UNESCO and the definition of intangible cultural heritage – proposing some conceptual underpinnings

1 Introduction

The Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (hereafter called the Convention), adopted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2003, represents a significant milestone in the global effort to preserve and promote cultural diversity. The idea of safeguarding intangible cultural heritage emerged from the recognition that cultural heritage is not limited to material products of arts and architecture, but also involves, inter alia, knowledge, skills and practices that are passed down through generations. The convention was adopted by the UNESCO General Conference on October 17, 2003, and came into force on April 20, 2006, after being ratified by 30 countries. The Convention was a response to the growing awareness of the importance of intangible cultural heritage and the need for an international framework to safeguard it in the face of globalization and social transformations (Aikawa 2004; Bortolotto 2007; Bouchenaki 2003; Kurin 2004; Labadi 2013; Lázaro and de Madariaga 2021; Lenzerini 2011; Lentini 2019). The Convention involves four overall purposes: Safeguarding, of course, intangible cultural heritage; which concerns identifying, documenting, researching, preserving, protecting, promoting, and revitalizing intangible cultural heritage; furthermore, the Convention aims to ensure respect for the intangible cultural heritage of the communities, groups, and individuals concerned; and raises awareness at local, national, and international levels about the importance of intangible cultural heritage and the need for its safeguarding. Finally, the Convention supports and promotes international cooperation and assistance in safeguarding intangible cultural heritage (UNESCO 2003, Article 1, p. 5). As of 2024, 180 countries have ratified or accepted the Convention. This widespread ratification reflects the global recognition of the importance of safeguarding intangible cultural heritage and an international commitment to preserving cultural diversity. Central to the Convention is the definition of intangible cultural heritage and the description of its domains; and since the publication of the Convention, the definition has caused comments from and discussions within academia. As Smith and Campbell (2018) remark: “Discussions about the nature and meaning of ICH and its relationship with tangible or material heritage have accelerated since the adoption of the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 2003” (Smith and Campbell 2018: 2). UNESCO’s definition of intangible cultural heritage has both garnered significant positive receptions and received harsh critique within academia. Hence, various scholars have welcomed the definition because of its inclusivity, community-centric approach (Aikawa-Faure 2009; Hafstein 2018), recognition of the living, dynamic nature of cultural practices (Bortolotto 2007; Kurin 2004), and interdisciplinary relevance; and furthermore have other scholars positively accentuated how the Convention recognizes the “deep-seated interdependence between intangible and tangible heritage” (UNESCO 2003, Preamble, p. 3) (Munjeri 2004; Bouchenaki 2003; Vecco 2010). Conversely, other scholars see the Convention, with the words of Leimgruber (2010), as: “…resulting from the work of anthropologists, sociologists, and folklore scholars who have not recognized or considered the findings of their colleagues in recent decades” (Leimgruber 2010:165; see also Duvignaud et al. 2004). And, concerning the critique of UNESCO’s definition of intangible cultural heritage does it range from labels, such as, vague, over unscientific, to even dangerous (Leimgruber 2010:165). Especially, the relationship between the intangible and tangible in the UNESCO definition seems open for critique, as Smith and Campbell (2018) stress: “the relationship between the two categories remains, as we argue, unstable and poorly theorized. This instability [causes continuous] conceptual discomfort…” (Smith and Campbell 2018: 2). Another scholar, Kurin (2004), whose critique of the Convention also involves appraisal, approaches the relationship between the intangible and tangible in the UNESCO definition as follows:

Recognizing intangible cultural heritage in terms of the Convention is not that obvious and is sometimes befuddling…The differentiation of intangible from tangible heritage might also be puzzling. Craft items, such as magnificently elaborate Lithuanian crosses are tangible, but the knowledge and skills to create them are intangible. Tools are tangible, but plans, if thought are not, but if drawn are…For many peoples, separating the tangible and the intangible seems quite artificial and makes little sense. For example, among many local and indigenous communities, particular land, mountains, volcanoes, caves and other tangible physical features are endowed with intangible meanings that are thought to be inherently tied to their physicality…Given that the Convention, in effect, operationally makes the intangible tangible, the conceptual distinction and separation of the two domains is problematic. (Kurin 2004: 70).

We find Kurin’s comments on UNESCO’s definition of intangible cultural heritage balanced and to the point; and in what follows, we want to propose some conceptual underpinnings which can, we hope, contribute to the understanding of what intangible cultural heritage is; including the relationship between intangible and tangible elements in cultural heritage as outlined in the UNESCO definition, also emphasizing the importance of the community, as highlighted by UNESCO.

Firstly, we will look into how Peirce understands the relation between mind and matter; including, addressing briefly Peirce’s concept of “Law of mind”, which involves his own original analysis of final causation. Seen in the light of Peirce’s metaphysical ideas we will argue intangible cultural heritage is not just mind, but, rather, it is involved in mind and, therefore, works by final causation.

Secondly, according to UNESCO, is it the community/group which recognizes “something” as intangible cultural heritage; that is, we will add, because the intangible cultural heritage, not surprisingly, means something for the community/group. And, furthermore, does something, as intangible cultural heritage, mean something for the community/group, because it serves a purpose, and therefore is valuable (regardless of what purpose and value we are talking about). And, then, we have returned to final causation. However, for Peirce, is final causation identical with semiotic causation. Therefore, can it be fruitful, we believe, to address intangible cultural heritage from a semiotic perspective also; hence, we will focus on how intangible cultural heritage becomes meaningful for the community/group, which includes an understanding of the relationship between meaning, purpose and value. We will address this from the perspective of Peirce’s semiotics, in particular his concepts of sign, interpretant, and (some) types of interpretants.

