Ideology and Strategy among Politicians: The Case of Judicial Independence

Dror Brenner; Alon Cohen

doi:10.1515/rle-2015-0038

Article

Ideology and Strategy among Politicians: The Case of Judicial Independence

Dror Brenner and Alon Cohen

Published/Copyright: April 13, 2016

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From the journal Review of Law & Economics Volume 12 Issue 2

Abstract

Politicians act strategically. In the face of competition they modify their decisions in order to restrict the latitude of their potential successors. On the other hand, politicians have ideological preferences that also affect their decisions. The literature, however, has neglected to fully explore the interaction between these two considerations. This work offers such an analysis, using an empirical investigation of judicial independence as an example. We show that when the interaction between ideological considerations and strategic ones is accounted for, the impact of political competition on the level of judicial independence that politicians prefer – may in fact be opposite to the traditional wisdom.

Keywords: judicial independence; political considerations; ideology and strategy

Acknowledgments

We thank Andrew Hanssen for kindly providing us with his data and addressing our questions. We were able to replicate his results and extend them in order to test our theory. We are in debt to Mark Gradstein for his insightful remarks and suggestions.

Appendix

Table 3:

Summary statistics.

	Mean	S.D
Gallup diversity index	19.61	(9.60)
Racial bias index	0.30	(0.09)
Judicial variables
Partisan elections	0.28	(0.45)
Merit plan	0.21	(0.41)
Political variables
Majority percentage	0.71	(0.14)
Ranney index	0.80	(0.13)
One party controls both houses	0.86	(0.35)
Change in party control	0.58	(0.77)
Policy distance	0.33	(0.28)
One party	0.33	(0.47)
Control variables
Population (in 1000s)	4134.97	(4385.53)
Urbanization	63.55	(15.54)
Income per capita	29.05	(72.98)
Fraction age >65	0.10	(0.03)
Fraction age between 5–17	0.23	(0.03)
Northeast	0.15	(0.36)
Midwest	0.15	(0.35)
South	0.46	(0.50)
West	0.24	(0.43)

Table 4:

Levels/rank of conservatism indices.

	Level		Rank^			Level		Rank^
	GDI	RBI	GDI	RBI		GDI	RBI	GDI	RBI
Alabama	31.4	0.35	45	35	Montana	22.6	0.4	28	44
Alaska	20.8	0	26	1	Nevada	19.6	0.12	24	5
Arizona	19	0.29	21	23	New Hampshire	14.9	0.46	16	49
Arkansas	30.3	0.3	42	26	New Jersey	10.4	0.25	12	9
California	9.1	0.15	10	6	New Mexico	20.2	0.27	25	14
Colorado	10.4	0.3	13	25	New York	4	0.11	4	4
Connecticut	4.9	0.27	6	15	North Carolina	23.7	0.32	30	30
Delaware	10.3	0.24	11	7	North Dakota	31	0.43	43	45
Florida	19.5	0.29	23	22	Ohio	19.5	0.28	22	18
Georgia	26.2	0.34	35	34	Oklahoma	28.7	0.35	39	36
Hawaii	4.3	0.07	5	2	Oregon	8.2	0.33	8	32
Idaho	33.6	0.37	48	40	Pennsylvania	18.4	0.25	19	10
Illinois	14	0.26	15	12	Rhode Island	0.6	0.27	2	17
Indiana	22.8	0.35	29	37	South Carolina	29.3	0.24	41	8
Iowa	25.7	0.39	34	43	South Dakota	32.6	0.3	46	27
Kansas	27	0.28	37	19	Tennessee	27.7	0.39	38	42
Kentucky	24.4	0.26	31	11	Texas	26.9	0.32	36	28
Louisiana	31.1	0.33	44	33	Utah	28.9	0.37	40	41
Maine	13.3	0.45	14	47	Vermont	0.2	0.36	1	38
Maryland	8.4	0.27	9	16	Virginia	19	0.3	20	24
Massachusetts	1.8	0.28	3	21	Washington	7.1	0.1	7	3
Michigan	16.2	0.26	18	13	West Virginia	25	0.45	32	46
Minnesota	15.6	0.32	17	29	Wisconsin	21.8	0.36	27	39
Mississippi	36.7	0.33	49	31	Wyoming	32.9	0.46	47	48
Missouri	25.5	0.28	33	20

^[1]^[2]^[3]

Table 5:

Retention method, regional affiliation and ideology index.

