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Interest Rate Changes and Borrower Search Behavior: An Experimental Replication with Extensions

  • Vojtěch Kotrba ORCID logo EMAIL logo and Pavel Kotrba ORCID logo
Published/Copyright: September 22, 2025

Abstract

This study replicates Lukas and Nöth’s (2019. Interest Rate Changes and Borrower Search Behavior.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 163 (July): 172–89.) analysis of borrower behavior in response to interest rate changes, focusing on consumer decisions to seek alternative mortgage offers. Confirming the original findings, we observe that consumers are more likely to search for a new offer when rates rise, implying higher payment costs. Extending this framework, we introduce a savings account scenario, framing consumer decisions symmetrically. Results reveal that consumers similarly respond to interest rate decreases, actively seeking alternatives when potential interest earnings drop. This replication supports the robustness of the original findings and highlights symmetry in consumer search behavior across contexts.

JEL Classification: D14; G41

1 Introduction

Financial markets, including mortgage markets and savings products, are essential components of the banking sector and crucial drivers of economic growth worldwide (Valickova et al. 2015). While mortgages generate revenue primarily through interest payments, banks also rely on savings deposits as a funding source, profiting from the spread between deposit and lending rates. These markets are often subject to regulatory oversight, which aims to balance consumer protection with financial stability. Effective regulation can support both objectives, benefiting consumers while allowing banks to maintain profitability (Battiston et al. 2016). Understanding consumer behavior in these financial decisions is crucial for policymakers, banks, and regulators alike.

These institutional aspects are not static. Mortgage and savings markets are shaped by regulatory interventions that affect competition, lending practices, and consumer protection (Benetton 2021; Nicoletti and Zhu 2023; Čermáková et al. 2023). Evaluations of the European Mortgage Credit Directive emphasize its role in strengthening transparency and comparability of mortgage offers across member states, thereby reinforcing the position of consumers in the market (European Commission 2020). At the same time, the rapid expansion of digital finance and fintech challenges existing frameworks and has spurred calls for more adaptive regulatory and supervisory tools (Alaassar et al. 2021; Gai et al. 2018). Taken together, these developments highlight that financial decision-making takes place in a dynamic institutional environment, where consumer behavior is influenced not only by psychological mechanisms but also by evolving regulatory conditions.

This study replicates the findings of Lukas and Nöth (2019), who examined consumers’ decision-making in seeking alternative remortgaging offers. Notably, the existence of search costs plays a role in this process, as finding a new offer requires consumers to invest at least some time and effort. Authors found that consumers are more likely to search for offers when market rates are rising than when they are falling, despite an experimental design that theoretically eliminates this difference. These findings align with prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), which suggests that consumers’ strong aversion to losses makes them respond more intensely to potential losses.

Recent research has shown that consumer responses to changing financial conditions are shaped by reference dependence and loss aversion (Lukas and Nöth 2021); however, these effects are highly context dependent. Prospect theory posits that losses weigh more heavily than gains. Still, empirical evidence suggests that this asymmetry is not uniform and can be influenced by framing and task design (Ert and Erev 2013). In addition, reference dependence has been documented beyond monetary outcomes, including decisions involving timing under uncertainty, where the relative salience of losses and gains can even be reversed (Attema and Li 2024). Individual differences also play a role, as risk attitudes, loss aversion, and discounting tendencies systematically vary with demographic and cognitive characteristics (Meissner et al. 2023). Finally, experimental evidence suggests that switching behavior in financial services is heterogeneous across populations and that results obtained from student samples may not always generalize to the broader public (Proestakis et al. 2024). Relatedly, expectation-based loss aversion can generate scale-dependent psychological switching costs, whereby consumers may remain with an inferior default rather than explore better alternatives even when switching is easy and potentially beneficial (Karle et al. 2023). These insights underscore the importance of testing consumer responsiveness in both loss-oriented contexts such as mortgages and gain-oriented contexts such as savings.

