Startseite Wirtschaftswissenschaften Priests, Conflicts and Property Rights: the Impacts on Tenancy and Land Use in Brazil
Artikel
Lizenziert
Nicht lizenziert Erfordert eine Authentifizierung

Priests, Conflicts and Property Rights: the Impacts on Tenancy and Land Use in Brazil

  • Lee J. Alston EMAIL logo und Bernardo Mueller
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 25. Mai 2018
Man and the Economy
Aus der Zeitschrift Man and the Economy Band 5 Heft 1

Abstract

Compared to the rest of the world, farmers in Brazil rely relatively little on tenant contracts. In agriculture, career mobility is associated with moving up the agricultural ladder from working for wages to renting to owning (Alston, L.J., and J.P. Ferrie. 2005. “Time on the Ladder: Career Mobility in Agriculture,” 1890-1938 The Journal of Economic History 65(04): 1058–1081. Cambridge University Press). Alone, this fact may not present a puzzle, but coupled with the large number of landless peasants and large amounts of unused land, the question is, Why don't landowners with unused or underutilized land negotiate land rental contracts with the landless.? In Brazil, this avenue for advancement has been hurt by a reluctance of owners to rent in areas experiencing land conflict. The lack of rentals is an important issue because Brazil is geographically a large country, roughly the size of the continental United States and has an expanding agricultural frontier, some of which is cutting into the Amazon. If the lack of land rentals is pervasive across Brazil and also signals inefficiency in production, the total magnitude is likely to be large when summed across the country.

Keywords: tenancy; brazil

Acknowledgements

The authors acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation (Grant 0528146). Mario Miranda and Adam Canton provided able research assistance organizing the data set. Thanks to Alexandre Iwata and IPEA for making the IPEAGeo 1.0.0 program available to us. We received extremely helpful comments from Ernesto dal Bo and Sebastian Galiani as discussants at the LACEA Political Economy Network Conference. We received further useful comments from Peter Houtzager, Madeleine Cousineau, Wolfgang Keller, Joseph Love, A. Mushfiq Mobarak, Charles Mueller, Décio Zylbersztajn, and participants at the following conferences and seminars: Conference on the Theory of Share Tenancy After 50 Years, 2017; NBER Summer Institute – Environment and Energy, 2010; LACEA Political Economy Network Conference, 2010 Cartagena; IV Research Workshop on Organizations and Institutions, São Paulo, 2009; International Society for New Institutional Economics Annual Meeting, 2009 Berkeley; IPEA-Brasília; IPEA-Rio de Janeiro; PUC-Rio de Janeiro; Universidade de Brasilia; Universidade Católica de Brasília; University of California, San Diego; University of Colorado; and University of Illinois.

References

Adriance, M.C. 1991. “Agents of Change: The Roles of Priests, Sisters, and Lay Workers in the Grassroots Catholic Church in Brazil,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 30(3): 292–305.10.2307/1386974Suche in Google Scholar

Adriance, M.C. 1992 . “The Paradox of Institutionalization: The Roman Catholic Church in Chile and Brazil.” Sociological Analysis 53: S51– S62.10.2307/3711250Suche in Google Scholar

Adriance, M.C. 1994. “Base Communities and Rural Mobilization in Northern Brazil,” Sociology of Religion 55(2): 163–178.10.2307/3711855Suche in Google Scholar

Adriance, M.C. 1995. “The Brazilian Catholic Church and the Struggle for Land in the Amazon,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 34(3): 377–382.10.2307/1386886Suche in Google Scholar

Alberto, A. 2003. A História Da OSIB E Os Desafios Da Formação. Belo Horizonte: 13a Assembléia da OSIB – Organização dos Seminários e Institutos do Brasil.Suche in Google Scholar

Almeida, P. 2002. Arrendamento e Acesso à Terra no Brasil. Master Dissertation at the University of Campinas, UNICAMP.Suche in Google Scholar

Almeida, P.J., and A.M. Buainain. 2001. “Arrendamento De Terras: Uma Contribuição Ao Neoinstitucionalismo Econômico,” in III International Conference on AgriChain/Networks Economics and Managemente, 10–30 Ribeirão Preto/SP – USP, - 24 a 26 de outubro de.Suche in Google Scholar

