What Do Science and Historical Denialists Deny – If Any – When Addressing Certainties in Wittgenstein’s Sense?

1 Introduction

Scepticism aims at preventing dogmatism by casting doubt on statements that are ordinarily regarded as trivially true, as a result of which it has traditionally constituted one of the driving forces of philosophical reflection. Yet scepticism also plays a key role in the scientific process, where findings must be tested by other researchers in order to discern – by systematically casting doubt on such findings – whether they are rejected or finally reach scientific consensus.^[1] There is an overwhelming consensus on the evidence that supports a number of scientific claims: for instance, the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic, the link between HIV and AIDS, the health risks of smoking, the efficacy of vaccines, the theory of evolution, or the human impact on global warming, to name but a few.^[2] However, the consensus on these claims has been rejected by commentators who use rhetorical tactics “to give the appearance of argument or legitimate debate, when in actuality there is none.”^[3] These commentators have been called “denialists,”^[4] but they prefer to be considered as “sceptics” – thus attempting to resist stigmatization, as well as emphasizing their alleged positive epistemic role as a necessary counterbalance to what they regard as a dogmatic scientific community.^[5] This position has been described as a “special interest” scepticism which may be business, political, or religious in nature.^[6] In order to prevent this rejection of scientific consensus based on ideologically driven reasoning from being confused with scientific scepticism, Torcello coined the term “pseudoskepticism.” According to Torcello, pseudosceptics ignore how rigorous methodological scepticism informs scientific consensus, despite which they attempt to appropriate the epistemological authority of science while critiquing “scientific consensus as uncritical, or fraudulent” and regarding “mainstream scientists as credulous dogmatists.”^[7] As a result, denialism – the term I will use here instead of “pseudoscepticism” – has given rise to problems as serious as the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives due to AIDS denialism,^[8] the influence of climate change denialism on voting patterns and socioeconomic outcomes,^[9] and the impact of COVID-19 denialism on health decisions such as vaccine acceptance,^[10] to which it should be added the extent to which denialism has contributed to many people not only becoming suspicious of science, but also misunderstanding how it actually works.^[11]

Keeping in mind that denialists often address certainties in Wittgenstein’s sense, in this article, I take as a reference Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty to show that when denialists attempt to deny a certainty, they do not even deny anything at all because they are articulating mere nonsense.^[12] To clarify this point, I start by providing a brief introduction to Wittgenstein’s conception of “certainty,” paying particular attention not only to the distinction between seeming and genuine doubt, but also to the nonsense generated when violating a certainty. Then, I analyze why we cannot even understand denialists when they try to deny certainties about the existence of the Holocaust and the sphericity of Earth. To this end, I consider the consequences of delegitimizing research procedures, regarding the case of doubt as the normal case, and formulating the denialist doubt through words whose use is incompatible with such doubt.^[13] As denialists cannot therefore provide compelling grounds to justify their position, I explain how they use persuasion in Wittgenstein’s sense to try to substitute scientific certainties for alternative ones. Lastly, although denialism concerning certainties cannot even be refuted because it is nonsense, I propose how to make deniers, as well as the general public, aware of such nonsense by asking questions that revolve around incongruences such as those I have previously noted concerning Holocaust denialism and the flat-Earth “theory.”