Our study extends the framework of Lukas and Nöth (2019) to savings accounts, which represent a case where interest rate changes influence potential earnings rather than costs. Unlike mortgage borrowers, depositors may exhibit different search elasticities when interest rates fall, as they evaluate the trade-off between effort and forgone returns. The experimental design mirrors the original one but applies it to savings decisions. In line with our preregistered design, we formulate the following hypotheses:

H1:

Consumers will be more likely to investigate alternative mortgages providers when interest rates are rising compared to when they are falling.

H2:

Consumers will be more likely to investigate alternative savings account providers when interest rates are falling compared to when they are rising.

Our results suggest that consumers actively search for better offers when savings rates decrease, exhibiting a response pattern comparable to mortgage borrowers facing rising costs. The marginal effect of interest rate changes on search behavior is larger in the savings context (0.337***, p < 0.01) than in the mortgage context (0.255***, p < 0.01), indicating that consumers respond even more strongly to declining returns on savings than to rising borrowing costs.

2 Materials and Methods

The experiment was conducted in March 2024 at the Laboratory of Experimental Economics (LEE) at the Prague University of Economics and Business, with approval from the Faculty of Economics Ethics Committee, and was preregistered (https://osf.io/sb8r3/). A total of 252 subjects participated in the study. Following the model established by Lukas and Nöth (2019), participants were asked to self-assess their financial literacy, general risk preferences, and financial risk preferences. They then made a decision regarding whether to search for an alternative offer from a mortgage savings account provider.

Cognitive abilities were measured using both numerical and verbal versions of the cognitive reflection test (CRT), with the verbal version included as a control due to the increasing familiarity of the standard numerical version. Age, gender, and field of study served as additional control variables. Overall, the sample can be considered similar to the original paper (Lukas and Nöth 2019). The biggest difference seems to be the higher financial literacy of our sample. Summary statistics are presented in Table 1.

Table 1:

Summary statistics comparison.

Our results Lukas and Nöth (2019)
Variable Mean Median Mean Median
Financial literacy 6.761 7 4.62 5
General risk preferences 5.933 6 5.14 5
Financial risk preferences 5.472 6 3.91 4
CRT score (number version) 1.996 2 1.94 2
CRT score (verbal version) 1.909 2
Age 23.496 23 25 25
Male 0.548 1 0.54 1
Economics as field of study 0.179 0 0.56 1
N 252 252 250 250
  1. Note: In original study, Lukas and Nöth’s (2019) did not use verbal version CRT. In the original paper, economics as a field of study was considered to be anything related to economics. We report on pure economics as a field of study. In a broader sense, this indicator (including business administration, public administration or finance) would be 73 %.

The experimental design was taken from the original paper by Lukas and Nöth (2019). The experiment followed a within-subject design, where each participant completed both the mortgage and the savings conditions. This design enables us to compare behavioral responses to losses and gains within the same individual. It was randomized whether the subject started with the mortgage or the savings scenario. The number of periods per condition was kept identical to the original study. In contrast to Lukas and Nöth (2019), all participants were paid based on the sum of their realized payoffs across all rounds, which should increase their incentives. The average payment was 215 CZK (approximately 10 EUR at the time of the experiment). The experiment was implemented in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Full instructions and used parameters can be found in the Appendix.

Overall, our sample shows a similar composition in terms of gender and CRT test, and higher scores for financial literacy and financial risk preferences.

3 Results

Figure 1 presents the proportion of subjects who chose to seek an alternative offer, comparing their decisions relative to the interest rate from the previous round (Δr t,t−1) and to the rate from the first (Δr t,1). In the mortgage context, the results replicate the pattern identified by Lukas and Nöth (2019), showing that as interest rates rise and payment obligations increase, consumers are more likely to search for an alternative offer.