Alston, L.J., and J.P. Ferrie. 2005. “Time on the Ladder: Career Mobility in Agriculture 1890–1938,” The Journal of Economic History 65(04): 1058–1081. Cambridge University Press.10.3386/w11231Suche in Google Scholar

Alston, L.J., E. Harris, and B. Mueller. 2009. “De Facto and De Jure Property Rights: Land Settlement and Land Conflict on the Australian, Brazilian and U.S. Frontiers” NBER Working Paper No. 15264, September.10.3386/w15264Suche in Google Scholar

Alston, L.J., and R. Higgs. 1982. “Contractual Mix in Southern Agriculture since the Civil War: Facts, Hypotheses and Tests,” Journal of Economic History XLII(June): 327–353.10.1017/S0022050700027467Suche in Google Scholar

Alston, L.J., and K. Kauffman. 1997. “Agricultural Chutes and Ladders: New Estimates of Sharecroppers and 'True Tenants' in the South, 1900–1960.” Journal of Economic History 57 (June): 464–475.10.1017/S0022050700018544Suche in Google Scholar

Alston, L.J., and K. Kauffman. 1998. “Up, down and off the Agricultural Ladder: New Evidence and Implications of Agricultural Mobility for Blacks in the Postbellum South,” Agricultural History 72: 263–279.Suche in Google Scholar

Alston, L.J., G.D. Libecap, and B. Mueller. 1999a. “A Model of Rural Conflict: Violence and Land Reform Policy in Brazil,” Environment and Development Economics 4: 135–160. Cambridge:UK.10.1017/S1355770X99000121Suche in Google Scholar

Alston, L.J., G.D. Libecap, and B. Mueller. 1999b. Titles, Conflict and Land Use: The Development of Property Rights and Land Reform on the Brazilian Amazon Frontier. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.10.3998/mpub.16208Suche in Google Scholar

Alston, L.J., G.D. Libecap, and B. Mueller. 2000. “Property Rights to Land and Land Reform: Legal Inconsistencies and the Sources of Violent Conflict in the Brazilian Amazon,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 39: 162–188.10.1006/jeem.1999.1103Suche in Google Scholar

Alston, L.J., G.D. Libecap, and B. Mueller. 2010. “Interest Groups, Information Manipulation in the Media, and Public Policy: The Case of the Landless Peasants Movement in Brazil” NBER Working Paper No. 15865.10.3386/w15865Suche in Google Scholar

Alston,, L.J., and J.P. Ferrie. 1999. Paternalism and the American Welfare State: Economics, Politics, and Institutions in the U.S. South. 1865–1965. New York: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511720529Suche in Google Scholar

Angrist, J.D., and J.-S. Pischke. 2009. Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press10.1515/9781400829828Suche in Google Scholar

Bank, W. 1994. Brazil: The Management of Agriculture, Rural Development and Natural Resources, Vol. 2 Background Papers. Latin America and the Caribbean Region: Natural Resource Management and Rural Poverty Division, Country Department. July 31.Suche in Google Scholar

Besley, T. 1995. “Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana,” Journal of Political Economy 103(5): 903–937.10.1086/262008Suche in Google Scholar

Besley, T., J. Leight, R. Pande, and V. Rao. 2011. “The Regulation of Markets: Evidence from Tenancy Reform in India,” London School of Economics, Economic Organization and Public Policy Series Discussion Paper EOPP/2011/31.Suche in Google Scholar

Binswanger, H.P., K. Deininger, and G. Feder. 1995. “Power, Distortions, Revolt and Reform in Agricultural Land Relations,” in J. Behrman and T.N. Srinivasan ed. Handbook of Development Economics, Volume III, 2659–2772. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.10.1016/S1573-4471(95)30019-8Suche in Google Scholar

Brandão, A.S., G.S. Bastos Filho, and A.P. Brandão. 2001. “Land Markets and Rural Poverty Alleviation,” Chapter 4 in World Bank, Rural Poverty Alleviation in Brazil: Towards an Integrated Strategy- Vol. 1: Policy Summary, World Bank, Report No. 21790-BRSuche in Google Scholar

Brito, L.L. 2010. “Medellín E Puebla: Epicentros Do Confronto Entre Progressistas E Conservadores Na América Latina,” Revista Espaço Acadêmico 111(Agosto): 81–89.Suche in Google Scholar

