Abstract
We examine a two-stage litigation in which risk-averse litigants set contingent fees strategically for risk-neutral lawyers. In the first stage of the litigation, each litigant sets a fixed fee and a contingent fee for his lawyer. In the second stage, each lawyer exerts effort to win a lawsuit on behalf of the litigant. Employing the subgame-perfect equilibrium as a solution concept, we obtain the following results. First, if a litigant sets a higher rate of contingent fee, then the opponent follows suit and the contingent fee fraction increases in the difference in litigant’s utility between winning and losing the case. Second, changes in a litigant’s initial endowment have different effects on the contingent fee fraction depending upon litigant preferences, while an increase in the prize of the case always increases the contingent fee fraction regardless of litigant preferences.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for constructive comments and suggestions. We also thank Myung-Hwan Cho and Hee-Chan Kang for their constructive comments and suggestions on an earlier version of the paper presented at the 38th Annual Meeting of Korea International Economic Association, Seoul, Korea, December 2015.
Appendix: Proofs
Consider Formula (10), which shows dαi/dαj. If the second-order condition is satisfied for the maximum of EUiN, the sign of the numerator is positive: that is, –
Then, Formula (23) can be rearranged:
which implies that
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2 for the concave quadratic utility function
Consider now the effects on the contingent fees of w and v using the quadratic utility function. Using Lemma 3, we obtain
From Formulae (25) and (26), we find
where 1>
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 2 for the negative exponential utility function
In Section 3, we obtain Formulae (8) and (9) by differentiating the first-order conditions represented by Formula (5). Formula (5) can be described by Formulae (15) and (16). First, consider the effect on the contingent fee fraction of w with the negative exponential utility function. From Formulae (15) and (16), we know that the equilibrium contingent fee fraction does not rely on w, which implies
Putting Formula (28) into Formula (8), we obtain
where the second-order conditions must be satisfied for
With partial differentiation of Formulae (15) and (16) with respect to v, we obtain
since
which implies
Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 2 for the power utility function
Consider now the effects on the contingent fees of w and v with the power utility function. First, consider
where the second-order conditions must be satisfied for
With partial differentiation of Formulae (19) and (20) with respect to w, we obtain
We can obtain
Considering
which implies
Next, consider the sign of
which implies
References
Arrow, K. J. 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing, Helsinki: Academic Publishers.Suche in Google Scholar
Baik, K.H., and J. Kim. 2014. “Contest with Bilateral Delegation: Unobservable Contracts,” 170(3) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 387–405.10.1628/093245614X13946975834836Suche in Google Scholar
Baik, K.H., and J.H. Lee. 2013. “Endogenous Timing in Contests with Delegation,” 51(4) Economic Inquiry 2044–2055.10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00487.xSuche in Google Scholar
Baik, Kyung Hwan. 2007. “Equilibrium Contingent Compensation in Contests with Delegation,” 73 Southern Economic Journal 986–1002.10.1002/j.2325-8012.2007.tb00814.xSuche in Google Scholar
Baik, Kyung Hwan. 2008. “Attorneys’ Compensation in Litigation with Bilateral Delegation,” 4 Review of Law and Economics 259–289.10.2202/1555-5879.1165Suche in Google Scholar
Baik, Kyung Hwan, and In-Gyu Kim. 1997. “Delegation in Contests,” 13(2) European Journal of Political Economy 281–298.10.1016/S0176-2680(96)00045-6Suche in Google Scholar
Baik, Kyung Hwan, and In-Gyu Kim. 2007a. “Contingent Fees versus Legal Expenses Insurance,” 27(3) International Review of Law and Economics 351–361.10.1016/j.irle.2007.08.001Suche in Google Scholar
