Characteristics of the X ie imperative expression: three criteria for the classification of imperatives

2.1 Differences from other imperatives in Japanese

There are imperative forms similar to X ie in Japanese, i.e., conditional imperatives and past imperatives. Below I provide a preliminary sketch of the differences of X ie from these imperatives and regular imperatives. First, I compare X ie with regular imperatives:

The speaker in (2) wants the addressee to close the window. This interpretation suggests that the propositional content (‘you close the window’) has not been realized at the time of speech. In Uso tuke in (1), by contrast, the content (‘you talk nonsense’) has just occurred and is not what the speaker expects the addressee to do. The speaker of X ie does not want the addressee to talk nonsense. Although X ie appears in the affirmative imperative form, X ie is not used as a regular imperative. Of course, the speaker can use the form X ie to require the addressee to lie to someone to cover up the truth on purpose; in that case, the form is a regular imperative, but not X ie.

Conditional imperatives, which need to be expressed by V te miro, are similar to X ie in that both state the opposite of the speaker’s intention (note that V te miro literally expressing the speaker’s intention belongs to regular imperatives and can go without te miro). For example, the speaker in (3) warns the addressee not to open the box:

The speaker does not require the addressee to realize the propositional content (‘you open the box’), which is suggested by the addition of a negative consequence of opening the box. The speaker of X ie has a similar mindset: he or she does not want or expect the addressee to talk nonsense. Despite this similarity, X ie and conditional imperatives differ in whether the propositional content is actual at the moment of utterance. The addressee of X ie has just talked nonsense, whereas the addressee of (3) has not opened the box yet (he or she is about to open it).

Another notable imperative expression is “past imperative” (Saito 2016).^[2] The propositional content of this type denotes the past event and thus cannot be realized, i.e., it is too late to be realized:

In this specific context, the expression serves as a reproach toward a person who arrived too late. Unlike English imperatives, the imperative form in (4) is compatible with the past-oriented adverb kinou (‘yesterday’). Neither past imperatives nor X ie asks the addressee to perform some action at a future time, and both are a verbal rebuke. However, the two forms should be differentiated. Example (4) implies that the speaker wanted the addressee to realize the propositional content (‘you come the previous day’). Recall that the speaker of X ie does not expect or want the addressee to talk nonsense. This difference correlates with another difference in speech act between the two. Past imperatives are a reproach about what was not realized (i.e., you did not come yesterday), whereas X ie is a reproof about what has been realized (i.e., you have talked nonsense).^[4]

With this relation, a crucial point to remember is the difference between past imperatives and the following idiomatic imperative form expressing a prohibition:

The co-occurrence with the past-oriented adverb ototoi results in this form appearing to be a past imperative, but the target meaning is not a reproach expressing ‘you should have come the day before yesterday.’ As the English translation ‘when two Sundays meet’ suggests, a mention of something that is obviously impossible to occur leads to a negative connotation. In (5), it is obviously impossible to go back to a point of time in the past by traveling into the past, inducing the negative interpretation ‘Don’t come again.’ The mechanism of interpretation in (5) differs from that of past imperatives. Furthermore, neither ototoi nor the imperative form of kuru (‘to come’) can be replaced with other expressions. Past imperatives exhibit no such fixedness. Thus, I maintain that Ototoi koi/kiyagare is an idiomatic fixed expression for a negative imperative of a prohibition. X ie is a partially fixed expression because X can be filled by at least uso, baka, and zyoudan. More importantly, X ie is not a form by which to express a prohibition. As mentioned in the next section, X ie is not always interchangeable with a negative imperative of a prohibition, whereas Ototoi koi/kiyagare always expresses a prohibition.

2.2 Descriptions in the literature

X ie differs from regular imperatives, conditional imperatives, and past imperatives. In this section, I review how this distinct type of imperative form is treated in the existing approaches. Specifically, X ie can be approached from the compatibility with an adverbial phrase inducing the negative connotation, the relation with imperatives of indifference, and the ironic use of a prohibition.

