Abstract
The Theory of Share Tenancy by Steven Cheung, first published as a PhD thesis 50 years ago, was an important watershed study on the economics of contracts. It contained the first formal demonstration of the Coase Theorem, linked the concepts of property rights and transaction costs, laid early foundations for the future economics of contracts, and can even lay claim to originating the idea of a risk/incentive tradeoff in contract design. This essay examines Cheung's key contributions in Share Tenancy, and considers reasons for its somewhat limited legacy outside of China.
Acknowlegement
We thank Yoram Barzel, Steve Cheung, Steve Medema, Ning Wang, L. Colin Xu, and participants at the Shenzhen conference in honor of the fiftieth anniversary of The Theory of Share Tenancy for their comments.
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Original Articles
- Theory of Share Tenancy after 50 Years
- The Insight and the Legacy of the Theory of Share Tenancy
- Priests, Conflicts and Property Rights: the Impacts on Tenancy and Land Use in Brazil
- Do Heterogeneous Agricultural Factors Affect Farmland Contractual Choice?—Evidence from China
- A Contest of Payment Contracts: A Structural Approach on How Chinese Firms Coped with Default Risk of Trade Credit
- Contractual Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
- Short Research Notes
- A New Essay on Von Neumann's Growth Model
- Celebrating Fifty Years to Cheung's Theory of Share Tenancy
- Cheung and Kochin in Chicago and Seattle
- The Theory of Share Tenancy and the Old “Good Economics”
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Original Articles
- Theory of Share Tenancy after 50 Years
- The Insight and the Legacy of the Theory of Share Tenancy
- Priests, Conflicts and Property Rights: the Impacts on Tenancy and Land Use in Brazil
- Do Heterogeneous Agricultural Factors Affect Farmland Contractual Choice?—Evidence from China
- A Contest of Payment Contracts: A Structural Approach on How Chinese Firms Coped with Default Risk of Trade Credit
- Contractual Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
- Short Research Notes
- A New Essay on Von Neumann's Growth Model
- Celebrating Fifty Years to Cheung's Theory of Share Tenancy
- Cheung and Kochin in Chicago and Seattle
- The Theory of Share Tenancy and the Old “Good Economics”