Balancing up, Down, and in: NGO Perspectives During Nepal’s Covid-19 Crisis
Abstract
This study examines how different forms of accountability relationships affected NGO operational resilience during Nepal’s Covid-19 crisis. Drawing on stakeholder and institutional theory, the research investigates three key questions: How do federal government restrictions impact NGO operational resilience? What role does local government satisfaction play in organizational resilience? And how do concerns about beneficiary wellbeing relate to operational challenges? Analysis of survey data from 274 NGOs in Nepal, collected during peak pandemic restrictions, reveals three key findings. First, federal government restrictions significantly impaired NGO operations, with regulatory constraints directly impacting organizational effectiveness. Second, satisfaction with local government response showed no significant relationship with operational concerns. Third, organizations more concerned about their beneficiaries’ welfare experienced greater operational challenges. These findings demonstrate how different forms of accountability pressure create varying levels of organizational strain during crises, providing concrete evidence for “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder,” and highlighting the need to differentiate between federal and local government relationships in accountability frameworks. These findings have significant implications for NGO management practices and policy approaches to civil society regulation during crises.
1 Introduction
The complex web of accountability relationships that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) navigate has long been a focus of scholarly attention (Cordery and Sim 2018; Kaba 2021; Pilon and Brouard 2023; Sumarwan and Luke 2024; van Zyl and Claeyé 2019; Williamson, Kingston, and Bennison 2022). These organizations must balance competing demands from multiple stakeholders–upward accountability to donors and government bodies who provide critical resources and regulatory oversight, and downward accountability to beneficiaries who give the organization its moral legitimacy and social purpose (Chen, Dyball, and Harrison 2020; Najam 1996). While extensive research has examined these accountability relationships during normal operations (Bawole and Langnel 2016; Williamson, Kingston, and Bennison 2022), our understanding of how these relationships evolve and impact organizational resilience during crisis periods remains limited. This gap in knowledge became particularly salient during the COVID-19 pandemic, which created unprecedented challenges for NGOs worldwide while simultaneously increasing demand for their services.
This study addresses three critical gaps in the current literature on NGO accountability. First, while scholars have theorized about the challenges of managing multiple stakeholder demands (Balboa 2017; Koppell 2005), empirical evidence demonstrating how these competing pressures affect organizational operations during crises remains scarce. Second, existing research often treats government as a monolithic stakeholder in upward accountability relationships (Marwell and Brown 2020; Najam 1996, 2000; Toepler et al. 2022; Young 2000), overlooking the potentially distinct dynamics that emerge at different levels of government authority. Third, the field lacks validated measurement tools for assessing key constructs related to NGO-government relationships and organizational resilience during crisis periods.
Drawing on stakeholder theory (Freeman 2010) and institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), this research examines how different forms of accountability relationships affected NGO operations during Nepal’s COVID-19 crisis. Specifically, it investigates three key questions: How do federal government restrictions impact NGO operational resilience? What role does local government satisfaction play in organizational resilience? And how do concerns about beneficiary wellbeing relate to operational challenges? These questions are explored through analysis of survey data from 274 NGOs in Nepal collected during the height of pandemic restrictions, reveals three key findings. First, federal government restrictions significantly impaired NGO operations, with regulatory constraints directly impacting organizational effectiveness. Second, satisfaction with local government response showed no significant relationship with operational concerns. Third, organizations more concerned about their beneficiaries’ welfare experienced greater operational challenges.
Nepal, like many developing nations, provides an instructive context for examining these accountability relationships. The country exemplifies common patterns seen across the Global South – rapid NGO sector growth following democratization, a focus on community development, and evolving government-civil society relations. During the pandemic, Nepal implemented highly restrictive measures that mirror approaches taken by numerous developing countries, reaching a government stringency index of 91.67 out of 100 in May 2021 (Hale et al. 2021). These restrictions created significant operational challenges for NGOs while simultaneously increasing demands for their services, a dynamic observed across many developing nations during the crisis. The context also allows examination of different levels of government relationships, as Nepal’s recent transition to federalism reflects broader trends of decentralization across developing countries, where new governance structures create complex accountability dynamics between federal and local authorities. Similar transitions to multi-level governance have occurred in countries like Indonesia, Ethiopia, and Pakistan, making Nepal’s experience relevant for understanding NGO-government relations in evolving federal systems more broadly.
This research makes three primary contributions to the literature. First, it provides empirical evidence for what scholars have termed “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder” (Balboa 2017; Koppell 2005) by demonstrating how simultaneous pressures from different stakeholders create operational challenges during crises. The findings reveal that both federal government restrictions and heightened beneficiary concerns significantly impacted NGO operations during the pandemic. Second, this study advances our understanding of government-NGO relationships by examining dynamics at both federal and local levels. While previous research often assumes a typologized relationship between government and NGOs (Marwell and Brown 2020; Najam 1996, 2000; Toepler et al. 2022; Young 2000), this study reveals how different levels of government authority can create distinct – and sometimes contradictory – accountability pressures. This multi-level perspective provides a more nuanced understanding of upward accountability relationships. Third, it develops and provides preliminary validation for three measurement scales assessing organizational resilience, freedom of expression and association, and local government satisfaction in crisis contexts. While the urgent nature of pandemic-related data collection necessitated abbreviated validation procedures, they provide a foundation for future research examining NGO-government relationships and organizational resilience during crises.
This paper proceeds as follows: The next section reviews theoretical perspectives on stakeholder theory and NGO accountability, particularly examining upward accountability to government authorities and downward accountability to beneficiaries. The paper then describes Nepal’s NGO sector and pandemic response context before outlining the methodological approach. After presenting the empirical findings, the discussion explores theoretical implications for understanding accountability relationships during crises and provides practical recommendations for strengthening NGO resilience.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Stakeholder Theory
Stakeholder theory emphasizes that organizations must consider the interests of all stakeholders – defined as any groups or individuals who can affect or are affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives. This perspective extends beyond traditional principal-agent relationships to recognize that organizational success requires understanding and responding to diverse stakeholder needs and concerns in order to secure broad-based support (Freeman 2010). The theory distinguishes between two main categories of stakeholders. Primary stakeholders are those whose ongoing participation is vital for organizational survival, creating a relationship of mutual dependence. In contrast, secondary stakeholders can influence or be influenced by the organization but are not engaged in essential transactions–while they may shape public perception and discourse around organizational performance, they are not critical to its continued existence (Clarkson 1995). This fundamental framework helps organizations map and manage their complex web of stakeholder relationships and responsibilities.
In the context of NGOs, primary stakeholders are those groups whose ongoing participation is essential for the organization’s mission fulfillment and survival (Bawole and Langnel 2016). The primary stakeholder groups include beneficiaries or service recipients who are central to the NGO’s social purpose, as well as federal and local government bodies that provide critical regulatory oversight, funding, and operational permissions. Federal government often supplies significant resources through grants and contracts while maintaining regulatory authority, whereas local government typically partners in service delivery while managing local oversight (Toepler, Pape, Benevolenski 2020a; Toepler et al. 2022). Other primary stakeholders include donors and funders who provide essential financial resources, staff and volunteers who deliver programs and services, and board members who ensure proper governance and strategic direction. The relationship between NGOs and these primary stakeholders is characterized by high interdependence – the organization requires their continued engagement and support to operate effectively and achieve its social mission. Secondary stakeholders, in contrast, are those who can influence or be influenced by the NGO but are not essential to its survival or direct mission fulfillment. These include media organizations, special interest groups, professional associations, peer organizations, the general public, and academic institutions. While these groups can significantly impact public perception and the broader operating environment, they are not directly involved in the NGO’s core service delivery or critical to its continued existence.
It is important to recognize the limitations and complexities inherent in this framework. Stakeholders may have opposing views, different political agendas, and socio-cultural differences that create tensions in their relationships with NGOs. Power inequalities, competing interests, and varying resource capacities among stakeholder groups can significantly impact their ability to influence organizational decisions and access benefits. For instance, government bodies often occupy dual roles as both regulators at the federal level (primary) and partners at the local level (secondary). Beneficiaries hold moral legitimacy as primary stakeholders but may lack economic power to influence organizational decisions. Additionally, the framework envisions a bi-directional relationship between organizations and stakeholders, acknowledging that influence and accountability flow both ways rather than in a purely hierarchical manner (Kaba 2021). These dynamics add layers of complexity to stakeholder management in the NGO.
