Summary
Employment protection affects labour market outcomes and hence the incentive to acquire skills. Using a matching model with two education levels in which workers decide ex-ante on their skill formation, it is shown that employment protection can raise the fraction of skilled workers. This will be the case if workers obtain a sufficiently large fraction of the rent created by skill formation. Furthermore, it will be shown that high-skilled workers face shorter unemployment duration and lower dismissal probabilities.
Online erschienen: 2016-9-20
Erschienen im Druck: 2006-2-1
© 2006 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Titelei
- Inhalt / Contents
- Editorial
- Abhandlungen / Original Papers
- Causal Returns to Education
- Heterogeneous Returns to Training
- Employment Protection: Its Effects on Different Skill Groups and on the Incentive to become Skilled
- Training, Mobility, and Wages: Specific Versus General Human Capital
- A Duration Analysis of the Effects of Tuition Fees for Long-Term Students in Germany
Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel
Education;
employment protection;
unemployment;
search and matching models
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Titelei
- Inhalt / Contents
- Editorial
- Abhandlungen / Original Papers
- Causal Returns to Education
- Heterogeneous Returns to Training
- Employment Protection: Its Effects on Different Skill Groups and on the Incentive to become Skilled
- Training, Mobility, and Wages: Specific Versus General Human Capital
- A Duration Analysis of the Effects of Tuition Fees for Long-Term Students in Germany