Furthermore, is it important for us to stress that this article has a strict theoretical focus; that is, any practical applicability of our arguments will not be pursued here – such as relevance for existing intangible cultural heritage inventorying practices or policy implementation. Formulated differently, is it our aim to contribute to the understanding of what intangible cultural heritage is; and not to address any practical framework for intangible cultural heritage safeguarding concerning its (possible) definition.

Finally, we will use the Somali Xeedho as a through-going example to explain our analytical points; Xeedho is a gift given by a mother-in-law to her son-in-law celebrating the first week of her daughter’s wedding. Xeedho is registered as intangible cultural heritage by UNESCO on the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding.^[1]

2 The relationship between mind and matter

We can address the relationship between intangible and tangible in cultural heritage from the perspective concerning the relationship between mind and matter (see also Leimgruber 2010; Odajima 2018); that is, from the perspective of ontology. Perhaps it may seem surprising or even academically irrelevant to address this relationship from a metaphysical perspective. Yet, for Peirce will every inquiry/study involve (a number of) metaphysical presuppositions and the question is, simply, whether these presuppositions are explicitly stated or not. For Peirce, there are three conflicting ontological theories, namely, neutralism, materialism and idealism, and to understand the relationship between mind and matter follows from deciding what kinds of law govern the universe. Hence, Peirce explains as follows:

[T]he questions arises whether physical laws on the one hand and the physical law on the other are to be taken–

1. as independent, a doctrine often called monism, but which I would name neutralism; or,

2. the psychical law as derived and special, the physical law alone as primordial, which is materialism; or.

3. the physical law as derived and special, the physical law alone as primordial, which is idealism.

(EP I: 292; 1891).

Peirce uses Ockham’s logical maxim (razor) and he disposes of neutralism as he calls it; neutralism, according to Peirce, supposes more independent elements than seem necessary, and, in the end, it makes both psychical and physical laws primordial. According to materialism, the universe is governed by exact, universal laws (determinism); this, Peirce says, has not been proved – for example arguing for real chance in the universe (which Peirce calls Tychism; EP I: 312–313; 1892); furthermore, materialism can only explain processes which are reversible, and not processes characterized by, for example, evolution and increasing complexity; nor can materialism explain consciousness (feeling), or it says that consciousness cannot be the cause of anything. Therefore (and due to other reasons), Peirce objects to materialism. Hence, Peirce chooses (objective) idealism because it is the only rational alternative (to neutralism and materialism; see also Potter 1997: 133 pp.; Reynolds 2002: 7 pp.); as he writes: “The only intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws.” (EP II: 293; 1891). So, for Peirce, physical laws are derived from psychical laws, and the consequence is that matter is effete mind. And, therefore, the next question is, of course, in what the “law of mind” consists? Peirce answers such a question in the following way:

There is but one law of mind, namely, that ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectability. In this spreading they lose intensity, and especially the power of affecting others, but gain generality and become welded with other ideas. (EP II: 313; 1892).

For Peirce, then, mind is not restricted to a brain; and mind is independent of embodiment or Peirce does not try to locate mind somewhere specific. Furthermore, is matter the embodiment of mind (Borges and Cardoso 2024: 3; Houser 2016: 286–388; Santaella 2001: 56–57; Skagestad 2004: 247–249). The law of mind can also be understood as the law of association; Peirce writes: “the one original law to be recognized [is] the law of mind, the law of association, of which the laws of matter are regarded as mere special results.” (CP 6.277; 1893). Of particular relevance here, we believe, is how ideas can affect other ideas and that they have a tendency to bring along other ideas with them. In short, Peirce ascribes potency to ideas. And this potency is related to mind, which, according to Peirce, works by final causation, as he writes: “mind has its universal mode of action, namely by final causation.” (CP 1.269; 1902). However, it is important to understand, of course, what Peirce’s concept of final causation involves. Firstly, purpose is an example of final causation but final causation is not simply identical with purpose. Hence, is Peirce accentuating how: “A purpose is merely that form of final causation which is most familiar to our experience.” (EP II: 120). Secondly, we should remember how final causation today is a concept which is mostly avoided in contemporary philosophy and science – as something mysterious or nonsense. Yet, as Shapiro does lucidly explain, going against the preposterous idea that final causation is backward causation, is Peirce taking his point of departure in the potency of the idea:

Since it is often erroneously thought that final causation is “backward causation”…that the future exerts a casual influence on the present…it is appropriate to emphasize that Peirce [construes] a final cause as a present possibility, not a future actuality…Peirce’s argument is based on the assertion that some possibilities are more likely to be actualized just because they are the possibilities they are. (Shapiro 1985: 11–12; see also Short 1981; Liszka 1996: 105 pp.).

The last point made by Shapiro, Peirce himself formulates as follows: “every general idea has more or less power of working itself into fact; some more so, some less so.” (CP 2.149; 1902). There is, then, nothing mysterious about Peirce’s concept of final causation. The law of mind, working by final causation, is a general principle, or a cause, governing actions – and it makes these actions intelligible. Furthermore, mind is omnipresent as the most fundamental law of the universe; it is a phenomenon which is at work everywhere. Houser also makes this important point about Peirce’s concept of mind accentuating how:

Peirce knew that…mind…can be embodied in institutions and cultural practices and traditions, and even in artifacts. In fact, Peirce believed that it was these extended minds that serve as the cognitive base, or ground, for human thought (semiosis). (Houser 2016: 387).