Bruneau, T. 1985. “Church and Politics in Brazil: The Genesis of Change,” Journal of Latin American Studies 17: 271–293.10.1017/S0022216X00007896Suche in Google Scholar

Buainain, A.M., P.J. Almeida, F. De Lima, and J.M. De Silveira. 2008. “Land Rental Markets and Land Access in Brazil,” Basis Brief: Assets and Market Access, CRSP, July, http://www.basis.wisc.edu.Suche in Google Scholar

Carter, M.R., and P. Olinto. 2003. “Getting Institutions ‘Right’ for Whom? Credit Constraints and the Impact of Property Rights on the Quantity and Composition of Investment,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85: 173–186.10.1111/1467-8276.00111Suche in Google Scholar

Carvalho, M.S. 1991. “A Pequena Produção De Café No Paraná,” PhD diss. University of São Paulo, Dept. of Geography.Suche in Google Scholar

CERIS – Centro de Estudos Religiosos e Investigações Sociais. Anuário Católico Do Brasil. Vol. 10, 1– 973. Rio de Janeiro: CERISSuche in Google Scholar

Cheung, S.N.S. 1969. The Theory of Share Tenancy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Suche in Google Scholar

CNBB – Confederação Nacional dos Bispos Brasilieros. 1980. Igreja E Problemas Da Terra. São Paulo: Ed. Paulinas.Suche in Google Scholar

Conley, T.G. 1999. “GMM Estimation with Cross Sectional Dependence,” Journal of Econometrics 92: 1–45.10.1016/S0304-4076(98)00084-0Suche in Google Scholar

Conning, J.H., and J.A. Robinson. 2007. “Property Rights and the Political Organization of Agriculture,” Journal of Development Economics 82: 416–447.10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.08.001Suche in Google Scholar

Daniel, H.F., S. Naidu, S. Nichter, and N. Richardson. 2010. “2010.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 92(3): 505–523.10.1162/REST_a_00007Suche in Google Scholar

De Janvry, A., K. Macours, and E. Sadoulet. 2002. Access to Land in the Rural Development Agenda. Washington D.C: Sustainable Development Department, Inter-American Development Bank.Suche in Google Scholar

De Janvry, A., and E. Sadoulet. 1989. “A Study in Resistance to Institutional Change: The Lost Game of Latin American Land Reform,” World Development 17(9): 1397–1407.10.4324/9781315240114-32Suche in Google Scholar

Deininger, K., and D.A. Ali. 2008. “Do Overlapping Land Rights Reduce Agricultural Investment? Evidence from Uganda,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 90(4): 869–882. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1263062.10.1111/j.1467-8276.2008.01171.xSuche in Google Scholar

Deininger, K., and J.S. Chamorro. 2004. “Investment and Equity Effects of Land Regularisation: The Case of Nicaragua.” Agricultural Economics 30 (2): 101–116.10.1111/j.1574-0862.2004.tb00180.xSuche in Google Scholar

Demsetz, H. 1967. “Towards a Theory of Property Rights,” The American Economic Review 57: 347–359. 2 May, 1967.10.1057/9780230523210_9Suche in Google Scholar

Economist, The 2011. Employer, Beware. 43 March12th–18th2011.Suche in Google Scholar

Federico, G. 2006. “The ‘Real’ Puzzle of Sharecropping: Why Is It Disappearing?,” Continuity and Change 21(2): 261–285.10.1017/S0268416006005947Suche in Google Scholar

Gallo, A. 2003. “Rural Rent Legislation in Argentina: Congress and Renters, 1912–1943,” Working Paper.Suche in Google Scholar

Garcia-Jimeno, C., and J.A. Robinson. 2009. “The Myth of the Frontier,” NBER Working Paper Series w14774(March): 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=135295410.3386/w14774Suche in Google Scholar

Ghatak, M., and S. Roy. 2007. “Land Reform and Agricultural Productivity in India: A Review of the Evidence,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 23(2): 251–269. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=115112910.1093/oxrep/grm017Suche in Google Scholar

Hewitt, W.E. 1990. “Religion and Consolidation of Democracy in Brazil: The Role of the Comunidades Eclesiais De Base (Cebs),” Sociological Analysis 50(2): 139–152.10.2307/3710811Suche in Google Scholar

