Voting Rules in Bankruptcy Law

Nicolae Stef

doi:10.1515/rle-2014-0063

Article

Voting Rules in Bankruptcy Law

Nicolae Stef

Published/Copyright: July 2, 2016

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From the journal Review of Law & Economics Volume 13 Issue 1

Abstract

We empirically evaluate creditors’ voting conditions and the bankruptcy voting rules of 90 countries. The severity of a voting rule is determined by the threshold values of the majority-voting rules by which creditors impose their interests. The higher the threshold values, the higher is the severity degree of the rule. We find that the bankruptcy laws of countries with German and French legal origin tend to have the least severe voting rules. The Nordic countries have moderate rules. The laws of the common law countries have the most severe rules. These results hold for secured and unsecured claimants. The court’s legal right of overcoming the voting result is granted more often by bankruptcy laws of French and German legal origin. The severity of the voting rules can influence the recovery of creditors’ debt. We show that a coalition of creditors that has a common interest can use the severity of the voting rule to influence the approval of a reorganization plan that provides a higher recovery rate of the creditors’ debt.

Keywords: bankruptcy; reorganization; severity; voting rules

JEL Classification: G33; K29; D79

Acknowledgments

The author is grateful to Régis Blazy, Laurent Weill, Bertrand Koebel, Abel François, Heinrich Ursprung, Arye Hillman, Claudine Mangen, Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, seminar participants of the Augustin Cournot Doctoral School, the participants at the 2013 German Law and Economics Association conference, the 2013 Italian Society of Law and Economics (SIDE-ISLE) conference, the 2014 International French Finance Association conference and the 2014 European Association of Law and Economics (EALE) conference for their helpful comments and suggestions. This article was awarded with the Brenno Galli Award for the most promising young scholar paper presented at the SIDE-ISLE 2013 conference. We are also very grateful to our partners and public institutions for their invaluable research assistance in the development of the first version of this article of April 2013.