2.2 Accountability to Stakeholders
NGO accountability encompasses three core dimensions that align closely with stakeholder theory principles. First is the relationship between those giving and receiving accounts – the “to whom” of accountability. Second is taking responsibility for organizational decisions and their consequences – the “for what.” Third is the practical mechanisms through which information and explanations are provided – the “how” of accountability (Cordery and Sim 2018; Pilon and Brouard 2023). These three interconnected elements – relationships, responsibilities, and reporting mechanisms – form the foundation for understanding accountability within NGO contexts. Importantly, the nature of accountability varies across NGOs based on their dominant stakeholders and activities (Cordery and Sim 2018).
Stakeholder theory suggests that organizations must manage relationships with multiple stakeholders who can affect or are affected by the organization’s objectives (Freeman 2010). In the NGO context, this manifests as complex accountability relationships with multiple stakeholders, each imposing distinct expectations (Ebrahim 2003, 2016; Edwards and Hulme 1995; Koppell 2005; Najam 1996). These stakeholders can be categorized into three main groups based on their legitimacy and power:
Patrons (primarily donors and state actors) who possess both power through resource provision and regulatory authority, and legitimacy through formal institutional roles.
Clients (beneficiaries and affected communities) who possess legitimacy through their status as intended beneficiaries but often lack power.
Internal stakeholders (staff, board members) who possess both power and legitimacy through their organizational roles.
The nature of accountability varies across NGOs based on their dominant stakeholders and activities (Cordery and Sim 2018). Large international NGOs may prioritize donor accountability due to resource dependencies, while community-based organizations might emphasize beneficiary accountability due to their grassroots mission. Service-providing NGOs often face stronger government oversight than advocacy organizations. Understanding these variations is crucial as they influence how NGOs balance competing accountability demands.
The most commonly used conceptualization in NGO accountability research is the upward-downward dichotomy (Ebrahim 2003; Kaba 2021; Pilon and Brouard 2023). However, this binary framework may oversimplify the complex web of relationships NGOs navigate. For instance, local governments can act simultaneously as upward stakeholders through their regulatory role and as partners in service delivery, creating a hybrid accountability relationship that challenges the traditional dichotomy.
2.3 Upward Accountability and Institutional Theory
Upward accountability reflects power-based relationships where stakeholders can exercise control through resources or regulations (Cordery and Sim 2018; Ebrahim 2003). While prior research heavily emphasizes donor-NGO relationships (Kaba 2021; O’Dwyer and Unerman 2010; van Zyl and Claeyé 2019), government actors represent another critical source of upward accountability demands. However, unlike donor relationships which primarily operate through resource dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003), government-NGO relationships are more complex, involving both resource and regulatory dimensions. Following institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), this study recognizes that government-NGO relations are shaped by multiple institutional pressures–coercive (through regulations), normative (through professional standards), and mimetic (through modeling successful relationships). These pressures manifest differently at federal versus local levels. Recognizing the limitations of treating government as a monolithic entity, Marwell and Brown (2020) emphasize a multi-level institutional perspective, explaining how federal government actions often impose coercive restrictions, whereas local-level relationships frequently embody collaborative or normative partnerships. This multi-level institutional perspective helps explain why, during the pandemic, federal governments often imposed restrictive regulations while local relationships remained collaborative (ICNL 2021).
Toepler et al. (2022) argue that government-NGO relationships cannot be reduced to a singular pattern, as multiple types of relationships can coexist. These relationships are significantly influenced by national contexts and political regimes. Building on foundational work by Salamon (1987); Young (2000), and Najam (2000), they propose three ideal type relations: Complementary – characterized by mutual resource dependence and aligned goals, supplementary – where NGOs independently fill government service gaps, and adversarial-marked by conflicting goals and power struggles. These relationship types can coexist within a single political system, as different government agencies may pursue varying approaches based on their institutional mandates and resource needs. China’s “dual management system” exemplifies this complexity – while restricting political activity through coercive pressure, it enables service delivery through complementary relationships (Toepler et al. 2022).
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Nepal’s experience provides empirical illustration of these dynamics, with federal regulations exemplifying coercive institutional pressures that hindered NGO operations. The relationship between NGOs and the federal government oscillated between supplementary and adversarial types. Although some federal government agencies recognized NGOs’ role, the Ministry of Home Affairs imposed increasingly restrictive regulations during the pandemic (Najam 2000; Toepler et al. 2022; Young 2000). Against this contextual and theoretical backdrop, this study hypothesizes that the federal government’s harsh measures – including mobility restrictions and curtailing civic freedoms – adversely impacted NGO operations.
H1:
Federal government restrictions (representing coercive institutional pressure) will negatively impact NGO operations.
At the local level, institutional theory suggests that closer proximity and shared community context create conditions for more collaborative relationships. For example, Gazley and Brudney’s (2007) study of local government-NGO relationships in Georgia found that nearly half of both local governments and nonprofit organizations actively pursued collaborative engagement, with each party perceiving distinct advantages – local governments valued NGOs’ expertise while NGOs sought funding support. The success of these collaborative accountability relationships appears to be shaped by several key factors. Political stability creates an enabling environment for productive partnerships, as demonstrated by Nelson-Nuñez and Cartwright’s (2018) research across 100 Bolivian municipalities. Interestingly, they found that municipalities with fewer financial resources often developed stronger collaborative relationships compared to wealthier counterparts, suggesting that resource constraints can actually incentivize more meaningful partnership approaches.
Guogis, Gudelis, and Stasiukynas (2008) identified six critical attributes that determine the quality of local government-NGO relations in Lithuania: degree of institutionalization, interaction intensity, functional value creation, trust between parties, resource interdependence, and power distribution. This framework helps explain why some partnerships thrive while others struggle. Building on this, Gazley (2010) found that organizations with prior experience working with government generally developed more positive perspectives on collaboration, though noting that not all collaborative experiences yielded positive outcomes.
The importance of pre-existing relationship quality is particularly evident in crisis situations. During the COVID-19 pandemic, countries with established collaborative frameworks between local governments and NGOs, like South Korea, were able to rapidly mobilize effective responses through task force engagement and voluntary cooperation (Jeong and Kim 2021). In contrast, India experienced a rollercoaster of cooperation and contestation, where initial collaborative efforts were undermined by unilateral policy decisions that damaged trust (Tandon and Aravind 2021). Even in more restrictive political contexts, local level government-NGO relationships can evolve productively. Toepler et al.’s (2022) research in Russia identified four distinct relationship types at the subnational level, ranging from “evolving partnership” characterized by robust collaboration to more constrained models. Particularly during crises, pre-existing collaborative relationships significantly determine response effectiveness, highlighting the potential institutional advantage of well-developed local collaborations. Thus, this study hypothesizes:
H2:
Satisfaction with local government response (indicating successful normative institutional collaboration) will reduce NGO organizational concerns.
Despite the potential benefits of government-NGO collaboration, institutional and resources-based challenges create significant tensions. These challenges manifest differently based on organizational characteristics and institutional context. First, power asymmetries within collaborative spaces can reinforce institutional inequalities. As seen in South Korea’s pandemic response, larger NGOs with greater resources and legitimacy often dominated collaborative spaces, potentially excluding smaller organizations with valuable expertise but limited institutional power (Jeong and Kim 2021). This suggests that organizational size and resources moderate the effectiveness of collaborative mechanisms, creating what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) describe as institutional isomorphism where powerful actors shape collaborative norms. Second, resource dependencies can create institutional constraints that limit NGO autonomy. In Austria, NGOs’ reliance on government contracts created financial dependencies that constrained both their advocacy role and financial reserves (Meyer et al. 2021). This aligns with resource dependence theory’s prediction that organizations will sacrifice autonomy to secure critical resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). The tension between maintaining independence and securing resources creates particular challenges for advocacy organizations whose missions may conflict with government preferences. Third, compliance with accountability demands creates institutional burdens that can detract from mission achievement. Excessive focus on meeting state compliance requirements and regulations diverts valuable organizational resources away from beneficiary needs, long-term mission achievement, and organizational learning (Brass 2016). This represents what Ebrahim (2005) terms “accountability myopia” – where focus on short-term regulatory compliance undermines strategic mission fulfillment.