First, many dictionaries (e.g., Dai zisen, Kozien, Meikyo, and Nihon kokugo dai ziten [2nd edition]) use uso, baka, and zyoudan as an example of the entry word yasumi yasumi (‘more carefully’ or ‘thinking carefully’):

The imperative expressions used with yasumi yasumi in (6) appear to be the X ie of my concern but are not the same. In the case of imperatives with yasumi yasumi, the particle mo cannot be replaced with o or omitted. Moreover, with yasumi yasumi in (6), an interpretation emerges that the speaker expects and requires the addressee to tell a joke or lie with due care. By contrast, X ie uses the particle o (or often omits the particle) and has no such interpretation. The expressions with yasumi yasumi may be regarded as a variant or original form of X ie, but they belong to regular imperatives literally meaning ‘Lie/Tell a joke more carefully’ and implying ‘Don’t lie/tell a joke.’ In similar contexts, the adverbs iikagen/hodohodo ni (Lit. ‘in moderation’) are also used:

These expressions can state the content that seems against the speaker’s intention. In (7a), for example, to lie is not what the speaker wants the addressee to do, but the content can be expressed in the affirmative imperative form. After all, to do something in moderation, you must stop doing something too much. The same applies to yasumi yasumi: to do something more carefully, you must stop doing something without due care. Putting aside the use or omission of the particle o and the connotation of a request, X ie is similar to the imperative used with yasumi yasumi, which induces the negative connotation.

From a historical view, Ono (1995) describes X ie as the main clause of a conditional construction with the connotation of hounin (‘indifference’ or ‘permission’). Using early data in the Edo period, Ono explains the interpretation of X ie:

The context is as follows: When a woman condemned a man for something, he attempted to talk himself out of trouble. From the woman’s standpoint, what the man said was a transparent lie or nonsense. Instead of saying so, she just tapped the man with her sleeve and said, “Uso o tuki nasai,” which implies that she let him lie as he wanted to, although she knew that it was nonsense. This implication illustrates an attitude of indifference or permission. Notably, Ono’s next example suggests that X ie is compatible with a conditional construction expressing indifference (see also Shinzato 2002):

X ie can be used in the context of indifference, where the speaker leaves the addressee to do what he or she likes. In (8), certainly, the woman left the man to lie as he liked. Typical imperatives of indifference are as follows:

The affirmative imperative form is used to express the indifference. As long as X ie is naturally compatible with the context of indifference, such as (9), X ie is semantically and pragmatically similar to imperatives of indifference, such as (10). Thus, the use of the affirmative imperative form in X ie makes sense despite appearing counterintuitive at first.

X ie can also be treated as an ironic expression of its negative version X iuna (‘Don’t say X’). Nishimitsu (1999), for example, explains the possible scenario of the development of X ie:

Of the speaker’s utterance “I think what you said is a lie, but I will overlook it. Don’t lie from now on,” the first half is considered to have been deleted, because it can implicitly criticize the addressee. The resulting Uso o tukuna (‘Don’t lie’) was entrenched, and then the opposite expression Uso o tuke (Lit. ‘Lie’) became used as hiniku (‘an irony’). Both expressions are now so conventional that it is difficult to see a connection between the two.

                       (Nishimitsu 1999: 248; translation mine)

As long as X ie is an irony, choosing to use X ie—as a pragmatic strategy—can avoid using a prohibition that may sound too direct or strong. Notice, however, that X ie is not always used instead of X iuna. For example, the choice of X ie is not appropriate, such as when the speaker seriously intends to stop the addressee from lying or talking nonsense in a formal setting. The negative form is used as a straightforward prohibition instead. The relation between X ie and X iuna needs to be understood based on each case.

Ishikawa (2008) also regards X ie as an example of hango (‘irony’). According to Ishikawa, the imperative form generally represents that the speaker intends that an unrealized action should volitionally be realized by the addressee. Thus, Ishikawa maintains that X ie is the imperative form that purposely characterizes the realized action (i.e., the addressee talked nonsense) as an unrealized action. As Svahn (2016) demonstrates, however, this characterization is not a full account of the usage of X ie. It remains unclear why X ie exceptionally characterizes a realized action as an unrealized action.

Each approach highlights the blended aspects of X ie: its similarity to the imperatives with the adverbial phrase yasumi yasumi, compatibility with the context of indifference that emerges in a conditional construction, and interpretation as an irony of its negative version. In these respects, X ie seems to be almost a regular imperative, which can co-occur with yasumi yasumi, appear in the context of indifference, and serve as an irony. This is what the descriptions of X ie in the literature imply. The question is rather how X ie, i.e., the imperative form of a verb of speech expressing a reproof as an immediate response to the addressee, can uniquely be characterized and differentiated from other types of imperatives in Japanese and other languages.