2 Two Examples of the Consequences of Denialism Concerning Certainty

Whenever we act or speak under normal circumstances, we are implicitly showing that there are countless things about which we are absolutely certain, e.g., the meaning of the basic words we are using, the existence of physical objects, or our being alive, among many others. From Wittgenstein’s standpoint, certainty is “an ungrounded way of acting”^[14] insofar as we could give many seeming grounds to justify it, but none of them would be as certain as the very thing it was supposed to be a ground for.^[15] It is remarkable that Wittgenstein describes certainty as a direct taking hold of something – for example, his own towel – without thinking of grounds or verifications, i.e., “without having doubts.”^[16] Indeed, the main feature of certainty is the logical exclusion of the possibility of mistake – and, by extension, of doubt.^[17] Yet, if we are to understand someone’s “signs of doubt as such”^[18] – instead of considering them as mere “behaviour of doubt”^[19] or as seeming doubts that “don’t make sense at all”^[20] – some conditions must be necessarily fulfilled. Taking as a reference Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, Coliva claims that genuine doubts presuppose certainty; must be based on grounds; can be raised only within some language-games; manifest themselves only in specific circumstances; and must have consequences in practice.^[21] Although certainty can seemingly be expressed through an empirical proposition – e.g., “There are physical objects” – it cannot be meaningfully negated because certainty never constitutes a move in our language-games. This is what Wittgenstein calls “nonsense” (OC §35), for these kinds of sentences “have no use within a language-game – that is, there is no recognized context or circumstances in which the expression functions.”^[22] As certainties make the language-game – and, by extension, sense – possible, they “do not therefore make sense,” as is the case with what violates or contravenes certainty.^[23] As a result, if someone seemed to seriously call a certainty into doubt, we could regard such nonsense as madness.^[24] Yet in this context Wittgenstein does not consider madness as a mental disorder, but as a way of making reference to the grammatical void that would then be opened up between the concerned individual and all of us.^[25] For, in such a case, we “would not know what such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what not.”^[26] Indeed, our certainties make up a “world-picture” which constitutes “the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.”^[27] This means that, if someone calls a certainty – and, by extension, our whole world-picture – into doubt, there will be no judgment of which she can be certain.^[28]

As could not be otherwise, scientists must also take as a basis a world-picture – made up of certainties – or background that allows them to distinguish between true and false. Yet it does not follow from this that the scientific method is designed to collect certainties. This has been systematically ignored by denialists: for they usually demand from scientists absolute certainty, which constitutes an obsolete conception of science.^[29] Indeed, usually, scientists are extremely sensitive to doubts and caveats, “outlining what they don’t know before proceeding to what they do.”^[30] Hence, science advances by carefully gathering evidence, so that scientific consensus concerning a new finding is by no means guaranteed. There are occasions where scientific consensus is so overwhelming that it ends up giving rise to a certainty.^[31] But this certainty is not always shared by the entire population: in fact, such certainty may be denied by denialists. Two clear examples of this are the certainties about the existence of the Holocaust as well as the sphericity of the Earth. There are two reasons as to why I have chosen these examples. On the one hand, I will next analyze both of them in order to show that the consequences of a case of historical denialism and another of science denialism turn out to be very similar when they are aimed at violating a certainty. On the other hand, both analyses should contribute to a better understanding of the characteristics of the grammatical gap opened up by the denialist due to the nonsense generated when denying certainties that are fully established among the research community.

3 What Denialists Can Do to Disguise Nonsense: Persuasion

If the existence of the Holocaust as well as the sphericity of the Earth are currently certainties immune to doubt, it is not due to an alleged plot carried out by historians and scientists, but to the fact that in the present context it cannot even be imagined what kind of evidence might prove that there had been no Holocaust or that the Earth is flat.^[48] Indeed, if it were possible to imagine which criteria should be fulfilled by such evidence, historians and scientists would have already taken all efforts to obtain this evidence. For, in such a case, neither the existence of the Holocaust nor the sphericity of the Earth would constitute deeply entrenched certainties in the research community, but key issues that remained to be elucidated. Arguably, denialists should also know those criteria, so that they would be expected to focus all their efforts on attempting to convince us that they had already gathered evidence that fits such criteria, for we should then be forced to acknowledge that they were right. Yet denialists, after years of social media activity, have provided nothing beyond irrelevant pseudo-scientific arguments as well as allusions to alleged conspiracies. Most importantly, I have explained why historians, scientists, and denialists should be heavily involved in searching for the criteria that should be fulfilled by the proofs that should seemingly prove the flatness of the Earth and the fact that the Holocaust did not happen. To this day, however, neither historians, nor scientists, nor denialists even seem to be missing the search for – or, at least, a discussion about – these criteria. For, if someone tried to find out such criteria, she could, at the very most, raise criteria that would only make sense if the existence of the Holocaust and the sphericity of the Earth were still issues to be empirically verified.

