Individual or Enterprise Liability? The Roles of Sanctions and Liability Under Contractible and Non-contractible Safety Efforts

Sverre Grepperud

doi:10.1515/rle-2016-0068

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Individual or Enterprise Liability? The Roles of Sanctions and Liability Under Contractible and Non-contractible Safety Efforts

Sverre Grepperud

Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 26. März 2020

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Aus der Zeitschrift Review of Law & Economics Band 16 Heft 3

Abstract

This paper analyzes the social effectiveness of fines (sanctions) and awards (liability) where accident risks are influenced by decisions made by both the enterprise and the employees of the enterprise (individuals). The regulator observes a proportion of accidents and the safety decision of the individual can be contractible or non-contractible for the enterprise. All sanction regimes yield the first best, given contractible individual care. The liability regimes, however, produce sub-optimal solutions. Given non-contractible individual care, the combined use of an individual sanction and an enterprise sanction (joint use) produces the first best. The exclusive use of an individual sanction produces the first best if the enterprise does not suffer any direct harm. The exclusive use of an enterprise sanction does not, however, produce the first best. If both decision-makers are solvent and have similar liability probabilities, then individual and enterprise liability do equally well under contractible individual care. Individual liability does, however, best for non-contractible individual care.

Keywords: safety regulation; incentive contracts; enterprise liability; joint liability; strict liability

JEL Classification: D62; D82; K20; K32; I18; L51

Appendix A: Second order conditions for problems (8), (11), (13), (17), (28) and (32)

The second order condition for the problem of the regulator (see 8) is;

d=See′′SeE′′SEe′′SEE′′>0, where d is the determinant of the Hesse matrix.

d=Pee′′PEE′′−PeE′′PEe′′>0 is fulfilled from (3).

The second order condition for the problem of the individual (see 11) is:

Uee′′=−Pee′′(E,e)αD+stαD<0, which is fulfilled from (1) and α>0.

The second order condition for the problem of the firm, when individual effort is non-contractible (see 13), is;

(44)CEE′′(∗)={PEE′′(∗)+[2PEe′′(∗)+Pee′′(∗)eE′(∗)]eE′}Ψ+[Pe′(∗)Ψ+k]eEE′′(∗)>0

Evaluating this condition in optimum using eE′(∗)=−PeE′′(∗)Pee′′(∗) (see footnote 6) leads to the first term in (44) becoming [PEE′′(∗)Pee′′(∗)−(PEe′′(∗))2Pee′′(∗)]Ψ, which from (3) is strictly positive meaning that (44) is always fulfilled for eEE′′(∗)=0. The second term of (44) is evaluated by inserting the first order condition of the individual, PE′(∗)=−kαD+st (see 11), which implies that the second term can be written as follows; −[βD+rT]αD+stkeEE′′(∗). This term is zero for JS (see 19). Thus CEE′′(∗)>0. For EL and IL[βD+rT]αD+st<0, thus a sufficient condition for CEE′′(∗)>0 is eEE′′(∗)≤0.

The second order condition for the problem of the regulator (see 17) is SEE′′>0. Assuming that all third derivatives of the accident probability function are zero yields SEE=PEE′′+Pee′′(eE′)2+2PeE′′eE′D, which from (3) is strictly positive.

The second order condition for the problem of the firm (see 28) is;

dF=Cbb′′CbE′′CEb′′CEE′′>0, where the determinant of the Hesse matrix

dF=Cbb′′CEE′′−CbE′′CEb′′>0. Assuming that all third derivatives of the accident probability function are zero yields the following expressions:

(45)CEb′′=CbE′′=PEe′′−Pee′′eEeb′Ψ=0

(46)Cbb′′=Pee′′(eb′)2Ψ>0

(47)CEE′′=Ψ(PEE′′+Pee′′(eE′)2+2PeE′′eE′)>0.

Substituting for eE′ in (45), it follows that CEb′′=CbE′′ = 0. From (46) and (47), it follows that Cbb′′ and CEE′′ are strictly positive. The second order condition is thus fulfilled. The second order condition for the problem of the regulator (see 32) is STT′′(∗)Stt′′(∗)−STt′′(∗)StT′′(∗)>0.