Hence, reading Houser’s description of Peirce’s concept of mind makes us think of intangible cultural heritage; because Houser, in particular, mentions how mind can be involved in “cultural practices and traditions, and even in artifacts”. Inspired by Houser we will, therefore, assume that intangible cultural heritage, somehow, is a part of mind, and that it, thereby, works by final causation; more precisely, we believe, that a way to understand the intangible in cultural heritage is by consider it from the potency of the idea. With affinity, from a Peircean perspective, no absolute separation possible between the intangible and tangible – also when we are talking about cultural heritage.

3 Intangible cultural heritage – and metaphysics

Let us now, then, begin to address our proposal for some conceptual underpinnings of UNESCO’s definition of intangible cultural heritage. In the Convention UNESCO defines intangible cultural heritage in the following way:

The ‘Intangible Cultural Heritage’ means the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage (UNESCO 2003, Article 2, p. 5).

The definition of intangible cultural heritage appears, we believe, somewhat unclear – particularly regarding the specific features that qualify it as such (Hibberd 2019). Let us remember, though, how the term “intangible” originates from the Latin “non tangere,” meaning “untouchable”; yet the definition surprisingly includes artifacts (Rudolff 2006). Additionally, “practices” and “skills” may imply the necessity of “knowledge,” a concept that is itself difficult to define – as evidenced by the long tradition of epistemology (Pavese, forthcoming). Despite these ambiguities, the definition is significant as it highlights the mutual dependency between intangible and tangible cultural heritage, reflecting the Convention’s emphasis on their interdependence (UNESCO 2003, Preamble, p. 3).

So, in the light of the previous paragraphs on Peirce’s law of mind, how will we address UNESCO’s definition of intangible cultural heritage? Well, to begin with we will say that the intangible aspect of cultural heritage has the character of a general idea; that is hardly surprising to say or new – we know. However, we will add, as a general idea it has the potentiality to work out both physical and psychical results. Or with the words of Peirce: “every general idea has more or less power of working itself out into fact.” (CP 2.149; 1902). In short, according to Peirce, a general idea, has namely: “generative life” (CP 1.219; 1902). If someone denies this power of ideas and, for example, engages in a verbal controversy, the controversy (as communication) itself would refute the denial, because as Peirce succinctly writes:

Words then do produce physical [and psychical] effects. It is madness to deny it. The very denial of it involves a belief in it; and nobody can constantly fail to acknowledge it until he sinks into a complete mental paresis. (CP 5.106; 1903).

The question is, of course, what Peirce means by the “power of ideas”? Not surprisingly, perhaps, the answer involves a return to Peirce’s concept of final causation; because ideas exercise their power by final causation or the law of mind. Again, with a quote from Peirce, he describes final causation as:

[T]hat mode of bringing facts about according to which a general description of result is made to come about, quite irrespective of any compulsion for it to come about in this or that particular way; although the means may be adapted to the end. The general result may be brought about at one time in one way, and at another in another way. Final causation does not determine in what particular way it is to be brought about, but only that the result shall have a certain general character. (CP 1.211; 1902).

So, if the intangible in cultural heritage concerns an idea which works itself out into fact by final causation how can we conceive that more precisely? Well, first let us say that the idea is a possibility; and, furthermore, it is an ideal end state which processes will have Hulswit 2002: 183–188; Potter 1997: 110–147; Short 1981: 369–382). Therefore, it is also this idea which is at work, as a final causation, in relation to the “knowledge, skills, and practices” mentioned in the UNESCO definition of intangible cultural heritage. That is, the knowledge, skills, and practices, while intrinsically linked and as general ideas, will have a tendency to bring out general physical and/or psychical results; and naturally, some results will be more specific than others or less general. A central point is, however, that knowledge, skills, and practices can never be reduced to their results; or their potentiality cannot be exhausted by any multitude of results. That is also why knowledge, skills, and practices, not simply, refer to past and present results, but, most importantly, concern future, possible physical or psychical results – this is also closely related to why intangible cultural heritage can be transmitted from generation to generation (which we will return to later). Finally, final causation is also involved concerning knowledge, skills and practices to the extent that these are related to goals or, more precisely, to goal-directed behavior, which we think it is safe to assume that they are always already – in daily human practical experience, and concerning intangible cultural heritage. That is not the same as saying, however, that the sole purpose of knowledge, skills, and practices is the action as such; knowledge may very well involve action, and skills and practices will, of course, most likely lead to action; yet, neither skills nor practices are identical with action. Even though final causation, for Peirce, is not identical with purpose it is central for our understanding of final causation, because, as he writes, purpose is: “that kind of final causation which is most familiar to our experience.” (CP 1.211; 1902). This has an important consequence for knowledge, skills and practices, as naturally intangible; that is, they involve a purpose in relation to which concrete actions will conform (or fail to conform). And this purpose is adopted by a community/group for which the purpose is meaningful in guiding, as a final cause, not only their actions, but also their feelings and thoughts. That also means normativity is introduced concerning intangible cultural heritage; or, perhaps, more precisely formulated, that normativity is involved in relation to the knowledge, skills, and practices of the community/group. Because as Peirce accentuates:

…the element of every [idea] enters into…thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passport at these two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason. (CP 5.212; 1903).

The intangible in cultural heritage, as an idea, involves the causality of normativity and thereby purpose(s); this means, that the idea, in principle, can at the same time, be controlled and developed by the community/group (or individuals), and that it is a real power guiding and attracting its members. The purpose ought to be followed, but need not; including the purposes of the knowledge, skills, and practices of the community/group. This also opens up for flexibility and allows for changes, modifications, creativity, and development – indeed, as mentioned in the UNESCO definition, where it says, that intangible cultural heritage is constantly recreated by the community/group as a response to changes in the environment.

