From Revolution to Elections. A Comparative Analysis of Tunisia and Egypt
Abstract
Political participation is far from being a trivial issue. The focus of this paper will be on two dissimilar acts of political participation in the context of the Arab Spring: revolution and elections. In detail, I will first describe participants in revolution and elections – who they are and why they do participate – to then analyse the link (if any) between revolution and electoral participation. This study will develop a comparison between the cases of Tunisia and Egypt. The findings will illustrate that Tunisian insurgents are more likely to vote in post-revolution elections when compared to their Egyptian fellows, and that this is consistent with the events in the aftermath of the two revolutions.
Acknowledgments
The author thanks Elena Manzoni, Michela Cella, Lorenzo Cappellari, Giovanna Iannantuoni, Giorgia Albertin, Luca Micheletto, participants to the ESSAI Seminars Series of the University of Carthage (Tunis) and two anonymous referees for invaluable comments.
Appendix
Generalized structural equation model estimates.
| Dep.Var. | Elect | |
|---|---|---|
| Country | Egypt | Tunisia |
| (1) | (2) | |
| Revol | −0.153 | 0.152** |
| (0.132) | (0.076) | |
| Age | 0.0146*** | 0.0148*** |
| (0.003) | (0.002) | |
| Gender | −0.435*** | 0.0631 |
| (0.070) | (0.066) | |
| Educ | 0.222*** | 0.080 |
| (0.039) | (0.049) | |
| Wealth | −0.002 | 0.008 |
| (0.063) | (0.043) | |
| Unempl | −0.102 | −0.0820 |
| (0.099) | (0.068) | |
| Rural | 0.171* | 0.020 |
| (0.103) | (0.068) | |
| Polinternet | 0.128** | 0.058** |
| (0.053) | (0.029) | |
| Member | 0.142 | 0.163 |
| (0.201) | (0.119) | |
| Demobest | −0.086 | 0.014 |
| (0.074) | (0.056) | |
| Armytrust | 0.149*** | −0.014 |
| (0.051) | (0.036) | |
| Polislam | −0.023 | 0.016 |
| (0.054) | (0.024) | |
Standard errors in brackets clustered by governorate. Entries are coefficients.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Coefficients are estimated by a generalized structural equation model ( Rabe-Hesketh & Pickles, 2004) with common unobserved component:
where F() in (7) is a smooth nonlinear function, Xi is the same vector of exogenous covariates that enter equations (1)–(8), Zi in (8) is the excluded instrument, δt is the wave dummy, ηi is the common unobserved component which resolves the issues of endogeneity and εi is an error term. Only results from equation (7) are reported in the Table.
Multinomial probit (1)–(4) and OLS (5)–(6) estimates.
| Dep.Var. Country | Revfeel | Ecofuture | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Egypt | Tunisia | Egypt | Tunisia | |||
| loss | gain | loss | gain | |||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| Revol | 0.075** | 0.051 | −0.019 | 0.070** | −0.156* | 0.132** |
| (0.034) | (0.033) | (0.025) | (0.033) | (0.089) | (0.058) | |
| Age | 0.001 | −0.001 | −0.002** | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.006*** |
| (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) | |
| Gender | 0.122*** | −0.133*** | −0.011 | 0.031 | 0.090 | 0.134*** |
| (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.021) | (0.029) | (0.072) | (0.060) | |
| Educ | −0.014 | 0.021* | −0.018 | 0.014 | 0.062** | −0.007 |
| (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.027) | (0.031) | |
| Wealth | −0.024** | 0.025** | −0.024** | 0.021 | 0.129*** | 0.071** |
| (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.014) | (0.031) | (0.030) | |
| Unempl | 0.037 | −0.037 | 0.027 | −0.014 | −0.026 | −0.037 |
| (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.022) | (0.030) | (0.075) | (0.062) | |
| Rural | 0.063*** | 0.013 | −0.020 | −0.003 | 0.261*** | 0.023 |
| (0.021) | (0.022) | (0.021) | (0.028) | (0.054) | (0.057) | |
| Polinternet | −0.015 | 0.016 | −0.0002 | 0.046 | 0.001 | 0.031 |
| (0.049) | (0.044) | (0.030) | (0.039) | (0.035) | (0.081) | |
| Member | −0.108*** | 0.104*** | −0.018 | 0.092* | 0.384*** | 0.141*** |
| (0.035) | (0.032) | (0.038) | (0.047) | (0.082) | (0.004) | |
| Demobest | −0.026*** | 0.032*** | 0.001 | 0.015*** | 0.010 | 0.037*** |
| (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.012) | (0.011) | |
| Armytrust | 0.007 | 0.039** | −0.041*** | 0.002* | 0.115*** | 0.149*** |
| (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.010) | (0.015) | (0.043) | (0.035) | |
| Polislam | −0.019** | 0.028*** | −0.018** | 0.039*** | 0.040* | 0.123*** |
| (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.007) | (0.011) | (0.023) | (0.024) | |
| Observations | 1823 | 1823 | 1565 | 1565 | 1902 | 1580 |
| Waves dummy | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in brackets. Columns (1)–(4) are estimated by multinomial probit models. Entries are marginal effects. The dependent variable Revfeel is coded as follows: (1) More of personal loss, (2) Difficult to define, (3) More of personal gain. The option Difficult to define represents the baseline category. Columns (5)–(6) are estimated by OLS. Entries are coefficients.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- ‘Of the Expence of Defence’: What Has Changed Since Adam Smith?
- Goal and Strategies of an Insurgent Group: Violent and Non-violent Actions
- Converging Allies?
- From Revolution to Elections. A Comparative Analysis of Tunisia and Egypt
- From Head to Head: An Emergy Analysis of a War Rifle Bullet
Artikel in diesem Heft
- ‘Of the Expence of Defence’: What Has Changed Since Adam Smith?
- Goal and Strategies of an Insurgent Group: Violent and Non-violent Actions
- Converging Allies?
- From Revolution to Elections. A Comparative Analysis of Tunisia and Egypt
- From Head to Head: An Emergy Analysis of a War Rifle Bullet
