic and even a positive reception of the heretic in the heresiologist. It is important to remember that the orthodox self that the heresiologist constructs also is a rhetorical construction, and that there is as much need of recovering heresiologists as heretics.
After years of using the works of Origen, after, in Mark Vessey’s terms, presenting himself in the persona of Origen,[9] after developing a theology of asceticism which was deeply influenced by Origen’s thought, Jerome, when accused of being an Origenist, certainly felt the need to make that seem distant which was dangerously close.
When it comes to Jerome’s teachings on the resurrection body (and his eschatology at large), there is a tendency in modern scholarship to position him as an opposite to Origen, both as an advocate of materiality in the resurrection, in contrast to Origen’s spirituality, and as holding a hierarchical view of the afterlife, as opposed to Origen’s idea of final equality.[10] Jerome is presented as someone who emphasized sameness in the relation between the resurrected body and the earthly body, while Origen’s ideas are thought to centre on difference. I argue that this way of presenting the two theologians depends, to a large extent, on the continuing influence that ancient heresiology has on early Christian studies. Although the concepts of orthodoxy and heresy have since long been deconstructed, and an awareness has grown of the performative side of religious polemics, I argue that the categorizations made by ancient heresiologists, their constructions of the heresy of others and their own orthodoxy, are still influential in how scholars today interpret their sources.
In this article, my intention is to problematize the above-mentioned way of presenting the relation between Origen’s and Jerome’s ideas about the resurrection. Examining the heresiological strategies applied by Jerome in Against John and other works, and comparing his orthodox self-presentation not to his polemical portrayal of Origen, but to Origen’s own ideas about the resurrection, I will argue that the similarities between these thinkers are much greater than either Jerome’s polemics or modern reconstructions have allowed for.
2 Glorious flesh vs. spiritual body. The question of identity
2.1 Jerome’s presentation of Origen’s ideas
Before Jerome presents Origen’s views on the resurrection body in Against John, he provides a context for Origen’s argumentation. This explanation appears to be accurate, from what can be found in texts from Origen, but what is most essential for our present purposes is the function that it has in Jerome’s anti-Origenist rhetoric. Origen, Jerome claims, saw a twofold error in the church: “That of us, and that of the heretics” (nostrorum et haereticorum).[11] We thus note that Jerome, already in the beginning of his presentation, identifies himself with one of two groups against whom Origen expressed his ideas about the resurrection. The other group, the heretics, are those who Origen claims to deny the resurrection of both flesh and body, so that only the soul will be saved. Who, then, are “we”? “We, who are simple and φιλοσάρκους, that is, lovers of the flesh, say that the same bones and blood, and flesh, the same outer appearance and bodily members, yes, the whole bodily composition, will rise in the last day.”[12]
This description, of course, is one in which Jerome presents Origen’s views about this group, rather than presenting his own actual ideas; it goes on with the claim that according to these, we will again eat, marry, beget children—why otherwise would we be resurrected with, for instance, teeth and genital organs? However, this does not lessen the importance of Jerome’s identification with the group. It is strategic in the sense that he, from the very beginning, marks distance towards Origen by identifying with a group against whom Origen had expressed his own views. Origen, Jerome writes, is dissatisfied with both these opinions— “our flesh and the phantom of the heretics”[13]—thinking that they express opposite extremes, the ones claiming that we will be exactly the same, the others claiming that the body will not rise at all.
Also, this identification fits into a larger rhetorical strategy that runs through the whole heresiological treatment of the question of the resurrection in Against John: That of presenting Origen, as well as a contemporary follower like John, as an intellectual elite, confusing simple believers with their cunning arguments. We may already at this point note that Jerome, from the very beginning, rhetorically places himself among the “simple.”
If we turn to Jerome’s presentation of Origen’s ideas about the resurrection,[14] Origen is said to hold that the same people will rise who have lived on earth. The bodies that will rise are those which have been placed in the tombs and decayed into ashes. Paul and Peter will have their own bodies. In this, Origen uses an argument from justice: “it is not right,” nor “worthy of the righteous Judge” that a soul sins in one body and is tormented in another, or is martyred for Christ in one body to be crowned in another.[15]
He presents Origen’s explanation of this identity as follows: Taking his departure from 1 Corinthians 15,[16] Origen compared the resurrected body to the plant springing from a seed. In every seed, there is a principle (σπερματικὸν λόγον)[17] that contains all of the future growth. When the seed is dissolved in the earth, it draws unto itself the surrounding materials, so that a plant can rise.[18] In a similar way, the elements of the human body—earth, air, water and fire—each return, as the body decays, to their original substances.[19] However, certain ancient principles (antiqua principia) remain that will rise, and on the Day of Judgment, the principles in the seeds will cause the dead to live again in a manner similar to a plant rising from the ground. One thing dies, another rises. The bodies that will rise “will not be restored with the same flesh, or in the form that they previously had.”[20] Returning to their elements, the substance of flesh and blood does not disappear, but neither will they return to their “former composition” and be “altogether what they were.”[21] As if you throw wine or milk into a lake, although they do not disappear, you cannot again separate what has been mixed.
If even something that will ultimately perish—like a vine—can pass from being a small, dry seed to having roots, leaves and grapes, how can it seem improbable that the human being, who will live forever, will have a condition that is very different from its former? If we would again have flesh, bones, blood, and members, we would again need barbers because of growing hair, nails would have to be cut, and our genital organs would be used for sexual purposes. We would again be males and females; also, small children in need of nursing and old men who need support by a staff, would be seen among the resurrected.[22] Instead, we will rise with a spiritual body, our body of humility being transformed according to the Lord’s glorious body, Origen affirms, quoting Philippians 3:21.[23] Something else, spiritual and ethereal, is promised to us, which cannot be subjected to touch or sense. The body will be changed in such a way that it can inhabit the place in which it will live.
This account of Origen’s ideas of the resurrection is, in my judgment, accurate: The importance of 1 Corinthians 15, the concept of λόγος σπερματικὸς, the emphasis that the resurrected body will be spiritual and that our existence will be utterly different from that on earth, are all characteristic of what we know about Origen’s ideas on resurrection. However, it is, of course, selective. Every explanation of the resurrection of the dead has to take two things into account: sameness and difference.[24] On the one hand, identity has to be guaranteed; on the other, some difference has to be admitted. Jerome’s presentation of Origen is one that focuses on one of these aspects, that of difference. As we will see further on, Origen expressed ideas about the sameness that were very similar to the ones Jerome himself expressed.