Houtzager, P.P. 2001. “Collective Action and Political Authority: Rural Workers, Church, and State in Brazil,” Theory and Society 30(1, Feb): 1–45.10.1023/A:1011076016977Suche in Google Scholar

IBGE. 1984. Áreas Mínimas De Comparação a Nível Municipal: 1980–1970–1960. Rio de Janeiro: IBGE.Suche in Google Scholar

IBGE. 2007. Séries Estatísticas & Séries Históricas, Rio De Janeiro, IBGE, Censo Agropecuário 1920 to 1995/96: http://www.ibge.gov.br/series_estatisticas/subtema.php?idsubtema=100.Suche in Google Scholar

IPARDES. 1978. O Trabalhador Volante No Estado Do Paraná. Vol. I. Curitiba. IPARDES.Suche in Google Scholar

Jaramillo, C.F. (2001).El Mercado Rural de Tierras em America Latina: Hacia uma Nova Estatrategia. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, Technical Report No. EVN-124.Suche in Google Scholar

Krischke, P.J. 1991. “Church Base Communities and Democratic Change in Brazilian Society,” Comparative Political Studies 24(2): 186–210.10.1177/0010414091024002002Suche in Google Scholar

Mainwaring, S. 1986. The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916–1985. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Suche in Google Scholar

Mainwaring, S., and A. Wilde. 1989. The Progressive Church in Latin America.. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press/Kellogg Institute.Suche in Google Scholar

Marshall, A. 1890. Guillebaud, C.W. (Ed.) Principles of Economics. London: Macmillan Company (1961)Suche in Google Scholar

Martins, J.S. 1980. “O Documento Da Terra Prometida,” Reforma Agrária: Boletim Da Associação Brasileira De Reforma Agrária 2: 39–43. Unicamp, Ano X, Mar./Abr.Suche in Google Scholar

Maybury-Lewis, B. 1994. The Politics of the Possible: The Brazilian Rural Worker's Trade Union Movement, 1964–1985. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.Suche in Google Scholar

McDonald, J.F., and R.A. Moffit. 1980. “The Uses of Tobit Analysis,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 62(2, May): 318–321.10.2307/1924766Suche in Google Scholar

Menezes Neto, A.J. 2007. “A Igreja Católica E Os Movimentos Sociais Do Campo: A Teologia Da Libertação E O Movimento Dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra,” Cadernos Do CRH (UFBA) 20: 331–342.10.1590/S0103-49792007000200010Suche in Google Scholar

Menezes Neto, A.J. 2009. A Igreja Católica E A Luta Pela Terra No Brasil. 1–16. IV Simpósio Internacional de Geografia Agrária Niteroi: SINGA.Suche in Google Scholar

Moura, M.J.S.B., and L.S.B. Rodrigo. 2009. “How Land Title Affects Income,” ANPEC - Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics, Proceedings of the 37th Brazilian Economics Meeting. 203.10.1596/1813-9450-5010Suche in Google Scholar

Nichols, W.H. 1971. “A Fronteira Agrícola Na História Recente Do Brasil: O Estado Do Paraná, 1920–65,” Revista Paranaense De Desenvolvimento 26: 19–53. Curitiba, set-out.Suche in Google Scholar

Pande, R., and C. Udry. 2006. “Institutions and Development: A View from Below,” with Chris Udry in Proceedings of the 9th World Congress of the Econometric Society, eds. R. Blundell, W. Newey and T. Persson, Cambridge University Press.Suche in Google Scholar

Pinckney, T.C., and P.K. Kimuyu. 1994. “Land Tenure Reform in East Africa: Good, Bad or Unimportant?,” Journal of African Economies 3(1): 1–28.10.1093/oxfordjournals.jae.a036794Suche in Google Scholar

Place, F., and K. Otsuka. 2002. “Land Tenure Systems and Their Impacts on Agricultural Investmetns and Productivity in Uganda,” Journal of Development Studies 38(6): 105–124.10.1080/00220380412331322601Suche in Google Scholar

Reis, E., M. Pimentel, and A.I. Alvarenga. 2009. Áreas Mínimas Comparáveis Para Os Períodos Intercensitários De 1872 a 2000. Rio de Janeiro: IPEA-DIMAC.Suche in Google Scholar

Rezende, G.C. 2006. “Políticas Trabalhista, Fundiária E De Crédito Agrícola No Brasil: Uma Avaliação Crítica,” Revista De Economia E Sociologia Rural 44(1): 47–78.10.1590/S0103-20032006000100003Suche in Google Scholar

