Indicative Conditionals and the Expressive Conception of Logic
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Spencer Paulson
Abstract
It is often thought that the test for whether an indicative conditional is assertible is to first suppose the antecedent and then check to see if the consequent is probable on that supposition. Call this procedure the “Ramsey Test”. Some influential accounts of indicative conditionals (e.g. Adams 1975, Edgington 1995) hold that the Ramsey Test works because indicative conditionals are used to express a high credence in the consequent conditional on the antecedent. In this paper I will argue that a different expressivist account, one inspired by Brandom (1994) can handle a wider range of phenomena. In particular, it does a better job explaining how conditionals function in modus tollens arguments. I will end by discussing how the account proposed here goes beyond Brandom’s own work on logic and hermeneutics. Of particular importance is the role played by a conversational common ground, distinct from the commitments of the interpreter and interpreted (6992 words).
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Editorial
- Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Brandom
- Research Articles
- Substitutional Accounting for Singular Terms: Some Problems and a Slightly More Kantian Solution for Brandom
- Indicative Conditionals and the Expressive Conception of Logic
- Brandom on Perceptual Knowledge
- The Normative/Agentive Correspondence
- Brandom and Quine on Perspectivally Hybrid De Re Attitude Ascription: A Solution to a Problem in the Explanation of Action
- Debunkings de dicto and de re : Brandom on Genealogical Explanation
- Forgiveness as an Approach to the History of Philosophy
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Editorial
- Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Brandom
- Research Articles
- Substitutional Accounting for Singular Terms: Some Problems and a Slightly More Kantian Solution for Brandom
- Indicative Conditionals and the Expressive Conception of Logic
- Brandom on Perceptual Knowledge
- The Normative/Agentive Correspondence
- Brandom and Quine on Perspectivally Hybrid De Re Attitude Ascription: A Solution to a Problem in the Explanation of Action
- Debunkings de dicto and de re : Brandom on Genealogical Explanation
- Forgiveness as an Approach to the History of Philosophy