2.4 Downward Accountability and Institutional Theory
Downward accountability emphasizes accountability toward beneficiaries and affected communities, reflecting NGOs’ moral obligations and constituent-based legitimacy (Ebrahim 2016; Najam 1996). Beneficiaries possess normative and social legitimacy, and NGOs often implement participatory accountability mechanisms to incorporate beneficiary perspectives into planning and evaluation processes (Chen, Dyball, and Harrison 2020; Kaba 2021; Williamson, Kingston, and Bennison 2022). Although mechanisms vary, effective downward accountability consistently requires substantive rather than tokenistic engagement (Bawole and Langnel 2016). However, institutional theory suggests that heightened normative pressures from beneficiaries during crises can significantly strain NGOs’ operational capacities by increasing resource demands and creating competing institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Thus, heightened NGO concerns about beneficiaries may intensify operational challenges, leading to third hypothesis:
H3:
Higher levels of NGO concern about beneficiaries negatively impacts their operational concers.
The complex interplay of upward and downward accountability pressures embodies what scholars term “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder” (MAD) versus “Single Accountability Disorder” (SAD) (Balboa 2017; Koppell 2005; Mitchell and Schmitz 2019). NGOs face competing demands from multiple stakeholders – upward accountability to donors and government bodies who provide critical resources and regulatory oversight, and downward accountability to beneficiaries who give the organization its moral legitimacy and social purpose. This creates a fundamental tension: attempting to be accountable to all stakeholders simultaneously (MAD) can paralyze operations and dilute mission effectiveness, while focusing solely on a single stakeholder group (SAD) risk neglecting other legitimate claims and potentially compromising long-term sustainability.
As illustrated in Figure 1, this study examines the theoretical intersection of stakeholder and institutional theories through empirical investigation into how diverse forms of accountability pressures from federal governments, local governments, and beneficiaries impact NGO resilience in crisis contexts. This speaks to a broader question raised by Brown, Ebrahim, and Batliwala (2012) regarding primary accountability – understanding not just to whom NGOs should be accountable, but how they can balance competing accountability demands without compromising their core mission and operational capacity. The following section examines these theoretical propositions through an in-depth investigation of Nepal’s NGO sector.
Conceptual framework for analysis. Author generated graphics based on accountability conceptualization (Ebrahim 2003, 2016; Edwards and Hulme 1995; Najam 1996) and government-NGO relationship (Toepler, Pape, and Benevolenski 2020; Toepler et al. 2022).
2.5 NGOs in Nepal and the Impact of Covid-19
Nepal’s NGO sector has grown significantly since the restoration of democracy in 1990. From just 214 NGOs in 1990, the number has increased to over 54,000 in 2023. The majority of registered organizations (65 %) work in community development, followed by youth development (11 %), women’s issues (7 %), moral development including faith-based institutions (4 %), and environment, health, and children’s issues (3 % each). Education and disability-focused NGOs each comprise 2 % of the total (Social Welfare Council 2024). In recent years, the rate of new NGO registrations has declined as not-for-profit companies have begun to occupy space traditionally held by NGOs (KC 2019, 2022; KC and Lorsuwannarat 2022). This shift is partly due to increased bureaucratic hurdles for NGO renewal (Gurung 2020b).
NGOs primarily register under the Association Registration Act of 1977 with district administration offices under the Ministry of Home Affairs. Professional associations can register under the National Directive Act of 1971. Since 2006, organizations can also register as not-for-profit companies under the Companies Act. Regardless of registration status, all organizations seeking international funding must affiliate with the Social Welfare Council (SWC) and obtain approval before implementing projects (ICNL 2017).
While major regulatory changes have not occurred, the state has made visible efforts to limit NGO activities. One key issue is the categorization of activities as “hardware” (physical infrastructure projects) or “software” (awareness activities, workshops), with policies encouraging the former and discouraging the latter. Another example is the “one-door policy” for relief efforts following the 2015 earthquake, which mandated that all relief activities be conducted through state mechanisms and discouraged direct NGO intervention. Additionally, international NGOs were required to partner with local NGOs for post-disaster relief and reconstruction work (Gurung 2020b).
Admist this backdrop, the Covid-19 pandemic significantly disrupted the operating environment for NGOs in Nepal. The government imposed various restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly and movement beginning in March 2020 to contain the spread of the virus. For instance, youth protestors were met with baton and water canons when they took the streets demanding better handling of the pandemic response (Pokhrel 2020). Furthermore, reports emerged of journalists receiving threats for covering news or criticizing the government’s pandemic response. The press council shut down several online portals, citing misinformation and public panic concerns. Some journalists faced threats and arrests, along with cyberbullying, for reporting on government mismanagement and corruption (RSF 2020). Government critics also faced repercussions. For example, authorities arrested a former government secretary at his home for posting critical comments about the Prime Minister on social media. He was charged with cybercrime under the Electronic Transaction Act (The Kathmandu Post 2020).
According to the Oxford Coronavirus Government Response Tracker, Nepal had a stringency index of 91.67 out of 100 in May 1, 2021, indicating the government had instituted highly strict measures that directly impacted civil society organizations like NGOs (Hale et al. 2021). International organizations monitoring civic freedoms also flagged concerns over Nepal’s restrictions during the pandemic. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) rated Nepal as having “concerning developments” in 2021 related to freedom of expression and freedom of association and assembly (International IDEA 2021). Reporters Without Borders downgraded Nepal to 106th out of 180 countries in its 2021 World Press Freedom Index, citing increased control of information during the pandemic (RSF 2020).
The Social Welfare Council (SWC), the government agency that oversees registration and regulation of NGOs in Nepal, issued various directives that significantly impacted NGO operations during the pandemic. In March 2020, amidst the first wave of Covid-19, the SWC directed all NGOs in Nepal to immediately cancel or postpone all training programs, workshops, meetings, and related events being organized or supported by them. It also required NGOs to sanitize their office spaces. Most impactfully, the SWC instructed NGOs to allocate 20 % of their approved project budgets for the next two months specifically towards Covid-19 response activities (Bhatta 2020). For NGOs with projects related to health, drinking water, sanitation or disaster relief, the allocation was 30 % of approved budgets. In May 2021, amidst a severe second wave of Covid-19, the SWC again allowed NGOs to reallocate between 5 and 20 % of approved project budgets towards Covid-19 relief, based on project size (Social Welfare Council 2021b). Similar to 2020, the focus was on diverting NGO resources to support healthcare facilities and provide relief to vulnerable populations impacted by the pandemic. Throughout 2021, the SWC also coordinated video conference discussions with NGO networks at the national and provincial levels about ongoing response needs and challenges (see Figure 2 for a detailed timeline).
COVID-19 stringency index and government interventions affecting NGOs. Author genereated chart, source: (Hale et al. 2021; Social Welfare Council 2021a, 2021b).
While this allowed NGOs more flexibility to redirect budgets towards critical Covid-19 relief, the short time frame of two months to reallocate and plan activities was extremely challenging for organizations. The SWC also established special provisions to fast-track approval of new projects related to Covid-19 response. However, NGOs had to quickly develop and submit proposals amidst the crisis to take advantage of this accelerated process. Throughout the implementation of Covid-19 response activities, SWC required NGOs to submit weekly progress reports detailing their activities and expenditures. Many NGOs felt this onerous level of reporting diverted resources away from actual response efforts. The SWC also controversially required NGOs to print banners with SWC’s logo when conducting any Covid-19 related distribution events or awareness campaigns (Social Welfare Council 2021a). Some observers critiqued this as an attempt by the SWC to claim credit for NGOs’ critical pandemic response activities.
