Debt Bondage in Late Period Egypt (8th – 5th Century BC)

1 Introduction

It can be tempting to view the ancient world as cruel and uncivilized times, during which a person could have heartlessly put his own children up for security on a loan with full awareness that his own flesh and blood would be enslaved^[2] if the debt were not repaid in time. We can all too well imagine a poor harvest leading to a high-stakes loan of grain from a ruthless creditor, in turn leading to the seizure of young children – who are then enslaved for the remainder of their lives.^[3] Classical Greek writers capitalized on this idea, yet another trope with which to paint Egypt as barbaric: Diodorus Siculus (1st century BC) wrote that the Egyptians practiced debt bondage until its outlawing as part of a systemic law reform.

But was the practice of debt bondage in Egypt of this period ever a reality?^[4] Although documentary evidence from the Late Period of Egypt (8th – 5th centuries BC) is sparse, the evidence includes clearly delineated property lists of security for loans, as well as the first appearances of self-sale into enslavement. In these property lists, children do indeed appear alongside cattle and slaves as property to be potentially seized if the debtor did not pay up; some of these loan documents also include a clause of liability stating that debts were liable to “upon the heads of the children” should the debtor default. The self-sales also pose some questions regarding debt bondage; to modern sensibilities, voluntary entrance into enslavement seems almost unthinkable, and modern interpreters of these texts are left wondering if debt could have been a motivator. As a result, it is unsurprising that the inclusion of children in security lists, the clause of liability, and the self-sales into enslavement are understood as evidence of debt bondage. While this interpretation of the evidence is understandable, it is also inaccurate.

This paper examines the evidence of debt bondage in the Late Period,^[5] or, more precisely, lack thereof. In loan contracts, this examination focuses on the inclusion of children in securities as well as the clause that the debt would fall “upon their [i.e. the children’s] heads” in the event of a default, with an eye to determining whether children were seized or held captive as part of the stipulations of a ^[6]contract loan. Ultimately, it seems that seizure and captivity may have served as a threat, but one which did not manifest in reality. Instead, the clause of liability was only intended to stress the perseverance of the debt past the debtors’ lifetime. In the context of self-sales, this paper surveys the social, economic, explicit, and implicit motivations behind self-sale into enslavement; debt does not appear to have been one of those motivators. Whether as a result of systematic law reform or not, there is no evidence for enslavement as a direct result of debt in Egypt of this time period.

2 Terminology of Loans, Debt, and Security

In legal scholarship and common parlance, there is a wide variety of terms which can be used to refer to a debt relationship and the property involved. Some of these terms can overlap in meaning (e.g. security and collateral). For increased legibility, it is therefore helpful to set a common vernacular of the terms used throughout this paper, alongside working definitions.

3 Definition of Debt Bondage

A pawn is an object or person who can be physically transferred from the debtor to the creditor in the event of default on a debt. This pawn could be seized (transferred as a possession from debtor to creditor) or distrained (transferred as a possession from debtor to creditor only until the debt is repaid). The seizure or distraint of a (human) pawn is, by definition, debt bondage.^[7]

Debt bondage can take three forms: (1) creditor-motivated seizure of a pawn following a failure to pay; (2) debtor-consented seizure of pawn (defined above as distraint of a pawn) until the debt is repaid; and (3) self-sale by the debtor into slavery to satisfy the debt, i.e. the debt is considered repaid following the self-sale (definitions of the terminology used in these forms of bondage are provided in Table 1). The types of debt bondage and their characteristics are summarised in Table 2, below.

All three of these types of debt bondage may be applied to different statuses of person. For example, a slave, a free laborer, and a free child of a debtor could all theoretically be pledged as security and potentially seized or distrained; a free laborer could sell themselves into slavery to pay off their own debt; and/or a free child could be sold by a parent to pay off a parent’s debt.