Appendix

Appendix A1: Bankruptcy laws

Country	Name of the law	Additional sources
Albania	Albanian Bankruptcy Law No. 8901 of 2002	Boga & Associates (Tirana, Albania)
Algeria	Commerce Code of Algeria (2002)
Angola	Decree-Law No. 77 (1986)	Henrique Doroteia – Lawyers, (Lisbon, Portugal)
Argentina	Insolvency and Bankruptcy Law No. 24522 of 1995
Armenia	Law on Bankruptcy of 2007	Armen Melkumyan, Prudence CJSC, (Armenia)
Australia	Corporation Act of 2001
Austria	Insolvency Act of 2010	Federal Ministry of Justice (Austria)
Azerbaijan	Law No. 604 of the Azerbaijan Republic of 1997	LexInfoSys (University of Bremen, Germany)
Bahrain	Bankruptcy and Composition Law of 1987
Bangladesh	Bankruptcy Act No. 10 of 1997
Barbados	Chapter 303 of 2002
Belarus	Law of Belarus on Economic Insolvency No. 423-Z of 2000	Cerha Hempel Spiegelfeld Hlawati FLLC (Minsk, Belarus)
Belgium	2009 Law of Business Survival
Bolivia	Reorganization Law of 2003
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Law on Bankruptcy Proceedings of 2007
Botswana	Chapter 42 of Insolvency Act (1929)	Restructuring and Insolvency, 2009, Law Business Research Ltd. (U.K.)
Brazil	Law No. 11.101 of 2005	Restructuring and Insolvency Multi-jurisdictional Guide, Practical Law Company
Bulgaria	Commerce Law of 1991	Bulgaria Economic Forum
Cameroon	OHADA No. 7 of 1998
Canada	Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act of 1985	Restructuring and Insolvency, 2010, Law Business Research Ltd. (U.K.)
Chile	Law No. 18175 of 1982 amended by the Law No. 20080 of 2005	Americas Restructuring and Insolvency Guide 2008/2009, Globe Business Publishing
China	Bankruptcy Law of 2007	Restructuring and Insolvency Multi-jurisdictional Guide, Practical Law Company
Colombia	Law No. 1116 of 2006
Costa Rica	Commercial Code of Costa Rica (1964)
Croatia	Bankruptcy Law of 2006
Cyprus	Chapter 113 of Company Law
Czech Republic	Act No. 182/2006 on Insolvency and Methods of its Resolution	Peterka & Partners (Prague, Czech Republic)
Denmark	Bankruptcy Law of 1977	Thomas Dahl Pedersen (Copenhagn, Denmark)
		Sj Law (Copenhagn, Denmark)
		Ministry of Justice (Denmark)
Dominican Republic	Law No. 4582 of 1956	Restructuring and Insolvency, 2012, Law Business Research Ltd. (U.K.)
Ecuador	Preventive Contest Act of 1997
Estonia	Reorganization Act of 2004	Ministry of Justice (Estonia)
Finland	Restructuring of Enterprises Act of 1993 updated up to 2007	Restructuring and Insolvency, 2009, Law Business Research Ltd. (U.K.)
France	Commercial Code, Chapter 6, (Sauvegarde Procedure, 2006)
Georgia	Law of Georgia on Insolvency Proceedings of 2007
Germany	Insolvency Statute of 1994	Ministry of Justice (Germany)
Greece	Bankruptcy Code of 2007	Mr. Manolis Fellios, (Athens, Greece)
Greece	Bankruptcy Code of 2007	Restructuring and Insolvency, 2011, Law Business Research Ltd. (U.K.)
Hungary	Act XLIX of 1991 on Bankruptcy and Liquidation Proceedings	Mazars – Audit (Budapest, Hungary)
Iceland	Bankruptcy Act of 1991	Restructuring and Insolvency, 2009, Law Business Research Ltd. (U.K.)
India	Bankruptcy Act of India (1956)	Restructuring and Insolvency, 2012, Law Business Research Ltd. (U.K.)
Indonesia	Law No. 37 of 2004
Ireland	Bankruptcy Act of 1988
Israel	Companies Law No. 5759 of 1999	Restructuring and Insolvency, 2011, Law Business Research Ltd. (U.K.)
Italy	Bankruptcy Law No. 267 (1942)	Restructuring and Insolvency Multi-jurisdictional Guide, Practical Law Company
Jamaica	Companies Act of 2004
Japan	Minjisaiseihou of 1999	Masashi Takahashi, Kojima Law Offices (Tokyo, Japan)
Kazakhstan	Law of Bankruptcy of 1997
Kenya	Bankruptcy Act, Chapter 53 (1930)
Latvia	Insolvency Law of 2010	Ministry of Justice (Latvia)
Lithuania	Law on Restructuring of Enterprises of 2001
Luxembourg	Bankruptcy Law (1886)	Restructuring and Insolvency, 2010, Law Business Research Ltd. (U.K.)
Macedonia	Bankruptcy Law of 2006
Madagascar	Commercial Code (1962)
Malaysia	Bankruptcy Act (1967)
Mexic	Commercial Insolvency Law of 2000	Restructuring and Insolvency, 2011, Law Business Research Ltd. (U.K.)
Moldova	Insolvency Law No. 632/2001
Namibia	Insolvency Act (1965)
Netherlands	Dutch Bankruptcy Act (1986)
New Zealand	Insolvency Act of 2006	Restructuring and Insolvency, 2009, Law Business Research Ltd. (U.K.)
Nigeria	Bankruptcy Act of 2004	Restructuring and Insolvency, 2012, Law Business Research Ltd. (U.K.)
Norway	Insolvency Act of 1984	Ministry of Justice and Public Security
Pakistan	Companies Act of 1984
Panama	Commercial Code (1916)	Americas Restructuring and Insolvency Guide 2008/2009, Globe Business Publishing
Paraguay	Bankruptcy Law No. 154 (1969)
Peru	Law No. 27809 of 2002
Philippines	Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act of 2010
Poland	Law on Bankruptcy and Reorganization of 2003	Juriscope
Portugal	Law No. 53 of 2004	Ministry of Justice (Portugal)
Romania	Insolvency Law No. 85 of 2006
Russia	Federal Law No. 127-FZ/2002
Serbia	Law on Bankruptcy Proceedings of 2003
Singapore	Bankruptcy Act, Chapter 20 (1995)
Slovakia	Act on Bankruptcy and Restructuring of 2006	Restructuring and Insolvency Multi-jurisdictional Guide, Practical Law Company
Slovenia	Financial Operations, Insolvency Proceedings and Compulsory Dissolution Act of 2007	Ministry of Justice and Public Administration (Slovenia)
South Africa	Companies Act No. 61 (1973)	Restructuring and Insolvency, 2009, Law Business Research Ltd. (U.K.)
South Korea	Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act of 2006
Spain	Law No. 22 of 2003
Sri Lanka	Companies Act No. 17 (1982)
Sweden	Reorganization of Business Act of 1996	Restructuring and Insolvency, 2010, Law Business Research Ltd. (U.K.)
Switzerland	Federal Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy (1997)	Ministry of Justice (Switzerland)
Thailand	Bankruptcy Act No. 4 of 1998
Trinidad and Tobago	Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act of 2007
Tunisia	Commercial Code (1959)
Turkey	Execution and Bankruptcy Law (2003)
Uganda	Bankruptcy Act of Uganda (1931)
Ukraine	Law on Renewal of the Debtor’s Solvency or Declaring Its Bankruptcy of 1992
United Arab Emirates	Federal Law No. 18 of 1993
United Kingdom	Entreprise Act of 2002, (Administration Procedure)
United States	U.S. Federal Reform Bankruptcy Act of 1978
Uruguay	Law No. 18387 of 2008
Venezuela	Commercial Code (1955)
Vietnam	Law on Bankruptcy No. 21 of 2004
Zambia	Chapter 82 of Bankruptcy Act (1967)

