The Optimal Standard of Proof with Adjudication Avoidance
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Murat C. Mungan
Abstract
Actors, whether guilty or innocent, may invest in costly measures to reduce their likelihood of being audited. The value of these investments are increasing in the probability with which they expect to be found guilty conditional on being audited. Because strengthening the standard of proof reduces the probability of conviction, it also lowers the investments by actors to reduce their likelihood of being audited. Therefore, when balancing such avoidance costs and deterrence effects, it is optimal to employ a stronger standard than that which maximizes deterrence, namely stronger than preponderance of the evidence.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Articles
- Laudatio: Francesco Parisi
- Law and Economics as We Grow Younger
- The Coase Theorem, the Nonempty Core, and the Legal Neutrality Principle
- The Optimal Standard of Proof with Adjudication Avoidance
- Political Insulation, Technical Expertise and the Technocrat’s Paradox
- Thinking Like (Law-And-) Economists – Legal Rules, Economic Prescriptions and Public Perceptions of Fairness
Articles in the same Issue
- Articles
- Laudatio: Francesco Parisi
- Law and Economics as We Grow Younger
- The Coase Theorem, the Nonempty Core, and the Legal Neutrality Principle
- The Optimal Standard of Proof with Adjudication Avoidance
- Political Insulation, Technical Expertise and the Technocrat’s Paradox
- Thinking Like (Law-And-) Economists – Legal Rules, Economic Prescriptions and Public Perceptions of Fairness
