“Mirativity” does not exist: ḥdug in “Lhasa” Tibetan and other suspects
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Nathan W. Hill
Abstract
Largely through the efforts of Scott DeLancey the grammatical category “mirative” has gained currency in linguistics. DeLancey bases his elaboration of this category on a misunderstanding of the semantics of ḥdug in “Lhasa” Tibetan. Rather than showing “surprising information”, linguists working on Tibetan have long described ḥdug as a sensory evidential. Much of the evidence DeLancey and Aikhenvald present for mirativity in other languages is also susceptible to explanation in terms of sensory evidence or appears close to Lazard's “mediative” (1999) or Johanson's “indirective” (2000). Until an independent grammatical category for “new information” is described in a way which precludes analysis in terms of sensory evidence or other well established evidential categories, mirativity should be excluded from the descriptive arsenal of linguistic analysis.
© 2012 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Masthead
- Debate 1: Prosodic typology defended - Introduction
- In defense of prosodic typology: A response to Beckman and Venditti
- Debate 2: MIR revisited - Introduction
- “Mirativity” does not exist: ḥdug in “Lhasa” Tibetan and other suspects
- The essence of mirativity
- Didn't you know? Mirativity does exist!
- Perhaps mirativity is phlogiston, but admirativity is perfect: On Balkan evidential strategies
- Still mirative after all these years
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Masthead
- Debate 1: Prosodic typology defended - Introduction
- In defense of prosodic typology: A response to Beckman and Venditti
- Debate 2: MIR revisited - Introduction
- “Mirativity” does not exist: ḥdug in “Lhasa” Tibetan and other suspects
- The essence of mirativity
- Didn't you know? Mirativity does exist!
- Perhaps mirativity is phlogiston, but admirativity is perfect: On Balkan evidential strategies
- Still mirative after all these years
