‘Of the Expence of Defence’: What Has Changed Since Adam Smith?
Abstract
This essay selectively reviews the history of economic thought on war and peace, starting with Adam Smith. Today, Smith’s trickle of thoughts has become a broad marshland. In this marshland, however, discrete currents are apparent – some stronger, some weaker – which this essay identifies, in rough chronological order, as war, defense, conflict, military, security, and peace economics. As these terms often are used interchangeably, one purpose of the essay is to more clearly delineate these intellectual currents and differentiate them from each other. By building canals in the marshlands as it were, the aim is to help all flows of contributions become stronger.
Appendix
Within the economics profession, Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) subject matter codes that pertain directly to war, defense, conflict, military, security, or peace are as follows: D74 (Conflict, Conflict Resolution, Alliances, Revolutions); F51 (International Conflicts, Negotiations, Sanctions); F52 (National Security, Economic Nationalism); F54 (Colonialism, Imperialism, Postcolonialism); H56 (National Security and War); N40 (Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation); and Q34 (Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts). The words “defense,” “military,” and “peace” actually do not appear in the JEL codes. Neither do the words “violence” (or variations thereof) or “arms” (but “armaments” does). Of course, many other JEL codes cover studies related to violent and nonviolent conflict. Obvious examples include C70 (Game Theory and Bargaining Theory), D10 (Household Behavior), K14 (Criminal Law), K38 (Human Rights Law, Gender Law), K42 (Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law), and L64 (Other Machinery; Business Equipment; Armaments).
Outside the economics profession, the U.S. Library of Congress (LC) classification and Dewey Decimal Classification (DDC) are important. Consider the four examples in Table A1, all of which are placed within the social sciences rubrics in both, LC and DDC. In LC, the Sandler and Hartley volume is classified as “economic history and conditions”, Anderton and Carter are under “general sociology”, Smith is grouped with “industries, land use, and labor”, and Brauer and Dunne are in the “economic theory and demography” rubric. In DDC, Sandler and Hartley as well as Smith are classified under “production in secondary industries and services”. But the Anderton and Carter book is grouped under “social processes (conflict)”, and the Brauer and Dunne volume comes under the rubric of “macroeconomic policy”. In all, the cataloguers assign seven different classifications. Even as the economists frequently use the terms in a seemingly interchangeable way, clearly, the subject matter is not unitary. It is, as I have suggested, a marshland within which distinct currents flow.
The authors themselves also mingle the subject matters. In Sandler and Hartley (1995)we read that “defense economics is the study of both defense and peace issues, using the tools of modern economics. It covers a range of issues, including nuclear proliferation, resource disputes, environmental externalities, ethnic conflicts, and terrorism, all of which present grave threats to peace and security” (my emphasis). But a “threat to peace” can hardly be said to constitute the “study of peace.” Indeed, the introduction aside, the book’s table of contents includes chapters on the economic theory of alliances (ch. 2), the demand for military expenditures (ch. 3), arms races (ch. 4), procurement (theories, evidence and policies) (ch. 5), military manpower (ch. 6), defense and the industrial base (ch. 7), economic growth, development and military expenditures (ch. 8), industrial and alliance policies (ch. 9), arms trade (ch. 10), arms control and disarmament (ch. 11), conversion (ch. 12), and nonconventional conflict: revolutions, guerrilla warfare and terrorism (ch. 13). Thus, the book’s title The Economics of Defense is actually quite accurate (Table 1).
