Abstract
Fines are an efficient method of sanctioning since the burden on the taxpayer for enforcing it is low and the offender is transferring wealth to society. However, using law-and-economics analysis, this paper suggests that the day-fine is a superior model to other forms of fines. This pecuniary measure takes into account the income of the offender and the severity of the offense. Consequently, criminals with different socioeconomic status committing the same crime would pay the same portion of their wealth but not the same absolute amount of money. Using this structure, the day-fine has a potential to deter equally both the rich and the poor and to avoid the costly sanction of imprisonment.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Michael Faure, Christoph Engel, Louis Visscher, Paul Mevis, Thomas Ulen and an anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments. In addition, I am grateful to the participants of the 1st Topics Workshop in Criminology at Erasmus University Rotterdam, and faculty seminars at Bologna University and at Erasmus University Rotterdam for their useful suggestions. Lastly, I would like to express my gratitude to Jaroslaw Kantorowicz for all his comments and support. All possible mistakes remain, however, my own.
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©2015 by De Gruyter
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Sentencing Discounts, Attorney Compensation and Plea Bargaining in Criminal Cases
- Optimal Marginal Deterrence and Incentives for Precaution
- The Deterrence Effects of Gun Laws in Games with Asymmetric Skills and Information
- Decomposition of Accident Loss and Efficiency of Liability Rules
- Day-Fines: Should the Rich Pay More?
- On the Complementarity between Law and Social Norms
- Can Decoupling Punitive Damages Deter an Injurer’s Harmful Activity?
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Sentencing Discounts, Attorney Compensation and Plea Bargaining in Criminal Cases
- Optimal Marginal Deterrence and Incentives for Precaution
- The Deterrence Effects of Gun Laws in Games with Asymmetric Skills and Information
- Decomposition of Accident Loss and Efficiency of Liability Rules
- Day-Fines: Should the Rich Pay More?
- On the Complementarity between Law and Social Norms
- Can Decoupling Punitive Damages Deter an Injurer’s Harmful Activity?