The first two types of debt bondage could both lead to the creditor acquiring one or more new laborers (enslaved or not) to add to his household. Presumably in Type 1, the creditor would want this laborer embedded within his household, since the seizure would be motivated by the creditor. In Type 2, the creditor may not necessarily want or need a new laborer, but acquires (and is responsible for) one regardless until the debt is repaid. In both Type 1 and Type 2, the creditor could put his newly-acquired pawns to work until the debt was repaid.^{[8] [9]}

The differences between Type 1 and Type 2 lie in both the motivation and the nature of the agreement. In Type 1, the seizure is creditor-motivated; in Type 2, the offering of a pawn is debtor-motivated. The nature of the agreement also differs: in Type 1, seizure occurred only after time has elapsed and the debt unpaid; in Type 2, distraint occurred while the debt was still waiting to be paid. Nonetheless, the two types are similar in that the bondage ends once the debt is paid and the pawn returned. The types are also similar in that the labor of the pawn does not contribute in any way to the repayment of the loan itself. In other words, both types of debt bondage are not a form of indentured servitude,^[10] since the pawn is not “working off” the debt or which s/he was pledged, and was returned to the debtor if and when the original debt was repaid in full.

Self-sale as satisfaction of a debt (Type 3) is the most distinctive of the three types of debt bondage, despite Moses Finley’s assertion that “sale into bondage and debt-bondage cannot be distinguished very sharply.”^[11] If an individual pledges themselves as security and then defaults on a loan, their seizure as a laborer could be considered as a seizure-after-default (Type 1). However, self-sale (Type 3) is a different mechanism in that the transaction in itself satisfies the debt:^[12] once an individual has sold themselves into slavery with the express purpose of satisfying a debt, the debt is paid off following the transaction. This lies in contrast with seizure of one’s own person, in which the debt is not considered paid off following the transaction. Self-sale is also more final than self-seizure,^[13] since in order to exit enslavement, a person who has sold themselves would then need to purchase their way out of enslavement, rather than simply repaying the debt for which they had been pledged as collateral.

The three types of debt bondage outlined above are roughly aligned with the three general types of loan security in Demotic documents, as outlined by Joseph Manning^[14] and summarised in Table 3.

The alignment of the types of debt bondage with the types of loan security in demotic documentation prompts a general discussion of the nature of security in loan contracts – namely, the question of what outcome would befall any property pledged as security in the event of a debtor default, human or non-human.

4 Loans, Debt, and Security in Egypt of the Late Period

Evidence for loans and debt in the centuries before the 8th century BC is meagre, though the basic principles associated with pledging and security are indirectly attested: the family of an absconder from mandatory labor were seized in order to encourage him to return to work; a farmer’s family was seized after missing tax payments; a man was seized when his father refused to return copper tools; and the official Wenamun seized thirty deben of silver, to be returned to the owner only when Wenamun’s own missing property is returned to him.^[15]

But all in all, these are secondary examples of security, and were not contractually binding. Before the first millennium, security was served by social and religious credit:^[16] an oath in the name of a local deity (invoking beatings and a fine if the debt is not repaid); community trust in the individual to repay a debt; or an infrequent appearance of a third-party guarantor.^[17] Clearly formulated loan documents – including security and interest – were a feature of the first millennium onwards.

A total of fourteen contract loans from the Late Period (dating from 882 BC to 400 BC) are recorded in Aramaic, Demotic, and Abnormal Hieratic, and summarised in Table 4. Most of these contract loans (eight out of fourteen) record the loan of an amount of grain, five record a loan of an amount of silver, and one records the loan of a cow.

Repayment was expected between a month to nine months after the contract was drawn up, usually with interest. Eight^[18] of the above contract loans included security. The term for security in Demotic was i̓wyt, ^[19] derived from an earlier Egyptian word i̓wꜣ, ^[20] which was used in reference to a replacement or substitute person seized for compulsory labor.^[21] By the Late Period, the seizure was hypothetical, and i̓wyt referred only to the security itself.^[22]

Loans were frequently accompanied by a statement of the security^[23] against which the loan was borrowed. In the Late Period, most of the contract loans in both Aramaic and Egyptian included a full guarantee of “general liability” which allowed the creditor to seize any desired item(s) from a list of the debtor’s property,^[24] rather than a specific security, a further protection of the creditor’s interests through the pledging of the debtor’s entire property.