So, let us now, then, try to sum up how “the intangible” works in relation to cultural heritage, including the knowledge, skills and practices of the community/group: The intangible is an idea, involving causa finalis, and, therefore, it has the real power of working out physical (tangible) and psychical results – concerning the (community) knowledge, skills, and practices. Furthermore, the intangible aspect of cultural heritage involves normativity; the conceivable concrete physical (tangible) and psychical results of knowledge, skills, and practices ought to conform to the purpose(s) of the community/group. Admittedly, these previous paragraphs may seem rather abstract; therefore, a concrete example, of course, is in order, including addressing, more explicitly, the relationship between the intangible and tangible aspects of cultural heritage as well as the role of the community/group regarding this relationship.

Xeedho was inscribed in 2023 on UNESCO’s List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding.^[2] Xeedho is an element of intangible cultural heritage for the entire Somali community in Djibouti as well as other countries located in the Horn of Africa.^[3] The intangible cultural heritage concerns the knowledge, skills, and practices preparing and giving the Xeedho which is a gift given by a mother-in-law to her son-in-law as part of a wedding celebration. The Xeedho involves a container which holds “muqmad”, small pieces of dried camel meat or beef, fried in butter and preserved in ghee before being placed in the container. Traditionally, this container was carved from a tree trunk and decorated, serving as the primary food storage utensil for nomads. Nowadays, a trumpet gourd or bowl is used to carry the muqmad. All the products used in the preparation of muqmad, such as dried meat, dates, and spices, originate from the nomadic environment. The container is placed inside a basket, wrapped in aluminum foil, and adorned with leather and shells. The entire arrangement is then covered with fabric and placed inside a bag made from traditional fabrics symbolizing a woman’s attire. Ropes are securely tied around the Xeedho and carefully concealed. The Xeedho is prepared by mothers, grandmothers, big sisters and aunts.

When the mother-in-law, grandmothers, big sisters, and aunts, wants to realize the idea of Xeedho, this idea functions as a final cause for the realization. The final cause of Xeedho determines what kind of means are suitable for reaching the general end: to prepare a Xeedho which can be given as a gift by a mother-in-law to a son-in-law as a part of a wedding celebration. The idea of Xeedho is involved in relation to the knowledge, skills, and practices of the female family members. Furthermore, however, the idea must have something “to operate on”; that is, the idea, qua knowledge, skills, and practices, determines what efficient causes will advance the realization of the Xeedho. And these efficient causes concern all the concrete (mechanical) actions taken by the female family members during the process of Xeedho-making; the female family members, for example, cut and fry meat in butter and add different spices, and put the dish into a container which is placed inside an adorned basket, then entire arrangement is covered with fabric, and placed inside another bag to carefully conceal the content and so on. As Peirce writes is: “final causation without efficient causation is…helpless.” (CP 1.220; 1902). In other words, the idea of Xeedho, as a final cause, will not be realized without processes of efficient causes; final causation and efficient causation are necessarily complementary in the process of Xeedho-making. The means that the female family members select in the Xeedho-making process may vary; as long as these means are judged appropriate in realizing the idea of the Xeedho. Hence, the ingredients in the dish, for example, can be different types of meat and spices, the container can be a trumpet gourd or a bowl, the design and color of the traditional fabric covering the entire arrangement will be different, and the tying of the complex knots to ensure that the Xeedho cannot be easily opened, is entirely up to the women tying the knots relative to their creativity, and so on. The goal of the Xeedho-making process is, in other words, far from pre-determined with exact precision. Therefore, there will be concrete differences between each Xeedho, but they all, nevertheless, will still be a Xeedho – due to the same general idea or final cause. The fact that the means may (or probably always will) be varied in the Xeedho-making process, and still may result in an artifact of the same general type, we can only understand, from the perspective of Peirce, as evidence of a final cause governing the entire process (see also Hulswit 2002: 187–188). We have mentioned how causa finalis is helpless without causa efficiens; however, we should not underestimate, according to Peirce, the strong power of ideas – as final causes. Peirce accentuates how:

[I]deas…have an inherent power of working their way to the governance of the world, at last. True, they cannot do this without machinery, without supporters, without facts; but the ideas somehow manage to grow their machinery, and their supporters, and their facts, and to render the machinery, the supporters, and the facts strong. (CP 2.149; 1902).

So, it is the idea of Xeedho, as a final cause, which, as Peirce, also writes: “will create its defenders and render them powerful.” (CP 1.217; 1902; see also Nöth 2014: 179–180); the idea of Xeedho, we can say, will confer existence upon the female members of the family. Of course, we are not talking about their life in flesh and blood; the idea will not create the female family members as persons, because this would amount to pure intellectualism (see also Hulswit 2003). Again, with the words of Peirce:

Do I mean that the idea calls new matter into existence? Certainly no. That would be pure intellectualism…What I mean by the idea’s conferring existence upon individual members…is that it confers upon them the power of working our results in this world, that it confers upon them…in one word, life. (CP 1.220; 1902).