Figure 1: 
The rate of contacting the provider for an alternative offer. Note: Bar heights show the share of decisions in which an L2 offer is solicited. Numbers printed above the bars are category counts (n) and do not determine bar height. In total, 1,008 observations are included. The paths of interest rate changes follow the design of Lukas and Nöth (2019) and are provided in the Appendix (Tables A1 and A2).
Figure 1:

The rate of contacting the provider for an alternative offer. Note: Bar heights show the share of decisions in which an L2 offer is solicited. Numbers printed above the bars are category counts (n) and do not determine bar height. In total, 1,008 observations are included. The paths of interest rate changes follow the design of Lukas and Nöth (2019) and are provided in the Appendix (Tables A1 and A2).

For savings accounts, the results exhibit a symmetrical and opposite pattern, where decreases in the interest rate lead to reduced interest earnings, prompting consumers to increasingly search for alternative offers.

To better illustrate the dependencies influencing the decision to seek an alternative offer, Figure 2 shows the relationship between this decision and changes in interest rates, focusing on the univariate effects of the difference between current and previous interest rates. They display the probit and logit curves capturing the univariate relationship between the decision to seek an alternative offer and changes in interest rates across rounds.

Figure 2: 
Probit and logit models of alternative offer decisions based on interest rate differences. Note: The figure shows the relationship between changes in interest rates and the probability of requesting an alternative offer. Each point represents the observed proportion of subjects making this choice for a given interest rate difference, with fitted probit and logit curves displayed. Numbers printed above the points are category counts (n) and do not determine point position. In total, 1,008 observations are included in each scenario. The exact paths of interest rate changes follow the design of Lukas and Nöth (2019) and are provided in the Appendix (Tables A1 and A2).
Figure 2:

Probit and logit models of alternative offer decisions based on interest rate differences. Note: The figure shows the relationship between changes in interest rates and the probability of requesting an alternative offer. Each point represents the observed proportion of subjects making this choice for a given interest rate difference, with fitted probit and logit curves displayed. Numbers printed above the points are category counts (n) and do not determine point position. In total, 1,008 observations are included in each scenario. The exact paths of interest rate changes follow the design of Lukas and Nöth (2019) and are provided in the Appendix (Tables A1 and A2).

Each point on the graphs represents the proportion of participants who chose to request an alternative offer for each given difference value, providing a probability estimate that the probit and logit models aim to capture. The y-axis represents the observed probability of an alternative offer request, while the x-axis depicts the values of these differences.

The curves demonstrate that the core trends of our hypotheses are consistent across both probit and logit models, suggesting a robust directional effect of interest rate changes on consumer behavior. While the general trends align, slight differences between the probit and logit paths underscore model sensitivity and offer insights into variance within the data.

Next, probit regressions are used to examine the factors influencing the decision to seek an alternative offer. Table 2 presents the factors affecting the decision in the mortgage scenario. The effect of a lower interest rate compared to the previous round (Δr t,t−1<0) is statistically significant at 1 %, with a coefficient value comparable to that reported in the previous literature by Lukas and Nöth (2019). Quantitatively, the marginal effects indicate that when the current interest rate is higher than in the previous round, the probability of searching for an alternative mortgage offer increases by 0.222 in Model 1 and by 0.255 in Model 2. These values correspond to 22.2 and 25.5 % points, respectively. Given the mean of the dependent variable, these effects represent relative increases of approximately 39.4 % in Model 1 and 45.2 % in Model 2. However, our results do not show a significant effect when comparing the first round, as the coefficients remain insignificant even at the 10 % level. A possible explanation is that our sample exhibits higher financial literacy compared to Lukas and Nöth (2019), which may reduce their susceptibility to anchoring on the initial interest rate. Anchoring refers to the tendency to rely heavily on an initial reference point when making decisions (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). If participants in our study were less anchored, their decisions might be more independent of the initial interest rate, leading to the observed non-significance.

Table 2:

Probit regression results for mortgage.

