Slur reclamation, irony, and resilience

2.1 The truth-conditional view

The truth-conditional view on slurs (TC) posits that the derogatory component of a slur is an integral part of its literal meaning (cf. Himma 2002; Hom 2008; Hom and May 2013). This implies that a slur is inherently offensive in virtue of what it truth-conditionally predicates of the targeted members, regardless of the speaker’s communicative intentions, which may mitigate but not entirely eliminate the semantically encoded offense. Therefore, TC is well equipped to account for the phenomenon of offensive autonomy: slurs cause offense even when the speaker does not intend to use them with derogatory purposes.^[1]

Accordingly, TC rejects the tenet of coreferentialism, which posits that a slur and its neutral counterpart have the same extension. To illustrate, the extension of the N-word should be limited to those individuals who are morally inferior (or similar) due to their black skin. This extension is obviously empty and does not correspond to the non-empty extension of the neutral counterpart “African-American”. In general, let S be a slur, and let S∗ be its neutral counterpart. In accordance with TC, S expresses the property of being S∗ and despicable because of it. A significant implication of TC is that slurs are characterized by having null extension. More precisely, the thesis of null extensionality is a consequence of the truth-conditional paraphrase and the moral claim that no individual should be the target of contempt (Hom and May 2013: 295). (1a) is truth-conditionally analysed as (1a′).

Variability presents a challenge to the truth-conditional paraphrase. Of course, TC is able to account for non-pejorative interpretations of embedded slurs, but it encounters significant difficulties in explaining their pejorative readings. In fact, if the pejorative content of a slur is part of its truth-conditional meaning, it should be neutralized when negated, hypothesised, questioned, and so forth. This is what TC correctly predicts in cases of non-pejorative interpretation. However, in pejorative interpretations, the derogatory content remains intact even when negated, hypothesised or questioned.^[2]

The persistence of offensiveness in embedding is an unexpected outcome according to TC. The difficulties intensify in instances of non-pejorative readings in atomic slurring predications, as in slur reclamation. The most natural strategy available to TC proponents is to invoke AT: a non-pejorative reclaimed reading of slurs must entail a change in meaning (Richard 2008: 16). Indeed, Hom (2008: 428) characterizes the phenomenon of slur reclamation as a process through which targeted groups alter the meaning of their own insulting epithets in order to reclaim the term for non-derogatory uses within the group. Consequently, AT treats reclamation variation as a form of word-variation.

Proponents of AT generally do not provide details of the novel meaning that the slur acquires as a result of a successful reclamation process. In particular, it is unclear whether the resulting meaning is the same as or different from the meaning of the neutral counterpart. However, the main challenge associated with AT is AW, namely, the failure of those who adopt AT to provide a rationale for why only members with insider status (typically targeted members) can successfully use slurs with a reclaimed meaning (cf. Anderson and Lepore 2013: 43).

2.2 Jeshion’s polysemy thesis

Jeshion (2020) makes a case for the use of AT. She focused on the diachronic structure of slur reclamation, distinguishing between two distinct forms: pride reclamation and insular reclamation. In the context of pride reclamation, in-group members use their own insulting epithet to self-label, thereby expressing pride in their targeted group membership. They publicly present the reclaimed slur as an appropriate way to refer to the targeted group. In contrast, in insular reclamation the insulting epithet is used by in-group members to promote camaraderie within the group. Insular reclamation is characterised by irony and assumes intimacy between speakers. It is notable that in this latter case, the slur is not presented as an appropriate way to refer to the targeted group.

Both processes result in a change of meaning. Through acts of linguistic creativity and innovation, initiated by in-group members and subsequently adopted by out-group members through imitation and diffusion, the pejorative linguistic conventions that govern the use of a slur in hate speech contexts are gradually replaced by novel linguistic conventions that result in reversal of polarity (at a minimum neutralizing the derogatory component of the slur) and weapons control (Jeshion 2020: 122). During the reclamation process, and even afterwards, slurs are polysemic. They simultaneously retain the linguistic conventions that codify derogation and acquire novel non-derogatory linguistic conventions. As Jeshion’s perspective is aligned with AT, it is subject to the same limitations as TC, that is, it is unclear what exactly the new meaning conventions consist of, and AW is not adequately addressed. Once the novel reclaimed meaning is established, the speaker’s authoritative status should not be relevant. It is unexpected that the speaker’s insider status continues to be a significant element in the interpretation of reclaimed uses of slurs.