According to surveys of NGOs in Nepal, the pandemic had a severe blow to the sector’s ability to carry out regular programs and services. In 2020, 87 % of NGOs reported some reduction in their capacity to provide services. Even as the situation improved in late 2020 and early 2021, 58 % of NGOs still reported a decline in their ability to implement regular programming, with 14 % indicating their programs had halted completely. This suggests many NGOs were at risk of permanent closure after nearly a year of suspended operations (KC 2022).
In addition to operational challenges, NGOs in Nepal faced funding difficulties during the pandemic. More than half of surveyed NGOs reported receiving no financial assistance, despite their vital role in pandemic response. Traditional sources like international NGOs and government remained the primary funders, but overall funding was limited. Many NGOs expressed concerns over potential loss of funding, delays in grant processing, and a decline in donations. The pressure of delivering services amidst mobility restrictions and with inadequate resources has put strain on Nepal’s NGO sector.
3 Methodology
3.1 Study Design
This study aimed to illuminate the landscape of NGO-government relations during crisis conditions created by the Covid-19 pandemic in Nepal. It assessed NGO leaders’ perceptions across multiple dimensions: their views on local government partnerships, the national policy environment’s support for organizational rights, beneficiary concerns, and operational challenges. By gauging NGO perspectives across these areas, the research sought to understand how NGOs balanced engagement with government actors, beneficiaries, and internal organizational management during an acute public health emergency.
The participant selection process began by combining two primary databases: the Social Welfare Council database (Social Welfare Council 2018) and the NGO Federation of Nepal membership database (NGO Federation of Nepal 2019). While the merged databases contained 57,967 registered organizations, not all were eligible for inclusion in the study due to inactive status or lack of valid contact information. To ensure the selection of operational NGOs, we established specific inclusion criteria. Organizations needed to have received international funding, which required mandatory approval from the Social Welfare Council of Nepal. This funding requirement served as a proxy for operational status and valid email and phone contact information, as NGOs receiving international support must maintain active operations and current documentation with regulatory authorities. Using these criteria, we identified NGOs that received international funding approval from the Social Welfare Council: 699 organizations in 2020 and 679 in 2021. After removing duplicates from these two years, we created a final purposive sample of 800 NGOs, all of which were invited to participate in the study. This sampling approach helped ensure that selected organizations were operational and actively implementing projects, as evidenced by their successful acquisition of international funding and maintained compliance with government regulations.
A web-based survey (see Appendix) was conducted from December 1, 2020, to April 15, 2021, using KoBoToolbox to collect data from NGOs in Nepal. The survey targeted board members, and executive directors from 800 NGOs. Participants were recruited through email invitations, with reminders sent via email and phone calls. In total, 301 NGOs participated in the survey, yielding an overall response rate of 37.63 %. Of the 301 responding NGOs, 274 provided complete, valid responses that were included in the analysis. Among these respondents, 41 % were board presidents, 36 % were board members, and 23 % were executive directors. The remaining 27 responses were excluded due to incomplete information.
The survey was self-administered and provided to participants in both English and Nepali to ensure comprehensive accessibility. The translation process leveraged the researcher’s bilingual proficiency in English and Nepali, combined with a systematic verification approach. Initially, the researcher translated the English survey into Nepali, which was then independently reviewed by a professional translator with expertise in development sector terminology. This initial translation underwent additional review by two bilingual research team members who assessed both linguistic accuracy and conceptual equivalence.
3.2 Survey Development and Scale Validation
While the rapid nature of data collection during the pandemic limited extensive scale validation, several steps were taken to establish content and face validity of the measures. The content validity of all four scales, including the NGO operational concern scale adapted from previous studies (Deitrick et al. 2020; KC, Bhandari, and Mahat 2020), was strengthened through expert consultation. The NGO Federation of Nepal, representing over 6,500 NGOs nationwide, provided crucial insights through its president’s extensive review. Additionally, two well-established NGOs, selected for their diverse portfolios and long-standing presence in Nepal’s development sector, participated in rigorous scale review. Their board presidents and program managers conducted cognitive interviews to assess item clarity and evaluated each item’s relevance, cultural appropriateness, and measurement adequacy (see Table 4).
Construct validation involved multiple steps. The study employed exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using principal factors method with both orthogonal (Varimax) and oblique (Oblimin) rotations (see Appendix 1 for the results of Oblimin rotation). The analysis yielded four distinct factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 (4.38, 2.38, 2.04, and 2.01), collectively explaining 97.74 % of the total variance. The KMO measure (0.796) and Bartlett’s test (p < 0.001) confirmed sampling adequacy and data appropriateness. Items loaded strongly on their intended factors (all loadings >0.6), with consistent patterns across rotation methods. The final scales demonstrated strong reliability.
NGO operational concern scale (α = 0.88): Six items measured concerns about funding loss, employee layoffs, grant processing delays, operating expenses, donation decline, and staff movement restrictions. Items used a 5-point Likert scale (1 = highest concern, 5 = least concern) and were reverse-coded for analysis. Higher scores on the NGO operational concern scale indicate greater organizational resiliency, as they reflect lower levels of concern about operational challenges. The scale score was calculated by averaging the recoded items, where a higher score represents better organizational capacity to manage pandemic-related disruptions.
Freedom of Expression and Association Scale (α = 0.78): This scale, adapted from ICNL’s (2021) measures of government restrictions in Asia and the Pacific during the pandemic, assessed NGOs’ perceptions of civic space under COVID-19 measures. The scale comprised four items measuring: government restrictions on civil society aid, restrictions on COVID-19 information access, exclusion from decision-making, and constraints on free expression and dissent. Each item was rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = closed civic space, 5 = open civic space). The final scale score was calculated as the mean of all items, with lower scores indicating greater perceived government restrictions on civil society activities.
Local government satisfaction scale (α = 0.85): Four items assessed satisfaction with local governments’ COVID-19 response: relief transparency, healthcare facility management, CSO coordination, and overall containment efforts. Each item was rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = lowest satisfaction, 5 = highest satisfaction), with the final scale score computed as the mean of all items. Higher scores indicate greater satisfaction with local government’s pandemic response.
NGO beneficiaries concern scale (α = 0.84): This three-item scale measured NGOs’ concerns about marginalized communities’ access to COVID-19 relief and recovery. The items assessed concerns about equitable public access, vulnerable groups’ access to relief, and attention to marginalized groups’ needs. Each item was rated on a 5-point Likert scale and reverse-coded during analysis. The final scale score was computed as the mean of all items, with higher scores indicating lower levels of concern about beneficiaries’ needs being met. In other words, higher scores reflected greater confidence in equitable relief distribution and attention to vulnerable populations.
The analysis employed multiple linear regression using STATA 17 SE to examine the relationships between NGO operational concerns and the key variables of interest. The regression model was specified as
Where: Yi represents NGO operational concerns
X1ᵢ captures freedom of expression and association
X2ᵢ measures local government satisfaction
X3ᵢ indicates beneficiaries’ concern, and
X4ᵢ through X7ᵢ represent the control variables (NGO age, staff size, advocacy focus, and government funding status respectively)
The models were built progressively, starting with individual predictors and gradually incorporating control variables, to assess the robustness of the findings and examine potential confounding effects. This approach enabled systematic evaluation of how different forms of accountability relationships influenced NGO operations during the pandemic while controlling for key organizational characteristics.
4 Results
Table 1 provides a comprehensive overview of the composition and key variables within the study’s sample of 274 Nepali NGOs. Looking at local government type, the sample drew primarily from urban municipalities (53.3 % of NGOs), followed by metropolitan areas (20.8 %), sub-metropolitan areas (14.2 %), and rural municipalities (11.7 %). This distribution indicates a sizable representation across different local administrative units in Nepal. In terms of geographic coverage, the sample included NGOs from all 7 provinces of Nepal. The three provinces with the largest representation were Bagmati Province (27.7 % of NGOs), Koshi Province (17.2 %), and Lumbini Province (13.5 %). The remaining provinces each accounted for 6.6 %–14.6 % of the sample.