2.2 Jerome about sameness and difference in the resurrection
Jerome uses this description of Origen’s ideas to argue that Bishop John’s attempt to demonstrate his orthodoxy in this question is insufficient. Nine times he had spoken of the body in his letter, but not even once of the flesh. Jerome returns to his rhetoric of simplicity: In speaking of the body, he claims, John sought to deceive simple Christians, so that they would think that he confessed the resurrection of the flesh. Again, Jerome identifies himself with the simple ones (nos rudes). Meanwhile, the perfect (hi qui perfecti sunt) would understand that in speaking only of the resurrection of the body, John denied the resurrection of the flesh.[25] However, Jerome points out to John, “flesh is defined in one way, body in another.”[26] Even if all flesh is also body, it is not the case that everything that is a body is also flesh. Sometimes a body is said to be ethereal or aerial, that is, when it is not subject to touch or sight—and such a body is not flesh. However, there are also many kinds of bodies that can be seen, but are still not flesh, such as a wall or a stone. As for flesh, it “is properly what is held together by blood, veins, bones and sinews.”[27]
Jerome also points out that it is the work of the flesh, and not its nature, that is condemned in the Scriptures. For instance, he writes concerning Paul that:
Et ad sanctos, qui utique in carne erant, dicit: “Vos autem in carne non estis, sed in Spiritu, si tamen Spiritus dei habitat in uobis.” Negando enim eos in carne, quos in carne esse constabat, non carnis substantiam, sed peccata damnabat.
To the saints, who certainly were in the flesh, he says: “You are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if the Spirit of God dwells in you.” For when he denied that they were in the flesh, whom he had asserted were in the flesh, it was not the substance of the flesh, but the sins that were condemned.[28]
We will later return to Jerome’s ideas about the difference between fleshly substance and fleshly life. For the moment, we may note that crucial in his heresiological construction of an Origenist idea of the resurrection is the distinction between body and flesh, and the assertion that claiming the resurrection of the body is not enough in order to claim identity between the person on earth and the person resurrected: For this, it is necessary to confess the resurrection of the flesh. The flesh that will rise is defined in quite a crude sense, as “what is held together by blood, veins, bones and sinews.”[29] This, together with Jerome’s identification with the “simple-minded” Christians of a chiliast and anthropomorphist kind, certainly makes his idea of resurrection appear as very distant from that of Origen.[30]
However, this emphasis on sameness over difference is soon to be modified in the treatise. A formulation that Jerome had expressed already before, and would return to in later writings, if in slightly different formulations, is the following: “This is the true confession of the resurrection, which ascribes glory to the flesh, but does not take away its reality.”[31] A change, thus, is certainly taking place, and this change is described by Jerome in terms of clothing. When it is said that the corruptible puts on incorruption, and the mortal immortality, this does not mean that the body is done away with, but that which was without glory is adorned in glory, is made glorious (efficere gloriosum),
ut mortalitatis et infirmitatis uiliore ueste deposita, immortalitatis auro et, ut ita dicam, firmitatis atque uirtutis induamur, uolentes non spoliari carne, sed superuestiri gloria, et domicilium nostrum, quod de caelo est, superindui desiderantes, ut deuoretur mortale a uita.
so that when the more worthless clothing of mortality and weakness has been laid aside, we may be clothed in the gold of immortality and, so to say, in strength and virtue. In this, we do not want to take away the flesh, but put the glory on over it, and we want to put on our house which is of heaven, so that the mortal may be swallowed up by life.[32]
Jerome also speaks of the flesh being “mortal according to nature and eternal according to grace.”[33] The biblical words about the hand of Moses changing colour into white,[34] and then again into its original colour, is used by Jerome to illustrate the kind of change that the body will undergo in the resurrection: There was still a hand, but the two states were different; that is, one and the same thing assumed different qualities.[35] Another biblical passage used by Jerome is Jeremiah 18:4, about the potter whose pot was marred, and who remade the same pot into the way that seemed best to him.[36] Resurrection does not imply a new body, but a reshaping of the one we formerly had.[37] If we look at the word itself, says Jerome, it does not mean that one thing perishes and another is raised; besides, the resurrection of the dead certainly points to our flesh, since it is that which dies which is brought back to life.[38]
The words in Isaiah about the one who is coming from Edom, with shining raiment from Bozrah,[39] are interpreted by Jerome as pointing to the mystery of the resurrection, showing “both the reality of the flesh and the growth in glory.”[40] Edom is interpreted as either “earthly” or “bloody,” Bozrah as either “flesh” or “in tribulation.”[41]
Jerome admits, in the last passage dealing with the resurrection in Against John, that as long as human beings remain mere flesh and blood (tantum caro sanguisque permanserint), they will not inherit the kingdom of God.[42] Reference is made to the words in 1 Corinthians about the corruptible putting on incorruption, and the mortal putting on immortality. The flesh, Jerome explains, will undergo a change, not a destruction (immutationis, non abolitionis). The flesh that was formerly kept down by heavy weight upon the earth will receive the wings of the spirit, and fly with fresh glory into heaven.[43]
What may be concluded so far is that, for all his emphasis on sameness in Against John—on the resurrection of blood, bones, and sinews—Jerome certainly left room also for difference in the resurrection, and this difference, this change, was explained in terms of clothing, of one and the same thing putting on new qualities. This is an aspect of Jerome’s teachings on the resurrection that has been overlooked in modern scholarship, arguably because of an imagined opposition, which I discussed briefly in my introduction, between Origen’s emphasis on spirituality and equality on the one hand, and Jerome’s emphasis on materiality and inequality on the other.[44]
Although Jerome did not treat the issue of bodily resurrection to any great extent before his involvement in anti-Origenist polemics, a comparison can be made to a passage from his Commentary on Galatians, written in the late 380s:
… cum de corpore humilitatis transformati fuerimus in corpus gloriae Domini Iesu Christi, illud habebimus corpus quod nec Iudaeus possit incidere, nec cum praeputio custodire Gentilis. Non quod aliud iuxta substantiam sit: sed quod iuxta gloriam sit diuersum.
