Estimating Judicial Ideal Points in Latin America: The Case of Argentina
-
Juan González Bertomeu
Abstract
This paper presents an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Argentina for 1984–2007. The estimated ideal points allow us to focus on political cycles in the Court as well as possible coalitions based on presidential appointments. We find strong evidence to support the existence of such coalitions in some periods (such as President Carlos Menem’s term) but less so in others (including President Néstor Kirchner’s term, a period of swift turnover in the Court due to impeachment processes and resignations). Implications for comparative judicial politics are discussed.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to one anonymous referee and to seminar participants at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella for very helpful suggestions. Lucia Dalla Pellegrina gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Baffi Centre at Bocconi University, Milano, Italy. The usual disclaimers apply. Part IV and dataset are based on Juan González Bertomeu’s JSD dissertation at NYU.
Appendix
Estimated ideal judicial points for the entire court, 1984–2007.
| Justice(a) | ID point | Std. dev. | Appointer(c) | Judge(b) | ID point | Std. dev. | Appointer(c) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zaffaroni | –1.70317 | 0.48026 | 3 | Petracchi | –1.5549 | 0.345 | 1 |
| Petracchi | –1.50991 | 0.28619 | 1 | Bacqué | –1.3303 | 0.4347 | 1 |
| Bacqué | –1.33181 | 0.43172 | 1 | Zaffaroni | –1.3155 | 0.5004 | 3 |
| Maqueda | –0.92925 | 0.2428 | 0(d) | Maqueda | –0.8712 | 0.2812 | 0(d) |
| Bossert | –0.82073 | 0.24608 | 1/2 | Bossert | –0.8097 | 0.2444 | 1/2 |
| Carrió | –0.66864 | 0.74939 | 1 | Carrió | –0.6521 | 0.7873 | 1 |
| Lorenzetti | –0.59786 | 0.23228 | 3 | Fayt | –0.3867 | 0.1238 | 1 |
| Fayt | –0.43113 | 0.11548 | 1 | Lorenzetti | –0.3517 | 0.2887 | 3 |
| Highton | 0.05253 | 0.04879 | 3 | Belluscio | 0.1885 | 0.101 | 1 |
| Belluscio | 0.18822 | 0.10042 | 1 | Highton | 0.2823 | 0.1994 | 3 |
| Barra | 0.37947 | 0.38025 | 2 | Barra | 0.3811 | 0.3702 | 2 |
| Boggiano | 0.43361 | 0.13296 | 2 | Boggiano | 0.4633 | 0.1335 | 2 |
| Caballero | 0.62268 | 0.39112 | 1 | Caballero | 0.648 | 0.3925 | 1 |
| Oyhanarte | 1.04078 | 0.65641 | 2 | Oyhanarte | 1.0106 | 0.6249 | 2 |
| Cavagna Martinez | 1.42363 | 0.66377 | 2 | Cavagna Martinez | 1.4406 | 0.6711 | 2 |
| Levene | 1.47818 | 0.56062 | 2 | Levene | 1.4723 | 0.5563 | 2 |
| Vázquez | 1.4793 | 0.33752 | 2 | Vázquez | 1.5086 | 0.3342 | 2 |
| Nazareno | 1.68874 | 0.34642 | 2 | Nazareno | 1.7096 | 0.3413 | 2 |
| López | 1.73167 | 0.37672 | 2 | López | 1.757 | 0.3715 | 2 |
| Moliné | 1.99567 | 0.42434 | 2 | Moliné | 2.0209 | 0.4225 | 2 |
| Argibay | 2.57589 | 0.55445 | 3 | ||||
| Correlation with Alfonsín being appointer: | –0.4419 | –0.4657 | |||||
| Correlation with Menem being appointer: | 0.2162 | 0.1723 | |||||
| Correlation with Kirchner being appointer: | –0.0989 | –0.2015 | |||||
Note: Median Justices in italics. ID points of Justices Argibay (second column) and Moliné (sixth column) exceed +2 since priors have been assigned such that the ideal points of Justices who are considered “more liberal” (see Table 2) take a negative sign, whereas the ideal points of “more conservative” Justices are set with a positive sign.
(a) Estimates have been obtained including Justice Argibay.
(b) Estimates have been obtained excluding Justice Argibay.
(c) Appointer 1=Alfonsín; 2=Menem; 3=Kirchner.
(d) See footnote 55.
Average ideal points, Alfonsín Term, 1984–1989 (including priors).
| Justices | Ideal point estimation | Std. dev. | Appointed by Alfonsín (yes=1, no=0) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petracchi | –2 (prior) | 0 | 1 |
| Bacqué | –1.4388 | 0.5019 | 1 |
| Fayt | –0.6009 | 0.3349 | 1 |
| Carrió | –0.5089 | 0.8473 | 1 |
| Caballero | 0.7638 | 0.3428 | 1 |
| Belluscio | 2 (prior) | 0 | 1 |
| Var(Ideal point) | 2.15 |
Note: Median Justices in italics.