Descriptive statistics.
| n | % | Mean | SD | Min | Max | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NGO operational concern scale | 255 | 2.75 | 1.1 | 1 | 5 | |
| Freedom of expression and association scale | 255 | 3.26 | 0.84 | 1 | 5 | |
| Local government satisfaction scale | 258 | 2.73 | 0.78 | 1 | 5 | |
| NGO’s concern for beneficiaries scale | 260 | 2.2 | 0.96 | 1 | 5 | |
| Organization age | 18.38 | 8.16 | 1 | 43 | ||
| Very young (7 years or less) | 33 | 12 | ||||
| Young (8–14 years) | 51 | 18.6 | ||||
| Established (15–24 years) | 118 | 43.1 | ||||
| Mature (>25 years) | 72 | 26.3 | ||||
| Total staff | 18.16 | 35.67 | 0 | 265 | ||
| 0–15 | 202 | 73.7 | ||||
| 16–30 | 25 | 9.1 | ||||
| 31–45 | 22 | 8 | ||||
| 46–60 | 7 | 2.6 | ||||
| > 60 | 18 | 6.6 | ||||
| Advocacy | ||||||
| Service delivery | 198 | 72.3 | ||||
| Advocacy | 76 | 27.7 | ||||
| Government fund | ||||||
| Non recipient | 136 | 49.6 | ||||
| Recipient | 138 | 50.4 | ||||
| Local government context | ||||||
| Metropolitan | 57 | 20.8 | ||||
| Sub metropolitan | 39 | 14.2 | ||||
| Urban municipality | 146 | 53.3 | ||||
| Rural municipality | 32 | 11.7 | ||||
| Province | ||||||
| Koshi | 47 | 17.2 | ||||
| Madhesh | 40 | 14.6 | ||||
| Bagmati | 76 | 27.7 | ||||
| Gandaki | 18 | 6.6 | ||||
| Lumbini | 37 | 13.5 | ||||
| karnali | 35 | 12.8 | ||||
| Sudurpaschim | 21 | 7.7 |
Multivariate regression results.
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Freedom of expression & association | −0.220*** | −0.207** | −0.185** | |||
| (0.083) | (0.085) | (0.084) | ||||
| Local government satisfaction | −0.021 | −0.065 | −0.077 | |||
| (0.069) | (0.068) | (0.068) | ||||
| Benefeciaries’ concern | 0.204*** | 0.194*** | 0.188*** | |||
| (0.072) | (0.073) | (0.072) | ||||
| NGO age | 0.005 | 0.003 | ||||
| (0.009) | (0.009) | |||||
| Number of staff | 0.005** | 0.005** | ||||
| (0.002) | (0.002) | |||||
| Advocacy | 0.341** | 0.402** | ||||
| (0.153) | (0.156) | |||||
| Government funding | −0.097 | −0.135 | ||||
| (0.137) | (0.140) | |||||
| Constant | 3.444*** | 2.820*** | 2.295*** | 3.217*** | 2.514*** | 3.019*** |
| (0.278) | (0.261) | (0.172) | (0.439) | (0.194) | (0.462) | |
| Observations | 242 | 245 | 248 | 235 | 256 | 235 |
| R-squared | 0.029 | 0.000 | 0.032 | 0.059 | 0.046 | 0.109 |
-
Standard errors in parentheses |***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Examining the primary focus, nearly three-fourths of NGOs (72.3 %) identified themselves as engaged in service delivery, while 27.7 % focused on advocacy. Regarding respondent gender, two-thirds (66.1 %) were male and 32.8 % were female, indicating a predominance of male NGO leaders. The average NGO age was 18.38 years (SD = 8.16). In terms of life cycle stages, 43.1 % were established (15–24 years old), 26.3 % were mature (>25 years), 18.6 % were young (8–14 years), and 12 % were very young (≤7 years). The mean number of total staff was 18.16 (SD = 35.67). However, most NGOs (73.7 %) had 15 or fewer staff members, reflecting small NGOs.
Half of the total NGO sample (50.4 % of 274 NGOs) received regular government funds in the year prior to the pandemic. All NGOs were asked whether they had received any new government funding specifically earmarked for the Covid-19 response and recovery. Of the total sample, 81 (29 %) NGOs responded to this question. Among those 81 respondents, 33.3 % reported receiving Covid-19 specific government aid.
On the freedom of expression and association satisfaction scale, the moderate mean score of 3.26 on the 1–5 range indicates NGOs felt space for civil society was only partially open under Covid-19 restrictions. Levels of satisfaction with local government pandemic response were even lower, with a mean of 2.73 highlighting general dissatisfaction and significant room for improvement in NGOs’ eyes.
NGOs also expressed substantial concern about whether the needs of marginalized groups were being adequately addressed through relief and recovery efforts, as reflected in the low mean of 2.2 on the beneficiary concern scale. This suggests that despite being constrained themselves, NGOs maintained a commitment to vulnerable populations which they felt were overlooked. Finally, the organizational concern scale had a mean of 2.75, illustrating NGOs faced real anxieties about funding, staffing, expenses and operations even if these worries were secondary to beneficiary needs.
Multivariate linear regression analysis examined the relationships between NGO operational concerns and three key factors: government restrictions on freedom of expression and association, satisfaction with local government response, and concerns about beneficiaries. These relationships were tested through a series of regression models (see Table 2), progressively introducing control variables to assess the robustness of findings.
The results strongly support Hypothesis 1, which predicted that federal government restrictions would negatively affect NGO operational effectiveness. The negative coefficients for freedom of expression and association (−0.220 in the base model to −0.185 in the fully specified model, p < 0.05) indicate that as civic space becomes more restricted, NGOs experience greater operational challenges. This relationship remained significant even after controlling for organizational characteristics, suggesting that coercive institutional pressures from federal authorities create substantial operational barriers. To interpret this practically, a one-unit increase in perceived government restrictions (measured on 5-point scale) corresponds to approximately a 0.2-unit increase in operational concerns. This finding aligns with institutional theory’s prediction that coercive pressures can significantly constrain organizational effectiveness.
Contrary to expectations in Hypothesis 2, there was no evidence that satisfaction with local government response significantly affects NGO operational concerns. The coefficients for local government satisfaction were consistently small and non-significant across all models (ranging from −0.021 to −0.077, p > 0.1). This surprising finding challenges theoretical framework about institutional collaboration at the local level. One possible explanation is that while local government partnerships might facilitate service delivery, they may not directly translate into reduced operational challenges during crisis periods. This suggests that the benefits of local collaboration might manifest in ways not captured by operational concerns measure.
Analysis provides strong support for Hypothesis 3, which proposed that greater NGO concern about beneficiary wellbeing would increase operational challenges. The consistently positive and significant coefficients for beneficiary concerns (ranging from 0.204 to 0.188, p < 0.01) reveal that organizations more worried about their beneficiaries also faced greater operational difficulties. This relationship demonstrates the interconnected nature of downward accountability and organizational stress – when NGOs perceive their beneficiaries as particularly vulnerable or underserved, this appears to create additional operational pressure.
Several control variables yielded interesting insights in the fully specified model. Organization size, measured by staff numbers, showed a small but significant positive relationship with operational concerns (β = 0.005, p < 0.05), suggesting larger organizations might have greater capacity to manage crisis-related challenges. Advocacy-focused organizations reported significantly higher operational concerns (β = 0.402, p < 0.05), which makes intuitive sense given their particular vulnerability to civic space restrictions. Neither organizational age nor government funding showed significant relationships with operational concerns, suggesting these structural characteristics may be less relevant during crisis periods.