… when we have been transformed from the body of humility into the body of glory of the Lord Jesus Christ, we will have that body that neither the Jew can cut nor the Gentile preserve in the state of uncircumcision. It will not be different in regard to the substance but in regard to the glory.[45]
Already here, Jerome expressed that the substance (in Contra Iohannem:ueritas) will remain, but that the glory will change. John O’Connell, in his work on the eschatology of Jerome, gives this as evidence that Jerome was consistent in his views on the resurrection body, meaning that he held the same idea that he expressed during the Origenist controversy already before.[46] I agree with O’Connell in this regard; however, O’Connell sees this as evidence that Jerome never embraced an Origenist idea of the resurrection. I argue to the contrary that in this quotation, a dependence on Origen’s thought can be seen—a dependence that brings nuance to the supposed anti-Origenism of Jerome’s views on the resurrection in Contra Iohannem.
In the preface to his commentary on Galatians, Jerome says that Origen had been an important authority in his writing of the work. Although Origen’s commentary is not extant, it is very probable that Jerome depended on it when he wrote the words quoted above, because precisely the distinction between a substance that remains the same, and qualities that change, was very important in Origen’s explanation of the sameness and difference of the resurrection body in relation to the earthly body. To this subject we now turn.
2.3 Origen about substance and qualities
In On First Principles, Origen speaks of two general natures (generales naturas), created by God: A visible and corporeal one and an invisible and incorporeal one.[47] To the two natures correspond two kinds of change (permutationes): The invisible nature changes with regard to mind and purpose because of free will, while the visible nature may undergo substantial change (substantialem recipit permutationem). This nature may be transformed by God into different forms.[48]
In his Commentary on John, Origen writes that every material body has a nature (φύσις) that is in itself without qualification, and receives the qualities (ποιότητες) that the Creator gives it.[49] Later in the same work, he writes that a mortal essence (οὐσίαν θνητὴν) cannot transform into (μεταβάλλουσαν εἰς) an immortal one.[50] Nothing can transform from corporeal into incorporeal. However, while the material (ὑλικὸν) subsists, and cannot be destroyed, the qualities may change.[51] What is denied in this text is change from a mortal essence (equivalent to the material substance) into an immortal (immaterial), while what is affirmed is a change of the qualities of matter.
A similar view is expressed in Against Celsus: There are bodies celestial, and bodies terrestrial.[52] The glory (δόξα) of the celestial is one, that of the terrestrial another. Even the glory of the celestial ones differs: That of the sun, moon, stars, and among the stars themselves.[53] As those who expect the resurrection of the dead, we believe that the qualities in bodies undergo change. The matter underlying bodies is capable of receiving the qualities that the Creator wishes to give them.
In On First Principles, Origen, discussing the issue of corporeality and incorporeality, claims that the thing that changes (mutatur) is not destroyed (perit). The habitus, that is, the form of the world, will certainly pass away, but not the material substance (substantiae materialis):[54] “but a certain change [inmutatio] of the quality [qualitatis] takes place, and a transformation [transformatio] of the form [habitus].”[55] The material or corporeal nature (naturam) cannot possibly disappear, because only the Trinity is without body.[56] Importantly, Origen does not only speak of the body as remaining, but also the flesh. The flesh, says Origen, is thought by ignorant people to be destroyed after death. We who believe in its resurrection, however, understand that only a change takes place, while its substance remains.[57]
In another part of the same work, Origen says that it is only in opinione … et intellectu that the material substance is distinguished from the rational natures with whom it is combined, and who cannot exist without it.[58] This substance is formed into more solid bodies when used on inferior beings, but when used by perfect and blessed beings (perfectoribus … beatoribus), it shimmers in the splendour of celestial bodies (cf. 1 Corinthians 15:40).[59] Likewise, in Contra Celsum, using the words about the tent in 2 Corinthians 5:4, Origen explains that the soul has to be united to a body, and that the body is adapted to the place where the soul lives. A distinction is made between the tent and the habitation (οἰκία) in which the tent is located. This habitation will be destroyed, but not the tent itself.[60]
In his Commentary on Matthew, Origen explains that likeness to the angels, spoken of in Matthew 22, does not only imply that the resurrected will not again be married, but also that their bodies will change into the likeness of angelic bodies: “their bodies of humility, being transformed, become such as the bodies of angels are, that is, ethereal.”[61] Their bodies will not be taken away, but be transformed into the likeness of angels. The σχῆμα, form, of the same body will be transformed into an ethereal body, like the angels have.
So far, we have seen Origen express an idea of the resurrection according to which the sameness is explained by reference to what is in Greek designated as οὐσία, φύσις, ὓλη, and in Latin translations natura and (materialis) substantia. The difference is explained by Greek terms as ποιότητες and σχῆμα, and by the Latin terms forma, habitus, and qualitas. A transformation takes place (μετασχηματίζω, μεταβάλλω, immuto, permuto), which does not imply the destruction of the substance or essence, but a change of its qualities.
This explanation of sameness and difference is certainly very close to what we have seen Jerome presenting in Against John. That is, the very idea that Jerome presents as his own, orthodox view, in opposition to the heretical idea that he constructs as Origen’s, appears to have important parallels in Origen’s thought. For all his insistence on the resurrection of bones, blood and sinews, Jerome certainly takes account not only of sameness, but also of difference: A clothing in incorruption, an increase of glory, a being lifted up by wings, that is, resurrection as implying a real transformation—the same thing taking on a different form.
We have noted that clothing was an important theme in Jerome’s heresiological presentation of his own view of the resurrection—one that implied a putting on rather than a passing from one kind of being into another. In what follows, I will address the concept of clothing in Origen’s understanding of change, in order to demonstrate that Jerome’s anti-Origenist explanation of difference in the resurrection to a great extent builds on ideas that Origen had himself expressed.
2.4 Transformation as clothing
What has become clear, if we return to Origen’s ideas, is that bodily change is dependent on the condition of the soul. In On First Principles 2,2,2, Origen says that the material substance, when used by perfect beings, adorns both the angels of God and the sons of the resurrection with the clothing of a spiritual body (spiritalis corporis indumentis … exornat).[62] On the one hand, then, the body is seen as a clothing of these beings; on the other hand, its very being a spiritual body is itself dependent on the condition of the beings that wear it. In this way, Origen can, as will become clear in what follows, speak of the soul clothing the body, because the body is transformed in accordance with, even into the likeness of its soul.