State	Retention	Region	GDI	Change	State	Retention	Region	GDI	Change
Alabama	PE	S	1	No	Montana	NPE	W	1	No
Alaska	MP	W	1	No	Nevada	NPE	W	1	No
Arizona	MP	W	1	Yes	New Hampshire	GA*	NE	0	No
Arkansas	PE	S	1	No	New Jersey	GA	NE	0	No
California	MP	W	0	No	New Mexico	MP	W	1	Yes
Colorado	MP	W	0	Yes	New York	GA	NE	0	No
Connecticut	LA	NE	0	No	North Carolina	PE	S	1	No
Delaware	GA	S	0	No	North Dakota	NPE	MW	1	No
Florida	MP	S	1	Yes	Ohio	NPE	MW	1	No
Georgia	NPE	S	1	No	Oklahoma	MP	S	1	Yes
Hawaii	MP	W	0	No	Oregon	NPE	W	0	No
Idaho	NPE	W	1	No	Pennsylvania	MP	NE	1	Yes
Illinois	MP	MW	0	Yes	Rhode Island	LA*	NE	0	No
Indiana	MP	MW	1	Yes	South Carolina	LA	S	1	No
Iowa	MP	MW	1	Yes	South Dakota	MP	MW	1	Yes
Kansas	MP	MW	1	Yes	Tennessee	PE	S	1	No
Kentucky	NPE	S	1	No	Texas	PE	S	1	No
Louisiana	NPE	S	1	No	Utah	MP	W	1	Yes
Maine	GA	NE	0	No	Vermont	GA	NE	0	No
Maryland	MP	S	0	Yes	Virginia	LA	S	1	No
Massachusetts	GA*	NE	0	No	Washington	NPE	MW	0	No
Michigan	NPE	MW	0	No	West Virginia	PE	S	1	No
Minnesota	NPE	MW	0	No	Wisconsin	NPE	W	1	No
Mississippi	PE	S	1	No	Wyoming	MP	W	1	Yes
Missouri	MP	MW	1	No

^[4]

Table 6:

Heterogeneous effect of political competition on retention method: multinomial logit model, USA 1950–1990.

Dependent	PE=1		MP=1		PE=1		MP=1
	GDI=1	GDI=0	GDI=1	GDI=0	GDI=1	GDI=0	GDI=1	GDI=0
Majority size	1.073***	–0.433*	–0.875*	–0.044
	(0.389)	(0.249)	(0.492)	(0.278)
Single party	0.077	0.024	0.118**	0.043
	(0.066)	(0.019)	(0.059)	(0.027)
Change in control	–0.046*	–0.011	0.029	0.006
	(0.028)	(0.010)	(0.031)	(0.010)
Ranney index					–1.006**	0.119	0.635	–0.184
					(0.400)	(0.264)	(0.495)	(0.276)
GDI	0.183**	0.183**	0.186**	0.186**	0.161*	0.161*	0.188**	0.188**
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Policy distance	0.109	0.047	0.274	0.113	–0.041	0.028	0.358	0.13
	(0.290)	(0.084)	(0.261)	(0.124)	(0.317)	(0.156)	(0.256)	(0.121)
One party	–0.011	0.018	0.276	0.123	–0.083	0.001	0.313*	0.132
	(0.137)	(0.041)	(0.173)	(0.115)	(0.138)	(0.072)	(0.172)	(0.112)
Population (’000)	0.000*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000**	0.000*	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Urbanization	–0.006	–0.001	0.012**	0.004	–0.008*	–0.002	0.013***	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Income per capita	0.000	0.000	–0.002	–0.001	0.000	0.000	–0.002	–0.001
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Fraction >65 age	0.489	0.179	0.729	0.320	0.204	0.233	0.975	0.383
	(1.793)	(0.457)	(1.762)	(0.628)	(2.006)	(0.911)	(1.901)	(0.668)
Fraction age 5–17	2.131**	0.442	–1.973*	–0.507	2.175**	0.825	–1.857*	–0.487
	(0.880)	(0.361)	(1.068)	(0.413)	–0.937	–0.636	–1.02	–0.387
Northeast	0.071	0.015	–0.068	–0.018	0.099	0.041	–0.068	–0.016
	(0.183)	(0.052)	(0.132)	(0.051)	(0.209)	(0.112)	(0.133)	(0.050)
Midwest	–0.153	–0.037	–0.024	–0.021	–0.168	–0.074	–0.011	–0.017
	(0.117)	(0.038)	(0.164)	(0.055)	(0.126)	(0.071)	(0.166)	(0.056)
South	0.251*	0.058	–0.198	–0.049	0.258*	0.104	–0.211	–0.056
	(0.135)	(0.048)	(0.171)	(0.065)	(0.137)	(0.085)	(0.166)	(0.063)
N	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007

^[5]

Table 7:

Heterogeneous effect of political competition on retention method: multinomial logit model, USA 1950–1990.