In both the Aramaic and Demotic legal tradition, these lists were categorical and detailed with little variation between them, and included everything that a person might conceivably own: houses, fields, male and female slaves, cows, donkeys, silver, copper, clothing, wheat, and emmer. On two occasions, these lists also included children,^[25] leading to the suggestion that these dependents could be seized following a default on a loan, but there is little evidence of such a seizure occurring beyond its threat.

For evidence of seizure of (non-human) pledged property, one can turn to Joseph Manning’s classification of types of security: seizure following default; pawning; and transfer of title as security. Of these, in the Ptolemaic Period pawning appears to have been the most common, and seizure following default occurring only in the form of conditional conveyance ripening to true conveyance once a debtor defaults. Both pawning and seizure essentially both served as a kind of conditional sale, in which money (the loan amount) was exchanged for an object (the security), and the object (security) returned after the money had been repaid. If the loan was not paid off in time, only then did the “conditional” sale become real: the money, rather than representing a loan amount, now represented the sale price for the object – which was now just a commodity, rather than security. At least in the Ptolemaic Period, an additional document may have been drawn up to establish the rights of the creditor to the pledged property while awaiting the repayment of the loan.

In the time between the loan contract and repayment, this pledged (i.e. conditionally sold) object could theoretically be sold to a third party. Such a situation is presented in the Demotic Legal Manual of Hermopolis West,^[26] a set of hypothetical legal scenarios. In one scenario, a debtor pledged a house as security on a loan, and subsequently sold that house to a third party, which was a perfectly acceptable action.

In sum, the process of a debtor conveying property-as-security to a creditor for the purposes of distraint or seizure following default was complex, contractual, and recorded in writing. There is no evidence of this process occurring for non-human pledged security in the Late Period. As ever when dealing with written contracts, it is entirely possible that this process was oral and therefore not recorded in writing. However, the legal tradition leads to some expectation of any evidence of such seizure, even indirect^[27] – and no such evidence is present.

5 “But Diodorus Siculus Said…!”

The concept of a manifested practice of debt bondage in Late Period Egypt has remained so pervasive^[64] in large part due to the 1st century BC Greek historian Diodorus Siculus. Diodorus explicitly wrote that the 8th century BC pharaoh Bocchoris outlawed debt slavery:^[65]

“The repayment of loans could be exacted only from a manʼs estate, and under no condition did he [Bocchoris] allow the debtorʼs person to be subject to seizure.”

The argument for debt bondage in Egypt reasons that if Bocchoris outlawed debt bondage, then surely such a concept had to have existed beforehand in order for him to consider its legality or illegality.^[66] But Diodorus’ account of Bocchoris is far from reliable as a historical source.^[67] Diodorus claimed that Bocchoris undertook a massive program of codifying public and private Egyptian law, but no trace of these laws or their codification exists, including the abolition of debt bondage. The choice of Bocchoris for this role of “law-giver” was likely a joint Egyptian-Greek venture that had little to do with what Bocchoris achieved and far more to do with who (or what) he represented. As the ancestor of the Twenty-Seventh (Saite) Dynasty, the characterisation of Bocchoris as a wise ruler was key to the legitimisation of the Late Period rulers of Egypt before the Persian conquest in 525 BC.

Diodorus’ account of Bocchoris, including the ruling about debt bondage, served two purposes: first, it highlighted how barbarous Egypt was before Bocchoris instituted reforms;^[68] and second, it emphasized Solon’s brilliance in borrowing these reforms and bringing them to Greece.^[69] Neither of these have much bearing on or relevance to historical events, and there is no more reason to believe that Bocchoris outlawed debt bondage than there is to believe that Solon imported Bocchoris’ legal reforms in their entirety into Greece.

6 Conclusions

This paper examined the inclusion of children security on loans and the motivations behind self-sale into enslavement, in order to investigate whether these phenomena could serve as evidence of debt bondage in the Late Period. Although debt bondage as a result of seizure or distraint may have represented a theoretical or hypothetical threat, ultimately there is no evidence that this threat manifested into practical reality. Children were included as debt security in two instances, but, in parallel, there is no direct or indirect evidence that the children included were seized following default nor distrained as pawns while the debt was outstanding.