The idea of Xeedho, as a final cause, makes the female family members tend, then, to act like they ought to act in relation to the Xeedho-making process; this, “Peircean fact” also has, we think, another interesting consequence concerning the relationship between the community/group and intangible cultural heritage. It is, as the UNESCO definition says, the community/group which recognizes the intangible element(s) as a part of their cultural heritage, and it is the members of the community/group who uphold the idea of Xeedho; however, no community/group and its members can exhaust the potentiality of the purpose of Xeedho. The purpose of Xeedho, as a final cause, concerns, namely, what with Peirce, can be called a “would-do” (also “would-be”; Potter 1997: 24–25) or it involves a reference to the (indefinite) future. That is, preparing the Xeedho, for example, “would happen” if certain kinds of conditions are fulfilled. Understood from this perspective, Xeedho is, as intangible cultural heritage, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, independent of any concrete Somali community/group recognizing it as its intangible cultural heritage – simply because intangible cultural heritage, involving final causation, is a possibility for future realization (by members of the community/group). Finally, we need to address the Xeedho in its aspect of tangible. In the above we have described the Xeedho as the (desirable) result (for the Somali Community/group) of a finious process, the Xeedho-making process; and this process, as previously said, determines the means appropriate for realizing the result, the Xeedho. However, we shall also remember, from a Peircean perspective, how “matter is effete mind” (EP II: 293; 1891). Or, formulated differently, the Xeedho, as an artifact, is not simply and solely dead matter. Rather, with Peirce, we can consider how there is a degree of mind in all matter – and also in the Xeedho as an artifact we must conclude. Because, in the words of Peirce: “it would be a mistake to conceive of the psychical and physical aspects of matter as two aspects absolutely distinct.” (EP I: 349; 1892). As a result of actions governed by final causation, the Xeedho as an artifact, also contains traces of mind; thereby, we simply understand that the Xeedho, as an artifact, involves a semiotic potential, a potential of meaning – related to purpose, value and so on (see also Borges and Cardoso 2024: 3; Skagestad 2004: 247–251). That is, firstly, it is the potentiality of being interpreted, for example by the Somali community/group, which makes the artifact a Xeedho and, on the other hand, not just any thing can be a Xeedho; and, secondly, this potentiality has real being without being interpreted (see also Popper 1972: 116). Thirdly, the Xeedho, as a meaning potential, cannot be reduced to the sum of its individual parts, for example, food ingredients, wood/plastic elements, fabric and so on; instead, with Peirce, these parts are: “called out by a whole” which works as a final cause, involved in the knowledge, skills, and practices of the Somali community/group. And, thereby, intelligibility is conferred upon the Xeedho, and the Xeedho has the power of working out results in the world (CP 1.220; 1903) – as when a Xeedho is presented by a mother-in-law as a gift to her son-in-law. Hence, from this Peircean perspective, there is no absolute separation possible between the intangible and the tangible in cultural heritage; rather, the intangible and the tangible aspects in cultural heritage are in a continuous contact. Therefore, we believe that Odajima (2018) makes an excellent point when she accentuates as follows:

Although tangible and intangible…are regarded as…separate…in practice they are closely tied to interaction, exchange, and intermingling in the long process of cultural production that continues in different social contexts. (Odajima 2018: 744).

And we also agree with Odajima that the close relationship between intangible and tangible in cultural heritage is intimately connected to interaction, exchange, and blending throughout the ongoing process of cultural production across various social contexts. We understand the interaction and exchange as processes of a semiotic nature where the intangible and tangible come together in cultural heritage as a meaningful phenomenon for a community/group. This is a matter of framing intangible cultural heritage, using the words of Danesi, as “a study of the distinct meanings that are generated through the various systems of everyday life” (Danesi 1999: 17).

4 Intangible cultural heritage – and semiotics

Let us begin by remembering how association is mentioned in UNESCO’s definition of intangible cultural heritage; that is, according to UNESCO, the relation between the intangible and tangible aspects of cultural heritage is a relation of association. So, a relevant question is, we think, how to understand this relation of association between the intangible and tangible in cultural heritage more precisely? We have already tried to describe intangible cultural heritage, including the relation between intangible and tangible, from a metaphysical perspective. Therefore, the following must of course not go against this description and, furthermore, new information must be added. Concerning the former, we can say, that there is an intimate connection between metaphysics and semiotics; that is, the two disciplines are, with Peirce, complementary – because with the succinct words of Houser, Peirce did not restrict his work to: “the relation between mind and matter…but also [to] the purpose and meaning of human life.” (Houser, in Houser 2002: xvii). Therefore, it is also relevant when Liszka explains how semiotic processes, indeed, are finious or involve final causation – because these processes concern a purposeful movement: “toward the determination of signs, the interpretation of signs, whose effect creates…habits of interpretation.” (Liszka 1996: 107). This is, we believe, of central importance; not only when attempting to understand the relationship between metaphysics and semiotics, but also for addressing intangible cultural heritage. Because the association of intangible and tangible in cultural heritage concerns processes of interpretation – processes in which the members of the community/group engage, when they recognize and identify with “something” as their intangible cultural heritage. For Peirce interpretation is not possible without signs (CP 5.251; 1868; 6.338; 1909; and he defines the sign in the following way:

A sign…is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, it creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps, a more developed sign. The sign which it creates I call the Interpretant of the first sign. (CP 2.228–29; 1897).

The sign represents something, which is the object of the sign; the sign can, however, not represent the object without the interpretant. The interpretant mediates between the sign and the object, and it can be understood as the meaning of the sign or according to Peirce it is “the proper significate outcome” or “effect of the sign” (CP 5.474–75; 1907; see also Nöth 1995: 42–44). Hence, for Peirce signs, meaning and interpretation are closely related; as he metaphorically explains: “To try to strip off the signs and get down to the very meaning itself is like trying to peel an onion and get down to the very onion itself.” (MS 1334: 44; 1905). Peirce divides the interpretant into different types organized in trichotomies (see also Bergman 2004: 370–386; Jappy 2017: 62–72; Schmidt 2022). Looking into (some of) these types of interpretants may lead us, perhaps, to understand better how intangible cultural heritage can mean something for a community/group associating the intangible with the tangible. That is, the interpretant types may indicate how different aspects of meaning of intangible culture are related from different perspectives – namely, a normative, a sign user, as well as a communicative perspective, respectively (see also Bergman 2004: 385–386).