In a passage from Against Celsus, which we have already referred to, the tent (σκηνή), spoken of in 2 Corinthians 5:4,[63] is interpreted as signifying the body. This tent is not the same as the habitation (οἰκία) in which it is located. It is the habitation that will be destroyed, while the tent itself will remain. This change is expressed in terms of clothing in the following way: The righteous “do not wish to put off the tent, but to put something else on over it, and through this, mortality might be swallowed up by life.”[64]
It is clear from this text that clothing, as Origen uses the concept in relation to the issue of the resurrection body, means that one thing remains that takes off its old clothes—qualities—and puts on new ones. We also return to the idea that bodily change is preceded by psychic change. The development of the body is always a consequence of the development of the soul.
In his Commentary on John, Origen, rather than contrasting transformation to destruction, contrasts one kind of transformation to another; that is, transformation into another essence, and transformation into the likeness of another essence. As we have already seen, Origen argues that a mortal essence (οὐσία) cannot transform into (μεταβάλλω εἰς) an immortal one. He makes the following distinction:
Οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ ἐστιν <τὸ> τὴν φθαρτὴν φύσιν ἐνδύεσθαι ἀφθαρσίαν, καὶ τὸ τὴν φθαρτὴν φύσιν μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἀφθαρσίαν.
It is not the same thing that the corruptible nature [φύσιν] is clothed [ἐνδύεσθαι] in incorruption, and that the corruptible nature is transformed into [μεταβάλλειν εἰς] incorruption.[65]
Here, a distinction is made between being transformed into and being clothed with. The material nature cannot become another nature, that is, essentially possess what the immaterial nature possesses: The qualities of immortality and incorruption. However, it can put on these qualities, remaining the same nature itself. That is, the body can become like the soul, which, as we know, Origen thought to belong to the other of the two “general natures,”[66] the immaterial one, which possesses in itself immortality from physical death. The body can possess the same qualities as the soul, while remaining a body. We return to the idea of the condition of the soul being determinative for the condition of the body.
This theme is elaborated in a fragment from the Commentary on Ephesians, which has been preserved thanks to Jerome, who quotes it in his own commentary. We will return to this text later on; for now, we will concentrate on what is said about the soul’s condition as determinative for that of the body. Origen, quoted by Jerome, says:
… illam carnem quae uisura sit salutare Dei, anima diligat, et nutriat et foueat, eam disciplinis erudiens, et coelesti saginans pane, et Christi sanguine irrigans, ut refecta et nitida possit libero cursu uirum sequi, et nulla debilitate, et pondere [Al. nullo debilitatis pondere] praegrauari. Pulchre etiam in similitudinem Christi nutrientis, et fouentis Ecclesiam, et dicentis ad Ierusalem: “Quoties uolui congregare filios tuos sicut gallina congregat pullos suos sub alas, et noluisti?” Animae quoque fouent corpora sua, ut corruptiuum hoc induat incorruptionem, et alarum leuitate suspensum, in aerem facilius eleuetur. Foueamus igitur et uiri uxores, et animae nostra corpora, ut et uxores in uiros, et corpora redigantur in animas.
[T]he soul loves, nourishes, and cherishes that flesh which will see the salvation of God, educating it with disciplines, fattening it with the heavenly bread, and supplying it with the blood of Christ to drink so that, renewed and with the look of health, it can follow its husband with free course and be unencumbered by weakness or burden. Excellently furthermore, in the likeness of Christ nourishing and cherishing the Church and saying to Jerusalem, “How often did I wish to gather your children as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you were not willing” (Matt 23:37), souls also cherish their bodies so that this corruptible may put on incorruption (1 Cor 15:53) and, suspended on the lightness of wings, may be lifted more easily into the air. Therefore, let us husbands cherish our wives and let our souls cherish our bodies so that wives may be brought into the rank of men and bodies into the rank of souls.[67]
First, we may note that Origen does not speak of the body, but of the flesh, more precisely the flesh that will see the salvation of God. The distinction between this flesh (which, we understand from what he says next, will be preserved, and thus seems to be signifying the material substance that we have seen him speaking of elsewhere) and that flesh which will disappear, is expressed in his Commentary on Romans.[68]
Origen interprets the passage in such a way that the relation between soul and flesh is correspondent to a relation between husband and wife. This is a relation of cherishing and nourishing, by which the higher/stronger part helps the lower/weaker part to rise. Souls are to cherish their bodies in such a way that bodies may be brought into the rank of souls. This is compared to how Jesus nourishes the Church, and as we shall see further on, precisely this parallel between Jesus moulding the soul and the soul moulding the body was central in Origen’s ideas of transformation.
Here, it is not only a question of the body being adapted to the location wherein the soul lives, but also a question of the soul reshaping the body by teaching and nourishing it, making it take part of its own qualities and rise to its own rank. Seen together with texts already discussed on this theme, we may conclude that the soul, by its free will, can effect a change in the body, a change that means that in the resurrection, it will be clothed with the qualities that essentially belong to the soul: Those of incorruption and immortality. Again, we are speaking of transformation into likeness, rather than into another being. The passing between ranks is precisely a transformation in terms of clothing, because passing to another rank means a transformation with regard to qualities.
In another text, Origen speaks in a similar way of how the matter of the body, which is now corruptible,[69] will put on (induet) incorruption when a perfect soul, and one instructed in the doctrines of incorruption, begins to use it (cum perfecta anima et dogmatibus incorruptionis instructa uti eo coeperit).[70] Such a perfect soul is clothing the body (indumentum corporis perfectam animam dicimus),[71] as Jesus is a clothing of the saints (indumentum sanctis), according to the words: “Put on the Lord Jesus Christ” (Rom 13:14).[72] We thus return to the parallel between Christ forming—clothing—the soul, and the soul clothing the body.