3.1 Three criteria

In this paper I argue that the uniqueness of X ie can best be described by the following three criteria related to the realization of the propositional content of imperatives:

1. possibility of realization

2. attitude toward realization

3. preparedness for realization

A relevant analysis is Mori’s (2006) discussion of regular imperatives, conditional imperatives, and X ie in terms of a potential/actual scale. The potential/actual scale alone, however, cannot fully distinguish types of imperatives. Under his framework, the propositional contents of regular imperatives, conditional imperatives, and X ie are potential, potential (close to actual), and actual, respectively. The propositional content ‘you close the window’ in (2) is not realized at the time of speech and can be realized at a future time. This characterization shows the content is potential on the scale. The addressee of the conditional imperative in (3) is about to realize the content ‘you open the box.’ Because the content is not realized and can be realized, it is also potential (almost actual). The propositional content of X ie is what the addressee said. In this sense, the content has been realized and it is considered actual.

Mori (2006) does not consider past imperatives. Because this type has propositional content, which was not realized and cannot be realized, the reality status of past imperatives is neither actual nor potential. Moreover, the differences on the potential/actual scale are no more than the differences in the reality status of the propositional content; these differences do not immediately reflect semantic or pragmatic differences between types of imperatives. Therefore, I revisit the concept of reality, which is useful for the description of types of imperatives, from the perspectives of (i) possibility of, (ii) attitude toward, and (iii) preparedness for the realization of the propositional content of imperatives.

First, I consider each type of imperative in terms of (i), i.e., whether realizing the propositional content is possible. In regular imperatives, because the speaker wants the addressee to realize the content, the content must be possible to realize. The content of conditional imperatives is about to occur. In other words, the content is possible to realize. In X ie, the content (e.g., ‘you talk nonsense’) was realized at the time of speech; thus, the content is possible to realize. In past imperatives, however, the content (e.g., ‘you come the previous day’) is too late to realize; thus, realizing the content is not possible.

Criterion (ii) is associated with a negative connotation that Mori (2006) mentions with reference to the speaker’s intention. Both conditional imperatives and X ie can be replaced with a negative imperative in certain contexts. This similarity indicates that the speakers of these imperatives have a negative attitude toward the realization of the propositional content. The speakers of these imperatives do not want the addressee to realize the content. In regular imperatives, however, the speaker has a positive attitude toward the realization of the content because he or she wants the addressee to realize the content. In past imperatives, too, the speaker has a positive attitude toward the realization of the propositional content, although for the addressee, realizing the content is no longer possible.

Preparedness for realization in (iii) means that the speaker is mentally prepared for the realization of the propositional content at the time of speech. Of the four types of imperatives, X ie alone has no preparedness. In regular imperatives, the speaker wants the content to be realized. This desire shows his or her preparedness for the realization at the time of speech. Preparedness in conditional imperatives is from the speaker’s expectation that the propositional content is about to occur. The speaker of past imperatives also has a prepared mind because he or she wanted the content to be realized. However, the speaker of X ie is not prepared for the realization of the propositional content (e.g., ‘you talk nonsense’). The addressee’s nonsense utterance is not what the speaker wants or expects to be realized. This unpreparedness, triggered by the addressee’s nonsense utterance, leads to the speaker’s immediate reaction with the connotation of surprise or unexpectedness.

In the remainder of this section, I mention negative imperatives and seemingly irregular imperatives, such as Ototoi koi, imperatives with iikagen ni/hodohodo ni/yasumi yasumi, and Katte/Suki ni siro treated in Section 2. In the negative imperative Hasiruna (‘Don’t run’), for example, the propositional content ‘you do not run’ is possible to realize. Because the speaker wants and expects the addressee to realize it, he or she has a positive attitude toward the realization of the content and is prepared for the realization. In other words, negative imperatives, including X iuna, are characterized as regular imperatives. Ototoi koi may appear to be a past imperative morpho-syntactically, but because of its lexical fixedness, it is better to regard it as an idiom that conventionally functions as a negative imperative of a prohibition (see example 5). Imperatives used with iikagen/hodohodo ni or yasumi yasumi are regular imperatives expressing ‘Do something in moderation’ or ‘Do something more carefully,’ even if interpreted as ‘Don’t do something’ or ‘Stop it’ (see examples 6 and 7). Likewise, Katte/Suki ni siro belongs to regular imperatives of hounin (see example 10). Because the speaker of this type of imperative leaves the addressee to perform an action as he or she likes, the propositional content is possible to realize, the speaker has a positive attitude toward the realization, and he or she has a prepared mind for the realization.