Appendix A2: Methodology of creating the VTN and the VTV

Case of one-class voting rule: Example of New Zealand

According to the Insolvency Act of New Zealand, article 331 (3) states that “The resolution accepting the proposal must be decided by a majority in number and three-quarters in value of the creditors who: (a) vote and (b) are personally present or are represented at the meeting.” Using this article of the law, we can deduce that the VTN is equal to 0.50 whereas the VTV is equal to 0.75. Moreover, we can observe that the voting process does not require the division of creditors in classes. Thus, the voting rule used in New Zealand is a one-class voting rule.

Case of multiple classes voting rule: Example of Philippines

According to the 2010 Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act of Philippines, section 64 defines the approval conditions of the reorganization plans such that “The Plan shall be deemed rejected unless approved by all classes of creditors whose rights are adversely modified or affected by the Plan. For purposes of this section, the Plan is deemed to have been approved by a class of creditors if members of the said class holding more than fifty percent (50 %) of the total claims of the said class vote in favor of the Plan.” This section of the Philippine law specifies that the plan must be approved by all classes of creditors. Hence, the voting rule is a multiple classes voting rule. In addition, the VTV used to obtain the approval of a class of creditors is equal to 0.50. Nevertheless, we can observe that the voting rule does not use any numerosity requirement. Consequently, the VTN of the Philippine law is nil.

Appendix B: Definition of variables

Variable	Definition
Voting Threshold Number (VTN)	The minimum percentage of voting right holders that the creditors have to exceed so that the reorganization plan or amicable settlement is accepted by creditors or by the class of creditors when the voting process groups the creditors in classes. The threshold is included in the voting rule of the bankruptcy law. Ranges from 0 to 1.
Voting Threshold Value (VTV)	The minimum percentage of the total debt that creditors must exceed so that the reorganization plan or proposal is accepted by creditors or by the class of creditors when the rule imposes voting in classes. The threshold coexists with VTN. Ranges from 0 to 1.
Voting in Classes	Dummy variable equal to 1 when the voting rule is a multiple classes rule. A multiple classes rule implies that a plan is accepted by the creditors if every class of creditors or a majority of classes voted in favor of the plan.
Court’s Power	Dummy equal to 1 when the court or the judge has the legal right to overcome the voting decision of creditors by using legal means provided by the insolvency law.
Secured Partial	Dummy variable that takes into account the secured creditors’ right to vote on the unsecured part of their debt whenever their collateral is insufficient to cover the total value of their claim.
Secured Status	Dummy variable equal to 1 if the bankruptcy law provides the right of secured creditors to vote as unsecured if they accept loss of their preferential status. The preferential position enables payment of the secured creditor’s claim before the other claims of unsecured creditors.
Legal Origin	Dummy variables that identify four main origins of the bankruptcy act or law of each country, e. g. English, French, German and Nordic. Sources: Djankov et al. (2008) and Woods (2007).
GNP per capita	The average gross national product per capita between 2007 and 2010 (Atlas Method). Source: The World Bank’s Open Data.
Recovery Rate	Ratio between the amounts actually paid to the creditors by a firm and the value of the total debt. Depreciation of the furniture and the deduction of insolvency costs are included. Considers the present value of the debt recovered. Source: The World Bank, Doing Business Project 2012.
Liquidation	Dummy variable equal to 1 if the legal procedure used to settle the creditors’ claims is a liquidation procedure, and 0 otherwise. Source: Djankov et al. (2008).
Foreclosure	Dummy variable equal to 1 if a foreclosure procedure was used against the business, and 0 otherwise. Source: Djankov et al. (2008).
Duration	The period of time measured in years starting from the firm’s default until the payment of some or all of the money owed to the bank. Appeals and extensions of the procedure are taken into account. Source: The World Bank, Doing Business Project 2012.
Young Law	Dummy variable that equals 1 if the bankruptcy law has been adopted since 2004.
D_VTN	Dummy variable that equals 1 if the voting rule has a numerosity requirement, and 0 otherwise.
INTERF(0.75)	Dummy variable that equals 1 if the bankruptcy voting rule has a VTV equal to 0.75 and a VTN equal to 0, and 0 otherwise.
Creditor rights	The creditor rights index ranges from 0 to 4. A score of one is accorded for each valid aspect of the following: (1) no automatic stay on secured assets in the case of a reorganization procedure, (2) secured creditors are first to be paid in bankruptcy, (3) the creditors’ consent is required to file for reorganization and (4) the management does not keep its position during bankruptcy. Source: La Porta et al. (1998).