Dependent	PE=1		MP=1		PE=1		MP=1
	GDI=1	GDI=0	GDI=1	GDI=0	GDI=1	GDI=0	GDI=1	GDI=0
Majority size	1.025***	–0.827*	–0.622	–0.081
	(0.326)	(0.440)	(0.393)	(0.414)
Single party	0.065	0.057	0.104**	0.079*
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.042)
Change in control	–0.046	–0.037	0.028	0.019
	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.027)
Ranney index					–1.164***	0.664	0.393	–0.191
					(0.330)	(0.410)	(0.388)	(0.418)
RBI	0.034	0.034	0.066	0.066	0.041	0.041	0.080	0.080
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.100)	(0.100)
Policy distance	0.149	0.142	0.324	0.255	0.056	0.075	0.381	0.282
	(0.231)	(0.204)	(0.230)	(0.205)	(0.259)	(0.217)	(0.243)	(0.204)
One party	–0.016	0.003	0.285*	0.230	–0.074	–0.04	0.321**	0.248
	(0.115)	(0.095)	(0.154)	(0.170)	(0.118)	(0.094)	(0.157)	(0.170)
Population (’000)	0.000	0.000**	0.000	0.000	0.000*	0.000**	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Urbanization	–0.006	–0.004*	0.008*	0.006**	–0.007*	–0.005*	0.009*	0.006**
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Income per capita	–0.001	0.000	–0.001	–0.001	0.000	0.000	–0.001	–0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Fraction >65 age	0.185	0.183	0.525	0.411	0.045	0.088	0.676	0.497
	(1.324)	(1.090)	(1.751)	(1.284)	(1.594)	(1.273)	(1.949)	(1.337)
Fraction age 5–17	2.230***	1.789	–1.003	–0.640	2.214***	1.761	–0.974	–0.569
	(0.694)	(1.143)	(0.855)	(0.686)	–0.695	–1.135	–0.846	–0.647
Northeast	0.061	0.046	–0.069	–0.049	0.088	0.068	–0.067	–0.044
	(0.153)	(0.134)	(0.110)	(0.091)	(0.170)	(0.154)	(0.117)	(0.090)
Midwest	–0.118	–0.095	–0.007	–0.011	–0.127	–0.102	0.008	–0.002
	(0.096)	(0.087)	(0.169)	(0.127)	(0.102)	(0.091)	(0.177)	(0.127)
South	0.247**	0.203	–0.105	–0.067	0.266**	0.216	–0.122	–0.073
	(0.120)	(0.151)	(0.128)	(0.114)	(0.119)	(0.151)	(0.131)	(0.112)
N	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007

^[6]

Table 8:

Heterogeneous effect of political competition on retention method (median partition): multinomial logit model, USA 1950–1990.

Dependent	PE=1		MP=1		PE=1		MP=1
	GDI=1	GDI=0	GDI=1	GDI=0	GDI=1	GDI=0	GDI=1	GDI=0
Majority size	1.269**	0.009	–1.239*	0.002
	(0.493)	(0.343)	(0.652)	(0.089)
Single party	0.044	0.036	0.140*	0.013
	(0.096)	(0.029)	(0.085)	(0.011)
Change in control	–0.065*	–0.019	0.049	0.002
	(0.034)	(0.017)	(0.040)	(0.004)
Ranney index					–1.095**	–0.265	0.969	–0.095
					(0.474)	(0.289)	(0.611)	(0.121)
GDI	0.213**	0.213**	0.387***	0.387***	0.240**	0.240**	0.383***	0.383***
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.105)	(0.105)
Policy distance	–0.186	–0.015	0.328	0.025	–0.356	–0.053	0.466	0.036
	(0.326)	(0.115)	(0.385)	(0.043)	(0.357)	(0.123)	(0.374)	(0.048)
One party	–0.144	0.007	0.334	0.039	–0.205	–0.010	0.365*	0.046
	(0.139)	(0.053)	(0.213)	(0.051)	(0.144)	(0.051)	(0.208)	(0.055)
Population (’000)	0.000*	0.000*	0.000	0.000	0.000**	0.000*	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Urbanization	–0.013**	0.000	0.028***	0.002	–0.015**	0	0.028***	0.003*
	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.002)	–0.006	–0.002	–0.008	–0.001
Income per capita	0.000	0.000	–0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	–0.001	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Fraction >65 age	–0.635	0.014	1.421	0.119	–0.757	0.007	1.507	0.144
	(2.330)	(0.740)	(2.370)	(0.187)	(2.478)	(0.732)	(2.504)	(0.224)
Fraction age 5–17	2.446***	0.410	–3.292***	–0.223	2.388**	0.37	–3.072**	–0.235
	(0.928)	(0.486)	(1.190)	(0.218)	(0.953)	(0.449)	(1.202)	(0.212)
Northeast	0.082	–0.014	–0.266*	–0.018	0.113	–0.007	–0.262*	–0.020
	(0.224)	(0.068)	(0.153)	(0.017)	(0.247)	(0.077)	(0.152)	(0.017)
Midwest	–0.171	–0.073	–0.215	–0.019	–0.181	–0.074	–0.198	–0.022
	(0.153)	(0.052)	(0.169)	(0.017)	(0.165)	(0.055)	(0.167)	(0.016)
South	0.315**	0.043	–0.473***	–0.040	0.333**	0.04	–0.480***	–0.047
	(0.140)	(0.066)	(0.167)	(0.034)	(0.143)	(0.069)	(0.155)	(0.036)
N	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007

