Molnar on Truthmakers for Negative Truths
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Nils Kürbis
Abstract
Molnar argues that the problem of truthmakers for negative truths arises because we tend to accept four metaphysical principles that entail that all negative truths have positive truthmakers. This conclusion, however, already follows from only three of Molnar´s metaphysical principles. One purpose of this note is to set the record straight. I provide an alternative reading of two of Molnar´s principles on which they are all needed to derive the desired conclusion. Furthermore, according to Molnar, the four principles may be inconsistent. By themselves, however, they are not. The other purpose of this note is to propose some plausible further principles that, when added to the four metaphysical theses, entail a contradiction.
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© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- The Deteleologization of Nature: Darwin’s Language in On the Origin of Species
- Dispositionality and Symmetry Structures
- A New Challenge for Objective Uncertainties and The Propensity Theorist
- Truthmaker Theory and Naturalism
- Molnar on Truthmakers for Negative Truths
- A Stage-Theoretical Account of Diachronic Identity
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- The Deteleologization of Nature: Darwin’s Language in On the Origin of Species
- Dispositionality and Symmetry Structures
- A New Challenge for Objective Uncertainties and The Propensity Theorist
- Truthmaker Theory and Naturalism
- Molnar on Truthmakers for Negative Truths
- A Stage-Theoretical Account of Diachronic Identity