In the event of a debtor default, a fine was the most likely outcome, followed by the seizure of other (non-human) property listed in the security. This type of seizure is supported by some Aramaic loan documents which include an order-of-operations in the event of insolvency: first a fine, then seizure.^[70] The hefty interest rates (as high as 100 % monthly) and fines recorded in many of the loan contracts suggest that a fine, or alternatively a collection of high interest, were preferable to the seizure of a person; seizure which would then saddle a creditor with the responsibilities of the feeding and housing of a depdendant while awaiting repayment of a loan.

Regarding the possibility of self-sale into enslavement to satisfy a debt, the four extant self-sales from the Late Period do not appear to be related to debt. If debt motivated the self-sale, Demotic legal tradition suggests that this debt would have been alluded to directly (e.g. through mention of the debt owed and perhaps even its amount) or indirectly (e.g. by noting an earlier document related to the transaction). The self-sales do not evidence such references. The single reference to a motivation of any kind is recorded in a transfer of title of a previously self-sold slave; the transfer of the title is motivated by the circumstance in which his current owner took care of him when he was about to die.

7 Implications

Returning to the hypothetical scenario of debt bondage outlined at the beginning of this paper, but with a clearer understanding of the absence such a practice in Late Period Egypt, raises some deeper questions about personal and social motivations for the repayment of debt. Since the world of Late Period Egypt was not one in which parents callously handed their children over for credit, what can be inferred about social relationships and responsibilities from parents to children? Additionally, though no less importantly, debt bondage is far from absent in other, contemporary societies such as Greece,^[71] Israel,^[72] and Mesopotamia.^[73] Presumably, this means that Egypt relied on other forms of security; on what other forms of security did the Egyptians rely? Relatedly, and as noted above, the lack of explicit motivations in the self-sale contracts of the Late Period naturally leads us to question the implicit motivations: if the self-sale was not meant to fulfil a debt, why indeed did people sell themselves into enslavement? I will now attempt to briefly answer these three questions within the context of this discussion, though each one certainly deserves a full-length work of its own.

The expectations for parent-child relationships in Egypt shed some light on why debt bondage should not considered a manifestable threat. Children had important social and religious obligations to their parent, which would be socially reprehensible to deny. The obligations between parents and children were reciprocal: parents educated their children and provided protection from physical difficulties,^[74] and in exchange, children took care of their elderly parents and maintained their funerary cult after they died.^[75] This last point is particularly salient, since providing for the parents’ mummification, burial, and funerary cult ensured that parent’s re-birth into the afterlife.^[76] To remand a child into bondage would both forsake the social ideals of parental obligations as well as surrender the reciprocal and expected, benefits of care. To break the family contract for the sake of satisfying a mere loan contract would make little sense, either ethically or financially.

Since debt bondage did not manifest in actuality, one must wonder on the motivations of Late Period Egyptians to pay back their debts in a timely manner. The role of social pressure and conformity should not be underestimated as motivating factors. Although the first millennium saw the development of clearly delineated security clauses in loans, it is possible that, as in earlier periods, true credit was determined by a model reliant on “generalized reciprocity”. Since exchange relationships were maintained through open credit, the upkeep of good social reputation (e.g. one in which a person can be relied upon to repay his debts) was more important than short-term gain.^[77]

Finally, what were the social conditions that might impel a person to see no other course of action than to sell themselves into slavery? It should be taken into account that the evidence for self-sale is limited temporally to the Late Period, and limited too in its scope: there are only four self-sales into slavery, three of which involve the same slave and come from the same archive. To say that this was a common practice would be misleading, but nevertheless, it did occur. As for its motivations, it is likely that self-sales fit into the larger role of patronage, protection, and dependency in pharaonic Egypt.^[78] Entry into a household or institution was not only socially preferable to isolation and unprotection, but practically speaking, entry also included with it the basics of maintenance, like food and shelter.^[79] This is not to say that Egyptian slavery was an institution with humane intentions, only that the motivations for – and experiences of – self-enslavement should be contextualized within Egyptian social mores.