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Propensities and Possibilities

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Published/Copyright: February 5, 2019
Metaphysica
From the journal Metaphysica Volume 20 Issue 1

Abstract

This paper is a reply to a recent Metaphysica paper advocating an ‘unrestricted actualism’ which lets the actual world include unrealised possible outcomes of propensities. I argue that the actual world can accommodate propensity theories of chance without including unrealised possibilities.

Keywords: propensity theory; philosophy of probability; dispositions; actualism; possibilism

References

Lewis, D. 1980. “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.” In Philosophical Papers Volume II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar

Mcgrath, M. and D. Frank. 2018. “Propositions.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. E. N. Zalta, ed. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/propositions/.Search in Google Scholar

Mellor, D. H. 1999. The Facts of Causation. London: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar

Mellor, D. H. 2005. Probability: A Philosophical Introduction. London: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar

Stenwall, R. J. Persson, and N.-E. Sahlin. 2018. “A New Challenge for Objective Uncertainties and the Propensity Theorist.” Metaphysica 19 (2):219–224.10.1515/mp-2018-0012Search in Google Scholar

Published Online: 2019-02-05
Published in Print: 2019-04-24

© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Article
  3. Propensities and Possibilities
  4. Powerful Qualities or Pure Powers?
  5. Aristotelian Time
  6. Time, Leeway, and the Laws of Nature: Why Humean Compatibilists Cannot Be Eternalists
  7. Persistence Conditions and Identity
  8. Persistence, Temporal Extension, and Transdurantism
  9. More Work for Hybrid Persistence
  10. Why We Shouldn’t Pity Schrödinger’s Kitty: Revisiting David Lewis’ Worry About Quantum Immortality in a Branching Multiverse
  11. Book Review
  12. Robert Lockie: Free Will and Epistemology. A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom
  13. Conference Review
  14. The Possibility of Metaphysics. Between Inductive, Analytic, and Transcendental Arguments, Duesseldorf, 31 January – 01 February, 2019
https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-2002
Keywords for this article
propensity theory; philosophy of probability; dispositions; actualism; possibilism

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Article
  3. Propensities and Possibilities
  4. Powerful Qualities or Pure Powers?
  5. Aristotelian Time
  6. Time, Leeway, and the Laws of Nature: Why Humean Compatibilists Cannot Be Eternalists
  7. Persistence Conditions and Identity
  8. Persistence, Temporal Extension, and Transdurantism
  9. More Work for Hybrid Persistence
  10. Why We Shouldn’t Pity Schrödinger’s Kitty: Revisiting David Lewis’ Worry About Quantum Immortality in a Branching Multiverse
  11. Book Review
  12. Robert Lockie: Free Will and Epistemology. A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom
  13. Conference Review
  14. The Possibility of Metaphysics. Between Inductive, Analytic, and Transcendental Arguments, Duesseldorf, 31 January – 01 February, 2019
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