First, we can address how Peirce describes what he calls the final interpretant:

My Final Interpretant is… the effect the Sign would produce upon any mind upon which circumstances should permit it to work out its full effect…The Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered…The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends. (SS 110–111; 1909)

Here, Peirce, obviously, characterizes meaning and its development in relation to final causation. Returning again to Xeedho this involves the meaning it ought to produce or the normative meaning which is accepted by the Somali community/group. The final interpretant, therefore, concerns the meaning of the Xeedho which has a potential to cause a lawlike/habitual effect on the interpreting agency – such as the Xeedho-making process of the mother-in-law and other female family members. Besides the final interpretant Peirce also recognizes the meaning of a sign as either immediate or dynamic. Hence, as he writes does a sign have: “its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter…The Immediate Interpretant is an abstraction, consisting in a Possibility.” (SS 110–11; 1909). And, furthermore, he accentuates, the sign involves: ” [the] direct effect actually produced by a Sign upon an Interpreter of it…My Dynamical Interpretant is that which is experienced in each act of Interpretation and is different in each from that of any other….” (SS 110–111; 1909). The final interpretant, we can say, mediates between the meaning potential of Xeedho and actual interpretations of this meaning potential. Of course, Xeedho has a meaning potential before a member of the Somali community/group experiences a part of this meaning potential in interpretation. In short, Xeedho has an intrinsic interpretability. Just think of the Xeedho as an artifact; in its design/form, for example, it has an expected significative effect on the members of the Somali community/group; that is, the Xeedho has a potential recognizability including – this “thing” is a Xeedho, the products to prepare it come from the nomadic environment: dried meat, dates and spices, the woven robes around the Xeedho give it a feminine shape – but also, a Xeedho is a wedding gift for the son-in-law, and it is the duty of a mother-in-law to prepare the Xeedho (and probably numerous other possible interpretations). Formulated differently: The Xeedho, as an artifact, embodies an intelligible form having the potentiality to determine meaning or interpretants; that is, before or independent of any concrete interpretations or processes of communication (see also Peirce quoted in Redondo 2012: 227). And again, we are reminded of the “deep-seated interdependence between intangible and tangible heritage”. Furthermore, Xeedho, as a matter of fact, causes concrete interpretations in the members of the Somali community/group on given occasions; such as the meanings just mentioned in relation to Xeedho as an artifact (and numerous other meanings obviously) – when someone from the Somali community/group participates in a wedding as a (social) practice or a mother-in-law uses her knowledge and skills preparing a Xeedho (both recognizing Xeedho as cultural heritage). And when the final interpretant mediates between the immediate and dynamic interpretant(s) of Xeedho we shall simply remember how intangible cultural heritage takes part in (universal) mind, and thereby works by final causation; that is, these (potentially infinite) processes of interpretations of the members of the Somali community/group are not arbitrary or completely determinate (because Peirce accepts developmental teleology); rather, the processes of interpretation have a tendency to move towards an ideal result still having a potential for development – such as when a trumpet gourd or bowl today is used as a container for the dish inside the Xeedho, and not a container carved from a tree trunk.

No member of the Somali community/group can exhaust the meaning potential of Xeedho (nor can a concrete Somali community/group for that matter) – it is a truism, of course, to say that no individual member of the community/group, for example, can know all the past, present and future meanings of Xeedho. Yet, seen from the perspective of the individual community/group member, understood as a sign agency, the Xeedho can cause (again) three significate effects, as meanings of its signs. Because as Peirce writes:

T]here is something which the sign in its significant function essentially determines in its interpreter. I term it the “interpretant” of the sign. In all cases, it includes feelings; for there must, at least, be a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than mere feeling, it must evoke some kind of effort. It may include something besides, which, for the present, may be vaguely called “thought.” I term these three kinds of interpretant the “emotional,” the “energetic,” and the “logical” interpretants. (EP II: 409).

Formulated differently: The possible significative effects of Xeedho in the community/group members range from feelings, over physical responses, to intellectual meanings; such as, inter alia, the son-in-law feeling appreciated by the mother-in-law when he receives the Xeedho, the female family members, preparing the Xeedho, react to the instructions of a more experienced family member – or when the mother-in-law reflects upon how Xeedho is a duty that the society expects of her (and a myriad of other meanings of course). When we say that the interpretants “range” from feelings to intellectual meanings, we mean that they, understood as a sequence, have an increasing degree of complexity. Hence, the physical responses of the community/group members will involve feelings and their thoughts will involve both physical responses and feelings. This has two central consequences we believe. Firstly, that the meaning of Xeedho, for the individual Somali community/group member, is not necessarily a result of self-controlled, self-conscious processes of interpretation, but simply involves series of feelings and physical responses – which are still meaningful to them. That is not the same as saying, however, that these processes cannot be common to informed and accustomed members of the Somali community/group; they probably most often will be because, in the end, the meaning potential of Xeedho is inter-subjective. Hence, as Peirce stresses:

One man’s experience is nothing, if it stands alone. If he sees what others cannot, we call it hallucination. It is not “my” experience, but our “experience” that has to be thought of; and this “us” has indefinite possibilities. (CP 5.402; 1878; see also Skagestad 2004: 245).