The final model explained approximately 11 % of the variance in NGO operational concerns (R2 = 0.109), with 235 organizations included in the analysis. While this low R-squared value indicates other factors influence NGO operations during crises, the consistent significance of key variables supports the robustness of findings regarding federal restrictions and beneficiary concerns. This pattern of results suggests that during the COVID-19 pandemic in Nepal, NGOs faced a complex balancing act between managing increasingly restrictive federal oversight while trying to meet growing beneficiary needs. The non-significance of local government satisfaction indicates that even positive local relationships may not have been sufficient to offset these dual pressures.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
This study examined how various accountability relationships, framed through stakeholder and institutional theories, influenced NGO operations during Nepal’s COVID-19 crisis. Specifically, it addressed three core research questions: How do federal government restrictions impact NGO operational resilience? What role does satisfaction with local government responses play in organizational resilience? And how do beneficiary welfare concerns relate to operational challenges? Empirical analysis produced three key findings. First, coercive pressures from federal government restrictions significantly impaired NGO operations. Second, contrary to theoretical expectations, satisfaction with local government response demonstrated no significant buffering effect on operational concerns. Third, NGOs exhibiting higher concern for beneficiary wellbeing experienced greater operational challenges. Collectively, these results illuminate the complex interplay between stakeholder expectations and institutional pressures in shaping NGO resilience during crises, contributing valuable insights specific to Nepal’s unique context.
The first finding, showing a significant negative relationship between federal government restrictions and NGO operational effectiveness, aligns with institutional theory, particularly the concept of coercive institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This empirically extends previous conceptualizations by Toepler et al. (2022) on government-NGO relationships by demonstrating how regulatory constraints at the federal level act as coercive isomorphic pressures that negatively impact organizational resilience during crisis periods (Marwell and Brown 2020). Within Nepal, coercive pressures manifested explicitly through the Social Welfare Council’s directives, including mandated reallocations of 20–30 % of project budgets to COVID-19 response, stringent weekly reporting requirements, and obligatory display of government logos at NGO events (Gurung 2020a; ICNL 2021). Stakeholder theory further contextualizes these findings by positioning the federal government as a powerful primary stakeholder whose coercive regulatory authority directly compromised NGO autonomy and operational effectiveness. These coercive measures were especially disruptive due to Nepal’s pre-existing restrictive NGO regulatory environment, where the “one-door policy” and emphasis on physical infrastructure (“hardware”) over awareness-raising (“software”) had already constrained NGOs’ flexibility. Thus, the crisis period served to significantly amplify pre-existing coercive institutional pressures, exacerbating operational challenges for NGOs.
The second finding, the non-significance of satisfaction with local government responses, provides a compelling refinement of stakeholder and institutional theories regarding collaborative relationships. Despite expectations from Gazley and Brudney (2007) and Nelson-Nuñez and Cartwright (2018) that productive local collaborations would enhance NGO resilience, this study found no significant relationship. Institutional theory helps explain this discrepancy through resource dependence perspectives (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003), highlighting that even when local stakeholder relationships are normatively positive, centralized political structures – such as Nepal’s highly centralized federal response during the pandemic – may limit local governments’ capacities to effectively support NGOs. Stakeholder theory further clarifies this unexpected result by suggesting that local governments, although positioned as primary stakeholders due to their collaborative potential, could not fulfill their expected role in mitigating operational concerns under centralized crisis conditions. This insight extends Meyer et al.’s (2021) findings, showing how national institutional configurations mediate local collaborative effectiveness, particularly during crisis contexts. Thus, this result shows the need to further refine stakeholder frameworks to account explicitly for varying capacities and autonomy levels among government stakeholders (Toepler, Pape, and Benevolenski 2020; Toepler et al. 2022).
The third finding, indicating that increased beneficiary concerns exacerbated NGOs’ operational challenges, strongly corroborates stakeholder theory assertions regarding downward accountability pressures (Chen, Dyball, and Harrison 2020; Williamson, Kingston, and Bennison 2022). Beneficiaries represent primary stakeholders with substantial normative legitimacy, thus demanding significant attention from NGOs, particularly during crises when beneficiary vulnerabilities intensify. Institutional theory complements this understanding by identifying how heightened normative institutional pressures – from beneficiary expectations – strain NGOs’ resources and operational capacities, leading directly to operational stress (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In Nepal, where a significant majority (65 %) of NGOs operate within community development contexts, increased beneficiary needs during the pandemic intensified operational challenges. This mechanism, described as “mission strain” by Brown, Ebrahim, and Batliwala (2012), shows the tension NGOs experience between maintaining mission alignment with downward accountability and sustaining operational effectiveness amidst crises. The stringent regulatory context further compounded this pressure, constraining NGOs’ abilities to adequately respond to escalating beneficiary demands.
The analysis of control variables further enriches theoretical understandings by identifying specific organizational attributes that contribute to crisis resilience. The positive relationship between staff size and operational resilience aligns with institutional theory, suggesting that larger organizations possess greater institutional resources, capabilities, and flexibility to respond adaptively to institutional pressures (Jeong and Kim 2021). While modest in magnitude, this finding indicates significant practical implications for Nepal’s NGO sector, characterized predominantly by smaller organizations (KC 2022). Even incremental expansions in staffing might markedly enhance resilience to future crises through improved capacity to manage stakeholder and institutional demands.
Advocacy-focused NGOs’ heightened vulnerability to operational challenges during COVID-19 strongly aligns with Brass’s (2016) examination of advocacy organizations facing restrictive environments. Institutional theory elucidates the multiple mechanisms underlying this finding, including the coercive institutional restrictions specifically targeting civic engagement activities critical for advocacy NGOs. The Nepalese government’s actions, including suppressing protests and arresting critics during the pandemic, explicitly illustrate these coercive institutional pressures. Stakeholder theory clarifies the particular vulnerability of advocacy NGOs, given their unique reliance on engaging public and governmental stakeholders for legitimacy and impact. Thus, mission type significantly determines how institutional and stakeholder pressures manifest operationally during crises.
These findings offer several contributions to NGO accountability literature. Primarily, they empirically reinforce the necessity for stakeholder theory refinement by incorporating a multi-level institutional perspective on upward accountability relationships. The differential impacts observed between federal coercive pressures and local normative collaborations challenge overly simplistic upward-downward accountability conceptualizations (Najam 1996). Moreover, this study provides clear empirical evidence supporting the concept of “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder” (Koppell 2005), demonstrating how simultaneous coercive (federal) and normative (beneficiary) pressures amplify operational challenges (Balboa 2017). This indicates need for theoretical frameworks to more explicitly account for complex interactions among stakeholder expectations and institutional constraints during crises.
These findings also have several practical implications for NGO management and policy. For NGO leaders, the results suggest the importance of building operational resilience through adequate staffing levels and diverse program portfolios that can weather restrictions on particular activities. The strong relationship between beneficiary concerns and operational challenges indicates that organizations may need to develop specific crisis response strategies that balance mission fulfillment with organizational sustainability. For policy makers, particularly in Nepal’s evolving federal system, the findings highlight the need to carefully consider how regulatory measures during crises might unintentionally compromise NGO effectiveness. The limited buffering effect of local government relationships suggests that decentralization efforts might need to specifically address local governments’ capacity to support NGOs during crises. The findings also raise important considerations for international donors and development partners working in Nepal. The significant impact of federal restrictions on NGO operations suggests that donor strategies might need to include specific support mechanisms for navigating regulatory constraints during crises. Additionally, the particular vulnerability of advocacy organizations indicates that donors might need to develop specialized support strategies for organizations working on governance and rights-based issues in restrictive environments.
Several important limitations should be considered when interpreting these findings. A primary methodological limitation concerns the abbreviated scale validation process necessitated by the urgent need for pandemic-related data collection. While the scales demonstrated strong internal consistency (α > 0.78) and underwent expert review for content validity through NGO Federation and practitioners’ input, more extensive validation procedures could not be conducted. This limitation is particularly relevant for the NGO operational concerns and freedom of expression scales, which were adapted for the specific context of pandemic response. While the strong reliability coefficients and expert validation provide confidence in the measures, future research should prioritize comprehensive psychometric validation of these scales.
The cross-sectional nature of the data presents another significant limitation, constraining ability to establish causality or examine how accountability relationships evolved throughout the pandemic. While the analysis demonstrates significant associations between federal restrictions, beneficiary concerns, and operational challenges, the temporal ordering of these relationships remains unclear. For instance, it is hard to determine whether increased beneficiary concerns led to operational challenges or if organizations experiencing operational difficulties became more attuned to beneficiary needs. Furthermore, the study’s timing during the peak of pandemic restrictions (December 2020 to April 2021) may have captured a particularly intense period of organizational stress, potentially affecting the generalizability of findings to non-crisis periods. Additionally, the focus on NGOs receiving international funding, while ensuring active organizational status, may have excluded those relying solely on domestic resources. Given that such organizations might experience accountability pressures differently, future research should examine how funding sources moderate the relationships identified in this study.
