Abstract
The arguments in favor of the Principle of Indifference fail to explain its fruitfulness in science. Using the recent metaphysical concept of Grounding, I devise an explanation that can justify a weak version of the principle and discuss an instance of its application in Quantum mechanics.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Math can’t Move Matter
- Sparks of New Metaphysics and the Limits of Explanatory Abstractions
- Implication as Inclusion and the Causal Asymmetry
- Dualism, the Causal Closure of the Physical, and Philip Goff’s Case for Panpsychism
- Power, Capacity, Disposition and Categorical Properties: A Roughly Aristotelian Proposal
- Anti-Criterialism Does Not Result in an Unacceptable Consequence
- Truthmaking. Are Facts Still Really Indispensable?
- Discussing the Formal Components of Material Objects: A New Reply to Bennett
- Easy Ontology and Undecidable Sentences
- The Metaphysical Foundations of the Principle of Indifference
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Math can’t Move Matter
- Sparks of New Metaphysics and the Limits of Explanatory Abstractions
- Implication as Inclusion and the Causal Asymmetry
- Dualism, the Causal Closure of the Physical, and Philip Goff’s Case for Panpsychism
- Power, Capacity, Disposition and Categorical Properties: A Roughly Aristotelian Proposal
- Anti-Criterialism Does Not Result in an Unacceptable Consequence
- Truthmaking. Are Facts Still Really Indispensable?
- Discussing the Formal Components of Material Objects: A New Reply to Bennett
- Easy Ontology and Undecidable Sentences
- The Metaphysical Foundations of the Principle of Indifference