Preventing spread of chemical weapons in an era of rapid technological change

Success in chemical disarmament

The ultimate aim of the CWC is to eliminate all chemical weapons worldwide while promoting the peaceful uses of chemistry, thereby enhancing international security and stability [1]. One of several disarmament treaties for weapons of mass destruction, the CWC is widely regarded as the most successful. Its success is often attributed, in part, to its near-universal membership. With a total of 193 states that have joined, so-called States Parties, and only four countries yet to do so, 98% of the global population is living under the protection of the Convention [2]. The success of the CWC is further underscored by the recognition of the OPCW, which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013 for “its extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons” [3]. However, this success is most clearly demonstrated by the tangible results that have been achieved. A historic milestone was reached in July 2023, when the last chemical weapon from the stockpiles declared by all States Parties was verified as irreversibly destroyed [4]. Over 72,000 metric tonnes of chemical warfare agents—including nerve agents, mustard gas, and their precursors—have been eliminated, overcoming significant technical challenges in a process that took 26 years to complete. This marks a monumental achievement in chemical disarmament.

Aside from its adherence and achievements in chemical disarmament, the CWC’s significant success also stems from its comprehensive scope. The CWC’s scientific counterpart, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), entered into force in 1975, more than 20 years before the CWC [5]. The text of the BWC is less than four pages long and has just 14 articles. By contrast, the CWC spans 167 pages, with 24 articles and three annexes. Addressing some of the BWC’s limitations, the CWC is a more robust and enforceable treaty for chemical weapons. For example, while the BWC lacks an implementing body, the CWC has the OPCW, a permanent body based in The Hague, the Netherlands. The OPCW oversees implementation, verification, and compliance. Additionally, the CWC incorporates a rigorous verification regime which ensures transparency, builds confidence, and provides a strong framework for monitoring compliance. Notably, the CWC is designed to be adaptable to advances in science and technology. To achieve this, the Convention requires regular review of these advances relevant to its implementation. Furthermore, the CWC mandates the establishment of a Scientific Advisory Board (SAB)—the only disarmament treaty to do so—which is tasked with conducting this review.

Unique scientific advice mechanism

Since its first meeting in 1998, the SAB has become a trusted source of objective, well-informed, and sound scientific advice [6]. The SAB achieves its robust and reliable outputs by ensuring diverse expertise among its members. Advances in science and technology that may impact the CWC are vast, ranging from developments in chemical detection and analysis to emerging technologies such as synthetic biology and artificial intelligence (AI). This breadth is reflected in the multidisciplinary knowledge and skills of the 25 SAB members. Fixed-term appointments leading to regular turnover of members allow the SAB’s knowledge base to evolve alongside scientific progress. Additionally, members are drawn from diverse professional roles, including academia, industry, and government, and represent a wide range of geographic regions across CWC States Parties. Importantly, SAB members serve in their individual capacities and do not represent their governments, ensuring that their advice remains objective, impartial, and politically neutral.

The SAB convenes in person at the OPCW headquarters at least once a year, engaging in dynamic, in-depth discussions on a wide array of topics relevant to the CWC. These discussions are informed not only by the expertise of the SAB members but also by the insights of external experts who are invited to share their knowledge and perspectives. The SAB monitors and reviews relevant advances in science and technology, adopting a risk-based and holistic approach to assess how they may impact the implementation of the Convention. This approach reflects the interdisciplinary nature of modern science. These developments can present opportunities, risks, or—most often—both. The SAB examines a broad range of scientific and technological topics. It may recommend that a temporary working group (TWG), with a time-bound mandate, is established to explore specific, relevant topics in more detail. The findings from the SAB and TWG meetings are captured in detailed reports which are made publicly available on the OPCW’s website [7]. One of the principal products of the SAB’s work is its comprehensive report on developments in science and technology, submitted to every five-yearly “Review Conference” which reviews the operation of the CWC.

