How to Think About the Correctness of Theistic Belief
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Mirosław Szatkowski
Abstract
Truth is a value in that sense that a belief is correct just in case it is true, which is frequently expressed in the metaphor that beliefs aim at truth. But, what does it mean to say that beliefs aim at truth? There are three most prominent approaches to this issue: purposive (or causal), teleological (or intentional), and normative. A comprehensive discussion of these approaches is the goal of our article. We also offer the hierarchy of languages and meta-languages, which gives a fragmentary account of the concept of God’s omniscience.
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- 1
It is a disputed question what normative properties are. See, on these issues, Broome (2000), Engel (2002), Wedgewood (2002), Zangwill (1998).
- 2
Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007, 280) distinguish between “S ought not to believe p” and “it is not the case that S ought to believe p”.
- 3
Of course, the theory
m must be previously determined in a meta-language 
for the object-language 
.
©2014 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin / Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Perception, Non-Propositional Content and the Justification of Perceptual Judgments
- Structure and Significance in Metaphysics
- De Re Essentialism, Species, and Modal Ambiguity
- How to Think About the Correctness of Theistic Belief
- The Only Probability Is Verbal Probability
- Against Logically Possible World-Relativized Existence
- Sider’s Third Realm
- I Am a Lot of Things: A Pluralistic Account of the Self
- The “Constant” Threat to the Dispositional Essentialist Conception of Laws
- Does Time Flow, at Any Rate?
- About Aboutness
- What Trans-World Causation Could and Could Not Be
- Modal Realism, Counterpart Theory, and Unactualized Possibilities
- The Natures of Types and Tokens: On the Metaphysical Commitments of Non-Reductive Physicalism
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Perception, Non-Propositional Content and the Justification of Perceptual Judgments
- Structure and Significance in Metaphysics
- De Re Essentialism, Species, and Modal Ambiguity
- How to Think About the Correctness of Theistic Belief
- The Only Probability Is Verbal Probability
- Against Logically Possible World-Relativized Existence
- Sider’s Third Realm
- I Am a Lot of Things: A Pluralistic Account of the Self
- The “Constant” Threat to the Dispositional Essentialist Conception of Laws
- Does Time Flow, at Any Rate?
- About Aboutness
- What Trans-World Causation Could and Could Not Be
- Modal Realism, Counterpart Theory, and Unactualized Possibilities
- The Natures of Types and Tokens: On the Metaphysical Commitments of Non-Reductive Physicalism