Appendix C: Data of unsecured creditors

Country	VTN	VTV	Voting in Classes	Court’s Power	Secured Partial	Secured Status
English legal origin
Australia	0.50	0.75	0	1	0	0
Bahrain	0.50	0.66	0	0	0	0
Bangladesh	0	0.66	0	0	0	0
Barbados	0.50	0.66	1	0	1	0
Botswana	0.75	0.75	0	0	1	0
Canada	0.50	0.66	1	0	0	0
Cyprus	0.50	0.75	0	0	0	0
India	0.50	0.75	0	0	0	0
Ireland	0.60	0.60	0	0	1	1
Israel	0.50	0.75	0	0	0	0
Jamaica	0.50	0.75	0	0	1	0
Japan	0.50	0.50	0	0	1	0
Kenya	0.50	0.75	0	0	1	0
Malaysia	0.50	0.75	0	0	1	1
Namibia	0.75	0.75	0	0	1	0
New Zealand	0.50	0.75	0	0	1	1
Nigeria	0.50	0.66	0	0	1	0
Pakistan	0.50	0.75	1	0	0	0
Philippines	0	0.50	1	1	1	0
Singapore	0.50	0.75	0	0	0	0
South Africa	0.75	0.75	0	0	0	0
South Korea	0	0.66	1	1	0	0
Sri Lanka	0.50	0.75	1	0	0	0
Thailand	0.50	0.75	1	0	0	0
Trinidad and Tobago	0.50	0.66	1	0	0	0
Uganda	0.50	0.75	0	0	1	1
United Kingdom	0	0.50	0	0	1	0
United States	0.50	0.66	1	1	0	0
Zambia	0.50	0.75	0	0	1	1
French legal origin
Algeria	0.50	0.66	0	0	0	1
Angola	0.50	0.66	0	0	0	0
Argentina	0.50	0.66	1	0	0	1
Azerbaijan	0.50	0.50	0	0	0	1
Belarus	0	0.50	0	1	0	0
Belgium	0.50	0.50	0	0	0	0
Bolivia	0	0.66	0	0	1	0
Brazil	0	0.50	1	1	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0.50	1	0	0	0
Cameroon	0.50	0.50	0	1	0	0
Chile	0.66	0.75	0	0	0	1
Colombia	0	0.50	1	0	0	0
Costa Rica	0	0.75	0	0	0	1
Dominican Republic	0	0.66	0	0	1	0
Ecuador	0	0.75	0	0	0	0
France	0	0.66	1	1	1	0
Indonesia	0.50	0.66	0	0	1	0
Italy	0	0.50	1	1	1	0
Kazakhstan	0	0.50	1	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0.50	0.50	0	0	0	0
Madagascar	0.50	0.66	0	0	0	1
Mexico	0	0.50	0	0	0	0
Moldova	0.50	0.50	1	1	0	0
Netherlands	0.50	0.50	0	1	1	0
Panama	0	0.75	0	0	0	0
Paraguay	0.75	0.66	0	0	0	1
Peru	0	0.66	0	1	0	0
Portugal	0.50	0.66	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	0.50	1	0	0	0
Russia	0	0.50	0	1	0	0
Spain	0.50	0.50	0	1	1	0
Switzerland	0.50	0.66	0	0	1	0
Tunisia	0.50	0.66	0	0	0	1
Turkey	0.50	0.66	0	0	1	0
United Arab Emirates	0.50	0.66	0	0	0	1
Uruguay	0	0.50	0	1	0	1
Venezuela	0.66	0.66	0	0	0	1
Vietnam	0.50	0.66	0	0	0	0
German legal origin
Albania	0.50	0.50	1	1	0	0
Armenia	0.50	0	0	0	1	0
Austria	0.50	0.50	0	0	0	0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	0.50	1	0	1	1
China	0.50	0.66	1	1	0	0
Croatia	0	0.66	0	0	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0.50	1	1	0	0
Estonia	0.50	0.66	1	1	0	0
Germany	0.50	0.50	1	1	1	0
Hungary	0	0.50	0	0	0	0
Latvia	0	0.50	1	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0.66	0	0	0	0
Macedonia	0.50	0.50	1	1	0	0
Poland	0.50	0.66	1	0	0	0
Serbia	0	0.50	1	0	0	0
Slovakia	0.50	0.50	1	1	0	0
Slovenia	0.50	0.60	0	0	0	0
Ukraine	0	0.50	0	0	1	0
Nordic legal origin
Denmark	0	0.50	0	0	1	0
Finland	0.50	0.50	1	1	0	0
Iceland	0.60	0.60	0	0	1	0
Norway	0.60	0.60	0	0	1	0
Sweden	0.60	0.60	0	0	1	0

