Volume 24, Issue 2

Observers of metropolitan dysfunction have long advocated for a regional tier of government that could (among other things) equalize spending across local jurisdictions, pursue cooperative economic development policies, provide for fair share housing, rationalize land use, and coordinate transportation planning. For many good government reformers, right-scaling our fragmented metropolitan areas appears to be an obvious solution to interjurisdictional spillovers and competitive races-to-the-bottom. This article counsels caution. “Region hope”—the idea that the substantive problems of metropolitan governance can be solved regionally by redrawing territorial boundaries to encompass ever-larger areas—is perennial. But territorial manipulation in aid of state centralization has significant drawbacks. The regional impulse exhibits some key features of failed social engineering efforts; seen through the lens of the state, these efforts privilege technocratic over democratic governance, bureaucratic over local knowledge, and mobile over immobile capital. That does not mean that regionalism should be resisted in all cases, but only that the costs of territorial manipulation should be weighed against its asserted benefits.

Regionalism is experiencing a global resurgence as countries grapple with issues such as coordination problems, economic inequality, racial tensions, and environmental degradation. Nations are exploring various regional entities as potential solutions to these challenges. However, despite the growing prominence of regions, they remain undertheorized. While extensive research has been conducted on national and local governments, regions have often been treated as either state-like or locality-like, or as ad-hoc remedies for the limitations of both. This article seeks to complicate this perspective and present the initial stages of a theory of regions. By examining the case study of the Cities’ Union in Israel and tracing its historical origins and legal evolution into multipurpose regional clusters, the article uncovers valuable theoretical insights about regions. First, it argues that just as “the local” and “the national” mutually shape one another, “the local” and “the regional” too are interdependent concepts, each definition relying on the other. The existence of a third concept—the regional—is crucial, making this a conceptual triad rather than a dyad. Second, the article highlights that legal institutions such as interlocal cooperations and special-purpose governments (SPGs) are not inherently local or regional but can be perceived as either depending on historical and political contingencies. The conceptualization and concrete manifestations of local and regional forms are subject to political concerns and ideological commitments, extending beyond mere technical or functional considerations. Lastly, the article reflects on the unique characteristics of regional forms that make them legally, socially, geographically, and economically nimbler and more adaptable than their national and local counterparts.

The role of subnational regions is ill-conceived in international law scholarship, which has come to slowly accept the important role that cities can play as international actors. Opening up the academic debate for a perspective on regions promises to develop new insights on the divide of governance functions between international organizations and states, regions and cities. At the same time, the regional focus helps to unearth some of the shortcomings of overly enthusiastic approaches to what cities can do as global actors. International law scholarship has found it difficult, however, to engage with the concept of the region. This is owed, as this Article demonstrates, to difficult definitional issues as well as the informalizing bend of a focus on regional governance, which is hard to square with traditions of formalist thinking in international law. Ultimately, the Article argues that regions can function as a useful prism through which to analyze current governance challenges.

Since ancient Greece’s “megalopolis,” the concept of vast cities has loomed in the urban discourse. A century ago, English planner Patrick Geddes warned about a growing imbalance between traditional society and ever-larger conurbations, an anxiety that Lewis Mumford later invoked to predict that urban hubris would inevitably collapse of its own weight. In 1961, by contrast, the geographer Jean Gottman surveyed the interconnected agglomeration stretching from Washington, D.C. up the east coast of the United States to the cities of southern New England, and more optimistically highlighted this new urban form’s governance potential. Today, the question is not whether urbanism will arrive at the scale that so concerned Geddes and Mumford yet engaged Gottman—it already has. Commentators and scholars increasingly recognize that vast polycentric urban regions are displacing cities and metropolitan areas as the locus of modern growth and development. Eleven distinct urban-centered megaregions, for example, concentrate the bulk of the population and economic activity in the United States, and similar clusters are coalescing globally, from Greater Tokyo, Beijing, and the Pearl River Delta, to the arc from São Paulo to Rio de Janeiro, to the European urban spine running from London to Milan. Grappling with the phenomenon’s legal-institutional dimensions—whether and how to formalize governance to match this scale—requires more than transposing the descriptive and normative discourse on metropolitanism. Crosscurrents around fragmentation, efficiency, inequality, and democratic legitimacy refract, but there are distinct arguments for fostering governance—and equally particular concerns to anticipate—with the rise of the megalopolis.