The soul is understood to be an ornament (ornamentum) of the body, covering its mortal nature (celans et contegens eius mortalem naturam).[73] Origen interprets Paul’s words about the corruptible putting on incorruption as meaning: This corruptible nature of the body must receive the clothing of incorruption—a soul possessing in itself incorruptibility, because it has been clothed with Christ.[74] “The incorruption and immortality that the body will put on is nothing else than the Wisdom, Word and Justice of God, who moulds, clothes, and adorns the soul.”[75]
2.5 Jerome’s anti-Origenist critique reconsidered
We may conclude that transformation understood as clothing, an idea that Jerome presents in his anti-Origenist polemics to indicate that a change (and not a destruction) will take place, as well as a change into the likeness of something else (rather than into the thing itself), had been part of Origen’s understanding of the resurrection as well. Jerome’s critique centres around precisely the distinction between being changed into something else, and being changed into the likeness of something else; the first being an essential change, the other one limited to the qualities of the being. Giving an argument that Origen had actually used himself,[76] Jerome claims that when the Apostle says “this mortal” etc., he certainly points to the body that was then present.[77] We have also seen Jerome use 2 Corinthians 4:6 to make the same point as Origen, that is, “we do not want to take away the flesh, but put the glory on over it, and we want to take on our house which is of heaven, so that the mortal may be swallowed up by life.”[78]
Likewise, Jerome’s words about the flesh being “mortal according to nature, but eternal according to grace,”[79] appears to be close to Origen’s idea of transformation, as does his statement that it is a change, not a destruction, that the flesh will undergo. His final words in the treatment of the resurrection in Against John, where he speaks of the putting on of incorruption and immortality, and says that the flesh which was formerly kept down by heavy weight upon the earth, when receiving the wings of the spirit, will fly with fresh glory to heaven,[80] certainly echo the passage from Origen’s Commentary on Ephesians that we treated above—a passage that Jerome had brought into his own commentary.
This brings us to our next theme, that of likeness to angels in the resurrection.
3 Angelic humans vs. humans becoming angels
3.1 Jerome about likeness to angels in Against John
Why is the resurrection of the flesh, rather than simply the body, so important in Jerome’s anti-Origenist polemics? Of course, as we have already noted, the concept of flesh itself is part of his rhetoric, a way of marking difference, a way of identifying with Origen’s opponents. But when we come further into the text, we find another clue to why it was so important for Jerome to claim the resurrection of the flesh in opposition to Origen. Resurrection with the same flesh meant, first and foremost, resurrection as man and woman.
Jerome uses the words in Job to illustrate the resurrection of the flesh:
Scio enim quod redemptor meus uiuat et in nouisimmo die de terra surrecturus sim, et rursum circumdabor pelle mea, et in carne mea uidebo deum, quem uisurus sum ego ipse, et oculi mei conspecturi sunt, et non alius. Reposita est haec spes mea in sinu meo.
I know that my Redeemer lives and that on the last day I will rise from the earth, and again be covered in my skin, and in my flesh I will see God, whom I will see for myself, and my own eyes will see, not those of anyone else. This hope rests in my bosom.[81]
“Where is the ethereal body?”[82] asks Jerome. Job will rise in his own flesh, and this has the consequence that Job will rise as a man: “where there is a structure of flesh, there is also the distinction of sex.”[83]
The resurrected body, Jerome continues to assert, is one of flesh, bones, blood and members. Where these are found, there is certainly also diversity of sex (sexus diuersitas). And “[w]here there is diversity of sex, there John is John, and Mary is Mary.”[84] Again, flesh, in contrast to body, is claimed to guarantee identity, and precisely sexual identity appears to be important for Jerome to claim. We remember that he had presented Origen as claiming that those who think that we will rise with the exact same body, apparently think that we will again marry and beget children. While Origen certainly did not claim that having sexual organs by necessity meant that they would be used, Jerome presents this to be an Origenist idea, and positions himself against it: He claims that we should not fear the marriage in heaven among those who, when still living on earth, did not use the sexual functions. “When it is said: ‘In that day they will neither marry nor be married,’ it is said of those who can marry, but still do not marry. For no one says of the angels: ‘They will neither marry nor be given in marriage.’”[85] What, then, is meant by likeness to the angels? Jerome’s answer is that: “the blessedness which they have without flesh and without sex, will be given to us in our flesh and with our sex.”[86] We will be like angels in the sense that we rise without the functions (operibus) of sex. “Likeness to the angels does not mean that humans will be transformed into angels, but refers to an increase in immortality and glory.”[87]
There are two important things to note in this passage. First, again, we see a denial of transformation into something else and an assertion instead of qualitative change, that is, an increase in immortality and glory. Secondly, we note that Jerome uses the fact that ascetics already in this live strive not to fulfil the functions of sex, in arguing against the Origenist idea that having sexual organs in the resurrection would imply a continuous use of them (as we have seen, a caricature of Origen’s, in turn, polemical construction of the chiliast position).[88]
While Origen had written that likeness to angels implies both the absence of sexuality and a bodily change,[89] Jerome focuses on the first aspect, although, as we have seen, he too embraced an idea of a profound bodily transformation. His insistence on rising with sexual organs certainly has to be explained in the same way as his insistence on the rising with flesh: He sought to rhetorically maximize the difference between his own view and what he presented to be Origen’s view. However, Jerome might have had especially good reason to focus precisely on sexual difference, since he had often expressed ideas about the possibility, for the ascetic person, to transcend sexual difference—a fact that may have made him all the more liable to accusations of being an Origenist.
In the following, I will argue that while the affirmation of lasting sexual difference was an important component in Jerome’s anti-Origenist polemics, he continued to embrace the idea of a possibility to transcend sexual difference in the present life. Precisely the distinction between present and future, individual and general, and, above all, inner and outer being, became central in his simultaneous construction of Origenist heresy and of his own anti-Origenist orthodoxy. It is also yet an example of how Jerome put Origenist ideas to new use in anti-Origenist polemics.
3.2 Jerome about the angelic life on earth
One of the accusations brought against Jerome by Rufinus of Aquileia, in a later state of the controversy, was that he had formerly agreed with Origen’s views on the possibility of transcending sexual difference. He was said to have done so precisely in the passage from his Commentary on Ephesians which we discussed above. The passage ends with the words:
Et nequaquam sit sexuum ulla diuersitas: sed quomodo apud angelos non est uir et mulier: ita et nos, qui similes angelis futuri sumus, iam nunc incipiamus esse quod nobis in coelestibus repromissum est.