The SAB’s fifth and latest report, covering the period between the 4^th Review Conference in 2018 and the 5^th in May 2023, was issued in February 2023 [8]. It consolidates insights from its meeting reports, temporary working groups, and workshops during this period, in addition to data from its review of the scientific literature and other relevant documentation. Reflecting the rapid pace of developments in science and technology, over the past 20 years the SAB’s reports to the Review Conferences have expanded in length, complexity, and the range of topics covered, with the latest report presenting a record total of 45 recommendations.

Key advances in science and technology

In this recent report, the SAB identified several overarching trends. It noted that developments in science and technology are progressing at an unprecedented pace. Scientific fields and technologies are converging and the boundaries between the traditional physical, biological, and digital realms are becoming blurred. Transdisciplinary approaches facilitated by international collaborations are emerging to address modern challenges. Instrumentation and equipment are becoming more affordable and powerful, often with an increased flexibility of application. Consequently, these tools and technologies are becoming easier to access by would-be malicious actors, and the technical barriers to their use are lowering. The SAB highlighted that advances in science and technology are presenting an ever-changing set of challenges and opportunities to the implementation of the CWC and the work of the OPCW.

The SAB’s core focus, which has remained consistent since its inception, is on understanding chemicals, their production methods, and trends in the chemical sciences, including those in industry. This deep knowledge helps the OPCW and States Parties identify potential threats, such as novel chemicals or emerging production technologies that could facilitate the creation of chemical weapons. It also supports the development of detection equipment and medical countermeasures and can lead to improvements in chemical safety. By monitoring these advances, vulnerabilities can be addressed and emerging threats can be mitigated, while also leading to increased efficiency, sustainability, and safety.

In its review of technological advances during the preparation of its recent report, the SAB identified and examined a number of relevant cross-cutting technologies. For example, AI, additive manufacturing (often called 3D printing), nanotechnology, unmanned aerial vehicles (also known as drones), and biotechnology are transforming the scientific and technological landscape, with wide-ranging applications and impact across multiple domains relevant to the Convention. These technologies are often combined, creating synergies that enhance capabilities, providing additional means to address challenges relevant to the Convention.

In the context of the CWC, these cross-cutting technologies are classified as “dual use” in the sense that they have legitimate civilian and commercial purposes, but could also be used in the creation of weapons. For example, AI-driven automated processes can be used in chemical production or the targeted application of pesticides to crops using drones. At the same time, these technologies pose risks if misused for harmful purposes, such as using AI to design new chemical weapons with specific properties, 3D-printing chemical equipment to bypass export controls, or using drones to disperse toxic chemicals over populated areas or critical infrastructure. This dual-use potential underscores the critical need for ongoing vigilance and continuous monitoring of developments in these areas.

Of particular significance is AI, whose developments the SAB has been monitoring over the past decade. The SAB noted that AI is incredibly versatile, with an “unparallelled flexibility of application”. It is emerging as a powerful enabling technology that is increasingly being integrated into many disciplines and technologies, including robotics, drones, and biotechnology. For example, AI can be applied throughout the entire chemical synthesis process. AI-powered retrosynthesis platforms can provide possible synthesis routes to a target molecule. AI can also be used to optimise reaction conditions and outcomes, as well as predict key properties such as toxicity, bioactivity, and solubility.

In automated synthesis, AI-driven robots not only produce chemicals more reproducibly but also accelerate development, enhance productivity, and augment safety. However, automation is not the only way in which AI is driving improvements in safety. The Internet of Things and connected workers with smart personal protective equipment can monitor an operating environment in real time, ensuring worker safety. Computer vision and AI-driven predictive analytics can analyse camera footage and sensor data to monitor safety conditions and equipment viability.

