Persistence Conditions and Identity
-
John Biro
Abstract
Pluralists believe that there are cases of distinct but spatio-temporally coinciding things. The statue goes, the piece of clay remains: differing persistence conditions, different things. Yet while both are with us, they are obviously in the same place. The argument rests on two assumptions: that statues have their shape essentially and that pieces of clay do not. Only if we make both does the conclusion follow. Here I suggest that while both assumptions are plausible on their face, each may be questioned. Given this, we are not forced to accept their conjunction and can thus avoid the counter-intuitive conclusion it entails.
References
Biro, J. 2017. “Are There Scattered Objects?” Metaphysica 18 (2): 155–65.10.1515/mp-2017-0007Search in Google Scholar
Biro, J. 2018. “Constitution and Identity.” Erkenntnis 83 (6): 1127–1138.10.1007/s10670-017-9932-0Search in Google Scholar
Burke, M. 1980. “Cohabitation, Stuff and Intermittent Existence.” MIND 89: 391–405.10.1093/mind/LXXXIX.355.391Search in Google Scholar
Cartwright, H. 1970. “Quantities.” The Philosophical Review LXX1X (1): 25–42.10.2307/2184067Search in Google Scholar
Cartwright, R. 1975. “Scattered Objects.” In Analysis and Metaphysics, K. Lehrer, (ed.) Dordrecht, Reidel: 153–7010.1007/978-94-010-9098-8_9Search in Google Scholar
Cotnoir, A. J., and D. L. M. Baxter. 2014. Composition as Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669615.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Elder, C. 1998. “Essential Properties and Coinciding Objects.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58: 317–31.10.2307/2653511Search in Google Scholar
Gibbard, A. 1975. “Contingent Identity.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 4: 187–221.10.1007/BF00693273Search in Google Scholar
Gray, A. E. 2001. The Semantics and Metaphysics of Contingent Identity. PhD. Dissertation, MIT.Search in Google Scholar
van Inwagen, P. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. New York: Basil Blackwell.Search in Google Scholar
Lowe, E. J. 1983. “The Identity of Artifacts.” The Journal of Philosophy 80/4: 220–32.10.2307/2026005Search in Google Scholar
Rea, M. 1997. “Introduction.” In Material Constitution: A Reader. Latham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.Search in Google Scholar
Thompson, J. J. 1983. “Parthood and Identity Across Time.” The Journal of Philosophy 80 (4): 201–20.10.2307/2026004Search in Google Scholar
© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Article
- Propensities and Possibilities
- Powerful Qualities or Pure Powers?
- Aristotelian Time
- Time, Leeway, and the Laws of Nature: Why Humean Compatibilists Cannot Be Eternalists
- Persistence Conditions and Identity
- Persistence, Temporal Extension, and Transdurantism
- More Work for Hybrid Persistence
- Why We Shouldn’t Pity Schrödinger’s Kitty: Revisiting David Lewis’ Worry About Quantum Immortality in a Branching Multiverse
- Book Review
- Robert Lockie: Free Will and Epistemology. A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom
- Conference Review
- The Possibility of Metaphysics. Between Inductive, Analytic, and Transcendental Arguments, Duesseldorf, 31 January – 01 February, 2019
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Article
- Propensities and Possibilities
- Powerful Qualities or Pure Powers?
- Aristotelian Time
- Time, Leeway, and the Laws of Nature: Why Humean Compatibilists Cannot Be Eternalists
- Persistence Conditions and Identity
- Persistence, Temporal Extension, and Transdurantism
- More Work for Hybrid Persistence
- Why We Shouldn’t Pity Schrödinger’s Kitty: Revisiting David Lewis’ Worry About Quantum Immortality in a Branching Multiverse
- Book Review
- Robert Lockie: Free Will and Epistemology. A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom
- Conference Review
- The Possibility of Metaphysics. Between Inductive, Analytic, and Transcendental Arguments, Duesseldorf, 31 January – 01 February, 2019