Secondly, the thoughts of the community/group members can mediate between their own or others emotional and energetic interpretants (in communication as we will touch upon below); and that is, these interpretants can be controlled (and corrected) in relation to what “ought to be” – or the interpretants are involved in legitimate interpretations of (some of) the meaning(s) of Xeedho. And, then we have, again, returned to normativity, and the purposeful in relation to the interpretation of the meaning(s) of Xeedho. Because as Short (2004) accentuates: “To act purposefully is to interpret something as sign of that which, if it obtains, will make that action appropriate to its goal.” (Short 2004: 233). We can just think of how the female family members (continuously) will adjust their activities in the Xeedho-making process in order to ensure, for example, the quality of the food in the dish depending on ingredients used and the techniques concerning cooking. Again, this is a clear example of how intangible and tangible are closely related in cultural heritage. The significative effects or interpretative reactions of the Somali community/group members are relative to, we shall remember, what Peirce understands as collateral experience. As he explains:

All that part of the understanding of the Sign which the Interpreting Mind has needed collateral observation for is outside the Interpretant. I do not mean by “collateral observation” acquaintance with the system of signs. What is so gathered is not COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the sign. But by collateral observation, I mean previous acquaintance with what the sign denotes. (EP II: 494; 1909).

That is, Xeedho is meaningful in relation to the background knowledge of the Somali community/group (see also Sørensen et al. 2014) – including, for example, the background knowledge of heritage bearers, practitioners, interpreters etc. And let us emphasize: We should understand this knowledge in the widest sense possible – involving, for example, practical knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance as well as propositional knowledge (about facts). The collateral observations of a community/group are probably central to why (besides ethical considerations of course) UNESCO privileges the community/group members in safeguarding intangible cultural heritage in general and identifying and defining elements of intangible cultural heritage in particular.

Finally, the Xeedho, not surprisingly, also has a communicative potential; that is, Xeedho becomes meaningful in relation to communication processes involving different sign agencies having different functions and roles. These different functions and roles can be addressed, we believe, with Peirce, using his interpretant trichotomy consisting of intentional, effectual and communicational interpretants, respectively. Peirce writes as follows regarding these three interpretants:

There is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the utterer; the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the interpreter; and the Communicational Interpretant, or say the Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which the mind of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take place. This mind may be called the commens. It consists of all that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter at the outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfil its function. (SS: 196–197;1906.^[4]).

From a Peircean perspective communication involves an utterer, an interpreter, and signs which are transmitted between them. Shared background knowledge and experiences are necessary for the communication to occur. Furthermore, the utterer must be able to create an intentional interpretant, and the interpreter must be able to generate an effectual interpretant. When the communication takes place (or is successful) this results in a fusion of minds, fostering a sense of community between the utterer and the interpreter (see also Liszka 1996: 89–93). Of particular interest is here, we believe, how we can locate different roles within and functions of communication in relation to intangible cultural heritage. That is, intangible cultural heritage does not simply involve signs “as such”, but signs are uttered and (potentially) received by interpreters – due to some determining conditions for communication. In relation to Xeedho we can give the following few, rather simple, examples: When a mother-in-law gives a son-in-law a Xeedho as a gift, this is, of course, an act of communication; therefore, the mother-in-law becomes an utterer who is creating intentional interpretants. Xeedho, as a practice, dates back to a nomadic period characterized by a harsh existence that required resilience and resourcefulness, including the preservation of food such as meat, butter, and dates for extended periods. So, by gifting the Xeedho, which contains food, a mother-in-law intends to show generosity to a son-in-law, and to ensure his happiness and good health. When a mother-in-law gives the Xeedho as a gift this also involves an intentional interpretant concerning the desire to consolidate and strengthen the ties between the two families, and to show solidarity with the newlyweds. As an act of communication, the Xeedho gift-giving by a mother-in-law can therefore be understood not only as an expression of appreciation for a son-in-law, but also as an intentional message to the larger community/group – indicating her acknowledgment of societal expectations (her feeling a sense of duty). Finally, let us remember how the Xeedho is intricately wrapped and tied with complex knots to prevent easy opening. When presented as a gift, it is the responsibility of the son-in-law’s family to untie the stitching without spilling or damaging the contents. Therefore, the female family members, who have prepared the Xeedho, intend to communicate that the family of the son-in-law must take this same kind of care to look after and protect the bride as well as the new family she will help to create. When, or if, a son-in-law and his family interpret these signs as intended, effectual interpretants will occur, leading to mutual recognition of the Xeedho’s significance by both parties – in this case cominterpretants concerning the mother-in-law’s appreciation for her son-in-law, the reinforcement of family bonds, and the shared responsibilities toward the newlyweds. And the cominterpretants occur only because something is familiar (at the outset) to both the utterers and interpreters; which could also be called, perhaps, an “experiential” sense of community (see also Liszka 1996: 91). No doubt, intangible cultural heritage always already has a communicative potential; every case of intangible cultural heritage will, for example, involve intentionally produced signs. The few examples just described concerning Xeedho (and numerous more could be described of course) are, as mentioned, rather simple.^[5] Yet, they should highlight that, firstly, intangible cultural heritage in communicative processes involves various roles and functions that collectively make the heritage meaningful for the community. Secondly, different utterers and interpreters may have diverse intentions, purposes, skills, knowledge and so on. Thirdly, this diversity leads to an understanding that the intangible cultural heritage community/group is not necessarily homogeneous or a well-defined social whole (thereby, potentially, involving different interests, influences, relations of power and so on) And, finally, and fourthly, intangible cultural heritage, as a communication phenomenon, requires shared cultural familiarity between utterers and interpreters for communication to take place (see also Liszka 1996: 91–92).