Subject classification for four text- or text-like books.
| LC | DDC | |
| Sandler and Hartley, The Economics of Defense (1995) | HC110.D4 H Social sciences C Economic history and conditions 94-1085 By region or country | 338.4 300 Social sciences -330 Economics --338 Production ---338.4 Secondary industries and services |
| Anderton and Carter, Principles of Conflict Economics (2009) | HM1121 H Social sciences M Sociology (general) 1106–1171 Interpersonal relations. Social behavior | 303.6 -300 Social sciences --303 Social processes ---303.6 Conflict |
| Smith, Military Economics (2009) | HD9743.A2 H Social sciences D Industries. Land use. Labor 9720–9975 Manufacturing industries | 338.4 300 Social sciences -330 Economics --338 Production ---338.4 Secondary industries and services |
| Brauer and Dunne, Peace Economics (2012) | HB3732 H Social sciences B Economic theory. Demography 3711–3840 Business cycles. Economic fluctuation | 339.5 -300 Social sciences --339 Macroeconomics and related topics ---339.5 Macroeconomic policy |
Anderton and Carter (2009)define conflict economics as “(1) the study of violent or potentially violent conflict using the concepts, principles, and methods of economics and (2) the development of economic models of appropriation and its interaction with production and exchange activities” (p. 2). Apart from an introductory chapter, their book covers production possibilities and the guns versus butter tradeoff (ch. 2), rational choice and equilibrium (ch. 3), fundamentals of game theory (ch. 4), a bargaining model of conflict (ch. 5), conflict between states (ch. 6), civil war and genocide (ch. 7), terrorism (ch. 8), geography and technology of conflict (ch. 9), arms rivalry, proliferation, and arms control (ch. 10), military alliances (ch. 11), and conflict success functions and the theory of appropriation possibilities (ch. 12).
Smith (2009)writes: “Since defense economics is often about attack and peace economics is often about war, I have used the title military economics: the economics of the use of organised force” (p. 1; my emphasis). If “defense” is attack and “peace” is war then military economics takes on a more critical perspective. Apart from the introduction, the book’s chapters are titled Power and Money (ch. 2; which deals with producing security, militarism, economic concepts, uncertainty, and economic-security interactions), Security: Are We Safe? (ch. 3; addressing individual, national, global security, war and oil, arms races and arms control), Military Spending: How Much is Enough? (ch. 4; treating of measures of military expenditure, motives for arming, economic functions of military spending, arms races, and military prices), Demand: The Biggest Bang for a Buck? (ch. 5; addressing labor, weapons procurement, and weapons technology), Supply: The Merchants of Death? (ch. 6; covering the arms industry, the evolution of the arms trade, and associated regulation), Military Capability: How to Win? (ch. 7; dealing with force employment, morale, logistics, and peacekeeping), and Economic Choices: Swords or Ploughshares? (ch. 8; covering budget constraints, the economic effects, technological spin-offs, and economic warfare.
Finally, Brauer and Dunne (2012) define peace economics as “the economic study and design of political, economic, and cultural institutions, their interrelations, and their policies to prevent, mitigate, or resolve any type of latent or actual violence or other destructive conflict within and between societies,” a definition taken from Brauer and Caruso (2013), pp. 151–152. Their book differs radically from the other three in part because unlike the others it focuses on macro- rather than microeconomic techniques and understanding and in part because they seek to identify moments of violence and potential possibilities for intervention or prevention within the macroeconomic context. Their chapters are Violence and Economic Development (ch. 1), Long-Term Economic Goals: Investment, Productivity, and Growth (ch. 2), Macroeconomic Stabilization and Dealing with Turbulence (ch. 3), The Global Economy: International Trade and Finance (ch. 4), and Designing and Promoting Peace (ch. 5).
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- ‘Of the Expence of Defence’: What Has Changed Since Adam Smith?
- Goal and Strategies of an Insurgent Group: Violent and Non-violent Actions
- Converging Allies?
- From Revolution to Elections. A Comparative Analysis of Tunisia and Egypt
- From Head to Head: An Emergy Analysis of a War Rifle Bullet
Artikel in diesem Heft
- ‘Of the Expence of Defence’: What Has Changed Since Adam Smith?
- Goal and Strategies of an Insurgent Group: Violent and Non-violent Actions
- Converging Allies?
- From Revolution to Elections. A Comparative Analysis of Tunisia and Egypt
- From Head to Head: An Emergy Analysis of a War Rifle Bullet
