Improving Analyses of Sanctions Busting

Jonathan Golub

doi:10.1515/peps-2019-0043

Article

Improving Analyses of Sanctions Busting

Jonathan Golub

Published/Copyright: March 18, 2020

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From the journal Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Volume 26 Issue 2

Abstract

When economic sanctions are directed against a target state by a sender state, the sender obviously wants third countries to participate with the sanctions and can apply pressure on them to prevent sanctions busting behaviour. But why does sanctions busting vary, so that the target’s trade with some third-countries increases but with others decreases? In this paper I offer two improvements to the analysis of sanctions busting: a theoretical framework that recognises how the effects of covariates on sanctions busting can only be identified if we treat them as more conditional than previous studies have done, and a gravity model that captures these conditional effects while also addressing several common specification errors. Applying these improvements to data for 1950–2006 significantly alters some of the central findings contained in previous research about sanctions busting.

Keywords: gravity models; sanctions; sanctions busting

Acknowledgement

I am grateful to members of the Comparative Politics and Political Economy group at the University of Reading, three anonymous reviewers, and the editor of Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy for their helpful comments and suggestions.

Appendix

Table 2:

Fixed effects Poisson models of target-third-state dyadic trade, including extra controls for regional trade agreements and common currencies.

	Total bilateral trade		3^rd state imports from target		3^rd state exports to target
	1950–1991	1992–2006	1950–1991	1992–2006	1950–1991	1992–2006
RTA	0.531**	0.116	0.473**	0.113	0.588**	0.113*
	(0.0937)	(0.0657)	(0.0983)	(0.0868)	(0.0950)	(0.0576)
Common currency	−0.315	−0.0701**	−0.320	−0.0251	−0.312	−0.131**
	(0.235)	(0.0265)	(0.258)	(0.0351)	(0.226)	(0.0365)
MID	−0.0715	0.0462	0.0187	0.0582	−0.166**	0.0319
	(0.0523)	(0.0356)	(0.0644)	(0.0452)	(0.0589)	(0.0264)
Sanction	0.160	−0.310**	0.149	−0.397**	0.163	−0.227**
	(0.0820)	(0.0654)	(0.0994)	(0.0891)	(0.0960)	(0.0836)
Defense	0.297**	0.160**	0.342**	0.0949	0.258*	0.241**
	(0.0935)	(0.0543)	(0.0904)	(0.0630)	(0.115)	(0.0612)
DefenseUS	0.215	0.252**	0.292*	0.269**	0.0831	0.205
	(0.124)	(0.0918)	(0.140)	(0.104)	(0.126)	(0.112)
Tradeshare	3.847**	3.403**	3.645**	3.384**	4.030**	3.431**
	(0.519)	(0.747)	(0.599)	(0.926)	(0.587)	(0.670)
PowerUS	−0.631**	0.0569	−0.583**	0.140	−0.683**	−0.0291
	(0.0872)	(0.101)	(0.0946)	(0.118)	(0.0953)	(0.104)
Democracy	−0.0200	−0.129**	−0.0481	−0.153**	0.00614	−0.0980
	(0.0430)	(0.0363)	(0.0519)	(0.0341)	(0.0493)	(0.0580)
Defense*Sanction	−0.0966	−0.118	−0.133	−0.0384	−0.0632	−0.235*
	(0.0698)	(0.113)	(0.0704)	(0.149)	(0.0872)	(0.110)
DefenseUS*Sanction	−0.0585	0.155*	−0.0730	0.0763	−0.0350	0.302**
	(0.0591)	(0.0627)	(0.0748)	(0.0768)	(0.0705)	(0.0741)
PowerUS*Sanction	9.79e-05	0.0429*	−0.0167	0.0342	0.0152	0.0550*
	(0.0190)	(0.0175)	(0.0227)	(0.0223)	(0.0230)	(0.0223)
Democracy*Sanction	−0.221**	−0.135*	−0.137*	−0.0117	−0.303**	−0.277**
	(0.0555)	(0.0575)	(0.0544)	(0.0700)	(0.0778)	(0.0697)
Tradeshare*Sanction	0.0768	0.170	0.0748	−0.143	0.136	0.527
	(0.621)	(0.731)	(0.649)	(0.776)	(0.693)	(0.803)
DefenseUS*Tradeshare	0.597	0.251	0.653	0.397	0.634	0.0944
	(0.805)	(0.515)	(0.889)	(0.617)	(0.825)	(0.527)
DefenseUSSanction Tradeshare	−0.182	0.867	0.285	−0.147	−0.770	1.652
	(1.137)	(1.154)	(1.116)	(1.473)	(1.261)	(1.103)
MID*Sanction	−0.0264	−0.0453	−0.197*	−0.0724	0.147	−0.0178
	(0.0812)	(0.0504)	(0.0964)	(0.0518)	(0.0972)	(0.0518)
Observations	239,566	143,778	231,685	139,394	228,409	138,222
Dyads	8024	10,149	7630	9782	7442	9695