In this Article, we explore a subset of the urban-rural divide and propose a mechanism for reducing its economic and political effects within that limited realm. Specifically, we focus on the subset of rural areas that lie within what the Office of Management and Budget defines as micropolitan areas. Micropolitan areas are characterized by an urban area with a population between 10,000 and 50,000, and adjacent rural counties. Data suggest that rural areas within micropolitan regions do better economically than rural areas unconnected to urban areas, though not as well as the principal city within the micropolitan area. If the objective is to reduce the economic, and perhaps also the political, divide between urban and rural areas, then micropolitan areas may represent low-hanging fruit for redress. This Article argues that micropolitan areas are an important window into understanding the relationship between urban and rural economies, explores the characteristics of those areas that are likely to generate economic success, and recommends policies that would capture those benefits. Additionally, we speculate that increased opportunities for economic interaction between the urban and rural parts of micropolitan areas could also address the political aspects of the urban-rural divide. Recognizing the complexity of the relationship between urban and rural economies, we identify various obstacles to realizing the kinds of interlocal cooperation that we believe are necessary to reduce the economic and political divide within micropolitan areas. We conclude with suggestions for a research agenda to remedy the underdeveloped study of micropolitan areas.

Democracy demands a capital city that represents a country and is not removed from it. If the government is to be of the people and for the people, then the capital must be able to relate to the people—and the people to the capital. In the United States, democracy struggles not just because of what happens outside of and comes to Washington, but because of what happens inside Washington. The federal government, in other words, faces democratic problems because of the type of place that Washington is. There are many factors to consider in deciding where a country should be governed from, but the ability of the capital to understand the country it governs is certainly one of the most important of these factors. The goal of this symposium article is to consider the contemporary democratic crisis in these geographical terms. Washington was initially a rural area meant to govern a rural country. It has gradually turned into a dynamic metropolitan area meant to govern a country featuring many—and many different—dynamic metropolitan areas. During its entire history, though, Washington has remained dominated by a single company: the federal government. A company town will struggle to attract and to cultivate the large range of people featured in the United States. Given that a company town struggles to satisfy the democratic demands of a capital, the question then becomes whether other types of places would better satisfy these democratic demands.

This article offers a discussion on the opportunity of collaborative, multi-actor (public, private, science, social, and civic actors) partnerships as experimental policymaking and governance solutions for climate mitigation and adaptation plans geographically localized at the urban, metropolitan, and regional level. It sets out considerations as regards the need to design newly conceived permanent or temporary institutional geographies by building on the analysis of examples of policies implementing this kind of partnerships in Italy (e.g., river contracts; river foundations; neighborhood agreements; pacts of collaboration; city science offices; urban sustainable development and innovation partnerships, etc.). Finally, the article draws attention to the challenges entailed by these partnerships including ethics, accountability, and climate justice concerns.

Fragmented regions face a range of collective action problems on issues ranging from transportation to affordable housing. Specifically, within regions, free-rider and race-to-the-bottom problems both abound. This Article offers theoretical lenses to clarify the sources of, and barriers to solving, these problems. First, it introduces the concept of concentricity to better understand the region. The municipality and the region represent coexisting, concentric communities and nodes of competition. The geographically based identity that one espouses may toggle between the local and the regional across different contexts. Second, this Article describes a community-competitor feedback loop. Drawing on social science literature, the Article shows how encouraging deep identification with a community can inspire competition with other communities. And encouraging competition between communities can deepen community identity. The Article then applies these theories to practical considerations. Given the persistent nature of hyperlocal identity, intraregional competition, and the resultant feedback loop, mandatory regional solutions may often be politically unattainable, even when they are the optimal solution. Accordingly, this Article presents two voluntary, cooperative regionalist solutions that embrace and potentially exploit regions’ concentric identities, instead of doing the more costly work of dislodging local identity.

This Article presents a new mode of governance called “inclusive regionalism,” which aims at curing the fragmented citizenship of marginalized groups within multicultural-divided societies. It seeks to expand the theoretical work on the appropriate mode of local governance in multicultural-divided societies from a narrow resident-based to a broad citizen-based point of view. I argue that regionalism can play a dual role in curing social ills through the establishment of regional facilities that engage in civic activities and promote solidarity between citizens. As opposed to localism, a regionalist mode of governance that coordinate the facilities and practices of several localities within a region is more capable of confronting issues of discrimination, segregation, and inequality within and between localities. Moreover, such a mode of governance can connect the residents of separate localities within the region by providing regional facilities and institutions that serve as bridges between communities. Accordingly, applying a regional mode of governance might result in a much less fragmented society, which benefits from greater opportunities for cooperation between residents of the region in various fields. Promoting such a mode of governance requires a shift in the perception of regionalism as a means of control toward a mode of “community building” that advances social and environmental justice and inclusive citizenship.