^[7]

Table 9:

Heterogeneous effect of political competition on retention method (median partition): multinomial logit model, USA 1950–1990.

Dependent	PE=1		MP=1		PE=1		MP=1
	GDI=1	GDI=0	GDI=1	GDI=0	GDI=1	GDI=0	GDI=1	GDI=0
Majority size	1.058***	–0.358	–0.452	–0.271
	(0.364)	(0.521)	(0.411)	(0.354)
Single party	0.061	0.056	0.102**	0.103**
	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Change in control	–0.047	–0.042*	0.027	0.026
	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.031)
Ranney index					–1.174***	0.239	0.335	–0.092
					(0.368)	(0.493)	(0.389)	(0.374)
RBI	0.019	0.019	0.001	0.001	0.033	0.033	0.008	0.008
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.119)	(0.119)
Policy distance	0.115	0.107	0.321	0.324	0.016	0.021	0.368	0.361
	(0.247)	(0.237)	(0.214)	(0.235)	(0.279)	(0.244)	(0.227)	(0.234)
One party	–0.014	–0.012	0.254*	0.254	–0.074	–0.059	0.283*	0.276
	(0.122)	(0.107)	(0.144)	(0.175)	(0.126)	(0.102)	(0.147)	(0.174)
Population (’000)	0.000	0.000*	0.000	0.000	0.000*	0.000**	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Urbanization	–0.005	–0.005	0.007	0.006*	–0.006	–0.005	0.007	0.007*
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	–0.004	–0.003	–0.006	–0.004
Income per capita	–0.001	0.000	–0.001	–0.001	0.000	0.000	–0.001	–0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Fraction >65 age	0.303	0.282	0.959	0.968	0.244	0.231	1.073	1.063
	(1.514)	(1.365)	(2.222)	(2.099)	(1.650)	(1.398)	(2.458)	(2.269)
Fraction age 5–17	2.078***	1.894*	–0.716	–0.663	2.070***	1.787*	–0.652	–0.546
	(0.712)	(1.001)	(0.880)	(0.897)	(0.712)	(1.026)	(0.894)	(0.890)
Northeast	0.052	0.048	–0.068	–0.067	0.079	0.068	–0.069	–0.064
	(0.174)	(0.171)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.190)	(0.183)	(0.095)	(0.092)
Midwest	–0.140	–0.127	–0.025	–0.028	–0.139	–0.119	–0.011	–0.016
	(0.106)	(0.091)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.114)	(0.094)	(0.147)	(0.143)
South	0.230*	0.212	–0.095	–0.090	0.258**	0.226	–0.115	–0.103
	(0.126)	(0.164)	(0.102)	(0.115)	(0.126)	(0.166)	(0.103)	(0.116)
N	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007	1007

^[8]

Table 10:

Heterogeneous effect of political competition on retention method (placebo test): multinomial logit model, USA 1950–1990.

Panel A: Partisan elections (N=1007)	AH	IPC
Majority size (Restricted model)	0.667**
	(0.308)
Majority size for the 1^st group		1.007**
		(0.394)
Majority size for the 2^nd group		0.487
		(0.399)
Difference		–0.519
		(0.525)
Ranney index (Restricted model)	–0.698**
	(0.308)
Ranney index for the 1^st group		–0.981***
		(0.360)
Ranney index for the 2^nd group		–0.639
		(0.425)
Difference		0.343
		(0.522)
Panel B: Merit plan (N=1007)	AH	IPC
Majority size (Restricted model)	–0.392
	(0.266)
Majority size for the 1^st group		–0.309
		(0.345)
Majority size for the 2^nd group		–0.101
		(0.108)
Difference		0.208
		(0.366)
Ranney index (Restricted model)	0.134
	(0.299)
Ranney index for the 1^st group		–0.045
		(0.370)
Ranney index for the 2^nd group		0.109
		(0.130)
Difference		0.154
		(0.386)

^[9]

Table 11:

Indication for selection into the fixed-effect subsample states.