Variable Our results Lukas and Nöth (2019)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Δr t,t−1>0 0.222*** (4.35) 0.255*** (4.57) 0.243*** (4.78) 0.267*** (4.99)
Δr t,1>0 0.058 (1.07) 0.083 (1.39) 0.371*** (4.65) 0.400*** (4.96)
Current interest rate 0.105*** (4.65) 0.097*** (4.07) 0.169*** (7.59) 0.167*** (7.08) 0.112*** (4.39) 0.098*** (3.72) 0.072** (2.28) 0.056* (1.71)
Financial literacy 0.028* (1.91) 0.024* (1.66) 0.030** (2.03) 0.025* (1.82) 0.002 (0.15) 0.002 (0.17) 0.003 (0.24) 0.003 (0.28)
General risk preferences 0.007 (0.48) 0.005 (0.37) 0.007 (0.49) 0.005 (0.39) 0.022** (2.04) 0.021* (1.92) 0.019* (1.79) 0.018* (1.66)
CRT score (number version) 0.023 (0.89) 0.020 (0.83) 0.022 (0.89) 0.019 (0.83) 0.057*** (2.64) 0.061*** (2.92) 0.059*** (2.75) 0.063*** (3.05)
Positive previous experience 0.265*** (4.82) 0.253*** (4.56) 0.208*** (4.63) 0.200*** (4.52)
All further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,008 1,008 1,008 1,008 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
Pseudo R 2 0.172 0.199 0.163 0.187 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.19
Mean of dependent variable 0.564
  1. Note: Table shows marginal effects of a probit regression of the decision to solicit an alternative offer (z-statistics in parentheses). Marginal effects are computed as marginal effects at the mean (MEM). ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. The dependent variable equals 1 if L2 is contacted in period t. ∆r t,t−1 > 0 is a dummy equal to 1 if the interest rate difference between the current offer made by L1 and the preceding period’s final rate is positive. ∆r t,1 > 0 is a dummy equal to 1 if the interest rate difference between the current offer made by L1 and the initial period’s final rate is positive. Current interest rate is the rate offered by L1 in the current period t. Financial literacy, general risk and financial risk preferences are self-assessed measures on a scale from 0 to 10 (10 = highest). Cognitive reflection test (CRT) scores range from 0 to 3, based on both numerical and verbal versions. Positive previous experience is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one previous offer of L2 was cheaper than the offer of L1. Additional controls include age, gender (0 = male, 1 = female), field of study (1 = economics), the experimental period, and the version of the experiment (1–12). Control variables and their coding follow the original specification by Lukas and Nöth (2019).

The current interest rate, financial literacy, and positive prior experience all show significant effects. In contrast, general and financial risk preferences, along with both the numerical and verbal cognitive reflection test scores, are not significant.

The biggest difference here is the insignificance of the interest rate differential compared to the first round. There is no evidence of anchoring compared to the first round. In our case, financial literacy is then significant, which is higher on average in our data. In contrast, CRT is significant in Lukas and Nöth (2019).

Similarly, probit regressions were conducted for the savings account scenario. It is important to note that the main variables, Δr t,t−1 and Δr t,1, take the value of 1 when the consumer is at a disadvantage, specifically when the interest rate has declined. The results are statistically significant when the interest rate falls compared to the previous round (Δr t,t−1<0). Quantitatively, the marginal effects show that when the current interest rate is lower than in the previous round, the probability of searching for an alternative savings offer increases by 0.309 in Model 5 and by 0.337 in Model 6. These correspond to 30.9 and 33.7 % points, respectively. With the dependent-variable mean at 0.601, these effects imply relative increases of approximately 51.4 % in Model 5 and 56.1 % in Model 6. Additionally, the marginal effects in the probit regression are larger for savings accounts than for mortgages, indicating that consumers are even more responsive to changes in this context.

As with the mortgage scenario, the results remain statistically insignificant when compared to the first round. The current interest rate shows significance in relation to the previous round, though the previous round comparison itself is not significant. Financial literacy, general risk preferences, and both numerical and verbal cognitive reflection test scores are insignificant. In contrast, financial risk preferences are weakly significant, and positive past experience is strongly significant (Table 3).

Table 3:

Probit regression results for savings.

