Contractual Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
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Yan Zhou
Abstract
Accompanying the rise of China in the world economy, intellectual property right protection comes to be the major issue apropos of international trade disputes in recent years. This paper, adopting the transaction costs paradigm and applying the contract theory, investigates and examines a form of contractual protection effectuated by market forces. The study shows that the contractual arrangement constituted by joint venture agreement with offsetting contractual arrangement is a form of intellectual property right protection driven by market forces. This contractual arrangement, though arising under the state policy of joint venture control, functions as an effective protection of intellectual property rights by fully pricing and protecting such hardly enforceable rights.
Acknowledgement
I am inclined to express my gratitude to Professor Steven N. S. Cheung, the very first person who advocated the proposition that multinational corporations literally license their technology by virtue of joint ventures, and that such arrangement could effectively protect intellectual property. I always cherish the memory of reading aloud to him the stack of contracts. I am also thankful to Cliff Yeung's valuable opinion and T.T. Yan's accurate translation.
References
Cheung, S.N.S. 1969. The Theory of Share Tenancy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Search in Google Scholar
Cheung, Steven N.S. 1982. Property Rights in Trade Secrets, Economic Inquiry, 20 (1): 40–53.10.1111/j.1465-7295.1982.tb01141.xSearch in Google Scholar
Cheung, S.N.S. 2000. The Theory of Share Tenancy. Hong Kong: Arcadia Press Limited.Search in Google Scholar
Cheung, S.N.S. 2005. Property Rights and Invention”, Economic Explanation: Selected Papers of Steven N. S. Cheung. Hong Kong: Arcadia Press Limited.Search in Google Scholar
© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Original Articles
- Theory of Share Tenancy after 50 Years
- The Insight and the Legacy of the Theory of Share Tenancy
- Priests, Conflicts and Property Rights: the Impacts on Tenancy and Land Use in Brazil
- Do Heterogeneous Agricultural Factors Affect Farmland Contractual Choice?—Evidence from China
- A Contest of Payment Contracts: A Structural Approach on How Chinese Firms Coped with Default Risk of Trade Credit
- Contractual Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
- Short Research Notes
- A New Essay on Von Neumann's Growth Model
- Celebrating Fifty Years to Cheung's Theory of Share Tenancy
- Cheung and Kochin in Chicago and Seattle
- The Theory of Share Tenancy and the Old “Good Economics”
Articles in the same Issue
- Original Articles
- Theory of Share Tenancy after 50 Years
- The Insight and the Legacy of the Theory of Share Tenancy
- Priests, Conflicts and Property Rights: the Impacts on Tenancy and Land Use in Brazil
- Do Heterogeneous Agricultural Factors Affect Farmland Contractual Choice?—Evidence from China
- A Contest of Payment Contracts: A Structural Approach on How Chinese Firms Coped with Default Risk of Trade Credit
- Contractual Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
- Short Research Notes
- A New Essay on Von Neumann's Growth Model
- Celebrating Fifty Years to Cheung's Theory of Share Tenancy
- Cheung and Kochin in Chicago and Seattle
- The Theory of Share Tenancy and the Old “Good Economics”