**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Estimated coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses. Controls for real GDP and population size included but not reported.

Table 3:

Fixed effects Poisson models of target-third-state dyadic trade, including extra control for trade openness of third-state.

	Total bilateral trade		3^rd state imports from target		3^rd state exports to target
	1950–1991	1992–2006	1950–1991	1992–2006	1950–1991	1992–2006
MID	−0.0774	0.0476	0.00553	0.0589	−0.164**	0.0346
	(0.0486)	(0.0354)	(0.0605)	(0.0445)	(0.0555)	(0.0275)
Sanction	0.196**	−0.339**	0.187*	−0.418**	0.197*	−0.278**
	(0.0754)	(0.0626)	(0.0953)	(0.0831)	(0.0874)	(0.0850)
Defense	0.306**	0.151**	0.333**	0.0899	0.278**	0.225**
	(0.0865)	(0.0573)	(0.0879)	(0.0637)	(0.105)	(0.0647)
DefenseUS	0.234	0.212*	0.294*	0.246*	0.130	0.101
	(0.121)	(0.0925)	(0.138)	(0.104)	(0.121)	(0.112)
Tradeshare	3.805**	3.559**	3.470**	3.439**	4.130**	3.816**
	(0.536)	(0.727)	(0.647)	(0.883)	(0.545)	(0.682)
PowerUS	−0.610**	−0.0266	−0.585**	0.0582	−0.637**	−0.122
	(0.0693)	(0.0997)	(0.0782)	(0.118)	(0.0781)	(0.102)
Democracy	−0.0276	−0.116**	−0.0521	−0.143**	−0.00550	−0.0767
	(0.0389)	(0.0370)	(0.0483)	(0.0343)	(0.0450)	(0.0595)
Defense*Sanction	−0.138*	−0.126	−0.178**	−0.0516	−0.0984	−0.240*
	(0.0585)	(0.111)	(0.0635)	(0.148)	(0.0732)	(0.106)
DefenseUS*Sanction	−0.0982	0.161**	−0.112	0.0821	−0.0761	0.305**
	(0.0571)	(0.0615)	(0.0732)	(0.0746)	(0.0669)	(0.0741)
PowerUS*Sanction	−0.0283	0.0518**	−0.0460*	0.0419*	−0.0119	0.0693**
	(0.0184)	(0.0169)	(0.0227)	(0.0214)	(0.0222)	(0.0224)
Democracy*Sanction	−0.179**	−0.140*	−0.130*	−0.0188	−0.228**	−0.271**
	(0.0449)	(0.0572)	(0.0528)	(0.0705)	(0.0621)	(0.0697)
Tradeshare*Sanction	0.133	0.227	0.272	−0.0499	0.0261	0.475
	(0.501)	(0.738)	(0.565)	(0.768)	(0.550)	(0.841)
DefenseUS*Tradeshare	1.118	0.451	1.252	0.502	1.037	0.474
	(0.866)	(0.526)	(0.962)	(0.619)	(0.882)	(0.538)
DefenseUSSanction Tradeshare	1.647*	0.825	2.029*	−0.182	1.203	1.522
	(0.774)	(1.210)	(0.920)	(1.509)	(0.802)	(1.166)
MID*Sanction	−0.0219	−0.0439	−0.193*	−0.0712	0.154	−0.0115
	(0.0830)	(0.0501)	(0.0971)	(0.0505)	(0.0979)	(0.0514)
Trade openess	0.0168**	0.00208**	0.0155**	0.00171**	0.0181**	0.00418**
	(0.00199)	(0.000440)	(0.00206)	(0.000329)	(0.00209)	(0.00122)
Observations	243,327	143,778	235,212	139,394	231,880	138,222
Dyads	8257	10,149	7852	9782	7663	9695

