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Optimal Marginal Deterrence and Incentives for Precaution

  • Lionel Thomas EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: May 21, 2015
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Abstract

This paper studies marginal deterrence in the presence of a basic and an aggravated harm when the occurrence of the latter may be reduced by criminals exerting costly precaution. We determine the optimal probability of fines when the enforcement authority provides incentives such that, if criminals commit offenses, they exert precaution. We show that marginal deterrence is fully optimal, even for severe basic harms. That is, the fine associated with the basic harm is not equal to the maximal sanction, the criminal’s wealth. Moreover, implementing marginal deterrence leads to the use of fines and the probability of being caught and sanctioned in a different way compared to Becker’s well-known result.

JEL Classification: K14; K42; D82

Acknowledgments

The author thanks five anonymous referees and the associate editor for very useful comments. He also thanks seminar participants at Besançon and especially C. At, N. Chappe, F. Cochard, P.-H. Morand and S. Ollier. The usual disclaimer applies.

Appendix

For the sake of clarity in what follows, we will omit arguments when this causes no ambiguity.

A.1 Appendix A

The Lagrangian is

L=0γ+pfsVsgdb+λLq(FfL)+λHq(FfH)+μLqfL+μHqfHdhc

where λj,j=L,H (respectively μj,j=L,H) are Kuhn and Tucker’s multipliers associated with eq. [5] (respectively eq. [6]).

Necessary conditions are

[28]LfL=(hspfs)g(γ+pfs,h)αspλLq+μLq=0
[29]LfH=(hspfs)g(γ+pfs,h)(1αs)pλHq+μHq=0
[30]λj(Ffj)=0,λj0,j=L,H
[31]μjfj=0,μj0,j=L,H
[32]Lp=0(hspfs)g(γ+pfs,h)fsdhc=0.
Fines
  1. It is straightforward that we cannot have simultaneously μj>0 and λj>0j=L,H.

  2. Consider μj>0,j=L,H, so fj=0,j=L,H (see eq. [31]). Using eq. [30], this implies λj=0,j=L,H. From eqs [28] and [29], we must have pfshs>0. This is impossible since fj=0,j=L,H.

  3. It follows that we have either λj>0 and μj=0 or λj=μj=0, j=L,H. Using eqs [28] and [29], the first case, implying fL=fH=F, arises if hs>pfs=pF or h>hs1(pF). The second case requires hs=pfs.

Probability

Using iii, we have

  1. hspfs>(=)0 if hs>()pF,

  2. fs=F if hspF.

Since hspF is equivalent to hhs1(pF), eq. [32] reduces to eq. [10].

A.2 Appendix B

First, notice that the constraints fLF and fH0 are never binding. Using eq. [3], the fine fL is necessarily strictly lower than fH. Hence, if fH=F, then fL<F or if fL=0, then fH>0. So, the constraints above can be ignored.

The Lagrangian is

L=0γ+pfsVsgdb+μqp(fHfL)Δαγ+λHq(FfH)+μLqfLdhc

where μ (respectively λH and μL) is Kuhn and Tucker’s multiplier associated with eq. [3] (respectively eq. [5] for H only and eq. [6] for L only).

Necessary conditions are

[33]LfL=hspfsg(γ+pfs,h)αspμqpΔα+μLq=0
[34]LfH=hspfsg(γ+pfs,h)(1αs)p+μqpΔαλHq=0
[35]μpfHfLΔαγ=0,μ0
[36]λH(FfH)=0,λH0
[37]μLfL=0,μL0
[38]Lp=0(hspfs)g(γ+pfs,h)fs+μq(fHfL)Δαdhc=0.

Fines

  1. Under assumption 1, the case where μL>0 and λH>0 is not possible. Consider the contrary. Using eqs [36] and [37], this implies fL=0 and fH=F, so that eq. [7] is strictly satisfied. Thus, from eq. [35], we have necessarily μ=0. Combining eqs [33] and [34], we get μL=λHαs1αs<0, a contradiction since μL and λH are assumed to be positive.

  2. Consider λH>0 (thus, μL=0 from i). Adding eqs [33] and [34] we obtain

[39]λHq=hspfsg(γ+pfs,h)p.

