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How Do Risk-Averse Litigants Set Contingent Fees for Risk-Neutral Lawyers?

  • Sung-Hoon Park und Sanghack Lee EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 6. März 2019
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Abstract

We examine a two-stage litigation in which risk-averse litigants set contingent fees strategically for risk-neutral lawyers. In the first stage of the litigation, each litigant sets a fixed fee and a contingent fee for his lawyer. In the second stage, each lawyer exerts effort to win a lawsuit on behalf of the litigant. Employing the subgame-perfect equilibrium as a solution concept, we obtain the following results. First, if a litigant sets a higher rate of contingent fee, then the opponent follows suit and the contingent fee fraction increases in the difference in litigant’s utility between winning and losing the case. Second, changes in a litigant’s initial endowment have different effects on the contingent fee fraction depending upon litigant preferences, while an increase in the prize of the case always increases the contingent fee fraction regardless of litigant preferences.

JEL Classification: D72; D74; K41

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for constructive comments and suggestions. We also thank Myung-Hwan Cho and Hee-Chan Kang for their constructive comments and suggestions on an earlier version of the paper presented at the 38th Annual Meeting of Korea International Economic Association, Seoul, Korea, December 2015.

Appendix: Proofs

Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1(a)

Consider Formula (10), which shows i/j. If the second-order condition is satisfied for the maximum of EUiN, the sign of the numerator is positive: that is, – 2EUjN/αj2>0. Therefore, the sign of dαi/dαj is identical with that of the denominator, 2EUjN/αjαi. Using the first-order condition represented by Formula (5), we obtain 2EUjN/αjαi as follows.

(23)2EUjN/αjαi=αjαi/αi+αj3UjYajUjYbjαj/αi+αj2UjYaj/αj.

Then, Formula (23) can be rearranged:

(24)αj/αi+αjUjYajUjYbj>0,

which implies that dαi/dαj>0.

Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2 for the concave quadratic utility function

Consider now the effects on the contingent fees of w and v using the quadratic utility function. Using Lemma 3, we obtain

(25)αi*/w=[3δ+2δ{4δv9(1δw)}/2{(4δv(δv2+2δw)+9(1δw)2)1/2}]÷5δv,
(26)αi/v=[3δ+2δ4δv91δw/24δvδv2+2δw+91δw21/2]÷5δv{3(δv+w1)+4δvδv2+2δw+91δw21/2}/5δv2.

From Formulae (25) and (26), we find αi/w>αi/v, which implies that if we show αi/v>0, then we obtain αi/w>αi/v>0. Formula (26) can be rearranged:

(27)(1δw)[4δv+3{3(δ(v+w)1)+(4δv(δv2(1δw))+9(1δw)2)1/2}+9(1δw)]÷5{3(δ(v+w)1)+(4δv(δv2(1δw))+9(1δw)2)1/2\gt>0,

where 1>δw and 3(δv+w1)+4δvδv21δw+91δw21/2>0 for α1=α2>0.

Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 2 for the negative exponential utility function

In Section 3, we obtain Formulae (8) and (9) by differentiating the first-order conditions represented by Formula (5). Formula (5) can be described by Formulae (15) and (16). First, consider the effect on the contingent fee fraction of w with the negative exponential utility function. From Formulae (15) and (16), we know that the equilibrium contingent fee fraction does not rely on w, which implies αi/w=0. Next, consider the effect on the contingent fee fraction of v with the negative exponential function. Without loss of generality, we assume litigant 1 as litigant i and litigant 2 as litigant j, and we only consider litigant i’s behavior. Formula (9) can be rearranged:

(28)dαj={2EUjN/αjαidαi+2EUjN/αjvdv+(2EUiN/αiw)dw}/2EUjN/αj2.

Putting Formula (28) into Formula (8), we obtain

(29)αi/v=2EUi/αiαj2EUj/αjv2EUi/αiv2EUj/αj2÷2EUi/αi22EUj/αj22EUi/αiαj2EUj/αjαi,

where the second-order conditions must be satisfied for 2EUi/αi2 <0and2EUj/αj2<0. [14] With partial differentiation of Formula (15) with respect to αj, we obtain 2EUi/αiαj and with partial differentiation of Formula (16) with respect to αi, we obtain 2EUj/αjαi. The sign of 2EUi/αiαj is as follows.

(30)2EUi/αiαj=exp[rw]αi(1exp[r(1αi)v]/αi+αj3>0.

With partial differentiation of Formulae (15) and (16) with respect to v, we obtain 2EUi/αivand2EUj/αjv. The sign of 2EUi/αiv is as follows. First, from Formulae (15) and (16), we obtain αj/αi+αj=αirvexp[r(1αi)v]/1exp[r(1αi)v]andαi/αi+αj=αjrvexp[r(1αj)v]/1exp[r(1αj)v]. Using the equations, we obtain 2EUi/αiv as follows.