The low R-squared value suggests that important factors influencing NGO operational concerns during crises remain unexplored. These might include organizational characteristics such as leadership quality, internal governance structures, or pre-existing crisis management capabilities. The role of international donors, while partially captured through the funding control variable, merits deeper examination, particularly regarding how donor requirements might interact with government restrictions to shape organizational responses during crises.
Several directions for future research emerge from these limitations and findings. First, longitudinal studies tracking NGO-government relationships before, during, and after crisis periods would help clarify causal mechanisms and examine how accountability relationships evolve over time. Such research could investigate whether organizations develop adaptive strategies that become institutionalized, potentially creating greater resilience to future crises. Second, future research should examine the role of organizational learning in crisis response. The findings suggest that larger organizations showed greater resilience, but the mechanisms underlying this relationship remain unclear. Studies focusing on how organizations of different sizes develop and maintain crisis response capabilities could provide valuable insights for building sector resilience. Third, more detailed investigation of the relationship between beneficiary concerns and operational challenges is warranted. Qualitative studies examining how organizations balance mission fulfillment with operational sustainability during crises could help identify effective strategies for managing this tension. This research could also explore how different types of beneficiary engagement affect organizational resilience.
Finally, future research should examine the long-term implications of crisis-induced changes in NGO-government relationships. The pandemic period saw significant shifts in regulatory frameworks and operational practices. Understanding which changes persist and how they affect sector development could provide valuable insights for policy makers and practitioners alike.
Descriptive statistics and pattern coefficients on the items of the self-description questionnaire-II.
| Item | n | Descriptive statistics | Factors | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mean | SD | Orgcn | Govsat | Foe | Bencon | Uniqueness | ||
| Revcn1 | 268 | 2.5 | 1.3 | 0.74 | 0.43 | |||
| Revcn2 | 265 | 2.8 | 1.4 | 0.77 | 0.40 | |||
| Revcn3 | 267 | 2.8 | 1.5 | 0.77 | 0.41 | |||
| Revcn4 | 264 | 2.8 | 1.4 | 0.74 | 0.42 | |||
| Revcn5 | 263 | 2.6 | 1.4 | 0.74 | 0.44 | |||
| Revcn6 | 265 | 3.6 | 1.5 | 0.66 | ||||
| Revcn7 | 265 | 2.7 | 1.4 | 0.66 | ||||
| Revcn8 | 263 | 3.0 | 1.4 | 0.67 | 0.53 | |||
| Revcn9 | 266 | 2.7 | 1.3 | 0.63 | ||||
| Foe1 | 262 | 3.3 | 1.1 | 0.62 | 0.59 | |||
| Foe2 | 266 | 3.2 | 1.1 | 0.62 | 0.61 | |||
| Foe3 | 263 | 3.4 | 1.1 | 0.72 | 0.46 | |||
| Foe4 | 261 | 3.2 | 1.0 | 0.66 | 0.55 | |||
| Foe5 | 261 | 3.1 | 1.1 | 0.74 | ||||
| Revbencon1 | 262 | 2.2 | 1.1 | 0.70 | 0.49 | |||
| Revbencon2 | 261 | 2.2 | 1.1 | 0.88 | 0.21 | |||
| Revbencon3 | 262 | 2.2 | 1.1 | 0.80 | 0.36 | |||
| Govsat1 | 260 | 2.5 | 0.8 | 0.75 | 0.43 | |||
| Govsat2 | 263 | 2.7 | 0.9 | 0.77 | 0.40 | |||
| Govsat3 | 262 | 2.9 | 1.1 | 0.72 | 0.45 | |||
| Govsat4 | 261 | 2.9 | 1.0 | 0.81 | 0.33 | |||
-
Blanks represent factor loading <0.6. Orgcn, NGO operational concern; Govsat, satisfaction with local government; Foe, freedom of expression and association; Bencon, beneficiaries’ concern.
Pairwise correlation.
| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) NGO operational concern scale | 1.00 | |||||||
| (2) Local government satisfaction scale | −0.02 | 1.00 | ||||||
| (0.76) | ||||||||
| (3) Freedom of expression and association scale | −0.17* | −0.14* | 1.00 | |||||
| (0.01) | (0.03) | |||||||
| (4) NGO’s concern for beneficiaries scale | 0.18* | 0.04 | −0.07 | 1.00 | ||||
| (0.00) | (0.56) | (0.24) | ||||||
| (5) Covid-19 budget | 0.00 | 0.13 | −0.11 | 0.17 | 1.00 | |||
| (0.98) | (0.23) | (0.34) | (0.13) | |||||
| (6) Pre-covid budget | 0.17* | 0.21* | −0.11 | 0.09 | 0.68* | 1.00 | ||
| (0.01) | (0.00) | (0.10) | (0.17) | (0.00) | ||||
| (7) Organization age | 0.07 | 0.16* | −0.10 | 0.09 | 0.35* | 0.32* | 1.00 | |
| (0.27) | (0.01) | (0.10) | (0.15) | (0.00) | (0.00) | |||
| (8) Total staff | 0.16* | 0.11 | −0.04 | 0.05 | 0.60* | 0.57* | 0.22* | 1.00 |
| (0.01) | (0.08) | (0.52) | (0.39) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
-
*p < 0.05.
Differences in NGO perceptions.
| NGO operational concern scale | Mean | Std. err. | [95 % conf. Interval] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Advocacy/service delivery | ||||
| Service delivery | 2.62 | 0.08 | 2.46 | 2.78 |
| Advocacy | 2.99 | 0.15 | 2.7 | 3.28 |
| Government fund | ||||
| Non recipient | 2.79 | 0.1 | 2.58 | 2.99 |
| Recipient | 2.67 | 0.1 | 2.47 | 2.87 |
| COVID-19 government fund | ||||
| Non recipient | 2.8 | 0.17 | 2.46 | 3.13 |
| Recipient | 3.06 | 0.24 | 2.58 | 3.54 |
| Local government context | ||||
| Metropolitan | 2.71 | 0.18 | 2.36 | 3.06 |
| Sub metropolitan | 2.62 | 0.16 | 2.31 | 2.93 |
| Urban municipality | 2.78 | 0.1 | 2.58 | 2.98 |
| Rural municipality | 2.65 | 0.19 | 2.28 | 3.03 |
| Province | ||||
| Koshi | 2.74 | 0.18 | 2.39 | 3.1 |
| Madhesh | 2.68 | 0.2 | 2.29 | 3.07 |
| Bagmati | 2.74 | 0.14 | 2.46 | 3.03 |
| Gandaki | 2.83 | 0.38 | 2.09 | 3.57 |
| Lumbini | 2.76 | 0.15 | 2.47 | 3.04 |
| Karnali | 2.55 | 0.19 | 2.17 | 2.93 |
| Sudurpaschim | 2.87 | 0.25 | 2.37 | 3.37 |
| Local government satisfaction scale | ||||
| Advocacy/service delivery | ||||
| Service delivery | 2.74 | 0.06 | 2.62 | 2.86 |
| Advocacy | 2.69 | 0.09 | 2.5 | 2.87 |
| Government fund | ||||
| Non recipient | 2.69 | 0.07 | 2.56 | 2.83 |
| Recipient | 2.76 | 0.07 | 2.61 | 2.91 |
| COVID-19 government fund | ||||
| Non recipient | 2.85 | 0.1 | 2.65 | 3.05 |
| Recipient | 3.12 | 0.15 | 2.83 | 3.42 |
| Local government context | ||||
| Metropolitan | 2.49 | 0.1 | 2.3 | 2.68 |
| Sub metropolitan | 2.94 | 0.13 | 2.68 | 3.19 |
| Urban municipality | 2.78 | 0.07 | 2.64 | 2.92 |
| Rural municipality | 2.62 | 0.15 | 2.34 | 2.91 |
| Province | ||||
| Koshi | 2.47 | 0.12 | 2.23 | 2.71 |
| Madhesh | 2.41 | 0.14 | 2.13 | 2.7 |
| Bagmati | 2.76 | 0.09 | 2.59 | 2.93 |
| Gandaki | 2.88 | 0.25 | 2.39 | 3.38 |
| Lumbini | 3.07 | 0.13 | 2.82 | 3.32 |
| Karnali | 2.91 | 0.15 | 2.62 | 3.19 |
| Sudurpaschim | 2.74 | 0.14 | 2.46 | 3.02 |
| Freedom of expression and association scale | ||||