Thus, using eq. [33], λH>0 implies μ>0. So, we have fH=F and pfL=pFγΔα. Using eq. [39], this gives

λH>0hsαspFγΔα(1αs)pF>0hs>pFγαsΔαh>hs1pFγαsΔα.
  1. Consider μL=0 (thus, λH=0 from i). Similar development to ii implies μLq=(pfshs)g(γ+pfs,h)p, μ>0, fL=0 and pfH=γΔα. So, this case arises if hs<γ1αsΔα. But, using assumption 2, this inequality leads to the contradiction h+(1αs)hc(h)γΔα<0. So, we have necessarily μL=0.

  2. Consider both μ=λH=0. Hence, from eqs. [33] and [34], we have pfs=hs.

Probability

From iii, we have μL=0. So, using eq. [33], we get μq=(hspfs)g(γ+pfs)αsΔα. From ii, we know that fHfL=γpΔα and fs=FαsγpΔα. Plugging these expressions into eq. [38], then simplifying, we get eq. [12] given that hs1pFγαsΔα comes from the threshold hs=pFγαsΔα determined in ii.

A.3 Appendix C

First, notice that

[40]hs1pFγαsΔαpFγαsΔα+γVsgdbdh=hs1pFγαsΔαhs1(pF)pFγαsΔα+γVsgdbdh+hs1(pF)pFγαsΔα+γpF+γVsgdbdh+hs1(pF)pF+γVsgdbdh.

So, using eqs [11] and [40], and adding then subtracting hs1pFγαsΔαhs1(pF)hs+γVsgdbdh in eq. [13], we find

EW(p)=EWA(p)hs1(pFγαsΔα)hs1(pF)hs+γVsgdbdh+hs1(pFγαsΔα)hs1(pF)pFγαsΔα+γVsgdbdh+hs1(pF)pFγαsΔα+γpF+γVsgdbdh.

But, for hhs1(pFγαsΔα),hs1(pF), there is underdeterrence, so pFγαsΔα<hs. Hence, we obtain

[41]EW(p)=EWA(p)+hs1pFγαsΔαhs1(pF)pFγαsΔα+γhs+γVsgdbdh+hs1(pF)pFγαsΔα+γpF+γVsgdbdh.

Second, notice that

hs1pFγαsΔα,hn1(pF)=hs1pFγαsΔα,hs1(pF)hs1(pF),hn1(pF)

and

hs1(pF),=hs1(pF),hn1(pF)hn1(pF),.

Moreover, adding then subtracting hs1pFγαsΔαhs1(pF)hs+γVngdbdh and hs1(pF)pF+γVngdbdh in [14], we obtain after simplifications,

EWn(p)=0hs1pFγαsΔαhs+γVsgdbdh+hs1pFγαsΔαhs1(pF)hs+γVngdbdh+hs1(pF)pF+γVngdbdh+hs1pFγαsΔαhs1(pF)hs+γhnVngdbdh+hs1(pF)hn1(pF)hnpF+γVngdbdh+hn1(pF)pFpF+γVngdbdh.

Since Vn=VsΔV, we obtain

[42]EWn(p)=EWA(p)hs1pFγαsΔαhs1(pF)hs+γΔVgdbdhhs1(pF)pF+γΔVgdbdhhs1pFγαsΔαhs1(pF)hs+γhnVngdbdh+hs1(pF)hn1(pF)hnpF+γVngdbdh+hn1(pF)pFpF+γVngdbdh.

Comparing eqs [41] and [42] leads to the proposition.

A.4 Appendix D

The Lagrangian is, for j=L,H

L=γ+p(fs+mxs)VsIgdb+μqp((fHfL)+m(xHxL))Δαγ+λjq(Ffj)+μjqfj

where μ (respectively λj and μj) is Kuhn and Tucker’s multiplier associated with eq. [19] (respectively [5] and [6]).

Necessary conditions are, since xj0,j=L,H

[43]LfL=hsp(fs+kxs)g(γ+p(fs+mxs),h)αspμqpΔαλLq+μLq=0
[44]LfH=hsp(fs+kxs)g(γ+p(fs+mxs),h)(1αs)p+μqpΔαλHq+μHq=0
[45]LxL=hsp(fs+kxs)g(γ+p(fs+mxs),h)αspmμqpmΔαγ+p(fs+mxs)p(m+k)gdb0
[46]xLLxL=0
[47]LxH=hsp(fs+kxs)g(γ+p(fs+mxs),h)(1αs)pm+μqpmΔαγ+p(fs+mxs)p(m+k)(1αs)gdb0
[48]xHLxH=0
[49]μpfHfL+mxHxLΔαγ=0,μ0
[50]λj(Ffj)=0,λj0,j=L,H
[51]μjfj=0,μL0,j=L,H.
  1. Consider μj>0,j=L,H. By eq. (51), this implies fL=fH=0. Thus, by eq. [50], λL=λH=0. By combining eq. [43] with [45] and eq. [44] with eq. [47], we have

mμLγ+p(fs+mxs)p(m+k)gdb<0,mμHγ+p(fs+mxs)p(m+k)(1αs)gdb<0.