**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Estimated coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses. Controls for real GDP and population size included but not reported.

Table 4:

Fixed effects Poisson models of target-third-state dyadic trade, including extra control for third state economic reliance on the target state.

	Total bilateral trade		3^rd state imports from target		3^rd state exports to target
	1950–1991	1992–2006	1950–1991	1992–2006	1950–1991	1992–2006
MID	−0.0434	0.0463	0.0430	0.0577	−0.135*	0.0309
	(0.0542)	(0.0342)	(0.0637)	(0.0436)	(0.0610)	(0.0245)
Sanction	0.212**	−0.334**	0.200*	−0.420**	0.216*	−0.272**
	(0.0790)	(0.0635)	(0.0945)	(0.0839)	(0.0944)	(0.0889)
Defense	0.263**	0.151*	0.276**	0.0879	0.253*	0.225**
	(0.0907)	(0.0592)	(0.0913)	(0.0647)	(0.112)	(0.0729)
DefenseUS	0.520**	0.213*	0.609**	0.243*	0.385**	0.0520
	(0.118)	(0.0918)	(0.131)	(0.103)	(0.126)	(0.113)
Tradeshare	3.192**	3.226**	2.813**	3.067**	3.544**	3.220**
	(0.435)	(0.699)	(0.578)	(0.849)	(0.442)	(0.642)
PowerUS	−0.548**	−0.0243	−0.520**	0.0665	−0.585**	−0.171
	(0.0737)	(0.0998)	(0.0815)	(0.117)	(0.0806)	(0.104)
Democracy	−0.00633	−0.119**	−0.0302	−0.146**	0.0161	−0.0750
	(0.0487)	(0.0365)	(0.0619)	(0.0343)	(0.0490)	(0.0579)
Defense*Sanction	−0.187**	−0.0985	−0.229**	−0.0443	−0.147	−0.132
	(0.0637)	(0.108)	(0.0656)	(0.149)	(0.0808)	(0.0946)
DefenseUS*Sanction	−0.114*	0.152*	−0.134	0.0835	−0.0870	0.247**
	(0.0576)	(0.0633)	(0.0726)	(0.0761)	(0.0690)	(0.0747)
PowerUS*Sanction	−0.00406	0.0515**	−0.0189	0.0409	0.00964	0.0797**
	(0.0186)	(0.0171)	(0.0216)	(0.0215)	(0.0234)	(0.0228)
Democracy*Sanction	−0.249**	−0.141*	−0.169**	−0.0221	−0.326**	−0.261**
	(0.0559)	(0.0565)	(0.0562)	(0.0707)	(0.0773)	(0.0672)
Tradeshare*Sanction	0.0467	−0.0321	0.214	−0.103	−0.0775	−1.443
	(0.529)	(0.792)	(0.591)	(0.791)	(0.592)	(1.103)
DefenseUS*Tradeshare	−1.164	0.439	−1.002	0.554	−1.293	0.275
	(0.838)	(0.525)	(0.889)	(0.614)	(0.886)	(0.545)
DefenseUSSanction Tradeshare	1.514	1.032	1.877	−0.0833	1.097	2.702
	(1.014)	(1.230)	(1.000)	(1.520)	(1.149)	(1.428)
MID*Sanction	−0.0471	−0.0406	−0.219*	−0.0706	0.128	0.0196
	(0.0811)	(0.0502)	(0.0951)	(0.0500)	(0.0975)	(0.0539)
Reliance3T	9.639**	0.995*	10.06**	0.703*	9.285**	4.152**
	(2.276)	(0.441)	(2.037)	(0.285)	(2.771)	(0.449)
Observations	245,726	143,778	237,048	139,373	233,787	138,205
Dyads	8299	10,149	7884	9781	7696	9695