Appendix D: Data of secured creditors

Country	VTN	VTV	Country	VTN	VTV
English legal origin			German legal origin
Australia	0.50	0.75	Albania	0.50	0.50
Bangladesh	0	0.66	Austria	0.50	0.50
Canada	0.50	0.66	China	0.50	0.66
Cyprus	0.50	0.75	Croatia	0	0.66
India	0.50	0.75	Czech Republic	0	0.50
Israel	0.50	0.75	Estonia	0.50	0.66
Pakistan	0.50	0.75	Hungary	0	0.50
Singapore	0.50	0.75	Latvia	0	0.66
South Africa	0.75	0.75	Lithuania	0	0.66
South Korea	0	0.75	Macedonia	0.50	0.50
Sri Lanka	0.50	0.75	Poland	0.50	0.66
Thailand	0.50	0.75	Serbia	0	0.50
Trinidad and Tobago	0.50	0.66	Slovakia	1	1
United States	0.50	0.66
French legal origin			Nordic legal origin
Angola	0.50	0.66	Finland	0.50	0.50
Belarus	0	0.50
Belgium	0.50	0.50
Brazil	0	0.50
Bulgaria	0	0.50
Cameroon	0.50	0.50
Colombia	0	0.50
Ecuador	0	0.75
Kazakhstan	0	0.50
Luxembourg	0.50	0.50
Mexico	0	0.50
Moldova	0.50	0.50
Panama	0	0.75
Peru	0	0.66
Portugal	0.50	0.66
Romania	0	0.50
Russia	1	1

Appendix E: Correlation matrix of unsecured creditors

	VTN	VTV	Voting in Classes	Court’s Power	Secured Partial	Secured Status	English origin	French origin	German origin	Nordic origin
VTV	0.314***
	(0.003)
Voting in Classes	–0.191*	–0.220**
	(0.071)	(0.037)
Court’s Power	–0.160	–0.317***	0.396***
	(0.132)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Secured Partial	0.089	–0.076	–0.215**	–0.103
	(0.404)	(0.476)	(0.041)	(0.334)
Secured Status	0.186*	0.204*	–0.221**	–0.218**	0.009
	(0.079)	(0.054)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.936)
English origin	0.291***	0.489***	–0.034	–0.186*	0.201*	–0.029
	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.753)	(0.079)	(0.058)	(0.786)
French origin	–0.204*	–0.117	–0.175*	0.066	–0.194*	0.220**	–0.589***
	(0.053)	(0.273)	(0.099)	(0.534)	(0.068)	(0.038)	(0.000)
German origin	–0.146	–0.369***	0.295***	0.153	–0.129	–0.170	–0.345***	–0.427***
	(0.170)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.150)	(0.227)	(0.109)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Nordic origin	0.102	–0.102	–0.069	–0.031	0.233**	–0.117	–0.167	–0.207**	–0.121
	(0.339)	(0.339)	(0.521)	(0.773)	(0.027)	(0.272)	(0.115)	(0.049)	(0.255)
GNP per capita	–0.006	–0.178*	–0.061	0.128	0.004	–0.183*	–0.119	–0.090	0.089	0.283***
	(0.955)	(0.093)	(0.570)	(0.228)	(0.973)	(0.085)	(0.263)	(0.396)	(0.405)	(0.007)

Notes: The numbers in parentheses are the p-values.

represents the significance at 1 % level,
represents the significance at 5 % level and
represents the significance at 10 % level.

