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Shadow regionalism in immigration enforcement during COVID-19

  • Fatma Marouf
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 21. Oktober 2023
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Theoretical Inquiries in Law
Aus der Zeitschrift Theoretical Inquiries in Law Band 24 Heft 2

Abstract

Stark variations exist in U.S. immigration enforcement. These variations have persisted even during the COVID-19 pandemic, when special measures that should have constrained variations were in place. This Article argues that variations in discretionary enforcement decisions based on resistance to national policies, bias, illegal tactics, or arbitrariness are unjust and should be curtailed. The Article first distinguishes between transparent sources of variation in immigration law and variations that stem from non-transparent, discretionary determinations. Within the category of discretionary determinations, the Article argues that there are just and unjust variations. It contends that unjust variations raise serious constitutional concerns, weaken preemption doctrine, and require us to reconceptualize the immigration federalism debate to account for cooperative and uncooperative behavior within the federal government itself. Finally, the Article offers solutions to help limit unjust variations.

Appendix

Table 1

ERO Field Officers with Area of Responsibility, Number od Detention Facilities, Average Daily Detained Population (FY19), and Number of “Guaranteed Minimum” Detention Beds

ICE Field Office Area of Responsibility Number of Detention Facilities ADP (FY19) “Guaranteed Minimums” (FY19)
Atlanta Georgia, Carolina North Carolina, South 6 2972 2482
Baltimore Maryland 2 313 40
Buffalo Counties in upstate New York 3 661 400
Chicago Illinois, Missouri, Indiana, Kentucky, Wisconsin, Kansas 8 1444 0
Dallas North Texas, Oklahoma 10 1669 0
Denver Colorado, Wyoming 3 1169 957
Detroit Michigan, Ohio 6 905 375
El Paso West Texas, New Mexico 6 3307 1464
Houston East Texas 7 3822 1500
Los Angeles Counties of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, Ventura, Santa San Bernardino, Barbara and San Luis Obispo 3 2181 1455
Miami Florida, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands 7 2436 1200
New Orleans Louisiana, Tennessee, Alabama, Arkansas Mississippi, 15 6171 6415
New York City Counties of New York, Kings, Bronx, Richmond, Queens, Dutchess, Nassau, Putnam, Suffolk, Sullivan, Orange, Rockland, Ulster, and Westchester 1 1074 0
Newark New Jersey 3 1032 285
Philadelphia Pennsylvania, Delaware West Virginia, 3 1051 96
Phoenix Arizona 9 4163 2048
Salt Lake City Utah, Nevada, Montana, Idaho 5 529 0
San Antonio (combined with Harlingen) Central Texas 14 7769 7235
San Diego San Diego County, Imperial County 5 1905 1640
San Francisco Northern California, Hawaii, Guam, Saipan 6 598 320
Seattle Washington, Oregon, Alaska 1 1369 1181
St. Paul Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota 9 745 300
Washington DC Washington DC and Virginia 2 1012 724
Table 2

Reduction in Immigration Arrests by ICE Field Office During the Six Months After ICE Announced Its COVID-19 enforcement Policy (Apr. 2020 – Sept. 2020), Compared to the Prior Six Monthe (Oct. 2019 – Mar. 2020)

ICE ERO Field Office Total Arrests (Oct. '19– Mar. '20) Total Arrests (Apr. '20– Sep. '20) % Decrease in Arrests (All Categories Combined % Decrease in Arrests (No Criminal History)
Atlanta 6463 3683 43 93.7
Baltimore 680 222 67.4 89.2
Boston 1070 534 50.1 85.8
Buttalo 582 348 40.2 74.1
Chicago 3877 2334 39.8 78.4
Dallas 8444 6186 26.7 67.9
Denver 1028 405 60.6 85.8
Detroit 1577 931 41 85.5
El Paso 1019 655 35.7 77.1
Houston 6860 3322 51.6 44.6
Los Angeles 2817 1566 44.4 89.6
Miami 4786 2611 45.4 80.6
New Orleans 4311 2031 52.9 67.8
New York City 1190 327 72.5 88.4
Newark 1473 626 57.5 90.5
Philadelphia 1928 898 53.4 90.7
Phoenix 2535 1727 31.9 66.3
Salt Lake City 2068 1455 29.6 60.5
San Antonio 4731 2928 38.1 49.7
San Diego 911 398 56.3 73.1
San Francisco 2112 1345 36.3 80.7
Seattle 1038 487 53.1 86.7
St. Paul 2109 1029 51.2 82.2
Washington 2220 665 70 85.7
Average 2743 1530 47.9 78.1
Avg. from Deviation Mean 1695.5 1051.7 10.2 10.2
Table 3