**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Estimated coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses. Controls for real GDP and population size included but not reported.

Table 5:

Fixed effects Poisson models of target-third-state dyadic trade, including extra control for comprehensiveness of sanctions.

	Total bilateral trade		3^rd state imports from target		3^rd state exports to target
	1950–1991	1992–2006	1950–1991	1992–2006	1950–1991	1992–2006
MID	−0.0541	0.0472	0.0349	0.0588	−0.146*	0.0335
	(0.0559)	(0.0354)	(0.0681)	(0.0446)	(0.0623)	(0.0266)
Sanction	0.121	−0.293**	0.112	−0.385**	0.125	−0.209**
	(0.0850)	(0.0597)	(0.104)	(0.0798)	(0.101)	(0.0783)
Defense	0.372**	0.156**	0.405**	0.0927	0.344**	0.237**
	(0.0812)	(0.0567)	(0.0806)	(0.0636)	(0.103)	(0.0642)
DefenseUS	0.428**	0.236*	0.495**	0.261*	0.319*	0.162
	(0.130)	(0.0938)	(0.144)	(0.104)	(0.135)	(0.114)
Tradeshare	2.953**	3.505**	2.516**	3.442**	3.344**	3.596**
	(0.668)	(0.740)	(0.733)	(0.905)	(0.693)	(0.675)
PowerUS	−0.661**	0.0285	−0.605**	0.123	−0.715**	−0.0690
	(0.0873)	(0.103)	(0.0966)	(0.121)	(0.0939)	(0.105)
Democracy	−0.0387	−0.115**	−0.0680	−0.139**	−0.0116	−0.0854
	(0.0468)	(0.0374)	(0.0565)	(0.0351)	(0.0508)	(0.0593)
Defense*Sanction	−0.230**	−0.119	−0.270**	−0.0515	−0.194*	−0.222*
	(0.0667)	(0.114)	(0.0672)	(0.152)	(0.0842)	(0.107)
DefenseUS*Sanction	−0.0977	0.185**	−0.119	0.119	−0.0679	0.312**
	(0.0616)	(0.0605)	(0.0761)	(0.0745)	(0.0727)	(0.0719)
PowerUS*Sanction	0.00181	0.0477**	−0.0157	0.0394	0.0178	0.0592**
	(0.0194)	(0.0167)	(0.0234)	(0.0206)	(0.0234)	(0.0219)
Democracy*Sanction	−0.207**	−0.191**	−0.124*	−0.0719	−0.291**	−0.321**
	(0.0575)	(0.0608)	(0.0581)	(0.0776)	(0.0794)	(0.0703)
Tradeshare*Sanction	0.583	0.237	0.812	−0.0407	0.424	0.573
	(0.573)	(0.758)	(0.604)	(0.786)	(0.628)	(0.835)
DefenseUS*Tradeshare	−0.887	0.418	−0.712	0.472	−1.010	0.410
	(0.979)	(0.536)	(0.999)	(0.630)	(1.037)	(0.548)
DefenseUSSanction Tradeshare	1.306	0.811	1.648	−0.256	0.881	1.537
	(1.066)	(1.229)	(1.044)	(1.525)	(1.188)	(1.165)
MID*Sanction	−0.0511	−0.0477	−0.227*	−0.0749	0.127	−0.0204
	(0.0884)	(0.0501)	(0.104)	(0.0508)	(0.103)	(0.0508)
Comprehensive sanctions (FXM)	0.174**	−0.330**	0.182**	−0.303**	0.168*	−0.320*
	(0.0609)	(0.0935)	(0.0677)	(0.0938)	(0.0715)	(0.142)
Observations	245,726	143,778	237,628	139,394	234,295	138,222
Dyads	8299	10,149	7893	9782	7702	9695