Rezende, G.C., and A.C. Kreter. 2007. ““Agricultural Labor Legislation and Poverty in Brazil,” A Transaction Costs Approach” Revista De Economia Agrícola 54: 121–137.Suche in Google Scholar

Ribeiro, M.C.M., and M.I. Stolf. 1975. “A Moradia Do Trabalhador Na Fazenda De Café Paulista.”. In Carone, E. (Ed.), O Café: Anais Do II Congresso De História De São Paulo. 135–156. São Paulo: Instituto Historico e Geografico BrasileiroSuche in Google Scholar

Romeiro, A., and B.P. Reydon. coords. 1994. O Mercado De Terras. Brasília: IPEA. 1994, Estudos de Política Agrícola (Documentos de Trabalho, 13).Suche in Google Scholar

Saint, W.S. 1980. “Mão-de-Obra Volante Na Agricultura Brasileira: Uma Revisão Da Bibliografia,” Pesquisa E Planejamento Econômico IPEA 10(2): 503–526. Agosto.Suche in Google Scholar

Sayad, J. 1982. “Especulação Com Terras Rurais: Efeitos Sobre a Produção Agrícola E O Novo ITR,” Pesquisa E Planejamento Econômico 12(1): 87–108. abr.Suche in Google Scholar

Serbin, K.P. 2000. “The Catholic Church, Religious Pluralism, and Democracy in Brazil.”. In Kingstone, P.R., and T.J. Powers (Eds.) Democratic Brazil: Actors, Institutions, and Processes. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.10.2307/jj.11660144.13Suche in Google Scholar

Skidmore, T. 2003. Uma História Do Brasil. 4th edition. São Paulo: Paz e Terra.Suche in Google Scholar

Stock, J.H., J.H. Wright, and M. Yogo. 2002. “A Survey of Weak Instruments and Weak Identification in Generalized Method of Moments,” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, October 20(4): 518–529.10.1198/073500102288618658Suche in Google Scholar

(US Department of Agriculture) (2007).Census of Agriculture: U.S. National Level DataVol. 1, Chapter 1, Complete Report, Table 58, https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_US/st99_1_058_058.pdf.Suche in Google Scholar

Vertova, P. 2006. “Property Rights on Unused Asset and Investment Incentives: Evidence from Brazil,” Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, Discussion Paper 48.Suche in Google Scholar

Wooldridge, J.M. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridge, MA: MIT PressSuche in Google Scholar

Appendix

A Data

Total number of observations = 3,659. This the AMC7097 grouping created by IPEA/IBGE that makes data comparable from 1970 to 2000 by adding, or in some cases averaging, the data of municipios that subdivided from 1970 to 1997. There are 27 states. The data for most of the variables are available for two set of years, 1985 and 1995/96. Agricultural data and Priest data can be added for 1980 and 1975, but Conflict data only goes back to 1985. Not all variables are used in the estimation, but we list all variables available.

Agricultural data (source = IBGE Agricultural Census)

  1. Area in farms (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  2. Number of establishments (1985 and 1996).

  3. Total municipio area (fixed)

  4. Farm area in natural forest (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  5. Farm area in planted forest (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  6. Farm area in permanent crops (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  7. Farm area in temporary crops (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  8. Farm area in natural pasture (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  9. Farm area in planted pasture (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  10. Farm area left fallow (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  11. Farm area productive but not used (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  12. Farm area unsuitable for productive use (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  13. Total area in owner-run farms (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  14. Total number of owner-run farms (1985 and 1996).

  15. Total area in rented farms (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  16. Total number of rented farms (1985 and 1996).

  17. Total area in sharecropped farms (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  18. Total number of sharecropped farms (1985 and 1996).

  19. Total area in squatted farms (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  20. Total number of squatted farms (1985 and 1996).

  21. Number of heads of cattle (1985 and 1996).

  22. Number of tractors (1985 and 1996).

  23. Investments realized in the year R$ (thou) of 2000(mil) (Deflated) (1985 and 1996).

  24. Revenues received in the year R$ (thou) of 2000(mil) (Deflated) (1985 and 1996).

  25. Expenditures in the year R$ (thou) of 2000(mil) (Deflated) (1985 and 1996).

  26. Area irrigated (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  27. Total number of tractors in the municipio (1985 and 1996).