Average ideal points, Menem Term, 1989–1999 (including priors).
| Justices | Ideal point estimation | Std. dev. | Appointed by Menem (yes=1, no=0) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petracchi | –2 (prior) | 0 | 0 |
| Bossert | –1.36943 | 0.3924 | 0/1a |
| Fayt | –0.87933 | 0.257233 | 0 |
| Bacqué | –0.77213 | 0.617733 | 0 |
| Belluscio | –0.2563 | 0.161667 | 0 |
| Boggiano | 0.184733 | 0.1713 | 1 |
| Barra | 0.2375 | 0.451367 | 1 |
| Oyhanarte | 0.880633 | 0.697 | 1 |
| Caballero | 0.9402 | 0.728167 | 0 |
| Vázquez | 1.184967 | 0.334967 | 1 |
| Levene | 1.2474 | 0.573067 | 1 |
| Cavagna Martinez | 1.388167 | 0.724667 | 1 |
| Nazareno | 1.683 | 0.2526 | 1 |
| López | 1.776533 | 0.285867 | 1 |
| Moliné | 1.979633 | 0.322867 | 1 |
| Var(Ideal point) | 1.519379 | ||
| Correlation with Menem being appointer | 0.7802 considering Bossert as Alfonsín appointee | ||
| 0.5989 considering Bossert as Menem appointee | |||
Notes: Median Justice in italics.
aAs mentioned above, Justice Bossert was appointed by Menem but we also consider the possibility that he should be considered an appointee of Alfonsín.
Average ideal points, De la Rúa Term, 1999–2001 (including priors).
| Justices | Ideal point estimation | Std. dev. | Appointed by De la Rúa (yes=1, no=0) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petracchi | –2 (prior) | 0 | 0 |
| Bossert | –0.65645 | 0.4005 | 0 |
| Belluscio | 0.1279 | 0.34125 | 0 |
| Fayt | 0.5149 | 0.4017 | 0 |
| López | 0.9659 | 0.48255 | 0 |
| Boggiano | 1.0648 | 0.1746 | 0 |
| Moliné | 1.1468 | 0.5177 | 0 |
| Nazareno | 1.34895 | 0.2091 | 0 |
| Vázquez | 1.6236 | 0.6377 | 0 |
| Var (Ideal point) | 1.331122 |
Note: Median Justice in italics.
Average ideal points, transition & Duhalde Term, 2001–2003 (including priors).
| Justices | Ideal Point Estimation | Std. dev. | Appointed in the period (yes=1, no=0) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Petracchi | –2 (prior) | 0 | 0 |
| Bossert | –0.87815 | 0.54215 | 0 |
| Fayt | –0.5247 | 0.41235 | 0 |
| Belluscio | –0.1356 | 0.3452 | 0 |
| Maqueda | 0.2738 | 0.8786 | 0/1a |
| Vázquez | 1.4286 | 0.58005 | 0 |
| Moliné | 1.4319 | 0.57865 | 0 |
| López | 1.43385 | 0.57915 | 0 |
| Boggiano | 1.4875 | 0.24225 | 0 |
| Nazareno | 1.72625 | 0.28995 | 0 |
| Var(Ideal point) | 1.630987 | ||
| Correlation with Duhalde being appointer | –0.0414 considering Maqueda as Duhalde appointee | ||
Notes: Median Justices in italics.
aAs noted, we consider the possibility that Justice Maqueda should be considered an appointment of either Duhalde or Kirchner.
Average ideal points, Kirchner Term, 2003–2007 (including priors; excluding Argibay).
| Justices | Ideal point estimation | Std. dev. | Appointed by Kirchner (yes=1, no=0) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zaffaroni | –1.7941 | 0.28035 | 1 |
| Petracchi | –1.15893 | 0.12155 | 0 |
| Maqueda | –0.65718 | 0.29625 | 0/1a |
| Fayt | –0.48741 | 0.3744 | 0 |
| Lorenzetti | –0.36268 | 0.36765 | 1 |
| Vázquez | –0.32654 | 0.6449 | 0 |
| Moliné | –0.20241 | 0.76845 | 0 |
| López | –0.07838 | 0.7097 | 0 |
| Belluscio | 0.330905 | 0.7293 | 0 |
| Boggiano | 1.239365 | 0.9302 | 0 |
| Highton | 2 (prior) | 0 | 1 |
| Var(Ideal point) | 1.095833 | ||
| Correlation with Kirchner being appointer | 0.051453 considering Maqueda as a Duhalde appointee | ||
| –0.05102 considering Maqueda as a Kirchner appointee | |||
Notes: Median Justice in italics.
aSee previous footnote.
Average ideal points, Kirchner Term, 2003–2007 (including priors; including Argibay).
| Justices | Ideal point estimation | Std. dev. | Appointed by Kirchner (yes=1, no=0) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zaffaroni | –1.9538 | 0.24575 | 1 |
| Petracchi | –1.5452 | 0.13395 | 0 |
| Maqueda | –1.1658 | 0.2706 | 0/1a |
| Lorenzetti | –0.8264 | 0.24825 | 1 |
| Fayt | –0.6684 | 0.21765 | 0 |
| Highton | –0.45005 | 0.19295 | 1 |
| Moliné | –0.36425 | 0.75915 | 0 |
| López | –0.2407 | 0.6922 | 0 |
| Vázquez | 0.02985 | 0.72945 | 0 |
| Boggiano | 0.6834 | 0.46575 | 0 |
| Belluscio | 0.75635 | 0.5425 | 0 |
| Argibay | 2 (prior) | 0 | 1 |
| Var(Ideal point) | 1.178015 | ||
| Correlation with Kirchner being appointer | 0.003076 considering Maqueda as a Duhalde appointee | ||
| –0.135925 considering Maqueda as a Kirchner appointee | |||
Notes: Median Justices in italics.
aSee previous footnote.
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