**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Estimated coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses. Controls for real GDP and population size included but not reported.

Table 6:

Fixed effects Poisson models of target-third-state dyadic trade, including extra control for time under sanctions.

	Total bilateral trade		3^rd state imports from target		3^rd state exports to target
	1950–1991	1992–2006	1950–1991	1992–2006	1950–1991	1992–2006
MID	−0.0506	0.0445	0.0383	0.0555	−0.143*	0.0323
	(0.0553)	(0.0355)	(0.0671)	(0.0448)	(0.0623)	(0.0265)
Sanction	0.180*	−0.223**	0.177	−0.296**	0.177	−0.174*
	(0.0866)	(0.0646)	(0.104)	(0.0839)	(0.101)	(0.0847)
Defense	0.358**	0.148*	0.387**	0.0816	0.334**	0.232**
	(0.0839)	(0.0595)	(0.0836)	(0.0667)	(0.105)	(0.0659)
DefenseUS	0.430**	0.223*	0.500**	0.252*	0.317*	0.151
	(0.131)	(0.0935)	(0.146)	(0.104)	(0.136)	(0.115)
Tradeshare	2.910**	3.462**	2.477**	3.416**	3.300**	3.555**
	(0.658)	(0.750)	(0.722)	(0.922)	(0.684)	(0.680)
PowerUS	−0.647**	0.0275	−0.588**	0.123	−0.705**	−0.0707
	(0.0871)	(0.102)	(0.0964)	(0.120)	(0.0936)	(0.104)
Democracy	−0.0318	−0.110**	−0.0606	−0.130**	−0.00471	−0.0843
	(0.0475)	(0.0366)	(0.0571)	(0.0334)	(0.0513)	(0.0591)
Defense*Sanction	−0.220**	−0.166	−0.262**	−0.109	−0.181*	−0.256*
	(0.0673)	(0.109)	(0.0682)	(0.142)	(0.0845)	(0.108)
DefenseUS*Sanction	−0.0968	0.167**	−0.118	0.0916	−0.0673	0.310**
	(0.0624)	(0.0593)	(0.0766)	(0.0703)	(0.0734)	(0.0730)
PowerUS*Sanction	−0.00128	0.0484**	−0.0184	0.0413*	0.0143	0.0594**
	(0.0198)	(0.0160)	(0.0232)	(0.0190)	(0.0241)	(0.0223)
Democracy*Sanction	−0.228**	−0.106*	−0.145*	0.0323	−0.314**	−0.270**
	(0.0629)	(0.0510)	(0.0640)	(0.0588)	(0.0814)	(0.0681)
Tradeshare*Sanction	0.627	0.742	0.855	0.556	0.470	0.922
	(0.561)	(0.778)	(0.590)	(0.784)	(0.617)	(0.862)
DefenseUS*Tradeshare	−0.859	0.480	−0.695	0.526	−0.970	0.465
	(0.977)	(0.544)	(0.999)	(0.642)	(1.035)	(0.552)
DefenseUSSanction Tradeshare	1.238	0.879	1.591	−0.164	0.804	1.564
	(1.052)	(1.267)	(1.028)	(1.586)	(1.184)	(1.187)
MID*Sanction	−0.0315	−0.0405	−0.203*	−0.0611	0.143	−0.0194
	(0.0826)	(0.0490)	(0.0983)	(0.0506)	(0.0991)	(0.0505)
Timeundersanction	−0.0024	−0.0083**	−0.0030	−0.0095**	−0.00140	−0.00578*
	(0.00373)	(0.00193)	(0.00455)	(0.00217)	(0.00352)	(0.00227)
Observations	245,726	143,778	237,628	139,394	234,295	138,222
Dyads	8299	10,149	7893	9782	7702	9695

**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Estimated coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses. Controls for real GDP and population size included but not reported.