2.3 Bianchi’s echoic account

An alternative pragmatic account of slur reclamation that does not make use of AT has been proposed by Bianchi (2014). In elucidating the concept of slur reclamation, Bianchi draws upon the distinction between descriptive and interpretive uses of utterances, as proposed by Sperber and Wilson (1986). An utterance may be employed to represent a state of affairs. This illustrates the descriptive dimension of language. It is also possible to employ an utterance to represent another person’s utterance concerning a given state of affairs. As Sperber and Wilson (1986: 229) have noted, the interpretive use of language does not entail the ascription of utterances to a particular individual. A subset of interpretive utterances are echoic uses of utterances. In such instances, the speaker represents an utterance (which may or may not be attributed) and conveys to the hearer their attitude towards the represented utterance. A subset of that subset consists of the ironic uses of utterances. These latter can be characterised as echoic uses in which the speaker communicates a dissociative attitude towards the represented utterance. Bianchi proposes that reclaimed uses of slurs should be considered as ironic echoic uses of slurs.

To exemplify the concept of echoic use of a slur, Bianchi (2014: 40) proposes the following community use scenario: two gay friends are talking about their new colleague Tom. At some point, one of them utters (2a) below. According to the echoic view, the utterance of (2a) exemplifies a reclaimed use of the homophobic slur. The speaker employs the slur with an ironic echoic mention of its derogatory content.

In other words, in uttering (2a) the speaker demonstrates a dissociative attitude towards the derogatory content of the homophobic slur, by ironically echoing its use by bigoted people. As pointed out by Bianchi (2014: 40–41), reclaimed sentences such as (2a) are also uttered with a descriptive use. In saying (2a) the speaker assert that Tom is a male homosexual, just as in saying (1a) in a reclaimed manner the speaker effectively asserts that Morgan Freeman is an African-American. In response to this possible objection, Bianchi suggests that the speaker echos only the derogatory content of the insulting epithet. Despite its merits, especially in dispensing with AT, the echoic view does not fully account for all instances of slur reclamation. As pointed out by Jeshion (2020: 133–134), it fails to account for pride reclamation, where no verbal irony is involved. In pride reclamation, the speaker does not mention the slur, but s/he uses it literally to self-label.

3.1 Insular reclamation

The proposal put forth here is that insular reclaimed slurs should be treated as instances of ironic word usage. It is once more relevant to consider Bianchi’s community use scenario. In uttering (2a), the speaker makes a reference to Tom, who is an in-group member. It is evident that the speaker is employing the homophobic slur in a reclaimed manner. In light of the postulated hypothesis that a slur is a mixed expression incorporating both descriptive and imperative content (i.e., a slurring warning, as previously stated), irony can be said to assume two distinct forms. The utterance of (2a), where square brackets are used to signal the ironic use of the bracketed expressions, is ambiguous between (2a′) and (2a″). (2a′) represents the reclaimed use, while (2a″) does not neutralize the derogatory nature of the term. It can be argued that irony is insufficient to negate the offensiveness of the term. For instance, in uttering (2a), the speaker may employ irony to suggest that Tom is a Don Giovanni (or something like that). This ironic and still derogatory sense is captured by (2a″).

Since the ironic meaning of a word is the opposite of its literal meaning, the speaker who utters (2a) is thereby committed to the truth of (2b), where the slur occurs literally. (2b) is to be considered ambiguous between (2b′) and (2b″), depending on the sense (i.e., declarative or prohibitive) that negation takes. The appropriate analysis of (2b), as implied by (2a) in its ironic and reclaimed use, is (2b′), whose logical form is ⌜α(p)&!(¬q)⌝.^[6] In contrast, (2b″) is implied by (2a) in its ironic but still derogatory use. (2b″) is expressed in the form ⌜α(¬p)&!(q)⌝.

3.2 Pride reclamation

Pride reclamation does not entail irony or meta-communication. The acts of pride reclamation are characterized by directness and sincerity (Jeshion 2020: 121). This presents a challenge for content-based theories that aim to reject semantic ambiguity. If the pejorative content of a slur is not ironically modified in pride reclaimed contexts and no meta-communicative mechanism is involved (as postulated by the echoic view), then pride reclaimed uses should be just as pejorative as the unreclaimed uses. This raises the question of how we might then explain the polarity reversal and weapons control in pride reclamation.

