Gang Rivalry and Crime: A Differential Game Approach
-
João Ricardo Faria
,
Ashish Upadhyaya
Abstract
This study contributes to the modern literature on the economics of crime by proposing and solving two models of a differential game that considers the dynamic strategic behavior of two gangs engaged in a territorial conflict. The police force acts as the leader in the game. In the first model, each gang is concerned solely by the actions of the other, thus leading to an equilibrium wherein the greater one gang’s criminal activity, the greater the rival gang’s criminal activity. In the second model both gangs account primarily for police activities aimed at maintaining law and order, thus leading to an equilibrium wherein the gangs respond directly to the law enforcement activities of the police force. Exploratory analyses employing gang-related crime and police activities in Los Angeles provide empirical support for the main features of both models of the differential game, such as how gang rivalry fuels criminal activity and how the role of police is crucial in reducing gang-related crime.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank an anonymous referee and Esin Cakan for helpful comments. The usual caveat applies.
Appendix 1: The Non-Controllability Property in Game 1
Xie (1997) shows that whenever the co-state variables of the followers in a differential game do not depend on the leader’s control (i. e. they are non-controllable), then the game is time consistent. This is apparent in the adjoint equations,
and
It is evident that both co-state variables, λs, do not depend on the police force’s control variable, which is law and order, or E.
Appendix 2: Los Angeles Police Bureaus
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Gang Rivalry and Crime: A Differential Game Approach
- Sharing of Cost Related Information Can Increase Consumer Welfare Under Risk-aversion
- Costly Voluntary Disclosure in a Signaling Game
- Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts
- A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator
- How Do Risk-Averse Litigants Set Contingent Fees for Risk-Neutral Lawyers?