Using eqs [46] and [48], it implies xL=xH=0. So, since fL=fH=0, eq. [3] is not satisfied.

  1. Consider μL>0 and μH=0. Following similar developments to i, μL>0 implies fL=λL=xL=0. Two subcases arise. If λH=0 (thus fH<F), by eqs [44], [47] and [48], we have xH=0. Using eqs [3] and [7], μ is necessarily strictly positive. This subcase is not possible since it boils down to iii in Appendix B. If λH>0, fH=F and constraint [3] is free using eq. [7]. As xH cannot be negative, this subcase boils down to i in Appendix B and is impossible.

  2. Consider μH>0 and μL=0, and follow similar developments. We get, μH>0, which implies fH=λH=xH=0. Therefore, eq. [3] reduces to pfL+axLΔαγ0, which cannot be satisfied with fL0 and xL0.

  3. Consider μj=0,j=L,H. Combining eq. [43] with eq. [45] and eq. [44] with eq. [47], we have

mλLγ+p(fs+mxs)p(m+k)gdb,mλHγ+p(fs+mxs)p(m+k)(1αs)gdb.

Thus, consider λH=λL=0. Using eqs [46] and [48], we get

xH=xL=0.

Using eqs [43] and [44], this implies pfs=hs.

Otherwise, λH and λL are simultaneously positive. Then fH=fL=F, so pfs=pF. Besides, eqs [45] and [47] are satisfied at equality. Then, adding eqs [45] and [47], xs must verify

hsp(F+kxs)g(γ+p(F+mxs),h)pm=γ+p(F+mxs)p(m+k)(2αs)gdb,

given that eq. [19] is binding. This implies, since fHfL=0,

pmxHxLΔα=γ.

This case arises if hs>pF or h>hs1(pF).

A.5 Appendix E

Ignoring the constraint [6] for the sake of simplicity, the Lagrangian is

L=0[γ+psfsVsgdb+μq(pHfHpLfL)Δαγ+λHq(FfH)+λLq(FfL)]dhcLcH.

where μ (respectively λj,j=L,H) the Kuhn and Tucker’s multiplier associated with eq. [21] (respectively [5]).

Necessary conditions are

[52]LfL=hspsfsg(γ+psfs,h)αspLμqpLΔαλLq=0
[53]LfH=hspsfsg(γ+psfs,h)(1αs)pH+μqpHΔαλHq=0
[54]μpHfHpLfLΔαγ=0,μ0
[55]λH(FfH)=0,λH0
[56]λL(FfL)=0,λL0.
[57]LpL=0[hspsfsg(γ+psfs,h)αsfLμqfLΔα]dhcL=0
[58]LpH=0[hspsfsg(γ+psfs,h)(1αs)fH+μqfHΔα]dhcH=0.

From eqs [55] and [56], we have λj0,j=L,H. Using eqs [52] and [53], it follows that

[59]λLq=hspsfsg(γ+psfs,h)αspL>μqpLΔα,
[60]λHq=hspsfsg(γ+psfs,h)(1αs)pH>μqpHΔα.

From eq. [59], we have

[61]λL=0onlyifμ=0.

By contrast, λL>0 can happen if μ0. Consider that eq. [21] is slack, so μ=0 from eq. [54]. Thus, λj>0,j=L,H, eqs [59] and [60] require hs>psfs with psfs=F(αspL+(1αs)pH), since fj=F,j=L,H. This is equivalent to

[62]h>hs1(F(αspL+(1αs)pH)).

But eq. [21] is slack. After rearrangements, this requires that the solutions for pL and pH given by eqs [57] and [58] given eq. [62] (equivalently by eqs [24] and [25]) satisfy eq. [26].

If eq. [26] is not satisfied, μ becomes positive. Thus, from eq. (61) λL>0 and we have necessarily fL=F. Using eqs [57], [58] and cj′′>0,j=L,H, it follows that pL must be decreased and pH increased compared to their values given by eqs [24] and [25].

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Published Online: 2015-5-21
Published in Print: 2015-11-1

©2015 by De Gruyter

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