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The Stoic Theory of Sign and the Semantic Modulation of Models

  • Miguel López-Astorga EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 14. Juni 2022
SATS
Aus der Zeitschrift SATS Band 23 Heft 2

Abstract

The theory of mental models is a current cognitive approach trying to describe the way people make inferences. According to this theory, people reason from possibilities or models linked to sentences. Sometimes, such possibilities or models are transformed by the action of a semantic modulation. The point this paper is intended to make is that Stoic logic also has the machinery to explain semantic processes such as that of modulation. This is shown by means of the criterion Chrysippus of Soli provided for conditional sentences and the theory of sign related to that criterion.


Corresponding author: Miguel López-Astorga, Institute of Humanistic Studies “Juan Ignacio Molina”, Universidad de Talca, Av. Lircay s/n, 3460000 Talca, VII Región del Maule, Chile, E-mail:

Funding source: Fondo Fondecyt de Continuidad para Investigadores Senior, Universidad de Talca

Award Identifier / Grant number: Código FCSEN2102

Funding source: PIA Ciencias Cognitivas, Centro de Investigación en Ciencias Cognitivas, Instituto de Estudios Humanísticos, Universidad de Talca

  1. Research funding: This work was supported by Fondo Fondecyt de Continuidad para Investigadores Senior, Universidad de Talca (Código FCSEN2102) and PIA Ciencias Cognitivas, Centro de Investigación en Ciencias Cognitivas, Instituto de Estudios Humanísticos, Universidad de Talca.

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Published Online: 2022-06-14
Published in Print: 2022-11-25

© 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Heruntergeladen am 21.9.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/sats-2021-0027/html
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