And may there be no diversity of the sexes at all, but as there is no man and woman among the angels, so also let us, who will be like angels, even now begin to be that which has been promised us in the heavens.[90]
In his Apology against Rufinus,[91] Jerome explains that the passage in question was a quotation from Origen. Jerome, however, does not stop his explanation there, but actually defends what he has quoted. What is it that Rufinus finds disturbing in the quotation from Origen? Jerome thinks that the problem, in Rufinus’ view, lies in the following words: “so that this corruption may put on incorruption and, suspended on the lightness of wings, may be lifted more easily into the air.”[92] When saying this, Jerome explains, he does not alter the nature of bodies, but increase their glory. Receiving immortality does not mean ceasing to be what one was—we return again to what we have seen to be Origen’s understanding of change. When it comes to the question of women being brought into the rank of men and the ending of sexual difference, being like the angels, Jerome directs the following words at Rufinus: “These words should rightly disturb you, if I had not said after the previous words: ‘Let us even now begin to be that which is promised us in the heavens.’ ”[93] Precisely this focus on the present becomes essential in Jerome’s orthodox self-construction, as we have already seen in Against John. He claims that because he says “let us begin here on earth,” he does not take away the nature of the sexes, but only sexual desire and sexual intercourse, since, of course, bodies remain physically the same while still on earth. Then, about the meaning of likeness to the angels, he returns to the explanation from Against John that this has to do with sexual functions, not bodily nature:
Et reuera ubi inter uirum et feminam castitas est, nec uir incipit esse, nec femina, sed, adhuc in corpore positi, mutantur in angelos, in quibus non est uir et mulier.[94]
Actually, where there is chastity between man and woman, there begins to be neither man nor woman, but, still situated in the body, they are changed into angels, among whom there is neither man nor woman.
Jerome is evidently aware that his ideas about sexual differentiation are a cause for concern, and it becomes important for him to show that his ideas about this question are orthodox: They do not, as is the case with Origen, imply a denial of a real resurrection in the future, that is, one guaranteeing the identity between the person living on earth and the person being resurrected. Being like angels means living like the angels, imitating the heavenly life. This can be done on earth as it is in heaven, and does not imply bodily transformation. Saying that we can already be like the angels means that we are like angels in our earthly body, which, in turn, means that in the resurrection, we will be like the angels in our earthly body.
Perhaps the clearest statement of Jerome’s view on the resurrection body as well as his view on sexual difference after his engaging in anti-Origenist polemics is seen in Letter 75, to the widow Theodora. Here, Jerome expresses the idea that for a couple living in continence, there is no difference of sex—this is the reason why Theodora’s husband treated her as a sister, or even as a brother. Since even when still living in the flesh, the distinction between male and female may cease, how much more will this be true in the future resurrection, when this corruptible has put on incorruption.
Quando dicitur: “non nubent neque nubentur, sed erunt sicut angelis in caelis,” non natura et substantia corporum tollitur, sed gloriae magnitudo monstratur. Neque enim scriptum est: “erunt angeli,” sed: “sicut angeli,” ubi similitudo promittitur, ueritas denegatur. … Ergo homines esse non desinunt, incliti quidem et angelico splendore decorati, sed tamen homines, ut et apostulus apostulus sit et Maria Maria et confundatur heresis, quae ideo incerta et magna promittit, ut, quae certa et moderata sunt, auferat.
When it is said: “They will neither marry nor be given in marriage but will be like the angels in heaven,” the nature and substance of bodies is not taken away, but the greatness of the glory is shown. Because it is not written: “they will be angels” but “like the angels.” When likeness is promised, identity is denied. … Therefore they will not cease to be human. They will certainly be glorious and adorned with angelic splendour, but they will still be human, so that the Apostle will be the Apostle, and Mary will be Mary. Then that heresy will be brought to confusion, which promises what is great but uncertain, to take away what is certain and modest.[95]
Again, the idea about transcendence of sexual difference in the present life becomes important in Jerome’s heresiological presentation of Origen’s heresy as well as his own orthodoxy. The ascetic person living on earth already lives the angelic life, in his/her earthly body; thus, in the future resurrection, sexual difference will certainly be absent in the sense of using the functions of sex; however, the resurrected will not be turned into angels, but be angelic humans.
In what follows, my intention is to demonstrate that the ideas about present-life transcendence, used in anti-Origenist polemics, is yet another example of Jerome using Origenist ideas against Origen, and contemporary Origenists.
3.3 Origen about the angelic life on earth
In his Commentary on Romans, Origen speaks of the twofold resurrection, the first meaning that we rise with Christ from what is earthly and seek the future, the second being the general resurrection.[96] The first one concerns an inner state, what we set our mind on. This would seem to be fulfilled in some already. The second resurrection is said to be one of the flesh. A distinction thus emerges between the first resurrection as individual, voluntary and involving the inner person—the soul, and the second as general, necessary and involving the outer person—the body. The soul was conceived by Origen as the individual, invested with free will, and it could choose to turn either to the spirit or to the flesh.