Therefore, when denialists attempt to deny the existence of the Holocaust and the sphericity of the Earth, a grammatical gap is opened up between them and historians, scientists and most of the population. Due to this grammatical gap, whose implications were outlined in the previous section, denialists can provide no compelling evidence to convince scientists, historians and most of the population that established certainties are false. Given this circumstance, denialists must resort to what Wittgenstein called “persuasion,” i.e., the transmission of certainties, as was the case with the natives converted by missionaries,^[49] and as might allegedly be the case with a hypothetical man who had been taught that the Earth has existed for only fifty years.^[50] As these examples indicate, persuasion in Wittgenstein’s sense is not aimed at someone – like a child – who “acquires a world-picture for the first time,”^[51] but at “people who already have different world-pictures, or rather, different certainties about the particular point on which they disagree.”^[52] The question that arises here is how denialists persuade. Keeping in mind that the main characteristic of certainty is the logical exclusion of the possibility of mistake – and thus also of doubt – denialists endeavor to include the possibility of mistake in the certainties they wish to deny, while they attempt to exclude the possibility of mistake concerning those aspects they want to be assimilated as certain. Next, I will expound some procedures used by denialists to achieve these aims. Such tactics have already been explained by other scholars, but exposing them in terms of certainties may help us to highlight some peculiarities.

A key factor in this persuasion process is the intense emotionalization generated by denialists.^[53] In this case, emotions can be generated implicitly because, even though denialists expressed themselves calmly, they would be communicating something that, if it were – or rather, if it could be – true, would reveal a lie of utmost importance. By way of example, their catchphrase allegedly might have made it possible to save many lives, in addition to which it would denounce a culprit that could not go unpunished. Just because of the relevance that seems to be attached to the denialist slogan, it is also easy to trigger an intense emotionalization explicitly by using tones and wordings that powerfully attract everyone’s attention. A clear example of this can be found in a message written by Kate Shemirani, a well-known conspiracy theorist and anti-vaccine activist who claimed in support of COVID-19 denialism: “Murder. Genocide. The NHS is the new Auschwitz.”^[54] Although not all denialist statements are as radical as this one, it serves to illustrate at least four aspects of the denier’s strategy. First, the fact that Shemirani’s message is so categorical indicates weakness, for it is out of place that someone expresses himself emphatically about something that allegedly could not be called into doubt.^[55] In comparison with the calm and respectful style of scientific discourse, denialist slogans are categorically formulated with the aim of leaving no room for any doubt, so that they are expected to be assimilated as certainties instead of as statements to be pondered. Second, Shemirani’s message is extremely simple because it is intended to incite to action rather than to foster reflection.^[56] After all, many denialist slogans are of the kind of “They use vaccines to kill you and your family,” which may give rise to high levels of stress that, in turn, may lead many people to drastically refuse vaccination and emphatically stand up against vaccine advocates. Third, the emotional polarization created against the opposing side is extreme. Thus, emotionalization contributes to create an “ontology” in which experts as well as guidelines of one’s own side are presented and perceived as heroic and infallible, while those of the opposing side are considered as undoubtedly evil and perverse.^[57] For instance, throughout the COVID-19 pandemic Joseph Mercola and Andrew Wakefield were seen as live-saving heroes by the vaccine-distrusting publics, who irrevocably condemned Anthony Fauci and Bill Gates as evil perpetrators. Likewise, the total refusal to get vaccinated and to wear masks is often assimilated as a certainty by the COVID-suspicious, for they regard all doubt about it as aberrant as well as characteristic of cowardly and misinformed people. Fourth, it should be noted that when deniers attempt to cast doubt on a certainty, it will have already been widely disseminated by traditionally reliable sources, as a result of which it will be difficult that people become perplexed by such certainty. Hence, if denialists aim for people to end up perceiving this certainty as a bizarre idea, the former must react against it “with stunned bewilderment.”^[58] Yet, if denialists cannot forget – or must make an effort – to react in such a way, this might mean they share the certainty that they are trying to deny. For certainties are shown spontaneously, thus without us having to remember them or making an effort of any kind.