So, Xeedho is recognized by the Somali community/group as intangible cultural heritage because it is meaningful, and through the knowledge, skills and practices of the community/group the intangible and the tangible are “associated”. That is, the “association” occurs through interpretative/communicative processes, guided by purposes (final causation) – in social contexts such as a wedding party or its preparation activities. And, naturally, purpose and value are closely related in intangible cultural heritage – through meaning or the interpretants. Because as Peirce writes:

Meaning is something allied in its nature to value. I do not know whether we ought rather to say that meaning is the value of a word – a phrase often used – or whether we ought to say that the value of anything to us is what it means for us – which we also sometimes hear said. Suffice it to say that the two ideas are near together. (MS 598; 1902).

Therefore, when the Somali community/group finds Xeedho valuable it is meaningful to them and vice versa; that is, Xeedho, qua meaningfulness, has a semantic value; or it points towards future purposeful realizations of its potential – in relation to the thoughts, actions and feelings of the members of the Somali community/group (see also Nöth 2021: 57).

That Xeedho is recognized as intangible cultural heritage by the Somali community/group members because it is meaningful/valuable for them is hardly surprising of course – neither seen from the perspective of semiotics, nor from, for example, the numerous anthropological/ethnographic (field) studies of intangible cultural heritage (or in relation to common sense for that matter). However, the underlying semiotic conditions which make intangible cultural heritage meaningful for a community/group and its members are not without theoretical/analytical intricacies; and these intricacies still need, we believe, to be uncovered (more fully) to understand what intangible cultural heritage “really is” – remembering, for example, the critique made by various scholars of UNESCO’s definition of intangible cultural heritage as, inter alia, vague, inconsistent, and unscientific (Leimgruber 2010:165). That being said, we still think that UNESCO’s definition of intangible cultural heritage merits positive attention (even after more than 20 years of its formulation). And, one way to show this attention is by proposing some conceptual underpinnings of the definition. Especially, we believe, by focussing on a concept of meaning, which involves that the meaningfulness of intangible cultural heritage concerns processes of interpretation/communication where the feelings, actions and thoughts of the community/group members inter-relate and (tendentially) move towards desirable end states – such as carefully preparing a high quality Xeedho or presenting a Xeedho as a gift to the son-in-law greatly appreciating him as the daughter’s husband and so on.

And such a focus on intangible cultural heritage should concern, we think, (at least) three perspectives, namely: First, an overall social and normative perspective, second a perspective concerning the individual sign use of the community/group members, and, finally, third, a perspective addressing the intangible cultural heritage from the communitive field of signification – and, as hopefully should be clear from the previous paragraphs, these three perspectives are very closely interwoven (see also Bergman 2004: 385–386).

5 UNESCO’s definition of intangible cultural heritage – some conceptual underpinnings

Trying to bring together the previous metaphysical and semiotic points on intangible cultural heritage should result in, as mentioned, a tentative proposal concerning some conceptual underpinnings of UNESCO’s definition of intangible cultural heritage. Hence, let us look again at the definition. It reads:

The ‘Intangible Cultural Heritage’ means the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage. (UNESCO 2003, Article 2, p. 5).

As a (modest) contribution to UNESCO’s definition of intangible cultural heritage we propose the following conceptual underpinnings, namely:

Intangible cultural heritage consists of ideas having the capacity to work out physical and psychical results in relation to communities/groups. That is, these ideas create, attract and guide the often inter-related feelings, actions and thoughts of the community/group members. The ideas can do that because they are (or become) meaningful to the community/group; and what is meaningful is at the same time valuable (and vice versa). Therefore, intangible cultural heritage takes place through purposeful interpretative/communicative processes. And, in these processes tangible elements are associated with knowledge, practices and skills. Finally, intangible cultural heritage is purpose-driven and inherently developmental.

We believe that the most important conceptual consequences of our proposal are:

1. That there is not an absolute separation between the intangible and tangible because they stand in a continuous contact;

2. That the intangible involves a semiotic potency which is real before any actualization in concrete interpretative/communicative processes of a community/group;

3. That the intangible is not operatively tangible;

4. That the tangible is not simply a “thing” but embodies intelligible forms; and,

5. That intangible cultural heritage involves purposes and therefore is inherently open to creativity and development to meet changes in the environment.

Our proposal, therefore, seems to complement UNESCO’s definition of intangible cultural heritage in different ways: Firstly, the proposal thoroughly argues how there is no absolute separation between the intangible and tangible; instead, these elements are in constant contact. This interaction is crucial for the meaningful transmission of cultural heritage. The tangible elements embody intelligible forms that are essential for the interpretation and communication of intangible cultural heritage – which taps directly into how the intangible and tangible become “associated” as UNESCO calls it. Secondly, the proposal demonstrates how intangible cultural heritage is purpose-driven; this perspective aligns nicely with UNESCO’s emphasis on the transmission of cultural practices, as it underscores the role of intangible cultural heritage in responding to contemporary challenges and opportunities. Finally, and thirdly, there is a clear correspondence between the proposal and UNESCO’s focus on diversity and inclusivity; because the proposal emphasizes how utterers and interpreters may have diverse intentions, purposes, skills, knowledge and so on – which points towards intangible cultural heritage as a dynamic and inclusive entity that evolves through continuous semiotic interaction and reinterpretation.