Reduction in Average Daily Detained Population in FY19–FY21 by ICE ERP Field Office and Detainee Threat Level Classification

All Detainees (All Threat Level Classifications) No Criminal History (“No Threat”) Minor Criminal History (“Low Threat”)
ICE ERO % Change in ADP (FY19–FY20) % Change in ADP (FY20–FY21) % Change in ADP (FY19–FY21) % Change in ADP (FY19–FY21) % Change in ADP (FY19–FY21)
Atlanta 7.3 –63.4 -60.7 -55.0 -85.0
Baltimore –31.6 –85.5 –90.1 –96.2 –98.0
Boston –18.3 –71.0 –76.3 –82.1 –84.3
Buttalo –33.4 –40.5 –60.4 –77.2 –88.5
Chicago –20.3 –64.2 –71.5 –73.6 –77.7
Dallas 8.3 –42.0 –37.2 –31.2 –75.4
Denver –29.3 –45.4 –61.4 –64.0 –87.2
Detroit –9.6 –80.2 –82.1 –93.4 –87.3
El Paso –37.4 –57.7 –73.5 –64.8 –95.3
Houston –33.7 –57.0 –71.5 –65.3 –90.5
Los Angeles –26.7 –82.7 –87.3 –97.0 –93.2
Miami –18.1 –52.6 –61.2 –62.5 –77.3
New Orleans 39.6 –57.4 –40.5 –32.7 –80.9
Newark –20.8 –71.6 –77.5 –82.5 –85.7
NYC –30.2 –85.4 –89.8 –83.6 –93.9
Philadelphia –18.9 –87.0 –89.4 –97.9 –94.8
Phoenix –17.0 –36.0 –46.8 –35.5 –89.7
Salt Lake City –3.0 –47.6 –49.1 –35.7 –78.8
San Antonio –19.6 –53.8 –62.9 –57.9 –91.0
San Diego –8.0 –49.9 –53.9 –54.9 –68.5
San Francisco –4,3 –68.0 –69.4 –96.3 –85.7
Seattle –30.0 –62.1 –73.5 –80.9 –88.3
St. Paul –13.4 –65.6 –70.2 –84.5 –80.3
Washington –13.5 –73.7 –77.3 –88.3 –90.1
Average –15.9 –62.5 –68.1 –70.6 –86.1
Average deviation from meati 12.2 12.4 12.2 18.0 5.7
Published Online: 2023-10-21
Published in Print: 2023-07-26

© 2023 by Theoretical Inquiries in Law

Artikel in diesem Heft

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Regionalisms: Shifting Scales Between Cities and States
  3. Introduction
  4. Seeing like a region
  5. The political stakes of regions
  6. Cities in a world of regions – Remarks from an international law perspective
  7. Megalopolis bound?
  8. Can micropolitan areas bridge the urban-rural divide?
  9. The democratic problems with Washington as the capital
  10. The science of urban regions: Public-science-community partnerships as a new mode of regional governance?
  11. Communities of competitors: Toward leveraging the region’s contradictions
  12. Regionalism as a mode of inclusive citizenship in divided societies
  13. A typology of the localism-regionalism nexus
  14. Shadow regionalism in immigration enforcement during COVID-19
  15. National priority regions (1971–2022): Redistribution, development and settlement
  16. The challenge of regionalist institutions without regionalist politics
https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2023-0023

Artikel in diesem Heft

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Regionalisms: Shifting Scales Between Cities and States
  3. Introduction
  4. Seeing like a region
  5. The political stakes of regions
  6. Cities in a world of regions – Remarks from an international law perspective
  7. Megalopolis bound?
  8. Can micropolitan areas bridge the urban-rural divide?
  9. The democratic problems with Washington as the capital
  10. The science of urban regions: Public-science-community partnerships as a new mode of regional governance?
  11. Communities of competitors: Toward leveraging the region’s contradictions
  12. Regionalism as a mode of inclusive citizenship in divided societies
  13. A typology of the localism-regionalism nexus
  14. Shadow regionalism in immigration enforcement during COVID-19
  15. National priority regions (1971–2022): Redistribution, development and settlement
  16. The challenge of regionalist institutions without regionalist politics
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