Table 7:

Fixed effects Poisson models of target-third-state dyadic trade, including yearly time dummies.

	Total bilateral trade		3^rd state imports from target		3^rd state exports to target
	1950–1991	1992–2006	1950–1991	1992–2006	1950–1991	1992–2006
MID	−0.102	0.0417	−0.0286	0.0615	−0.180**	0.0174
	(0.0682)	(0.0407)	(0.0902)	(0.0476)	(0.0570)	(0.0340)
Sanction	0.0724	−0.291**	0.0583	−0.341**	0.0809	−0.250**
	(0.0653)	(0.0665)	(0.0836)	(0.0865)	(0.0797)	(0.0864)
Defense	0.540**	0.120	0.557**	0.0465	0.524**	0.210**
	(0.0811)	(0.0719)	(0.0833)	(0.0790)	(0.0905)	(0.0765)
DefenseUS	0.161	0.234**	0.241*	0.268**	0.0436	0.153
	(0.108)	(0.0865)	(0.120)	(0.0973)	(0.112)	(0.111)
Tradeshare	4.229**	4.384**	3.897**	4.294**	4.550**	4.520**
	(0.492)	(0.586)	(0.505)	(0.754)	(0.560)	(0.523)
PowerUS	−0.380**	−0.667**	−0.399**	−0.575**	−0.370**	−0.751**
	(0.0605)	(0.123)	(0.0737)	(0.156)	(0.0667)	(0.115)
Democracy	0.000746	−0.0855**	−0.0321	−0.108**	0.0315	−0.0562
	(0.0268)	(0.0298)	(0.0343)	(0.0293)	(0.0357)	(0.0504)
Defense*Sanction	−0.0223	−0.0956	−0.0520	−0.0289	0.00328	−0.190
	(0.0573)	(0.0867)	(0.0591)	(0.114)	(0.0711)	(0.0994)
DefenseUS*sanction	−0.106*	0.189**	−0.131	0.114	−0.0702	0.319**
	(0.0526)	(0.0547)	(0.0696)	(0.0668)	(0.0606)	(0.0708)
PowerUS*Sanction	−0.0120	0.0446*	−0.0266	0.0314	0.00132	0.0622**
	(0.0145)	(0.0177)	(0.0194)	(0.0225)	(0.0180)	(0.0223)
Democracy*Sanction	−0.115**	−0.0719	−0.0389	0.0430	−0.194**	−0.201**
	(0.0429)	(0.0428)	(0.0472)	(0.0514)	(0.0633)	(0.0665)
Tradeshare*Sanction	−0.550	0.528	−0.372	0.367	−0.681	0.705
	(0.552)	(0.587)	(0.545)	(0.600)	(0.627)	(0.690)
DefenseUS*Tradeshare	−0.971	0.594	−0.905	0.678	−0.999	0.552
	(0.769)	(0.535)	(0.762)	(0.620)	(0.851)	(0.565)
DefenseUSSanction Tradeshare	0.970	−0.403	1.367	−1.414	0.505	0.303
	(1.050)	(1.286)	(1.019)	(1.654)	(1.169)	(1.148)
MID*Sanction	−0.00719	0.00339	−0.168	−0.0369	0.158	0.0450
	(0.110)	(0.0570)	(0.127)	(0.0569)	(0.115)	(0.0576)
Observations	245,726	143,778	237,628	139,394	234,295	138,222
Dyads	8299	10,149	7893	9782	7702	9695

**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Estimated coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses. Controls for real GDP, population size, and yearly time dummies included but not reported.