	All Sample		FE Sample		Difference
	Mean	SE	Mean	SE	Change	SD
GDI	18.62	0.36	22.04	0.56	3.42	0.67
RBI	0.29	0.00	0.32	0.01	0.03	0.01
Ranney index	0.79	0.00	0.83	0.01	0.04	0.01
Majority size	0.72	0.01	0.67	0.01	–0.05	0.01
Retention method	0.48	0.03	1.26	0.04	0.78	0.05
Single party	0.86	0.01	0.87	0.02	0.02	0.02
Change in control	0.57	0.03	0.60	0.04	0.03	0.05
Policy distance	0.31	0.01	0.38	0.02	0.07	0.02
One party	0.36	0.02	0.27	0.03	–0.09	0.03
Population (’000s)	4260.71	164.16	3830.01	255.64	–430.71	303.81
Urbanization	61.95	0.57	67.42	0.90	5.47	1.06
Income per capita	32.49	2.73	20.71	4.25	–11.78	5.05
Fraction >65 age	0.10	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00
Fraction age 5–17	0.23	0.00	0.23	0.00	0.00	0.00
Northeast	0.13	0.01	0.21	0.02	0.08	0.02
Midwest	0.18	0.01	0.07	0.02	–0.11	0.02
South	0.47	0.02	0.43	0.03	–0.04	0.03

Table 12:

Replicating AH estimation for the entire sample and the FE subsample: multinomial logit model, USA 1950–1990.

Dependent	PE	PE	PE	PE	MP	MP	MP	MP
Majority size	0.668**	1.836***			–0.392	–1.846***
	(0.309)	(0.676)			(0.266)	(0.671)
Single party	0.045	–0.035			0.100***	0.033
	(0.067)	(0.162)			(0.037)	(0.164)
Change in control	–0.044*	–0.184**			0.027	0.185**
	(0.025)	(0.083)			(0.027)	(0.083)
Ranney index			–0.699**	–1.413**			0.135	1.431**
			(0.308)	(0.586)			(0.299)	(0.580)
Policy distance	0.024	–0.094	–0.056	–0.294	0.327	0.104	0.383*	0.304
	(0.256)	(0.469)	(0.265)	(0.536)	(0.208)	(0.470)	(0.215)	(0.535)
One party	–0.038	–0.262	–0.080	–0.308	0.258	0.268	0.279*	0.314
	(0.113)	(0.213)	(0.112)	(0.210)	(0.158)	(0.210)	(0.156)	(0.208)
Population (’000s)	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	–0.000***	0.000	–0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Urbanization	–0.007*	–0.044***	–0.007*	–0.042***	0.007*	0.044***	0.007**	0.042***
	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.013)
Income per capita	0.000	0.008***	0.000	0.006**	–0.001	–0.008***	–0.001	–0.006**
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Fraction >65 age	0.774	–18.966**	0.476	–19.209**	0.904	19.255**	1.072	19.473**
	(1.504)	(8.902)	(1.624)	(8.540)	(2.125)	(8.940)	(2.360)	(8.600)
Fraction age 5–17	2.334***	6.076***	2.101***	4.518*	–0.801	–6.287***	–0.625	–4.708*
	(0.800)	(2.304)	(0.771)	(2.469)	(0.852)	(2.403)	(0.879)	(2.595)
Northeast	0.062	0.171	0.077	0.202	–0.065	–0.186	–0.060	–0.217
	(0.189)	(0.182)	(0.194)	(0.182)	(0.089)	(0.188)	(0.095)	(0.186)
Midwest	–0.156	–0.126	–0.153	–0.064	–0.018	0.133	–0.013	0.070
	(0.099)	(0.126)	(0.101)	(0.118)	(0.135)	(0.125)	(0.142)	(0.117)
South	0.194	–0.050	0.220*	0.035	–0.089	0.048	–0.102	–0.037
	(0.132)	(0.226)	(0.130)	(0.239)	(0.110)	(0.227)	(0.112)	(0.238)
N	1007	294	1007	294	1007	294	1007	294

^[10]

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Published Online: 2016-4-13

Published in Print: 2016-7-1

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Articles in the same Issue

https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2015-0038

Keywords for this article

judicial independence; political considerations; ideology and strategy