Abstract
This article re-presents the case, first presented in DeLancey (1997), for the mirative as a crosslinguistic category, and responds to critiques of that work by Gilbert Lazard and Nathan Hill. The nature of the mirative, a category which marks a statement as representing information which is new or unexpected, is exemplified with data from Kham (Tibeto-Burman) and Hare (Athabaskan). The mirative category is shown to be distinct from the well-known mediative or indirective evidential category. Finally, the role of mirativity in the complex verbal systems of Tibetan languages is briefly outlined.
Published Online: 2012-12-30
Published in Print: 2012-11-27
© 2012 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin Boston
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Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Debate 1: Prosodic typology defended - Introduction
- In defense of prosodic typology: A response to Beckman and Venditti
- Debate 2: MIR revisited - Introduction
- “Mirativity” does not exist: ḥdug in “Lhasa” Tibetan and other suspects
- The essence of mirativity
- Didn't you know? Mirativity does exist!
- Perhaps mirativity is phlogiston, but admirativity is perfect: On Balkan evidential strategies
- Still mirative after all these years
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Debate 1: Prosodic typology defended - Introduction
- In defense of prosodic typology: A response to Beckman and Venditti
- Debate 2: MIR revisited - Introduction
- “Mirativity” does not exist: ḥdug in “Lhasa” Tibetan and other suspects
- The essence of mirativity
- Didn't you know? Mirativity does exist!
- Perhaps mirativity is phlogiston, but admirativity is perfect: On Balkan evidential strategies
- Still mirative after all these years