| Advocacy/service delivery | ||||
| Service delivery | 3.31 | 0.06 | 3.19 | 3.44 |
| Advocacy | 3.2 | 0.1 | 3 | 3.41 |
| Government fund | ||||
| Non recipient | 3.28 | 0.08 | 3.13 | 3.43 |
| Recipient | 3.28 | 0.08 | 3.13 | 3.44 |
| COVID-19 government fund | ||||
| Non recipient | 3.2 | 0.13 | 2.94 | 3.45 |
| Recipient | 3.12 | 0.12 | 2.89 | 3.36 |
| Local government context | ||||
| Metropolitan | 3.35 | 0.13 | 3.09 | 3.6 |
| Sub metropolitan | 3.29 | 0.12 | 3.04 | 3.53 |
| Urban municipality | 3.31 | 0.08 | 3.16 | 3.46 |
| Rural municipality | 3.05 | 0.15 | 2.76 | 3.35 |
| Province | ||||
| Koshi | 3.38 | 0.13 | 3.12 | 3.65 |
| Madhesh | 3.36 | 0.16 | 3.05 | 3.67 |
| Bagmati | 3.4 | 0.1 | 3.21 | 3.59 |
| Gandaki | 3.19 | 0.17 | 2.86 | 3.53 |
| Lumbini | 3.14 | 0.16 | 2.82 | 3.46 |
| Karnali | 3.26 | 0.14 | 2.98 | 3.54 |
| Sudurpaschim | 2.86 | 0.19 | 2.48 | 3.24 |
| NGO’s concern for beneficiaries scale | ||||
| Advocacy/service delivery | ||||
| Service delivery | 2.19 | 0.07 | 2.05 | 2.34 |
| Advocacy | 2.2 | 0.12 | 1.96 | 2.43 |
| Government fund | ||||
| Non recipient | 2.17 | 0.09 | 1.99 | 2.34 |
| Recipient | 2.22 | 0.09 | 2.04 | 2.4 |
| COVID-19 government fund | ||||
| Non recipient | 2.18 | 0.15 | 1.87 | 2.49 |
| Recipient | 2.29 | 0.19 | 1.92 | 2.67 |
| Local government context | ||||
| Metropolitan | 2.34 | 0.15 | 2.05 | 2.63 |
| Sub metropolitan | 2.03 | 0.16 | 1.72 | 2.34 |
| Urban municipality | 2.15 | 0.09 | 1.98 | 2.33 |
| Rural municipality | 2.33 | 0.17 | 2 | 2.67 |
| Province | ||||
| Koshi | 2.31 | 0.15 | 2.02 | 2.6 |
| Madhesh | 1.87 | 0.17 | 1.54 | 2.2 |
| Bagmati | 2.18 | 0.12 | 1.94 | 2.41 |
| Gandaki | 2.69 | 0.28 | 2.15 | 3.24 |
| Lumbini | 2.16 | 0.16 | 1.84 | 2.48 |
| Karnali | 2.18 | 0.16 | 1.86 | 2.5 |
| Sudurpaschim | 2.37 | 0.24 | 1.9 | 2.84 |
Survey instrument.
| NGO operational concern | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| How concerned are you about the following? | Not at all concerned | Slightly concerned | Somewhat concerned | Moderately concerned | Very concerned |
| 1. Loss of funding | |||||
| 2. Having to lay off employees | |||||
| 3. Delayed grant processing for a program/general operating support | |||||
| 4. Inability to pay rent/operating expenses | |||||
| 5. Decline in donations | |||||
| 6. Inability to meet registration/renewal requirements | |||||
| 7. Increased demand for service | |||||
| 8. Restricted movement of staff | |||||
| 9. Reduced face-to-face community interactions | |||||
| Beneficiaries’ concern | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| How concerned are you about the following? | Not at all concerned | Slightly concerned | Somewhat concerned | Moderately concerned | Very concerned |
| 1. To what extent are you concerned about equal and fair access to relief and recovery by the public? | |||||
| 2. To what extent do the most vulnerable and marginalized populations have access to relief and recovery measures? | |||||
| 3. To what extent is there sufficient attention to the specific needs of vulnerable and marginalized populations? | |||||
|
|
|||||
| Freedom of expression and freedom of association | |||||
|
|
|||||
| Please express your opinion on the state of freedom of expression and freedom of association during COVID-19 | Strongly disagree | Disagree | Neutral | Agree | Strongly agree |
| 1. Government’s COVID-19 measures are making it harder for civil society to aid those impacted by the crisis. | |||||
| 2. Government has restricted access to information, obscuring the nature of the crisis, and undercutting civil society’s ability to respond effectively. | |||||
| 3. Government has excluded civil society from decision-making in its COVID-19 response, omitting vital voices. | |||||
| 4. Government is chilling free expression, shielding itself from criticism while penalizing dissent. | |||||
| 5. Lockdown is stifling peaceful and socially distant protests. | |||||
| Local government satisfaction | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Please express your perception towards the pandemic response from the government | Not at all | Not satisfactory | Satisfactory | Good | Excellent |
| 1. How transparent and accountable do you think your local government is in providing relief materials? | |||||
| 2. How effectively do you think your local government is managing the health care facilities (quarantine/isolation and other health facilities)? | |||||
| 3. Overall, how satisfied are you with the level of coordination by the local government with the CSOs? | |||||
| 4. Overall, how satisfied are you with the performance of the local government in containing COVID 19? | |||||
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- Introduction to Nonprofit Policy Forum Special Issue Dedicated to 2023 ARNOVA Asia: Embracing Diversity in Nonprofit Research and Scholarly Community in Asia
- Editorial
- Memorial Essay for Professor Naoto Yamauchi
- Research Articles
- Balancing up, Down, and in: NGO Perspectives During Nepal’s Covid-19 Crisis
- Community Leadership in a Dynamic Perspective: An Exploratory Study of Community Foundations in Hong Kong During the COVID-19 Pandemic
- Intersecting Identities: Exploring Worker-Member Perspectives on Government-Certified Worker-Run Social Cooperatives in South Korea
- The Role of Public Education in NGO Advocacy in the Authoritarian Context: A Case Study of Chinese ENGOs
- Policy Brief
- Steering a Restrictive Course: Rebooting China’s Charity Law
- Research Note
- What are Program Officer’s Responsibilities and Competencies? An Exploratory Research on Human Resource Development Policy for Effective Grantmaking
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- Introduction to Nonprofit Policy Forum Special Issue Dedicated to 2023 ARNOVA Asia: Embracing Diversity in Nonprofit Research and Scholarly Community in Asia
- Editorial
- Memorial Essay for Professor Naoto Yamauchi
- Research Articles
- Balancing up, Down, and in: NGO Perspectives During Nepal’s Covid-19 Crisis
- Community Leadership in a Dynamic Perspective: An Exploratory Study of Community Foundations in Hong Kong During the COVID-19 Pandemic
- Intersecting Identities: Exploring Worker-Member Perspectives on Government-Certified Worker-Run Social Cooperatives in South Korea
- The Role of Public Education in NGO Advocacy in the Authoritarian Context: A Case Study of Chinese ENGOs
- Policy Brief
- Steering a Restrictive Course: Rebooting China’s Charity Law
- Research Note
- What are Program Officer’s Responsibilities and Competencies? An Exploratory Research on Human Resource Development Policy for Effective Grantmaking
