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The core of a strategic game

  • Parkash Chander EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: March 22, 2018
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
From the journal The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics Volume 19 Issue 1

Abstract

In this paper, I introduce and study the γ-core of a general strategic game. I first show that the γ-core of an arbitrary strategic game is smaller than the conventional α- and β- cores. I then consider the partition function form of a general strategic game and show that a prominent class of partition function games admit nonempty γ-cores. Finally, I show that each γ-core payoff vector (a cooperative solution) can be supported as an equilibrium outcome of an intuitive non-cooperative game and the grand coalition is the unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the γ-core is non-empty.

Keywords: strategic game; core; partition function; repeated game; Nash program
JEL Classification: C71-73

Notes

The paper has benefitted from comments by Myrna Wooders, Parimal Bag, and seminar participants at UPenn and Vanderbilt University. Two anonymous referees of this journal made very useful comments which have led to significant improvements in the paper. An earlier version of the paper was completed during my visit to Nanyang Technological University (NTU) in fall 2016. I wish to thank the Department of Economics, NTU, for the hospitality and stimulating environment.

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Published Online: 2018-03-22

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  4. On Decay Centrality
  5. Sequential Auctions with Decreasing Reserve Prices
  6. The core of a strategic game
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  8. Representation in Multi-Issue Delegated Bargaining
  9. Endogenous Mergers in Markets with Vertically Differentiated Products
  10. Standards of Proof and Civil Litigation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
  11. Retained Earnings, Interest Rates and Lending Relationship
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  14. Sellouts, Beliefs, and Bandwagon Behavior
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  16. Eco-Firms and the Sequential Adoption of Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility in the Managerial Delegation
  17. Vertical Contract and Competition Intensity in Hotelling’s Model
  18. Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogeneous Workers with Preferences over Peers
  19. Irrelevance of the Strategic Variable in the Case of Relative Performance Maximization
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https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2017-0155
Keywords for this article
strategic game; core; partition function; repeated game; Nash program

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Articles
  2. Privatizing Multi-subsidiary Public Firm in Location Model
  3. Efficient Combinatorial Allocations: Individual Rationality versus Stability
  4. On Decay Centrality
  5. Sequential Auctions with Decreasing Reserve Prices
  6. The core of a strategic game
  7. Targeted Advertising on Competing Platforms
  8. Representation in Multi-Issue Delegated Bargaining
  9. Endogenous Mergers in Markets with Vertically Differentiated Products
  10. Standards of Proof and Civil Litigation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
  11. Retained Earnings, Interest Rates and Lending Relationship
  12. Uniform Price Auctions with Asymmetric Bidders
  13. Conformity and Influence
  14. Sellouts, Beliefs, and Bandwagon Behavior
  15. Notes
  16. Eco-Firms and the Sequential Adoption of Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility in the Managerial Delegation
  17. Vertical Contract and Competition Intensity in Hotelling’s Model
  18. Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogeneous Workers with Preferences over Peers
  19. Irrelevance of the Strategic Variable in the Case of Relative Performance Maximization
  20. Critical Efficiencies as Upward Pricing Pressure with Feedback Effects
  21. On the Openness of Unique Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
  22. Forecast Dispersion in Finite-Player Forecasting Games
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