Appendix B: The partial effects of T and t on E

ET′=−CET′′(∗)CEE′′(∗) and Et′=−CEt′′(∗)CEE′′(∗) where CEE′′(∗)>0 (see 44), CET′′(∗)=PE′(∗)+Pe′(∗)eE′(∗)r and CEt′′(∗)=PEE′′(∗)Ψ+Pee′′(∗)eE′(∗)et′+PE′(∗)s+Pe′(∗)Ψ+keEt′′.CET′′(∗) and CEt′′(∗) are indeterminate, thus ET′≥(<)0 and Et′≥(<)0.

Appendix C: The first order conditions for problem (17)

(1)–(5) ensure interior solutions to problem (17). Solving problem (17) yields;

(48)ST′(E,e)=Pe′(∗)D+kET′(∗)eE′(∗)+PE′(∗)D+KET′(∗)=0

(49)St′(E,e)=Pe′(∗)D+kEt′(∗)eE′(∗)+et′(∗)+PE′(∗)D+KEt′(∗)=0

Appendix D: The optimal sanction when the firm issues a sanction being contingent upon the occurrence of accidents

The objective functions of the individual and the firm follows from replacing be in (6) and (7) with zfP(E,e), where z is the probability of the individual being sanctioned by the firm and f is the firm penalty. This procedure yields the following objective functions;

(50)U(E,e)=A−zfP(E,e)−P(E,e)αD−P(E,e)st−ke≥Uˉ

(51)C(E,b)=A+P(E,e)βD+P(E,e)rT+KE

(52)S(E,e)=P(E,e)D+KE+ke

In the final stage, the individual maximizes (50) with respect to e, which yields; Ue′(e;E,b,t)=−Pe′(E,e)(αD+st+zf)−k=0, which again can be expressed as;

(53)−Pe′(E,e)αD+st+zf=k

The first order condition of the individual, (53), defines the following

response function;

(54)e=e(E,t,f)

The firms’ maximization problem becomes;

MinE,bC(E,b,e)=Uˉ+P(E,e)Ω+ke+KEs.t.e=e(E,t,f)whereΩ≡(α+β)D+rT+st.

The first order conditions for this problem become (assuming interior solutions);

(55)Cf′(E,b)=ef′(∗)Pe′(∗)Ω+k=0

(56)CE′(E,f)=PE′(∗)Ω+K+eE′(∗)Pe′(∗)Ω+k=0

By using (53), the two conditions can be expressed as;

(57)zf=βD+rT

(58)PE′(E,e(E,b,t))=−KΩ

Equation (58) defines the response function of the firm;

(59)E=E(T,t)

The regulator minimizes (52) given (54), (57) and (59). Solving this problem

produces the following first order conditions for the regulator;

(60)st+zf−(1−α)D=rT+st−(1−α−β)D=0

By inserting (57), (60) can be expressed as;

(61)st+rT=γD

By inserting (61) into (57), we arrive at the following expression for the

optimal firm sanction;

(62)zf=βD+rT=(1−α)D−st

This regime produces the first best. This is seen by inserting the sanction

levels in (61) and (62) into (53) and (58).

Now consider ES (t = 0). From (61) we get rTˉEL=γD. By inserting this optimal enterprise sanction level into (62), the optimal internal penalty becomes zfˉES=(β+γ)D. For IS (T = 0), the optimal individual sanction level stˉIL=γD (see 61) and the optimal internal penalty is zfˉIS=βD (see 20) and is independent of the optimal individual sanction level.

Appendix E: The first order conditions for problem (28)

The first order conditions for problem (28) become;

(63)Cb′(E,b)=eb′(∗)Pe′(∗)Ψ+k≥(<)0

(64)CE′(E,b)=PE′(∗)Ψ+K+eE′(∗)Pe′(∗)Ψ+k≥(<)0

From (1)–(5) and Ψ>0, (63) and (64) are binding. Thus we get;

Pe′(E,e(E,b,t))=−kΨ

PE′(E,e(E,b,t))=−KΨ

Appendix F: The first order conditions for problem (32)

(1)–(5) ensures interior solutions. Solving the problem of (32) therefore yields the following equation system;

(65)ST′(E,e)=Pe′(∗)D+k(ET′(∗)eE′(∗)+eb′(∗)bT′(∗))+PE′(∗)D+KET′(∗)=0

(66)St′(E,e)=Pe′(∗)D+k(Et′(∗)eE′(∗)+eb′(∗)bt′(∗)+et′(∗))+PE′(∗)D+KEt′(∗)=0

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Published Online: 2020-03-26

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safety regulation; incentive contracts; enterprise liability; joint liability; strict liability