The discussion in this section is summarized in Table 1:

The distribution in Table 1 clearly shows how X ie is similar to and different from the other types of imperatives. X ie is remarkably similar to conditional imperatives because of the shared characteristics (i) and (ii) but is different from past imperatives because no characteristics are shared with each other. Deviance from regular imperatives determines the degree to which a given imperative is typical or canonical. Conditional and past imperatives share two characteristics with regular imperatives, but X ie shares one.

The focus on the realization of the propositional content of imperatives with reference to possibility, attitude, and preparedness improves the understanding of the multi-faceted characteristics of X ie and differentiates X ie from regular, conditional, and past imperatives. The introduction of (iii) provides a new perspective on the classification of imperatives: prepared versus unprepared imperatives, which was not found in the literature on Japanese imperatives.

3.2 An immediate reaction to the preceding utterance

I have compared X ie with types of imperatives. I can now consider other related expressions with reference to the preceding context. First, there are similar but non-imperative expressions, which use X of X ie:

Just as with X ie, these expressions (‘X-expressions’ hereafter) can also function as the speaker’s instantaneous response to what the addressee said at the discourse site. Notably, (11a)–(11c) can be replaced with Uso tuke in (1). The replacement, however, affects the nuance of the entire sentence:

X ie, as suggested by the imperative form, focuses on the addressee’s verbal behavior (i.e., ‘you talk nonsense’). X-expressions do not have such propositional content and sound similar to the speaker’s assessment of the situation or information that he or she has encountered.

With this relation, there is a crucial difference in usage: X-expressions are compatible with wider contexts than those of X ie. For example, when you find your car gone from where it was parked, you can talk to yourself, as in (11a)–(11c), but you cannot use X ie. X-expressions can thus be used as a monologue when the speaker encounters an unexpected situation or information that has nothing to do with the addressee’s prior utterance. In this case, X-expressions show disbelief regarding what the speaker has encountered or learned unexpectedly.

Consider the difference in the acceptability of X-expressions and X ie in a dialogic context:

In this context, no reproof is given when speaker B unexpectedly learned that John was in Tokyo. Unlike (1), speaker B does not think that speaker A’s utterance is nonsense. Uso da in (13) expresses one of the disbeliefs stemming from a gap between the speaker’s knowledge and the information that he or she received from the addressee’s prior utterance at the discourse site. The same applies to Sonna bakana and Zyoudan zya nai. Next, I present a monologic context:

In (14), the speaker who has encountered an unexpected situation is talking to himself or herself but not to someone else. Once again, Uso da in (14) expresses one of the disbeliefs caused by a gap between the speaker’s knowledge and the situation that he or she has encountered. Sonna bakana and Zyoudan zya nai can also function as a monologue, but X ie cannot be used in such a monologic situation.^[5]

This approximation clarifies the nature of X ie. X ie is an expression used in a specific context, i.e., a dialogic response to the addressee’s preceding utterance. I argue that X ie is a marked imperative form that lexicalizes the addressee’s violation of the maxim of quality in the Cooperative Principle (Grice 1975):^[6]

Saying something false or nonsense conflicts with this maxim. As stated by Grice, the observance of the maxim of quality is of particular importance to the extent that “other maxims come into operation only on the assumption that this maxim of quality is satisfied” (ibid.). Given this significance, a reasonable assumption is that a construction has emerged as a specific expression to lexicalize the serious violation of this maxim of quality. This lexicalization is exemplified by X ie in the case of Japanese.

