Abstract
How to enhance the maintenance, repair and improvement of condo buildings? We address this issue by focusing on the case of an elevator installation whose benefits are not uniform across units. We examine the link between majority approval and cost sharing. Relying on a cooperative game theory approach, we prove the coalitional stability of any cost allocation which is such that the unit shares are a non-decreasing function of the floor level. Second, we show that the two surplus allocations induced, respectively, by the de facto cost-sharing rule used in France and the equal cost-sharing rule may fail to be coalitionally stable. By insisting that the cost sharing must depend on the relative individual advantages provided by an improvement, French law increases the risk of disputes between neighbors, compared to other sharing rules.
Acknowledgements
We thank Laurent Benzoni for drawing our attention to the topic of this paper. We also thank Gabrielle Smart and two anonymous referees for very stimulating and detailed comments on three previous version of this work.
Appendix
A A brief overview of cost sharing in European condominium laws
Share in the common areas
In Belgium, the number of shares into the common areas is determined on the basis of three exhaustive criteria: the net surface area, the destination and location of the private area. This value needs to be set out in a reasoned report by a notary, a land surveyor, an architect or an estate agent.
In Italy, contributions are apportioned by the share value of each unit unless otherwise agreed or provided for in the by-laws of the scheme (CC art. 1123). The Civil Code also provides that where common areas only benefit a particular group of owners, only those owners must contribute towards their maintenance (CC art. 1123 par. 2). Where a particular area benefits different owners to varying extents, the costs are apportioned accordingly (CC art. 1123 par. 3).
In the Netherlands, each of the apartment owners must “participate for an equal part in the debts and costs which are for account of all apartment owners jointly pursuant to law or the internal arrangements, unless the internal arrangements provide for another proportion of participation.” (Article 5:113).
In Spain, according to Chapter two, Section 3 of the Horizontal Property Act, “An assessment quota shall be allocated to every unit in relation to the value of the building and expressed as a percentage of said value. Said quota shall serve as a coefficient to determine individual unit shares in the expenses and benefits of the community.” [24]
In Germany, all co-owners must bear the costs incurred for maintaining/refurbishing the common property in proportion to their co-ownership quota, i.e. in proportion to the relative size of their apartments, if no alternative agreement exists (§16 par. 2 of the Condominium Ownership Act (Wohnungseigentumsgesetz, WEG)).
In France, the system of apartment ownership (copropri\’eté) is governed by the statute 65-557 of 10 July 1965. As concerns the decisions on improvements in a condo, several articles of this law play a key role. Article 5 of the law states that “the share of the common areas pertaining to each lot is proportionate to the value of each private area in relation to the value of all said areas, as the value resulting from the establishment of the property, the substance and the situation of the lots without regards to their use”. Article 30 of the aforesaid law states that the general assembly of the co-owners establishes the distribution of the expenses for the improvement works “in proportion to the advantages that will result from the planned works for each of the co-owners, except when taking into account the consent of some of them to bear a higher proportion of the expenses”. According to case law the “advantage” is the increase in the apartment value stemming from the improvement. The 1965 statute (implemented by Decree no. 67-223 of 17 March 1967) has had several amendments, the last of which is the statute no. 2014-366 of 24 March 2014, which, like the laws that preceded it, makes various technical adjustments to certain provisions, such as reducing the majority required for works of preservation.
Majority rules
Decisions on improvements are usually taken by the members of the association of co-owners. The majority rules differ from one country to another.
In Belgium, the decisions are taken by a majority of the members of the association representing at least four fifths of the votes. Each co-owner has a number of votes which corresponds to his share in the common parts.
In Italy, A 50% quorum of all the owners and value of the building is required to carry out extraordinary and onerous repairs or maintenance works and other improvements.
In the Netherlands, the decisions on improvement work are taken by a majority of the members of the association representing at least two-thirds of the votes.
In Germany, the installation of a lift is considered as an improvement rather than mere maintenance and, therefore, a certain degree of approval (a qualified resolution), on the part of the owners must be attained in order to give effect to such measures.
In England and Wales, what needs to be done, in terms of repairs, service charges and so on, is decided by majority.
In France, Article 26 of the above law states that decisions concerning the works involving improvements “are taken by a majority of the members of the management association representing at least two thirds of the votes”. Article 30 of the law states that the general assembly of the co-owners establishes, with the same majority, the distribution of the expenses for the improvement works “in proportion to the advantages that will result from the planned works for each of the co-owners, except when taking into account the consent of some of them to bear a higher proportion of the expenses”. In addition, article 30 of the aforesaid law states that, when the general assembly refuses the authorization defined in article 25, “any co-owner or group of co-owners can be authorized by the courts to execute any improvement works”, such as the transformation of one or several existing facilities.
B Proof of the Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof
Assume that the Proposition is false. Therefore there exists a coalition S of co-owners such that:
where:
or
A necessary condition for the above inequation to be satisfied is
Assume then that
where #S is the cardinal of S. Since #
But then, using again the assumption that the shares
This is a contradiction. □
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof
Let us first show that there is a coalitionally stable allocation to the surplus-sharing problem associated to v. This surplus-sharing problem corresponds to what is called an airport profit game in the cooperative game theory literature.[25] Now from Hou and Drissen (2013) we know that airport profit games are convex. It then follows from Theorem 17.55 of Maschler et al. (2013, 719) that there always exists a coalitionally stable surplus allocation. In particular, Maschler et al. (ibid) shows that the allocation
is coalitionally stable (for the core associated to v). Let us show that this allocation is also coalitionally stable for the surplus-sharing problem associated to
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Gang Rivalry and Crime: A Differential Game Approach
- Sharing of Cost Related Information Can Increase Consumer Welfare Under Risk-aversion
- Costly Voluntary Disclosure in a Signaling Game
- Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts
- A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator
- How Do Risk-Averse Litigants Set Contingent Fees for Risk-Neutral Lawyers?
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Gang Rivalry and Crime: A Differential Game Approach
- Sharing of Cost Related Information Can Increase Consumer Welfare Under Risk-aversion
- Costly Voluntary Disclosure in a Signaling Game
- Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts
- A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator
- How Do Risk-Averse Litigants Set Contingent Fees for Risk-Neutral Lawyers?