  28. People working in farms (1985 and 1996).

  29. Area in cotton (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  30. Area in rice (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  31. Area in coffee (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  32. Area in sugar cane (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  33. Area in beans (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  34. Area in manioc (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  35. Area in corn (1985 and 1996), hectares.

  36. Area in soy beans (1985 and 1996), hectares.

Conflict data

  1. Number of murders, yearly data (1985 to 1995). (Pastoral Land Commission)

  2. Number of threats of murder, yearly data (1985 to 1995). (Pastoral Land Commission)

  3. Number of murder attempts, yearly data (1985 to 1995). (Pastoral Land Commission)

  4. Number of occupations/invasions, yearly data (1988 to 1995). (Pastoral Land Commission)

  5. Area expropriated for land reform, yearly data (1979 to 1996). (INCRA/Ipeadata)

  6. Capacity for settling families in settlement projects, yearly data (1979 to 1996), unit = families. (INCRA/Ipeadata)

  7. Number of expropriations, yearly data (1979 to 1996). (Pastoral Land Commission) (INCRA/Ipeadata)

Priest data (source Catholic Hierarchy – The hierarchy of the Catholic Church http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/)

  1. Number of Catholics, data for 1966, 1975, 1985, 1995 (proximate years in some cases).

  2. Total population (data from Catholic Hierarchy, not IBGE), for 1966, 1975, 1985, 1995 (proximate years in some cases).

  3. Number of priests in Diocese, data for 1966, 1975, 1985, 1995 (proximate years in some cases).

  4. Number of Catholics per priest, for 1966, 1975, 1985, 1995 (proximate years in some cases).

Other data

  1. Area of entire municipio, square kilometers (oddly this varies from 1985 to 1996) (IBGE/Ipeadata).

  2. Distance from the municipio head to the federal capital, kilometers, fixed for 1985 and 1996.

  3. Distance to the state capital kilometers, fixed for 1985 and 1996.

  4. Transport cost to São Paulo (index) – Nucleo de Estudos e Modelos Espaciais Sistêmicos, http://www.nemesis.org.br/.

  5. Number of train stations in the município - Nucleo de Estudos e Modelos Espaciais Sistêmicos, http://www.nemesis.org.br/.

  6. Latitute, degrees, fixed for 1985 and 1996.

  7. Longitude, degrees, fixed for 1985 and 1996.

  8. Total population, 1980 and 1996. (IBGE/Ipeadata)

  9. Total rural population, 1980 and 1996. (IBGE/Ipeadata)

  10. Total urban population, 1980 and 1996. (IBGE/Ipeadata)

  11. Economically active population, 1985 and 1996. (IBGE/Ipeadata)

  12. Economically active rural population, 1985 and 1996. (IBGE/Ipeadata)

  13. Economically active urban population, 1985 and 1996. (IBGE/Ipeadata)

  14. County GDP in R$ of 2000 (thou) (deflated), 1985 and 1996. (IBGE/Ipeadata)

  15. County agricultural GDP in R$ of 2000 (thou) (deflated), 1985 and 1996. (IBGE/Ipeadata)

B
Table A:

Non-instrumented results.