Variable (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δr t,t−1<0 0.309*** (6.2) 0.337*** (6.28)
Δr t,1<0 0.046 (0.83) 0.075 (1.27)
Current interest rate −0.030 (−1.33) −0.022 (−0.95) −0.127*** (−5.5) −0.122*** (−5.0)
Financial literacy 0.002 (0.19) 0.002 (0.16) 0.002 (0.16) 0.002 (0.13)
General risk preferences −0.004 (−0.3) −0.004 (−0.3) −0.005 (−0.36) −0.004 (−0.37)
Financial risk preferences 0.021* (1.84) 0.019* (1.79) 0.021* (1.88) 0.019* (1.85)
CRT score (number version) 0.027 (1.12) 0.024 (1.06) 0.026 (1.1) 0.024 (1.06)
CRT score (verbal version) 0.007 (0.24) 0.008 (0.28) 0.007 (0.23) 0.008 (0.27)
Positive previous experience 0.206*** (4.2) 0.189*** (3.88)
All further controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,008 1,008 1,008 1,008
Pseudo R 2 0.132 0.151 0.111 0.127
Mean of dependent variable 0.601
  1. Note: Table shows marginal effects of a probit regression of the decision to solicit an alternative offer (z-statistics in parentheses). Marginal effects are computed as marginal effects at the mean (MEM). ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. The dependent variable equals 1 if L2 is contacted in period t. ∆r t,t−1 < 0 is a dummy equal to 1 if the interest rate difference between the current offer made by L1 and the preceding period’s final rate is negative. ∆r t,1 < 0 is a dummy equal to 1 if the interest rate difference between the current offer made by L1 and the initial period’s final rate is negative. Current interest rate is the rate offered by L1 in the current period t. Financial literacy, general risk and financial risk preferences are self-assessed measures on a scale from 0 to 10 (10 = highest). Cognitive reflection test (CRT) scores range from 0 to 3, based on both numerical and verbal versions. Positive previous experience is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one previous offer of L2 was better than the offer of L1. Additional controls include age, gender (0 = male, 1 = female), field of study (1 = economics), the experimental period, and the version of the experiment (1–12). Control variables and their coding follow the original specification by Lukas and Nöth (2019).

Considering that individuals were exposed to both loan and savings settings, we also control for this factor. While order effects appear in the savings scenario, where subjects request alternative offers more often when encountering it later, no such effect is found for loans. Importantly, this does not affect the statistical significance of other variables, as all retain their significance and comparable marginal effects.

4 Discussion and Conclusions

This study successfully replicates Lukas and Nöth’s (2019) findings on the effect of interest rate changes on borrower behavior, particularly in the decision to seek alternative offers. Our results confirm that consumers exhibit heightened sensitivity to rising interest rates in a mortgage context, prompting them to search for competitive offers, as anticipated.

However, several differences emerged in the results of the current experiment. Increased searching behavior is confirmed when conditions worsen compared to the previous round, as is a significant positive effect of prior positive experience with alternative offers. In contrast, there is no observed effect of interest rate deterioration compared to the first round, and some differences appear in the significance of control variables.

Extending the original study, we introduced a savings account context to explore whether consumer responses align symmetrically in a gain-oriented financial setting. The results reveal that consumers are similarly sensitive to decreases in interest rates, actively seeking alternative offers when potential interest earnings diminish. This behavior supports a broader application of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), particularly loss aversion, as consumers respond comparably to losses or reduced gains, whether they are in debt or savings situations.

With clear evidence that consumers respond to interest rate changes, institutions might consider structuring product offerings to anticipate and address this sensitivity, especially in volatile rate environments. Banks could achieve this by offering products with interest rate guarantees, step-up or step-down interest options, or loyalty incentives for customers who stay despite rate fluctuations. Additionally, they may enhance digital tools that allow customers to track and compare interest rates in real time, helping them make informed decisions while fostering customer retention.


