Substitutional Accounting for Singular Terms: Some Problems and a Slightly More Kantian Solution for Brandom
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Micah Lewin
Abstract
This article grapples with Robert Brandom’s account of singular terms. I argue that neither Brandom’s answer to the question “What are singular terms?” nor his answer to the question “Why are there any singular terms?” works as they currently stand. Brandom’s substitution-inferential semantic account of what singular terms are fails to distinguish between the semantic role of singular terms and indefinite descriptions, and Brandom’s “expressive transcendental deduction” for why there are any singular terms fails to deciseively show that singular terms are expressively necessary for the use of logical vocabulary. Still, I then characterize how Brandom does have resources within his substitution-inferential semantics to give a better, revised answer to the question “What are singular terms?” that both fits programmatically within his framework and has a curious Kantian parallel. I leave the matter offering a Brandom-friendly replacement account for why there are any singular terms thus conceived for another occasion.
References
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© 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Editorial
- Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Brandom
- Research Articles
- Substitutional Accounting for Singular Terms: Some Problems and a Slightly More Kantian Solution for Brandom
- Indicative Conditionals and the Expressive Conception of Logic
- Brandom on Perceptual Knowledge
- The Normative/Agentive Correspondence
- Brandom and Quine on Perspectivally Hybrid De Re Attitude Ascription: A Solution to a Problem in the Explanation of Action
- Debunkings de dicto and de re : Brandom on Genealogical Explanation
- Forgiveness as an Approach to the History of Philosophy
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Editorial
- Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Brandom
- Research Articles
- Substitutional Accounting for Singular Terms: Some Problems and a Slightly More Kantian Solution for Brandom
- Indicative Conditionals and the Expressive Conception of Logic
- Brandom on Perceptual Knowledge
- The Normative/Agentive Correspondence
- Brandom and Quine on Perspectivally Hybrid De Re Attitude Ascription: A Solution to a Problem in the Explanation of Action
- Debunkings de dicto and de re : Brandom on Genealogical Explanation
- Forgiveness as an Approach to the History of Philosophy