Baik, Kyung Hwan, and In-Gyu Kim. 2007b. “Strategic Decisions on Lawyers’ Compensations in Civil Disputes,” 45(4) Economic Inquiry 854–863.10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00054.xSuche in Google Scholar
Brandauer, S., and F. Englmaier. 2009. “A Model of Strategic Delegation in Contests between Groups,” 13(3) Review of Economic Design 205–232.10.1007/s10058-008-0058-3Suche in Google Scholar
Dana, James D., and K.E. Spier. 1993. “Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation,” 9(2) Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 349–367.Suche in Google Scholar
Dixit, Avinash. 1987. “Strategic Behavior in Contests,” 77(5) American Economic Review 891–898.10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_30Suche in Google Scholar
Emons, Winand. 2000. “Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Insufficient Attorney Effort,” 20 International Review of Law and Economics 21–33.10.1016/S0144-8188(00)00019-3Suche in Google Scholar
Emons, Winand. 2006. “Conditional versus Contingent Fees,” 59 Oxford Economic Papers 89–101.10.1093/oep/gpl015Suche in Google Scholar
Katz, Avery. 1988. “Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure,” 8(2) International Review of Law and Economics 127–143.10.1016/0144-8188(88)90001-4Suche in Google Scholar
Konrad, Kai A. 2009. Strategy and Dynamics in Contests, New York: Oxford University Press.Suche in Google Scholar
Konrad, Kai A., W. Peters, and K. Wärneryd. 2004. “Delegation in First-Price All-Pay Auctions,” 25(5) Managerial and Decision Economics 283–290.10.1002/mde.1182Suche in Google Scholar
Kräkel, M. 2005. “Strategic Delegation in Oligopolistic Tournaments,” 9(4) Review of Economic Design 377–396.10.1007/s10058-005-0136-8Suche in Google Scholar
Kräkel, M., and D. Sliwka. 2006. “Strategic Delegation and Mergers in Oligopolistic Contests,” 58(2) Journal of Economics and Business 119–136.10.1016/j.jeconbus.2005.08.003Suche in Google Scholar
Lee, S. 1995. “Endogenous Sharing Rules in Collective-Group Rent-Seeking,” 85(1–2) Public Choice 31–44.10.1007/BF01047900Suche in Google Scholar
Pratt, J.W. 1964. “Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large,” 32(1/2) Econometrica 122–136.10.2307/1913738Suche in Google Scholar
Santore, R., and D. Viard. 2001. “Legal Fee Restrictions, Moral Hazard, and Attorney Rents,” 44(2) Journal of Law and Economics 549–572.10.1086/322814Suche in Google Scholar
Schoonbeek, Lambert. 2002. “A Delegate Agent in A Winner-Takes-All Contest,” 9(1) Applied Economics Letters 21–23.10.1080/13504850110049333Suche in Google Scholar
Schoonbeek, Lambert. 2004. “Delegation in Group-Contest,” 20(1) European Journal of Political Economy 263–272.10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.10.004Suche in Google Scholar
Schoonbeek, Lambert. 2007. “Delegation with Multiple Instruments in a Rent-Seeking Contest,” 131(1) Public Choice 453–464.10.1007/s11127-006-9125-xSuche in Google Scholar
Wärneryd, Karl. 2000. “In Defense of Lawyers: Moral Hazard as an Aid to Cooperation,” 33 Games and Economic Behavior 145–158.10.1006/game.1999.0774Suche in Google Scholar
© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Gang Rivalry and Crime: A Differential Game Approach
- Sharing of Cost Related Information Can Increase Consumer Welfare Under Risk-aversion
- Costly Voluntary Disclosure in a Signaling Game
- Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts
- A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator
- How Do Risk-Averse Litigants Set Contingent Fees for Risk-Neutral Lawyers?
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Gang Rivalry and Crime: A Differential Game Approach
- Sharing of Cost Related Information Can Increase Consumer Welfare Under Risk-aversion
- Costly Voluntary Disclosure in a Signaling Game
- Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts
- A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator
- How Do Risk-Averse Litigants Set Contingent Fees for Risk-Neutral Lawyers?