Naturally, the lexicalization of its violation correlates with the restriction on the predicate type of X ie: Uso (o) tuke/ie (Lit. ‘Lie’), Baka (o) ie (Lit. ‘Say something foolish’), and Zyoudan (o) ie (Lit. ‘Tell a joke’). These predicates involve the maxim violation and receive special treatment in Japanese. The markedness of X ie correlates with deviance from typical imperative usage: as shown in Table 1, X ie is the most deviated from regular imperatives. Moreover, if X ie is a marked imperative, its negative form X iuna is an unmarked imperative that literally corresponds to the maxim and lexicalizes the violation. As mentioned in Section 2.2, X iuna functions to stop the addressee from lying or talking nonsense in a serious manner, such as when a teacher scolds a pupil for lying:

This type of X iuna expresses the addressee’s violation of the maxim of quality, just as X ie does. Notice, however, that X iuna does not always lexicalize the violation. It can also be used when the speaker wants to prevent the addressee from talking nonsense as a precaution:

No prior utterance violating the maxim is involved in this case. X iuna is an unmarked negative imperative used in a dialogic context. It is not restricted to an instantaneous response to what the addressee said.

The findings in this section are summarized in Table 2:

3.3 A unit with the following utterance

I have examined the characteristics of X ie in relation to the addressee’s preceding utterance. To further understand the characteristics of X ie, in this section, I shift the focus to an utterance subsequent to X ie. The speaker often adds another comment to X ie, disqualifying the addressee’s prior utterance:

In (18), the additional comment after X ie is intended to convince A. In general, the content that follows X ie serves to disqualify what the addressee said. The speaker of X ie lets him or her talk nonsense while recognizing that the addressee’s utterance is not worth believing. In this sense, X ie plays a role as a discourse marker to introduce a disqualifying utterance.

X ie and a disqualifying utterance are not separate components; rather, the two utterances form a unit in this order, which is shown by a comma instead of a period in (18). In a natural course of conversation, X ie normally precedes a disqualifying utterance. Because X ie is an immediate response, it is appropriate to respond to the addressee’s nonsense before disqualifying the nonsense. In reverse order, the flow of utterances would become unnatural:

Compared with (18B), B’s utterance in this order is less natural as an immediate response to A’s preceding utterance. The contrast of (18) and (18’) indicates that X ie preferably precedes a disqualifying utterance at the discourse-pragmatic level.^[7]

For comparison, consider X ie together with X-expressions and X iuna in the context of (1):

X ie, X-expressions, and X iuna can co-occur with a disqualifying utterance. The inherent difference between the three expressions reflects itself in whether the disqualifying utterance can naturally be first:

X ie and X-expressions become unnatural when preceded by the disqualifying utterance, unlike X iuna, which does not change much. This correlates with X ie and X-expressions being an immediate reaction to what the addressee said. Immediacy decreases if the speaker begins with a comment that disqualifies the addressee’s utterance. This is how X ie and X-expressions in (19’) become unnatural as an instantaneous response.

X ie and X-expressions still differ in terms of connecting a disqualifying utterance by (na)n(o) dakara (‘because’). Consider the following context:

The use of nan(o) dakara in (20) requires both the speaker and the addressee to take the content of a disqualifying utterance for granted. To be connected by (na)n(o) dakara with a disqualifying utterance, John’s presence in Osaka must be a known fact to the addressee and the speaker at the time of B’s final utterance in (20). X-expressions connected by (na)n(o) dakara are not an immediate response expressing the speaker’s disbelief of newly obtained information but an expression by which the speaker attempts to convince the addressee of his or her nonsense in the preceding utterance. However, X ie cannot be preceded by a disqualifying utterance or be connected with it by (na)n(o) dakara. This finding suggests that X ie is strictly restricted to the speaker’s immediate response (i.e., a response without his or her analytical judgment) to newly obtained information at the discourse site. X iuna, whether connected by (na)n(o) dakara or not, is a prohibition, which stops the addressee from talking nonsense.

The findings in this section are summarized in Table 3:

Table 3 implies that X ie is not an independent expression at the discourse-pragmatic level. X ie forms a unit with the subsequent disqualifying utterance; if not overtly expressed, the disqualification would be implied in the context. Obviously, this unit has another close connection with the addressee’s preceding utterance because it triggers the utterance of X ie, as discussed in Section 3.2.

3.4 Mirativity

This paper proposed criteria (i)–(iii) for the classification of types of imperatives in terms of the realization of the propositional content. Notice that (iii) was introduced in the discussion of imperatives for the first time; whether the speaker is mentally prepared for the realization has not been considered seriously in the imperative research. I have shown that combining (iii) with (i) and (ii) facilitates the systematic understanding of the characteristics of regular/less regular imperatives or unmarked/marked imperatives.