Kirk-Giannini (2019) postulates that slur reclamation is a result of a shift in the affective correlates contingently (and subjectively) associated with perspectives: “it is possible for one and the same perspective […] to be associated with negative emotions by one individual or at one time and neutral or positive emotions by another individual or at another time”. Thus he suggests that “the process of reclamation associated with certain appropriated slurs be understood as a process of changing the affective correlates of the associated perspectives” (2019]: 22). This proposal presents a dual challenge. Once more, AW arises at the level of perspectives.^[7] The concept of a derogatory perspective is undermined by a form of subjectivism. If the affective correlates of slurs are the determining factor in differentiating between derogatory and non-derogatory use, then the desired requirement of conventionalized derogatory content will not be met.

An alternative directive account is provided by WT. As previously stated, WT posits that slurs encode imperatives at level of what is said. In uttering a slurring warning, the speaker engages in describing a state of affairs (the one described by the corresponding neutral sentence), and in addition performs an action: ordering, suggesting, or encouraging contempt toward the targeted group. In the context of insular reclamation, the speaker utters the imperative in an ironic manner, thereby conveying the opposite literal imperative. This represents the reversal of polarity in insular reclamation. In the context of pride reclamation, the speaker utters the slurring imperative with the intention of demonstrating resilience in the face of the contempt they have endured. This phenomenon may be observed, for example, in the actions of boxers, who invite opponents to strike with force, thereby displaying indifference to any strikes that may be made. The objective is to convey to the opponent that their blows are ineffective. This explains why pride reclamation can lead to the empowerment of the targeted group through the process of self-labeling, as tested by empirical evidence (cf., e.g., Galinsky et al. 2013). In pride reclaimed contexts the original derogatory content of the slur remains unaltered. Therefore, the initial acts of pride reclamation yield no semantic alteration or change in the affective correlates associated with a particular perspective. Rather, the imperative slurring is uttered as an act of resistance and a display of resilience. This explains why pride reclamation requires, among its conditions of felicity, the speaker’s insider status. Out-group members echo the (pride) reclaimed uses, showing solidarity with the oppressed group. Through the processes of imitation, the slur can spread and become a symbol of the targeted group’s courage and resilience. This is suggested to represent the reversal of polarity and weapons control in pride slur reclamation.

3.3 The warrant argument

The moral legitimacy of slur reclamation may be challenged by what has been called the Warrant Argument (WA), which was anticipated and rejected by Cepollaro (2021). WA says that reclaimed uses of slurs, due to the polarity reversal of their derogatory content, are tainted by the same moral error that underlies their pejorative uses. Standard pejorative uses of slurs in hate speech contexts are based on an unwarranted connection between descriptive properties and value judgments. The same phenomenon could be observed in reclaimed uses, although in this case value judgments derived from descriptive properties are positive. However, WA continues, the unwarranted connection between descriptive properties and positive value judgments in reclaimed uses of slurs may result in a violation of the principle of equality: after all, no individual is despicable/appreciable as belonging to a targeted group. This would make slur reclamation morally objectionable. WA could potentially lead to the conclusion that pride reclamation should be condemned for the same reasons that the derogatory use of slurs is condemned.

In order to resist WA, Cepollaro (2021: 680) suggests to consider slur reclamation (in particular, pride reclamation) as a form of affirmative action, that is, “in order to balance an unjust mechanism (negative discrimination), it is morally admissible to introduce a countervailing kind of imbalance (positive discrimination) that is supposed to counteract the initial one over time”. Cepollaro’s response to WA is based on the premise that positive discrimination is morally acceptable, at least when introduced temporarily to counteract an existing form of injustice. However, this principle is not universally accepted, as evidenced by the debate over gender quotas in politics (cf., e.g., Bacchi 2006; Dahlerup 2007). Furthermore, in the case of certain reclaimed terms, such as “Queer”, the requirement of temporariness is not satisfied.

A more straightforward way to block WA is provided by our perspective. WT suggests that the polarity reversal in pride slur reclamation does not concern the encoded derogatory content (the slurring imperative), but rather the objectives of the speech act of reclaimed slurring. In standard pejorative uses, the imperative slurring is intended to oppress and subordinate the targeted group. In pride reclaimed uses, while retaining its literal meaning, the imperative slurring is intended to convey a sense of strength and resilience in the face of adversity. This is done in order to strengthen the targeted group. In insular reclamation, the polarity reversal is not literal, but the outcome of an ironic use of words. WA is avoided by denying that there is an unwarranted connection between descriptive properties and value judgments in slur reclamation.