Origen expressed, in several texts, the idea that it was possible for a person to live on earth, in the flesh, without living in accordance with the flesh. In a fragment from the Commentary on Ephesians, preserved in Greek, Origen comments on Ephesians 2:6,[97] and explains that if we understand that the kingdom of Christ is spiritual, something that is within us, we will hold that someone who is already holy (άγιον) is not in the flesh, nor on the earth, even if simple people may say that he/she is.[98] Such a person already has his/her citizenship in heaven and is sitting with Christ in the heavenly places. No one of those in the heavenly places is in the flesh, but already in the spirit.[99]
This is a splendid example of Origen’s view of the soul’s possibility to transcend its bodily condition, by choosing to follow the spirit—which also means to be in the spirit, or in Christ—rather than the flesh. Interestingly, this following, this inhabiting (which, as we shall see, Origen could express in terms of clothing) also meant a transformation. Following the spirit, imitating Christ, meant a change of the soul into spirit, which also meant a change into the likeness of Christ. In his book On prayer, Origen speaks about the spiritual soul (ψυχὴ πνευματικὴ) as one which is lifted up and follows the spirit—and not only follows it, but even becomes it (ἐν αὐτῷ γινομένη).[100]
In the same work, Origen expresses the same idea by speaking of earth being transformed into heaven. The one who sins is earth, and becomes what he/she is associated with.[101] The one who does the will of God is heaven. If God’s will is done on earth as in heaven, the earth will no longer be earth. The useless flesh and the blood, which cannot inherit the kingdom of God, can still inherit it if it is changed (μεταβάλωσιν) from flesh and dust and blood to the heavenly being/essence (οὐράνιον οὐσίαν).[102]
We have already seen that the transformation of the body is dependent on the condition of the soul; that the body puts on the qualities of the soul. Here, we see how the same is true of the relation of the soul to the spirit, or to Christ. Turning to the spirit, or imitating Christ, the soul is transformed from fleshly to spiritual, a transformation not meaning that it becomes spirit rather than soul—and certainly not equal to Christ—but that it puts on spiritual qualities. The passage from Jerome’s Commentary on Ephesians discussed above, about beginning to live like angels already on earth, is another example of Origen’s idea of how the saints on earth, transcending their bodily existence, anticipate what will become a reality in the general, bodily resurrection. Jerome, who apparently, even after his involvement in anti-Origenist polemics, agreed with this idea, expressed it in several other texts as well. It is clear that in his Commentary on Ephesians, he was dependent on Origen’s interpretation of Ephesians 2:6, mentioned above: Like Origen, he claims that if we understand the Kingdom of Christ in a spiritual way, we will say that the saints already sit and rule with Christ. The one who has his/her conversation in heaven ceases to be flesh, being changed totally into spirit.[103]
In another commentary in which he was heavily dependent on Origen, that on Galatians, Jerome likewise spoke about transformation in this life, in terms of having risen with Christ in baptism. We have become new beings and “we should believe that we even now are what we will be.”[104] The idea of living in the flesh, but not in accordance with it, was also brought up in letters in which he dealt with the ascetic life.[105]
We have seen that an important element in Jerome’s anti-Origenist polemics was to claim that sexual difference will remain in the resurrection. For all his emphasis on the remaining of sexual organs, however, he continued to express the idea—expressed long before his involvement in anti-Origenist polemics, and certainly under the influence of Origen’s thought—that it is possible for the perfect Christian living on earth, the ascetic person, to transcend his/her bodily condition, including sex. Paradoxically, this Origenist idea is used against Origen in Jerome’s treatment of the question of bodily resurrection. In his simultaneous construction of Origenist heresy and his own orthodoxy in this question, the distinction between the present and the future, the individual and the general, the inner person and the outer person, is central. It is possible, in this life, in our earthly bodies, to transcend sexual difference. This is a transformation that concerns the inner being, the soul, and it is individual and voluntary. The future resurrection, on the other hand, concerns the outer person, and is general and necessary. Jerome thus both maintains the Origenist idea of transcending sexual difference through asceticism and distances himself from an Origenist view on the resurrection as one of spiritual beings without sexual difference. This is important in how he presents Origen as heretical and himself as orthodox: While Origen is presented as claiming a transformation of human beings into angels, Jerome presents himself as claiming only an inner transformation, which takes place with the same body intact. The transformation of the soul, and its possibility to achieve fleshlessness/sexlessness, is presented as an orthodox counterpart to the idea of a transformation of the body into fleshlessness/sexlessness. Thus, the ascetic person living on earth assumes the central place in Jerome’s anti-Origenist polemics concerning the question of the resurrection.
3.4 Hierarchy in the resurrection
A final point to consider is that of hierarchy in the resurrection. Important in Jerome’s anti-Origenist heresiology was to present his own idea of heaven as hierarchical as an orthodox alternative to Origen’s idea about a state of equality—that is, the idea of ἀποκατάστασις. As our focus is on the resurrection, I will not elaborate on either Origen’s ideas about salvation in general or Jerome’s critique thereof, but concentrate on the idea of hierarchy among the resurrected.
It becomes clear from Jerome’s argumentation from the book of Job in Against John, that he sees the resurrection of the flesh as important for preserving identity, and that the importance of identity in turn is explained by an argument from justice. If it is not the same person that rises, the same person will not be rewarded.[106] Although Jerome’s critique of Origen’s ideas of salvation is first and foremost elaborated in polemics against the idea of ἀποκατάστασις,[107] also the spiritual body, in Jerome’s heresiological construction of the concept, implies an ending of difference—not only of sex, but of identity in general.
However, Origen himself imagined the resurrection as being hierarchical, and he too argued from justice when he claimed that the same body will be resurrected.[108] In several texts, Origen used 1 Corinthians 15:23 (each one will rise “in turn”) and 15:39–42[109] (about the different splendour of the heavenly bodies) in arguing that the future resurrection will be diversified. There will not only be a difference between the righteous and the unrighteous, between the sheep and the goats, but also among the sheep themselves.[110] John 14:2, about the many mansions in the Father’s house, was also used by Origen to make the same point: There will be a hierarchy among the righteous.[111] We may note that precisely these biblical passages were frequently used by Jerome as well. For instance, in his Commentary on Ephesians, Jerome writes that the kingdom of heaven can be understood as one house of God with various dwellings, “for there is one glory of the sun, another of the moon and another of the stars.”[112] As we know, Origen was his main source in composing this commentary. Jerome also applied this exegetical strategy in his polemics against Jovinian.[113]
In De Principiis, Origen had written that when the flesh is raised from the earth, it will, according to the merits of the soul, advance to the glory of a spiritual body (prout meritum inhabitantis animae poposcerit, in gloriam “corporis” proficiat “spiritalis”).[114]
We have already seen that the condition of the body is understood by Origen to be dependent on the condition of the soul. The hierarchy in the resurrection is precisely a hierarchy of souls, based on their difference in merit. It is to this difference that the different splendour of the bodies corresponds. The idea that psychic change precedes bodily change appears to be basic to Origen’s view of resurrection as diversified.
The idea of the soul clothing the body and the idea of hierarchy in the resurrection are thus closely connected. If the change taking place in the body depends on the condition of the soul, in the sense that the body is clothed with the qualities of the soul, the change will not be the same in everyone.
4 Conclusion
A common strategy in heresiology is the maximizing of difference to the heretic or the heresy constructed. In Jerome’s case, there was certainly good reason to use this strategy, because of his affinity with Origen’s theology. Origen was a proximate other, who demanded a good deal of difference making.