Corresponding author: Vojtěch Kotrba, Department of Economics, Prague University of Economics and Business, Nám. W. Churchilla 1938/4, 130 67 Praha, Czechia, E-mail:

Award Identifier / Grant number: VSE IGS F5/14/2024

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank their families for their support during the research.

  1. Research funding: Supported by grant No. VŠE IGS F5/14/2024 of the Internal Grant Agency by Faculty of Economics, Prague University of Economics and Business.

  2. Data availability: The data that support the findings of this study are openly available at https://data.mendeley.com/preview/dzw6hdsr8k?a=25c295ae-a77b-40a3-a59c-adc0e0ce6282.

  3. Preregistration: https://osf.io/sb8r3/.

Appendix

1 Experimental Instructions for Mortgage in English

Introduction

You are going to participate in an experiment on credit decisions which consists of 5 periods. One period is equal to 5 experimental years. The experiment therefore lasts for 25 experimental years.

The experiment will take 10–15 min. Should you leave the experiment early, you will not be able to receive any payments. Repeated participation is not possible.

Compensation

The currency in this experiment is Experimental Currency Units (ECU). After the experiment, the amount paid depends on your final wealth at the end of the experiment. You will receive your final wealth, converted into CZK. The expected value of the payment – should you be chosen for a payment – is about CZK 250. Your actual payment can be higher or lower – depending on your decisions in the experiment. Final wealth can never fall below ECU 0.

Experimental Procedure

Imagine you took out a loan some time ago (Period 1) as high as ECU 300,000. In each of the following periods you can refinance your loan. This means that the yearly interest rate that you pay on your loan is determined in each period (i.e., for 5 years). You will decide, period by period, how to refinance your loan. At the end of Period 5, the loan will be fully repaid out of your account. Before that, no repayment will be made.

In each period, you have to pay the interest rate and you receive an income which is the same in each period. The interest payment is a result of the currently valid yearly interest rate and the loan amount and is calculated over 5 years (i.e., 1 period). Your income minus your interest payment equals your wealth.

In each period, you first receive the offer of one provider (Provider 1 – P1). Compared to the offer of the previous period, this can be higher or lower by 1 % point with equal probability. For example, if Provider 1 offers an interest rate of 10 % in Period 1, Provider 1 will offer either 11 % or 9 % in Period 2, each with equal probability.

In addition to the offer of Provider 1, you can contact a further provider (Provider 2 – P2) in each period. The offer of Provider 2 is either 1 % point higher or lower than the current offer of Provider 1, each with equal probability; you can still accept the offer of Provider 1. You incur costs of ECU 3,000 if you decide to contact Provider 2. If you contact Provider 2, these costs have to be paid in any case, even if you accept the offer of Provider 1 in the end.

When loaning, it is advisable to keep the interest rate as LOW as possible.

Example 1:

Provider 1 offers an interest rate of 10 % for the current period. You decide to contact Provider 2. The offer of Provider 2 is 11 %. You accept the offer of Provider 1. For this period, you pay 10 % interest and ECU 3,000 for contacting Provider 2.

Example 2:

Provider 1 offers an interest rate of 10 % for the current period. You decide to contact Provider 2. The offer of Provider 2 is 9 %. You accept the offer of Provider 2. For this period, you pay 9 % interest and ECU 3,000 for contacting Provider 2.

Example 3:

Provider 1 offers an interest rate of 10 % for the current period. You decide to accept this offer immediately. For this period, you pay 10 % interest and incur no further costs.

Your final payout will be determined by the following formula:

Payout = b * wealth − a

a [CZK] = 158.6

b [CZK/ECU] = 0.0016

If Provider 1 offers you an interest rate of 10 % and you decide to approach Provider 2, Provider 2 may make you the following offer:

At 50 %, Provider 2 will offer you 9 % and at 50 %, Provider 2 will offer you 11 %.

Provider 2 will always offer you a lower rate.

If you wish to receive an offer from Provider 2, the costs involved are as follows:

0 ECU

3,000 ECU

The experiment will continue with training period 1. This part is used to familiarise yourself with the experiment. Its results will NOT be included in the final payout.