This section further stresses how unpreparedness in imperatives is related to what is called mirativity (cf. Akatsuka 1985; see also Aksu-Koç and Slobin 1986; DeLancey 1986, 1997, 2001; Slobin and Aksu 1982). In this paper, I use “unpreparedness” as a general term and “mirativity” as a linguistic term. By mirativity, I mean the unexpected realization of a situation associated with the speaker’s surprise. The speaker’s surprise at newly obtained information has been discussed in terms of the speaker’s unprepared mind and the irrealis-realis nature of discourse (e.g., Akatsuka 1985; Aksu-Koç and Slobin 1986; DeLancey 1986).

The way of marking the speaker’s unprepared mind or mirativity varies from language to language. For example, as Aksu-Koç and Slobin (1986) and Slobin and Aksu (1982) have discussed, the choice of the suffix miş expressing indirect experience in Turkish suggests that the speaker is not prepared for a given event:

In the example of Richard Nixon’s resignation being expected and then occurring, the suffix di (realized as ti) expressing direct experience is used as in (21a). By contrast, when the Turkish premier Bülent Ecevit unexpectedly resigned, the suffix miş expressing indirect experience is used as in (21b), implying “an unprepared mind from the standpoint of the speaker” (Slobin and Aksu 1982: 196). A similar phenomenon is shown by the contrast between existential copular verbs yod and ’dug in Tibetan:

According to DeLancey, the cat in (22a) is presumably the speaker’s or a cat which the speaker expects to find in the house, but in (22b), the speaker has no such expectation. The use of ’dug in (22b) requires the context where the speaker comes home and unexpectedly finds a strange cat.

Akatsuka (1985) connects the use of the conditional form no nara in Japanese with the discussion of mirativity:^[8]

As Akatsuka explains, speaker 23B, who is surprised at the new information about speaker A’s decision to go to LSA, has to use no nara in the conditional clause. The incompatibility with mosi (‘by any chance’) suggests that B is certain of A’s going to LSA and is not hypothesizing. According to Akatsuka, no nara becomes compatible with mosi when A uses iku ka mo sire nai (‘maybe go’) and B is not certain of A’s going to LSA. In the context of (23), the choice of no nara implies B’s certainty of it. However, the information that B did not know has just entered his consciousness at the discourse site, and the newly learned information has not been integrated as a fact into B’s knowledge of the world. In other words, although the information is incongruous with what the speaker knew, it is not yet part of his or her existing knowledge. In (23), the use of no nara induces the implication, ‘I didn’t know this until now,’ which is connected with B’s surprise or unexpectedness.

Akatsuka further explains that it is not appropriate for speaker 23B to continue using no nara after the conversation with speaker 23A. In (24), speaker 23A is referred to as Takeda san by speaker 23B:

The ungrammaticality of no nara is due to the integration of the relevant information into B’s knowledge, whereby the information is no longer new to him at the time of uttering (24). Relating this phenomenon to the irrealis-realis division, Akatsuka argues that the change in the acceptability of (23) and (24) shows the movement of the newly learned information from the domain of irrealis to that of realis.^[9]

The characteristics of X ie are indicative of the mirativity I have outlined. X ie is characterized by the speaker’s unprepared mind. Because the speaker of X ie does not expect the addressee to violate the maxim of quality or talk nonsense, he or she does not expect the addressee’s nonsense until the moment of speech. In this sense, the addressee’s nonsense is newly obtained information, and the speaker is not prepared for it. This unpreparedness immediately prompts him or her to give the addressee a reproof for the violation of the maxim. Recall that the speaker’s unpreparedness is a prerequisite for the choice of mirative markers in (21)–(23). The choice of X ie also needs the speaker’s unprepared mind, which suggests the mirative nature of X ie.

In addition, X ie’s resistance to the clause combining by (na)n(o) dakara can be compared with the inappropriateness of no nara in (24) caused by the integration of newly obtained information into the speaker’s body of knowledge. X ie must be an immediate response to newly obtained information (i.e., irrealis domain). Thus, after the information is taken for granted and becomes a known fact to both the speaker and the addressee (i.e., realis domain), the use of X ie becomes unnatural. In such a case, X-expressions and X iuna must be used instead, as shown in (20). Regarding the irrealis-realis division, X ie is neither preceded by nor combined with a (na)n(o) dakara clause, owing to the newly obtained information being resistant to the transition from the domain of irrealis to that of realis.