When it comes to the question about the resurrection, this maximizing of difference is seen not only in statements about the resurrection of blood, bones, and sinews, or in the emphasis on flesh over body, but also in Jerome’s identification with a group within the church—the antropomorphists—whom Origen had opposed, and against whom he had expressed his view on the resurrection. This, in turn, is part of a larger rhetorical strategy, an identification on Jerome’s part with the simple and unlearned Christians; those who are despised by an intellectual elite, who consider themselves to be perfect.
Jerome had in fact little in common with the antropomorphists whom Origen had argued against. Jerome was not a chiliast, nor did he imagine a life including marriage and childbirth in the resurrection, nor, indeed, did he think that our body would be exactly the same—from what we have seen above, he seems to have imagined a profound transformation. His emphasis on flesh over body, and his reluctance of using the concept of spiritual body, has to be understood as reflecting his polemical concerns. At closer look, we may conclude that his idea of sameness and difference in the resurrection, his ideas about transformation, his view on what constituted the angelic life, and his idea of diversity in the resurrection, had very much in common with Origen’s thought, which was certainly his main source.
The change that takes place, in Jerome’s view, is a transformation of the body into the likeness of the soul. The nature, or reality, remains the same, but the qualities change. The bodily condition is dependent on the condition of the soul; thus, the hierarchy of the resurrection is a hierarchy of souls, corresponding to the hierarchy of Christians on earth: The more perfect will be more splendid; their victory and superiority will be complete, perfect, irreversible and visible to all. Such ideas we have seen to be expressed by Origen as well, and still, they are used in Jerome’s anti-Origenist polemics, as Jerome presents his own view on sameness and difference, as well as on diversity among the resurrected, as an orthodox opposite to a heresiologically constructed Origenist idea of a dissolvement of the human person, a ceasing to be human and a change into something else, and thus, an absence of diversity. The idea of transformation as clothing, as a putting on, as the possessing of other qualities—that is, the transformation into the likeness of something—so important in Origen’s theology of the resurrection, was used by Jerome against Origen and his contemporary followers. Ideas about hierarchy in the afterlife, expressed by Origen, are likewise used against Origen.
When it came to the question of sexual difference, Jerome continued to hold the Origenist view that sexual difference could cease in the inner person, while he firmly held that it would continue in the outer person. In this way, he marked difference from Origen: Origen was presented as claiming bodily transformation, a transformation of humans into angels, without flesh and sexual organs, while Jerome presented himself as claiming a transformation of the inner person with the outer person—that is, with bodily flesh and sexual organs—intact. This idea of a transformation of the inner person in this life through asceticism, an idea that Jerome had learnt from Origen and had used to a great extent in his ascetical theology, was now used to distance his own, supposedly orthodox view on the resurrection from Origen’s view. The ascetic person, the angelic human living on earth, was elevated to heaven, and became the orthodox counterpart of humans transformed into angels.
The rhetorical maximizing of difference by which Jerome sought to distance himself from Origen and, thereby, from accusations of heresy, has had its intended effect. It has contributed to shaping our common ideas of both Origen and Jerome. It is common to find, in modern historical reconstructions, the opinion that materiality and hierarchy are characteristic of Jerome’s thought, in contrast to Origen’s emphasis on spirituality and equality. I hope that this article can provide one step in the deconstruction of this simplifying categorization, which does not do justice to the thought of either Origen or Jerome. If we begin to search beneath the heresiological constructions, we may be on our way to a reassessment of Jerome’s place in the history of the reception of Origen: Rather than being seen as an anti-Origenist who turned away from Origen and refuted his ideas, he might be seen as theologian who, even after his involvement in anti-Origenist polemics, continued to integrate ideas from Origen in his thought. Because of his lasting influence in Western Christianity, there may be reason to appreciate Jerome as one of the authors who made sure that Origen would have a remaining place in this tradition.
© 2019 Pålsson, published by De Gruyter
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Titelseiten
- Introduction
- Artikel
- The Theological Use of Eating and Drinking Metaphors in Origen’s DePrincipiis
- Bodily Souls? Paradoxical Bodies in Origen’s Theology of Progress
- The nature, function, and destiny of the human body—Origen’s interpretation of 1 Cor 15
- Angelic humans, glorious flesh: Jerome’s reception of Origen’s teachings on the resurrection body
- Quodammodo transfiguratum est in animum: Erasmus’ doctrine of the resurrection of the body and its Origenian roots
- “It is right to keep the secret of a king” (Tobit 12:7)—the King’s secret as a metaphor for the mysterium Dei in Origen
- Being as Motion The First Principles of Origen’s Ontology of Freedom
- Natural Law in Origen’s Anthropology
- Rezension
- Wolfram Kinzig, Hg. und Übers., unter Mitarbeit von Christopher M. Hays: Faith in Formulae: A Collection of Early Christian Creeds and Creed-Related Texts, 4 Bde., Oxford Early Christian Texts, Bd. 1: XXIV + 552 S.; Bd. 2: 420 S.; Bd. 3: 464 S.; Bd. 4: 509 S., Oxford (Oxford University Press) 2017, ISBN: 978-0-19-826941-0, £ 450,–.
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Titelseiten
- Introduction
- Artikel
- The Theological Use of Eating and Drinking Metaphors in Origen’s DePrincipiis
- Bodily Souls? Paradoxical Bodies in Origen’s Theology of Progress
- The nature, function, and destiny of the human body—Origen’s interpretation of 1 Cor 15
- Angelic humans, glorious flesh: Jerome’s reception of Origen’s teachings on the resurrection body
- Quodammodo transfiguratum est in animum: Erasmus’ doctrine of the resurrection of the body and its Origenian roots
- “It is right to keep the secret of a king” (Tobit 12:7)—the King’s secret as a metaphor for the mysterium Dei in Origen
- Being as Motion The First Principles of Origen’s Ontology of Freedom
- Natural Law in Origen’s Anthropology
- Rezension
- Wolfram Kinzig, Hg. und Übers., unter Mitarbeit von Christopher M. Hays: Faith in Formulae: A Collection of Early Christian Creeds and Creed-Related Texts, 4 Bde., Oxford Early Christian Texts, Bd. 1: XXIV + 552 S.; Bd. 2: 420 S.; Bd. 3: 464 S.; Bd. 4: 509 S., Oxford (Oxford University Press) 2017, ISBN: 978-0-19-826941-0, £ 450,–.