Appendix F: Correlation matrix of secured creditors

	VTN	VTV	Voting in Classes	Court’s Power	English origin	French origin	German origin
VTV	0.495***
	(0.001)
Voting in Classes	–0.191*	–0.167
	(0.071)	(0.274)
Court’s Power	0.202	–0.007	0.262*
	(0.182)	(0.960)	(0.082)
English origin	0.277*	0.461***	–0.015	–0.198
	(0.065)	(0.001)	(0.922)	(0.192)
French origin	–0.250*	–0.250*	–0.247	–0.004	–0.524***
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.103)	(0.978)	(0.000)
German origin	–0.044	–0.112	0.231	0.141	–0.429***	–0.497***
	(0.771)	(0.465)	(0.127)	(0.355)	(0.003)	(0.001)
GNP per capita	0.127	0.026	–0.056	–0.02	0.006	–0.172	0.122
	(0.407)	(0.868)	(0.715)	(0.989)	(0.969)	(0.259)	(0.426)

Notes: The numbers in parentheses are the p-values.

represents the significance at 1 % level,
represents the significance at 5 % level and
represents the significance at 10 % level.

Appendix G: Correlation matrix of the recovery rate of the creditors’ total debt and the bankruptcy voting conditions

	Recovery rate	D_VTN	INTERF(0.75)	Secured Status	Voting in Classes	Court’s Power	GNP per capita	Liquidation	Foreclosure	Duration
D_VTN	0.273**
	(0.022)
INTERF (0.75)	–0.231*	–0.267**
	(0.055)	(0.025)
Secured Status	–0.192	0.152	0.080
	(0.110)	(0.209)	(0.509)
Voting in Classes	–0.004	–0.144	–0.158	–0.203*
	(0.973)	(0.233)	(0.192)	(0.093)
Court’s Power	0.106	–0.084	–0.134	–0.221**	0.386***
	(0.381)	(0.492)	(0.269)	(0.066)	(0.000)
GNP per capita	0.739***	0.173	–0.139	–0.094	–0.081	0.125
	(0.000)	(0.151)	(0.252)	(0.438)	(0.504)	(0.304)
Liquidation	0.032	0.046	–0.134	–0.139	0.057	0.090	0.119
	(0.792)	(0.703)	(0.269)	(0.250)	(0.642)	(0.459)	(0.327)
Foreclosure	–0.040	0.038	0.045	0.243**	–0.214*	–0.137	–0.052	–0.358***
	(0.744)	(0.754)	(0.714)	(0.042)	(0.076)	(0.258)	(0.666)	(0.002)
Duration	–0.802***	–0.180	0.240**	0.075	0.038	–0.040	–0.533***	0.013	–0.105
	(0.000)	(0.136)	(0.046)	(0.536)	(0.756)	(0.741)	(0.000)	(0.918)	(0.386)
Young Law	–0.024	–0.071	–0.148	–0.021	0.240**	0.164	–0.154	–0.106	0.242**	0.127
	(0.847)	(0.561)	(0.221)	(0.862)	(0.045)	(0.176)	(0.203)	(0.383)	(0.043)	(0.293)
Creditor rights	0.122	0.132	–0.066	–0.029	–0.135	0.009	0.152	0.287**	0.334***	–0.122
	(0.316)	(0.274)	(0.586)	(0.810)	(0.263)	(0.942)	(0.208)	(0.016)	(0.004)	(0.316)

Notes: The total number of observations of the subsample is 70. The numbers in parentheses are the p-values.

represents the significance at 1 % level,
represents the significance at 5 % level and
represents the significance at 10 % level.

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Published Online: 2016-7-2

Published in Print: 2017-3-1

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Articles in the same Issue

https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2014-0063

Keywords for this article

bankruptcy; reorganization; severity; voting rules