Fixed rent (%) Sharecropper (%) Owner (%) Squatted/Occupant (%)
Conflict per 1000 farms 0.0002 −0.00004 −0.0001 −0.0001
(1.41) (−0.42) (−0.31) (−0.81)
Cotton, % of total farm area 0.463*** 0.208*** −0.734*** 0.062
(5.93) (4.33) (−6.59) (0.91)
Rice, % of total farm area 0.308*** 0.252*** −0.553*** −0.007
(8.72) (11.53) (−10.96) (−0.23)
Coffee, % of total farm area −0.127*** 0.056*** 0.101*** −0.030
(−4.70) (3.35) (2.63) (−1.29)
Cane, % of total farm area 0.175*** 0.059*** −0.210*** −0.024***
(22.63) (12.33) (−19.03) (−3.56)
Beans, % of total farm area 0.0008 0.128*** −0.231*** 0.102***
(0.03) (8.09) (−6.31) (4.56)
Manioc, % of total farm area 0.047 0.086*** −0.676*** 0.543***
(1.20) (3.52) (−12.02) (15.80)
Corn, % of total farm area −0.027 0.032*** −0.001 −0.006
(−1.45) (2.74) (−0.04) (−0.34)
Soy Beans, % total farm area 0.213*** 0.028*** −0.212*** −0.029**
(16.66) (3.53) (−11.63) (−2.58)
Frontier −0.0004*** 0.0001 0.0009*** −0.0006***
(−2.67) (0.62) (4.78) (−4.71)
GDP growth 1985–1995 0.0002 −0.0005 −0.006*** 0.006***
(0.15) (−0.58) (2.75) (4.75)
Latitude −0.003*** 0.0009** 0.004*** −0.002***
(−4.10) (2.23) (4.18) (−3.72)
Longitude 0.001 0.0008* −0.005*** 0.004***
(1.43) (1.89) (−5.57) (6.13)
Distance to state capital −0.00003*** 0.00001 0.00004*** −0.00002***
(−3.21) (1.18) (3.53) (−2.93)
Transport cost to São Paulo −0.000001 −0.000003** −0.00001* 0.00001***
(−0.54) (−1,99) (1.90) (5.14)
Number of train stations 0.002*** −0.0004 −0.002*** 0.0006
(3.69) (−1.49) (2.72) (1.27)
Population density 1995 0.00001 −0.0000003 −0.00001 0.000002
(0.99) (−0.10) (−0.96) (0.49)
Rural/Urban Population 1995 −0.0008 −0.0001 −0.001 0.002***
(−1.45) (−0.22) (−1.57) (4.39)
Population growth 1985–1995 −0.001 −0.0007 0.003 −0.009
(−0.99) (−0.69) (1.15) (−0.64)
Tractor per hectare growth 1985–1995 −0.081 0.636*** −0.976*** 0.421***
(−0.46) (5.88) (3.90) (2.75)
Cattle per hectare1995 −0.004** −0.002 0.009*** −0.004***
(−2.13) (−1.43) (3.75) (−2.68)
Constant −0.054 −0.028 1.26*** −0.181***
(−1.21) (−1.01) (19.86) (−4.66)
Number of observations Total: 3616 Total: 3616 Total: 3616 Total: 3616
State dummies (27 states) Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.44 0.28 0.42 0.42
χ2(44) 2835.14 1404.88 2033.70 2587.83
Prob>χ2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

  1. Estimated Seemingly Unrelated Regresion. t-stats in parentheses. Statistical signif.: 1 % ***. 5 % **, 10 % *. The coefficients for all four equations are constrained to add up to zero for every variable.

C Sensitivity Analysis for Spatial Autocorrelation

Ideally, we would like to take into account the effect of spatial autocorrelation in our regressions in Table 4. Although we are able to run estimation procedures controlling for spatial autocorrelation using latitude and longitude to indicate each municipio's location, we have not found any program or routine that can do so in the context of three-stage least squares estimation with all coefficients of the same variable constrained to add up to zero across equations and when the first stage is a Tobit. Therefore, for the purpose of sensitivity analysis, we did three separate estimation procedures that can be compared to ascertain the relative impact on results of spatial autocorrelation versus the 3SLS. The first step is to use GMM estimation with the estimated level of conflict from the first-stage Tobit directly in each separate second-stage contract-choice equation. This procedure was then repeated including an additional procedure (Conely, 1999) that takes into account also the possibility of spatial autocorrelation of errors, that is, the impact of neighboring municipios' variables on a given município´s dependent variable. The estimates from the two GMM procedures can be compared to see how much spatial autocorrelation affects the results. The second step is a comparison of the 3SLS results in Table 4 and the non-spatial GMM estimation in order to ascertain how much of the former results are due to taking into account contemporaneous correlation and to constraining the coefficients to add up to zero. The relative impacts of spatial autocorrelation and of the 3SLS can then be compared. The estimated coefficient of conflict in the contract-choice equations is shown in Table B.[25]

Table B:

Sensitivity analysis for estimation procedure.