(31)2EUi/αiv=rexp[r(w+(1αi)v)](1αi)αj/αi+αjαi(1r(1αi)v)÷αi+αj=αirexp[r(w+(1αi)v)]1+exp[r(1αi)v]+r(1αi)v÷αi+αj1exp[r(1αi)v]>0,

since 1+exp[r(1αi)v]+r(1αi)v>0. We can obtain 2EUj/αjv in the same way. [15] Considering 2EUi/αi2<0and,2EUj/αj2<0, we find that the sign of the numerator of Formula (29) is positive. Therefore, the sign of αi/v is the same as the sign of the denominator of Formula (29). For concise exposition, we let [αj/αi+αj21exp[r(1αi)v] as A,rvαj/αi+αjexp[r(1αi)v)] as B,rvαj/αi+αjexp[r(1αi)v)] as C,αi/αi+αj21exp[r(1αj)v] as D,rvαi/αi+αjexp[r(1αj)v] as E,andrv(1+αjrv)exp[r(1αj)v] as F, where A, B, C, D, E, and F>0.

(32)2EUi/αi22EUj/αj22EUi/αiαj2EUj/αjαi=exp[rw]/αi+αj2A(E+F)+B(D+E+F)+C(D+E+F)>0,

which implies αi/v>0.

Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 2 for the power utility function

Consider now the effects on the contingent fees of w and v with the power utility function. First, consider αi/w. Putting Formula (28) into Formula (8), we obtain

(33)αi/w=2EUi/αiw2EUj/αj22EUi/αiαj2EUj/αjw÷2EUi/αi22EUj/αj22EUi/αiαj2EUj/αjαi,

where the second-order conditions must be satisfied for 2EUi/αi2<0and2EUj/αj2<0. [16] With partial differentiation of Formula (19) with respect to αj, we obtain 2EUi/αiαj and with partial differentiation of Formula (20) with respect to αi, we obtain 2EUj/αjαi. The sign of 2EUi/αiαj is as follows.

(34)2EUi/αiαj={n/(n1)(αi+αj)}{αi/(αi+αj)2}{(w+(1αi)v)(n1)/nw(n1)/n\gt]>0.

With partial differentiation of Formulae (19) and (20) with respect to w, we obtain 2EUi/αiw. First, from Formulae (19) and (20), we obtain αj/αi+αj=αin1/nw+1αiv1/n/w+1αiv(n1)/nw(n1)/n and αi/αi+αj=αjn1/nw+1αjv1/n/w+1αjv(n1)/nw(n1)/n. Using the equations, we obtain 2EUi/αiw as follows.

(35)2EUi/αiw={1/(αi+αj)}[{αj/(αi+αj)}{(w+(1αi)v)1/nw1/n\gt+(αi/n){w+(1αi)v}(1+n)/n] \cr= &{αi/n(αi+αj)}{(w+(1αi)v)1/n}[n{(w+(1αi)v)1/nw1/n\gt+{w1/nw(n1)/n(w+(1αi)v)(n1)/n}]< 0.

We can obtain 2EUj/αjw in the same way. [17]

Considering 2EUi/αi2<0and2EUj/αj2<0, we find that the sign of the numerator of Formula (33) is negative. Therefore, αi/w has the opposite sign of the denominator of Formula (33). For concise exposition, we let αj/αi+αj2w+1αivn1/nwn1/n as G,n1/nαjv/αi+αjw+1αiv1/nasH,n1/nw+1αiv1/n+αivw+1αiv1+n/n/n as I,αi/αi+αj2w+1αjvn1/nwn1/n as J,n1/nαiv/αi+αjw+1αjv1/n as K,andn1/nw+1αjv1/n+αjvw+1αjv1+n/n/n as L: G, H, I, J, K, and L<0.

(36)2EUi/αi22EUj/αj22EUi/αiαj2EUj/αjαi=n/n11/αi+αjG(K+L)+H(J+K+L)+I(J+K+L)>0,

which implies αi/w<0.

Next, consider the sign of αi/v which is shown in Formula (29). We know that the sign of the denominator of Formula (36) is positive. Herein, the sign of αi/v is the same as that of the numerator of Formula (29). Since 2EUi/αi20,2EUj/αj20,2EUi/αiαj0and2EUj/αjαi0, the sign of αi/v depends on the signs of 2EUi/αiv and 2EUj/αjv. Using Formulae (19) and (20), we obtain

(37)2EUi/αiv={(1αi)/(αi+αj)}[{αj/(αi+αj)}{(w+(1αi)v)1/n}+{αi/n}{w+(1αi)v}(1+n)/n> 0,

which implies αi/v>0.

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Published Online: 2019-03-06

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Heruntergeladen am 19.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/rle-2016-0034/pdf
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