Cities are traditionally characterized as a sub-unit of the state that functions as a socioeconomic node. However, global trends in recent decades indicate that cities are gradually acquiring a semi-independent political role, challenging and contesting the nation state`s authority. Into the twenty-first century, cities` actions in global politics (e.g., supranational city-based networks) and within the state (e.g., sanctuary cities) indicate that they aspire to attain or even directly claim more political autonomy. However, achieving these localist goals sometimes warrants regional cooperation with neighboring municipal jurisdictions, thereby engendering ad-hoc and bottom-up regionalisms. Addressing this phenomenon theoretically, this Article analyzes three empirically and conceptually distinct types of the localist-regionalist nexus, demonstrating different rationales: (1) regional cooperation supporting localist innovation independent of state intervention; (2) regional cooperation supporting localist contestation of state policies; and (3) regional solidarity in the face of national tensions. Based on recent examples from Israel, it analyzes these three types along with their political and normative implications. Despite various discrepancies and possible tensions between localism and regionalism, the main conclusion emerging from this Article is that these two principles are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, although there are legal, institutional, political, and ideological tensions between them, the analysis suggests a third way between localism or regionalism. Likewise, some types of regionalization may act as a mechanism or tactic to support and deepen localist agendas.

Stark variations exist in U.S. immigration enforcement. These variations have persisted even during the COVID-19 pandemic, when special measures that should have constrained variations were in place. This Article argues that variations in discretionary enforcement decisions based on resistance to national policies, bias, illegal tactics, or arbitrariness are unjust and should be curtailed. The Article first distinguishes between transparent sources of variation in immigration law and variations that stem from non-transparent, discretionary determinations. Within the category of discretionary determinations, the Article argues that there are just and unjust variations. It contends that unjust variations raise serious constitutional concerns, weaken preemption doctrine, and require us to reconceptualize the immigration federalism debate to account for cooperative and uncooperative behavior within the federal government itself. Finally, the Article offers solutions to help limit unjust variations.

National Priority Regions (NPRs) are one of Israel’s most robust tools for redistribution: a resource allocation governmental plan that favors some regions over others, mostly according to their socioeconomic status and peripherality. Drawing on archival research, this article is the first to focus on this topic and provide a detailed description and analysis of this measure. It provides historical and theoretical accounts of NPRs, tracing their history, starting in the 1970s, over three periods and showing how they have been used and abused. This allows for some important observations about the stakes of using a "color-blind" place-based distributive mechanism, and about the complex relationship between redistribution, development, and settlement. At the national level, this article shows how NPRs changed over the years from a discriminatory tool that excluded almost all Palestinian-Arab localities into a more inclusionary mechanism, but one that also works to support and incentivize Jewish settlement in the Occupied West Bank. At the theoretical level, this article lends itself to and supports a ‘region-skeptic’ approach that sees the regional scale, much like other seemingly “race-neutral” criteria, mostly as an elusive exercise of power that often deepens inequality. However, drawing on Israel’s experience with NPRs, this article provides some more specific cautionary tales that can, I suggest, work to improve the regional scale rather than eliminate it altogether.

Scholarship on regionalist institutions lacks a theory of regionalist politics because we lack regional political parties, without which regional politics is difficult. Particularly in the United States, regional governments are the product of either intergovernmental agreements between governments controlled by ostensibly national parties or state statutes and federal grants administered by ostensibly nonpartisan bureaucrats. The absence of truly regionalist politics and parties creates problems for governmental problem-solving at both the national and regional levels. First, politics abhors a vacuum: In the absence of truly regionalist parties, politics generates semi-regionalized parties that risk hindering national policymaking with the parochial outlook of the semi-regionalized politicians. Second, regional politics are important tools for organizing both legislators and voters to pursue regionally controversial ends requiring political compromise. National parties organized around national issues cannot perform this function at the regional level. Without regional parties organized around issues like overcoming NIMBY (“not-in-my-backyard”) resistance to housing, for instance, it is difficult to rally politicians to take politically costly positions on those issues. This Article aims to solve the problem of missing regionalist parties and politics in two steps—first, with a taxonomy of regional governments and regionalist and semi-regionalist parties along with their respective benefits and burdens, and second, with very modest suggestions for promoting regionalist and discouraging semi-regionalist, parties. None of these solutions is perfect. Genuinely regionalist democracy presents an unsolvable problem, resulting from the inevitable cognitive limits of voters and the organizational incentives of politicians at every level of government.