In order to downgrade scientific certainty to a mere opinion, denialists must conduct an intense public sensitization campaign aimed at weakening a certainty derived from fact-based consensus.^[59] From then on, some uninformed people may accept that a new doubt has arisen inasmuch as they contemplate the denialist position at the same level as the scientific one, so that both become equally exposed to the possibility of mistake. A clear example of an attempt to downgrade the scientific position could be found during the COVID-19 pandemic in the Brazilian mass media, which assumed that equal weight must be given to both sides of an event – even when one of them shows a denialist position toward science – so that the pursuit of neutrality in news coverage made it possible to spread false premises as if they were scientific, thus strengthening the denialist position.^[60] Once the certainty has been downgraded to a mere opinion, the next step in the denialist strategy is to treat in a very different way the evidence presented by each side. Thus, denialists accept no evidence against their slogans, while they demand that scientists admit evidence against established certainties. Therefore, denialists implicitly reject the possibility of doubt and mistake concerning their position, so that they present themselves as infallible. To this end, denialist claims are often categorical – e.g., by saying “is not” instead of “might not be” – to the extent of leaving no room to the possibility of doubt.^[61] Meanwhile, deniers are sharply critical of the dogmatism they attribute to scientists, thus ignoring that scientific scepticism is fully “aware of its own fallibility and cautious in both rejecting unsupportable claims and accepting evidentially cogent and rationally sound conclusions.”^[62] In fact, denialists argue that science is not open to revision, for it resembles a traditional religion that demands faith from believers.^[63] Conversely, denialists often base their arguments on religious dogmas just because they think that, in this way, such arguments become immunized against doubt.^[64] In any case, denialists usually focus their criticisms on a specific power group – whether pharmaceutical companies, governments, or leading entrepreneurs – that have allegedly conspired to weave a perverse lie. This allows denialists to create an enemy – whose existence is assumed as certain – who not only makes it possible to trigger an emotionalization process to mobilize the population, but also contributes to promoting unified group consciousness against a huge danger whose existence is also assimilated as certain.

4 Conclusion

It has been denounced that research on ways to counteract denialism is still largely theoretical rather than empirical or centered on the efficiency of interventions.^[65] However, I think theoretical – and specifically, philosophical – analysis of denialist claims is of particular relevance to decide what answer should be given to denialists and to the general population about this issue. My conclusion is that, paradoxical as it may seem, denialists do not deny anything at all when they attempt to deny certainties in Wittgenstein’s sense.^[66] For, despite appearances, the fact that their claims are nonsense entails that they are not expressing themselves through meaningful or understandable sentences. From this, it follows that it would be wrong to respond to the denialist’s doubt, for this would involve attributing sense to it. Some scholars recommended that a response should be given to legitimate scepticism,^[67] but I think we cannot reply to illegitimate scepticism – understood as scepticism whose queries put certainties into question. Yet, although denialism concerning certainties is nonsense, and therefore cannot even be refuted, we must help the denier – and the entire population – to become aware of such nonsense and its consequences.^[68] However, it should be noted that openly tackling a denialist argument^[69] as well as attempting to refute such argument once the denialist position has already “solidified”^[70] may be self-defeating because it will likely provoke the denialist to take an even more radical stand. This is why I think the best way to show that the denialist doubt is nonsense would consist not in overwhelming him with arguments against his position, but in asking questions to make the denier aware that his claims saw off the branch on which they are sitting. These questions might revolve around incongruencies such as those I have noted concerning Holocaust denialism and the flat-Earth “theory.” Of course, I cannot in any way guarantee that denialists of certainties will renounce their claims due to such questions; yet these questions should break the vicious circle in which denialists treat scientific certainties as mere opinions, in addition to which the population at large might realize why the denialist doubt is incongruent.

Nonetheless, when anyone claims denialism, he will probably be seen as someone who tries to shut down a legitimate debate.^[71] Hence, in order to show the incongruences of the denier’s position, I think it is not necessary to explicitly qualify him as a denialist. And keeping in mind that his doubt will be regarded as nonsense, there are at least two reasons as to why his attempt to promote emotionalization should not be replied with even more emotionalization and radicalization.^[72] On the one hand, fostering emotionalization makes it harder to concentrate on the question raised and promotes impulsive reactions, which in turn may facilitate that the denialist redirects the conversation, thus finding loopholes to avoid awkward questions that might become him aware that his doubt is nonsense. On the other hand, bearing in mind that certainties are neither acquired nor lost at will, care must be taken to properly manage emotions because intense emotionalization might, to some extent, facilitate the acquisition and the loss of diverse certainties.^[73] For the expansion of denialism concerning certainties reveals that the fact that its slogans lack sense does not prevent such slogans from being assumed by a significant proportion of the population.