Table 8:

Random effects Poisson models of target-third-state dyadic trade.

	Total bilateral trade		3^rd state imports from target		3^rd state exports to target
	1950–1991	1992–2006	1950–1991	1992–2006	1950–1991	1992–2006
MID	−0.0375	0.0503	0.0420	0.0672	−0.127	0.0299
	(0.0588)	(0.0349)	(0.0732)	(0.0427)	(0.0656)	(0.0276)
Sanction	0.217*	−0.252**	0.212	−0.419**	0.215	−0.0890
	(0.100)	(0.0779)	(0.126)	(0.108)	(0.123)	(0.0919)
Defense	0.463**	0.139	0.512**	0.107	0.427**	0.194**
	(0.108)	(0.0727)	(0.0917)	(0.105)	(0.149)	(0.0727)
DefenseUS	0.332*	0.228*	0.404*	0.242*	0.210	0.164
	(0.138)	(0.104)	(0.158)	(0.120)	(0.137)	(0.121)
Tradeshare3T	3.722**	3.423*	3.384**	3.506	4.006**	3.424**
	(0.619)	(1.339)	(0.800)	(1.815)	(0.662)	(1.085)
PowerUS	−0.647**	−0.0514	−0.590**	0.0382	−0.704**	−0.136
	(0.0850)	(0.106)	(0.0915)	(0.124)	(0.0965)	(0.109)
Democracy	−0.0258	−0.104**	−0.0550	−0.126**	0.00230	−0.0762
	(0.0471)	(0.0402)	(0.0556)	(0.0373)	(0.0538)	(0.0629)
Defense*Sanction	−0.174*	0.103	−0.237**	0.234	−0.112	−0.0620
	(0.0770)	(0.0841)	(0.0819)	(0.144)	(0.0958)	(0.0703)
DefenseUS*Sanction	−0.136*	0.128	−0.164	0.0859	−0.0980	0.251**
	(0.0672)	(0.0664)	(0.0839)	(0.0842)	(0.0819)	(0.0720)
PowerUS*Sanction	−0.0119	0.0283	−0.0272	0.0344	0.00231	0.0201
	(0.0229)	(0.0203)	(0.0293)	(0.0267)	(0.0285)	(0.0245)
Democracy*Sanction	−0.194**	−0.146*	−0.0958	−0.00322	−0.290**	−0.313**
	(0.0569)	(0.0600)	(0.0540)	(0.0734)	(0.0809)	(0.0693)
Tradeshare*Sanction	0.164	0.812	0.0931	0.609	0.273	1.093
	(1.029)	(1.412)	(1.093)	(1.626)	(1.102)	(1.349)
DefenseUS*Tradeshare	−0.211	1.449	−0.139	1.467	−0.195	1.392
	(0.980)	(1.136)	(1.069)	(1.465)	(1.014)	(1.002)
DefenseUSSanction Tradeshare	0.244	−0.554	0.863	−1.777	−0.461	0.319
	(1.439)	(1.669)	(1.404)	(1.973)	(1.615)	(1.552)
MID*Sanction	−0.0472	−0.0438	−0.222	−0.0889	0.136	−0.00191
	(0.0966)	(0.0481)	(0.119)	(0.0490)	(0.111)	(0.0474)
Constant	−11.80**	−15.63**	−14.79**	−15.59**	−9.921**	−18.19**
	(1.763)	(2.523)	(2.020)	(2.353)	(2.128)	(2.896)
Observations	236,962	147,242	237,405	147,252	237,374	147,259
Dyads	8417	10,767	8421	10,767	8420	10,767

**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. Estimated coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by dyad in parentheses. Controls for real GDP, population size, distance, contiguity, common language, colony, and whether both dyad members are either islands or landlocked are included but not reported.

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Published Online: 2020-03-18

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https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2019-0043

Keywords for this article

gravity models; sanctions; sanctions busting