The experiment continues with a standard credit period.

2 Experimental Instructions for Savings in English

Introduction

You are going to participate in an experiment on credit decisions which consists of 5 periods. One period is equal to 5 experimental years. The experiment therefore lasts for 25 experimental years.

The experiment will take 10–15 min. Should you leave the experiment early, you will not be able to receive any payments. Repeated participation is not possible.

Compensation

The currency in this experiment is experimental currency units (ECU). After the experiment, the amount paid depends on your final wealth at the end of the experiment. You will receive your final wealth, converted into CZK. The expected value of the payment – should you be chosen for a payment – is about CZK 250. Your actual payment can be higher or lower – depending on your decisions in the experiment. Final wealth can never fall below ECU 0.

Experimental Procedure

Imagine that at a certain point in time (period 1) you have savings of 300,000 ECU and you decide which savings product you want to appreciate. In each of the following periods (one period is equivalent to 5 years) you can change your savings provider. This means that in each period (i.e. for 5 years) there is an annual interest rate that determines the interest you will receive on your deposit. You decide whether to change your savings provider in each period.

The interest income is the result of the current annual interest rate and the interest amount is calculated once every 5 years (i.e. 1 period).

In each period, you will first receive a quote from one provider (Provider 1). This may be 1 % point higher or lower than the previous period’s offer with equal probability. For example, if Provider 1 offers 10 % in Period 1, Provider 1 will offer you either 11 % or 9 % in Period 2, always with the same probability.

In addition to the offer of Provider 1, you can contact another provider (Provider 2) in any period. Provider 2’s offer is either 1 % point higher or lower than Provider 1’s current offer, each with equal probability; you can still accept Provider 1’s offer. If you decide to contact Provider 2, you will incur a cost of ECU 3,000 to find Provider 2. If you contact Provider 2, you must pay these costs in any event, even if you eventually accept Provider 1’s offer.

When saving, it is advisable to keep the interest rate as HIGH as possible.

Example 1:

Provider 1 offers an interest rate of 10 % for the current period. You decide to contact Provider 2. You accept Provider 1’s offer. You earn 10 % interest for this period and pay 3,000 ECU for contacting Provider 2.

Example 2:

Provider 1 offers 10 % interest for the current period. You decide to contact Provider 2. Provider 2’s offer is 11 %. You accept Provider 2’s offer. You receive 11 % interest for the current period and pay 3,000 ECU for contacting Provider 2.

Example 3:

Provider 1 offers you an interest rate of 10 % for the current period. You decide to accept the offer immediately. You receive 10 % interest for this period and incur no further costs.

If Provider 1 offers you an interest rate of 10 % and you decide to approach Provider 2, Provider 2 may make you the following offer:

At 50 %, Provider 2 will offer you 9 % and at 50 %, Provider 2 will offer you 11 %.

Provider 2 will always offer you a lower rate.

If you wish to receive an offer from Provider 2, the costs involved are as follows:

0 ECU

3,000 ECU

The experiment will continue with training period 1. This part is used to familiarize yourself with the experiment. Its results will NOT be included in the final payout.

The experiment continues with a standard credit period (Figure A1).

Figure A1: 
Experiment screenshot.
Figure A1:

Experiment screenshot.

Table A1:

Experiment parameters for mortgage.