The SAB observed that the field of AI is incredibly fast-moving: scientific publications are prolific and growing, and the applications are continuing to emerge. In its view, AI presents many opportunities for implementation of the CWC and the work of the OPCW. Examples included “strengthening the verification regime, streamlining certain chemical weapons-related research activities, and possibly leading to breakthroughs in research on medical countermeasures to chemical weapons exposure.” Nevertheless, the SAB highlighted the potential for AI to be misused to discover novel routes to, and accelerate the production of, new and existing chemical weapons. The Board recommended that the OPCW should monitor closely developments in AI-assisted chemistry and consider not only the potential risks they pose, but also the opportunities they may offer. It also underscored the need for ethical guidelines and robust safeguards to promote the responsible use of AI.

One of the technologies increasingly benefitting from AI integration is drones, particularly those used in agriculture. Drones are becoming more widely available and affordable, making them accessible to a broader range of users. Advances in battery technologies are increasing flight times and payload capacities, meaning that agricultural drones can transport greater quantities of chemicals over greater distances. AI-powered drones are employed in precision farming, enabling autonomous navigation, real-time crop monitoring, and optimised pesticide application. These advances are boosting efficiency and sustainability, reducing the quantities of chemicals released and improving yields.

Within the context of the CWC, drones are a versatile tool offering numerous benefits. They could be used for the real-time monitoring of a chemical incident site or chemical production plant, or designed to take samples in hazardous or inaccessible environments. Drones could also be integrated with sensor technologies to detect chemical warfare agents. However, as a dual-use technology, drones also have the potential to be misused. The SAB recognised that they could be used to deliver toxic chemicals causing deliberate harm and, if integrated with facial recognition technology, drones could carry out highly targeted chemical attacks. It advised that continued monitoring and assessment of advances in this area will be important for minimising the potential risks of misuse.

In its report, the SAB also highlighted some of the developments in additive manufacturing since 2018. These include increased layer thickness and laser power, leading to quicker build times. In some industries, additive manufacturing has shifted from enabling rapid prototyping to being incorporated in production processes. It is now routinely used in many industrial sectors, including automotive, robotics, pharmaceutical and medical, and even the food industry.

Similar to AI and drones, the SAB noted that additive manufacturing presents some significant opportunities in the context of the Convention. It could be leveraged to accelerate research due to its low cost, decreased fabrication times, and flexibility. Its application in drug delivery can be used to either print medication with specific or personalised release profiles, or it can be used to print a variety of drug delivery devices. This could have a potential application in developing medical countermeasures to chemical weapons exposure. At the same time, the SAB noted the potential risks posed by this technology. Reactionware can be fabricated using chemically resistant materials, potentially overcoming the difficulties in acquiring controlled equipment. Additive manufacturing can also be used to produce components of improvised explosive devices, including the energetic materials.

The application of continuous flow chemistry is gaining traction in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries due to its advantages over traditional batch processes. By enabling faster, safer, and more environmentally sustainable reactions, flow chemistry produces higher quality products with a smaller operational footprint. It is increasingly integrated with other emerging technologies, including AI.

The Board suggested that the modularity and mobility of continuous flow equipment could make it a suitable tool for the on-site destruction of chemical warfare agents. However, these same features could be exploited for nefarious purposes, including the production of hazardous materials like organophosphorus compounds.

Impact of the SAB’s advice

By effectively monitoring and assessing developments in science and technology, the SAB ensures a comprehensive understanding of their implications for the Convention. Its robust and impartial advice is crucial not only for the Director-General and Technical Secretariat of the OPCW but also for States Parties, particularly those with limited access to scientific resources. This advice also forms the technical basis for informed policy development, as well as ensuring that the Technical Secretariat and States Parties are best prepared to address future challenges and able to harness the benefits and opportunities offered as science and technology progress.

Only a small proportion of the advances discussed in the SAB’s report are presented here. A more detailed summary of its findings, with an update on advice since the report, will be published in the coming months. This article will also highlight how the OPCW is taking forward the SAB’s advice and recommendations and implementing them in its work. The Director-General has emphasised that the implications of AI for the CWC remain a priority for the OPCW [9]. Ongoing monitoring, assessing, and adapting to advances in science and technology are essential to support non-proliferation and disarmament goals, rather than undermine them.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the OPCW.