Coefficient of Estimated Conflict (from 1st stage) in Contract Equations Fixed Rent (%) Sharecrop (%) Owner (%) Squatted/Occupant (%)
1 Three Stage Least Squares, Instrumental variables, no spatial correction (Table 3) −0.008*** −0.006*** 0.010*** 0.004**
(−3.60) (−4.21) (3.39) (2.50)
2 GMM Instrumental variables, separate equations, no spatial correction −0.020* −0.010** 0.033*** −0.004*
(−1.82) (−2.38) (2.68) (−1.65)
3 GMM instrumental variable, spatial autocorrelation (Conley 1999) −0.020 −0.011* 0.033** −0.004
(−1.63) (−1.92) (2.16) (−1.46)
Number of observations 3616 3616 3616 3616

  1. Lines 2 and 3 estimated using IPEAGeo 1.0.0. t-stat in parentheses. Statistical significance: 1 % ***, 5 % **, 10 % *. Spatial GMM based on Conley (1999) using latitude and longitude as x and y coordinates with proportional distance set at 10 % of maximum distance. Same controls used as in Table 4 except state dummies.

Line 1 in Table B shows the estimated coefficient for conflict using 3SLS, replicated from Table 4. Line 2 shows the GMM estimates with no consideration of spatial autocorrelation. Finally, line 3 shows the GMM estimates including the correction for autocorrelation. Comparison of lines 2 and 3 shows the impact of spatial autocorrelation on the standard errors. By construction, the estimated coefficients are the same. Comparison of lines 1 and 2, none of which consider spatial autocorrelation, shows the impact of estimating the equations in a system by 3SLS with constrained coefficients rather than estimating separate equations through GMM, though the same instruments are used in both procedures.

The comparisons show that including the impact of spatial autocorrelation has very little impact on the t-stats, which become slightly smaller but do not change the result of the tested hypotheses. In both cases, conflicts are found to reduce fixed rent and sharecropping, though no effect is found on squatted/occupied land. On the other hand, the impact of using 3SLS is large. The estimated coefficients vary and the t-stats become larger, adding substantial statistical significance to the result that the tenancy contracts are inhibited by conflict. The 3SLS results are preferable to the GMM results because they are more efficient econometrically. This is so for two reasons. The first is that the simultaneous estimation of the equations including the ‘contemporaneous’ correlation of errors makes the estimates more efficient. The second is due to the additional information that is added by the constraints that force all coefficients of each variable to add up to zero across equations. The upshot is that we can have confidence in the results presented in Table 4, with perhaps a small but inconsequent underestimation of the standard errors.
Published Online: 2018-05-25

© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Artikel in diesem Heft

  1. Original Articles
  2. Theory of Share Tenancy after 50 Years
  3. The Insight and the Legacy of the Theory of Share Tenancy
  4. Priests, Conflicts and Property Rights: the Impacts on Tenancy and Land Use in Brazil
  5. Do Heterogeneous Agricultural Factors Affect Farmland Contractual Choice?—Evidence from China
  6. A Contest of Payment Contracts: A Structural Approach on How Chinese Firms Coped with Default Risk of Trade Credit
  7. Contractual Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
  8. Short Research Notes
  9. A New Essay on Von Neumann's Growth Model
  10. Celebrating Fifty Years to Cheung's Theory of Share Tenancy
  11. Cheung and Kochin in Chicago and Seattle
  12. The Theory of Share Tenancy and the Old “Good Economics”
https://doi.org/10.1515/me-2018-0003
Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel
tenancy; brazil

Artikel in diesem Heft

  1. Original Articles
  2. Theory of Share Tenancy after 50 Years
  3. The Insight and the Legacy of the Theory of Share Tenancy
  4. Priests, Conflicts and Property Rights: the Impacts on Tenancy and Land Use in Brazil
  5. Do Heterogeneous Agricultural Factors Affect Farmland Contractual Choice?—Evidence from China
  6. A Contest of Payment Contracts: A Structural Approach on How Chinese Firms Coped with Default Risk of Trade Credit
  7. Contractual Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
  8. Short Research Notes
  9. A New Essay on Von Neumann's Growth Model
  10. Celebrating Fifty Years to Cheung's Theory of Share Tenancy
  11. Cheung and Kochin in Chicago and Seattle
  12. The Theory of Share Tenancy and the Old “Good Economics”
Jetzt anmelden und 20% sparen
Institutioneller Zugang
Wie funktioniert Authentifizierung?
Haben Sie eine Idee, wie wir unsere Website verbessern können?
Bitte schreiben Sie uns.
© 2025 De Gruyter Brill
Heruntergeladen am 27.12.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/me-2018-0003/pdf
Button zum nach oben scrollen