Why we do not need demonstrative proof for God’s existence to know that God exists
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Aleksandar Novaković
Abstract
As a counterpoint to demonstrative proofs in metaphysics, Robert Nozick presented the case for God’s existence based on the value of personal experiences. Personal experiences shape one’s life, but this is even more evident with extraordinary experiences, such can be religious ones. In the next step, says the argument, if those experiences can be explained only by invoking the concept of the Supreme Being, then God exists. The second step mirrors scientific explanation constituting what Nozick calls the “argument to the best explanation.” The argument is set against the background of Nozick’s methodology which rejects demonstrative proofs in metaphysics. Its purpose is threefold. It aims to establish a certain sort of experience (religious/spiritual) as a legitimate basis for the argumentation; it aims to show that it is not philosophically blasphemous to explain such experiences by introducing a concept of divinity. Finally, it seeks to showcase the non-dogmatic, investigative nature of the argument. By exploring the merits of Nozick’s proposal, I will try to elucidate all three components, which should pave the way for a broader discussion on the role of non-demonstrative arguments in metaphysics.
Zusammenfassung
Als Gegenpol zu den demonstrativen Beweisen in der Metaphysik, hat Robert Nozick einen Beweis der Existenz Gottes ausgehend vom Begriff der persönlichen Erfahrung entwickelt. Persönliche Erfahrungen prägen das Leben – das gilt umso mehr für außergewöhnliche Erfahrungen, wie religiöse Erfahrungen. Der nächste Schritt des Argumentes lautet, dass wenn diese Erfahrungen nur durch Berufung auf ein Konzept des Höchsten Wesens möglich sind, Gott existiert. Dieser Schritt spiegelt wissenschaftliche Erklärungen, die auf dem Argument, das Nozick als das „Argument der besten Erklärung“ bezeichnet, beruhen. Das Argument ist vor dem Hintergrund von Nozicks Methodologie zu verstehen, die demonstrative Beweise in der Metaphysik ablehnt. Es verfolgt einen dreifachen Zweck. Es zielt erstens darauf ab, eine bestimmte Art von Erfahrung (religiös/spirituell) als legitime Grundlage für die Argumentation zu etablieren; es zielt zweitens darauf ab zu zeigen, dass es philosophisch nicht blasphemisch ist, solche Erfahrungen durch die Einführung eines Konzepts der Göttlichkeit zu erklären. Und drittens soll schließlich der nicht-dogmatische, investigative Charakter des Arguments aufgezeigt werden. Indem ich die Vorzüge von Nozicks Vorschlag untersuche, werde ich versuchen, alle drei Komponenten zu erläutern, was den Weg für eine breitere Diskussion über die Rolle von nicht-demonstrativen Argumenten in der Metaphysik ebnen sollte.
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Frontmatter
- Editorial
- Munich Lecture in the Philosophy of Religion
- Is Religious Belief a Kind of Belief?
- What’s Belief Got to Do With It?
- Religious Belief, Occurrent Thought, and Reasonable Disagreement
- Why Belief? Varieties of Religious Commitment
- Replies to Gäb, Schmidt and Scott
- Other Research Articles
- Why we do not need demonstrative proof for God’s existence to know that God exists
- An Appraisal of Christoph Schwöbel’s Trinitarian Theology of Creation in Dialogue with Natural Sciences
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Frontmatter
- Editorial
- Munich Lecture in the Philosophy of Religion
- Is Religious Belief a Kind of Belief?
- What’s Belief Got to Do With It?
- Religious Belief, Occurrent Thought, and Reasonable Disagreement
- Why Belief? Varieties of Religious Commitment
- Replies to Gäb, Schmidt and Scott
- Other Research Articles
- Why we do not need demonstrative proof for God’s existence to know that God exists
- An Appraisal of Christoph Schwöbel’s Trinitarian Theology of Creation in Dialogue with Natural Sciences