Probability P1 interest rate/per.
Path Vers. Loan ECU Income ECU Per. no. Dec. no. Up Down 1 % 2 % 3 % 4 % 5 % Cost ECU
↑↓↑↑ 1 300,000 240,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 9 10 9 10 11 3,000
2 300,000 195,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 6 7 6 7 8 3,000
3 300,000 315,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 14 15 14 15 16 3,000
↓↑↓↓ 4 300,000 240,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 11 10 11 10 9 3,000
5 300,000 195,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 8 7 8 7 6 3,000
6 300,000 315,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 16 15 16 15 14 3,000
↓↑↑↑ 7 300,000 240,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 9 8 9 10 11 3,000
8 300,000 195,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 6 5 6 7 8 3,000
9 300,000 315,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 14 13 14 15 16 3,000
↑↓↓↓ 10 300,000 240,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 11 12 11 10 9 3,000
11 300,000 195,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 8 9 8 7 6 3,000
12 300,000 315,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 16 17 16 15 14 3,000
  1. Note: Retrieved from Lukas and Nöth’s (2019). The paths for savings accounts were always 1 % point lower to reflect the interest differential between the mortgage and savings account. The table contains the parameters of the experimental setup. There are four different interest rate paths. In addition, each path is shifted by several percentage points to control for potential level effects, leading to twelve versions of an interest rate path which are allocated to subjects in the order of their login. The choice of parameters ensures that the expected value of the final wealth is the same for all subjects within each interest rate path. Path shows period-by-period increases (↑) and decreases (↓) of the interest rate offer of P1 from period 1–5 by 1 % point; Vers. is the version number; loan denotes the amount of the loan in ECU on which the interest payments have to be made and which has to be repaid in the final period; income is the constant income in ECU subjects receive in each period; Per. denotes the number of periods each subject encounters; Dec. is the number of decisions each subject has to make; probability denotes the probability of an up or a down movement of the interest rate offer of P1 in the next period; P1 interest rate/per. shows the pre-simulated interest rate sequences of P1 in % by period; cost is the cost in ECU of soliciting an offer from P2.

Table A2:

Experiment parameters for savings.

Probability P1 interest rate/per.
Path Vers. Deposit ECU Expenditures ECU Per. no. Dec. no. Up Down 1 % 2 % 3 % 4 % 5 % Cost ECU
↑↓↑↑ 1 300,000 122,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 8 9 8 9 10 3,000
2 300,000 77,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 5 6 5 6 7 3,000
3 300,000 197,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 13 14 13 14 15 3,000
↓↑↓↓ 4 300,000 122,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 10 9 10 9 8 3,000
5 300,000 77,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 7 6 7 6 5 3,000
6 300,000 197,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 15 14 15 14 13 3,000
↓↑↑↑ 7 300,000 122,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 8 7 8 9 10 3,000
8 300,000 77,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 5 4 5 6 7 3,000
9 300,000 197,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 13 12 13 14 15 3,000
↑↓↓↓ 10 300,000 122,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 10 11 10 9 8 3,000
11 300,000 77,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 7 8 7 6 5 3,000
12 300,000 197,000 5 4 0.5 0.5 15 16 15 14 13 3,000
  1. Note: The paths for savings accounts were always 1 % point lower to reflect the interest differential between the mortgage and savings account. The table contains the parameters of the experimental setup. There are four different interest rate paths. In addition, each path is shifted by several percentage points to control for potential level effects, leading to twelve versions of an interest rate path which are allocated to subjects in the order of their login. The choice of parameters ensures that the expected value of the final wealth is the same for all subjects within each interest rate path. Path shows period-by-period increases (↑) and decreases (↓) of the interest rate offer of P1 from period 1–5 by 1 % point; Vers. is the version number; expenditures denotes the amount of the expenditure in ECU that the subject has in a given version; deposit is the constant amount in ECU subjects deposit, then interest is calculated on this amount. When a subject saves, they incur expenses to prevent excessive wealth accumulation compared to the mortgage scenario solely through interest and, most importantly, to compensate for differences in interest rate levels (with low rates, the subject has low expenses; with high rates, the subject has high expenses); Per. denotes the number of periods each subject encounters; Dec. is the number of decisions each subject has to make; probability denotes the probability of an up or a down movement of the interest rate offer of P1 in the next period; P1 interest rate/per. shows the pre-simulated interest rate sequences of P1 in % by period; cost is the cost in ECU of soliciting an offer from P2.

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Received: 2025-05-29
Accepted: 2025-09-04
Published Online: 2025-09-22

© 2025 the author(s), published by De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

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