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Polarization and Local Conflicts in Post Decentralization Indonesia

  • Iwan J. Azis EMAIL logo and Alvin Pratama
Published/Copyright: May 7, 2020

Abstract

Exploring the hypothesis that socio-economic discrimination contributes to conflict occurrence, we show that the experience of a large country that have gone through a big-bang shift from centralized to decentralized system and introduced direct local elections, confirms the link. Using the case of Indonesia, and by controlling for poverty, demand-induced resource scarcity, and institutional variables, it is revealed that income polarization and inequality at the provincial level explain the occurrence of violent conflict (causing at least 1 death), be it for total or for different types. The results are robust to a series of model specifications. For understanding its impact on conflict, polarization is found more important than income inequality as a measure of socio-economic discrimination.

JEL Classification: D31; J15; J39; O15; O53

Correction note

Correction added after online publication on June 4, 2020: In a previous version of this article, Alvin Pratama’s affiliation was mistakenly stated as “University of Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia”.



Corresponding author: Iwan J. Azis, Cornell University, 7 Lowell Place, Ithaca, NY, USA; and University of Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia, E-mail:

Appendix

Table A1:

Results of negative binomial regression for violent conflict between citizens following full swing direct local elections (2008, 2011, 2014).

Variables(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)
Polarization23.89***22.70***29.70***28.70***32.80***
(7.688)(7.751)(9.089)(8.809)(9.105)
Inequality3.4093.0753.6834.8433.997
(3.277)(3.502)(3.506)(3.500)(3.474)
Poverty0.0469***0.0485***0.0368**0.0316**0.0272
(0.0123)(0.0131)(0.0154)(0.0147)(0.0166)
Log population0.07780.03910.03340.0930
(0.131)(0.136)(0.135)(0.136)
Democratic institution−1.891*−1.950**−1.739*
(0.995)(0.983)(0.982)
Political rights−0.454−0.256
(0.562)(0.542)
Share of mining0.176**
(0.0846)
Constant−4.634***−4.432***2.3674.2841.875
(1.493)(1.520)(3.870)(4.123)(4.037)
Observations9999999999
AIC5.5155.5315.5215.5375.516
BIC104.023108.226109.875114.056114.535

Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

Table A2:

Results of negative binomial regression for violent conflict between villages following full swing direct local elections (2008, 2011, 2014).

Variables(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)
Polarization13.465.3545.8525.9325.646
(11.07)(11.43)(11.34)(11.12)(11.27)
Inequality8.834***8.486**8.606**6.688*6.723*
(3.376)(3.892)(3.855)(3.902)(3.924)
Poverty0.0663***0.0761***0.0744***0.0826***0.0828***
(0.0148)(0.0163)(0.0182)(0.0205)(0.0203)
Log population0.334***0.330***0.355***0.350***
(0.124)(0.124)(0.119)(0.127)
Democratic institution–0.245–0.0381–0.0191
(1.004)(1.037)(1.030)
Political rights0.7470.724
(0.757)(0.776)
Share of mining–0.0177
(0.0928)
Constant–5.255***–4.328**–3.386–6.744–6.665
(1.735)(1.848)(4.608)(5.779)(5.853)
Observations9999999999
AIC4.974.9224.9424.9554.975
BIC50.10947.95852.556.40760.97

Robust standard errors in parentheses.***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Table A3:

Results of negative binomial regression for violent conflict between student following full swing direct local elections (2008, 2011, 2014).

Variables(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)
Polarization60.0326.9233.1837.3148.55
(25.05)(14.43)(16.21)(14.22)(15.54)
Inequality13.12*5.7995.8409.0728.551
(7.483)(7.044)(6.853)(56950)(5.757)
Poverty–0.01710.0215.008710.0396–0.0612
(0.0321)(0.0283)(0.0304)(0.0355)(0.0421)
Log population0.711***0.666***0.816***0.836***
(0.275)(0.278)(0.284)(0.293)
Democratic institution–1.703–2.209–2.551
(1.848)(1.781)(1.779)
Political rights–3.5313.622
(1.143)(1.236)
Share of mining–0.216
(0.152)
Constant–15.255***–8.882**–2.51712.0712.01
(4.379)(2.873)(6.879)(7.934)(8.140)
Observations9999999999
AIC2.0982.0552.0692.0112.019
BIC–234.282–235.935–231.939235.079231.663

Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Table A4:

Results of negative binomial regression for violent conflict between ethic group full swing direct local elections (2008, 2011, 2014).

Variables(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)
Polarization26.1426.4122.4119.2533.72*
(16.57)(16.93)(16.48)(17.45)(18.20)
Inequality2.6303.0061.8324.6022.957
(8.703)(8.256)(7.148)(9.011)(7.687)
Poverty0.154***0.152***0.169***0.159***0.154***
(0.0330)(0.0363)(0.0483)(0.0590)(0.0516)
Log population–0.0649–0.120–0.09000.0334
(0.377)(0.368)(0.357)(0.336)
Democratic institution2.9102.9253.850
(2.427)(2.362)(2.286)
Political rights–1.0850.358
(2.321)(1.832)
Share of mining0.441
(0.0172)
Constant–9.737***9.802**–21.34–17.3729.92*
(4.127)(4.019)(12.15)(17.52)(15.48)
Observations9999999999
AIC1.3261.3461.3561.3741.365
BIC310.709306.133302.54298.172296.453

Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

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Received: 2019-12-08
Accepted: 2020-04-02
Published Online: 2020-05-07

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