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Sequential Auctions with Decreasing Reserve Prices

  • Massimiliano Landi and Domenico Menicucci EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: January 19, 2018

Abstract

We study sequential sealed bid auctions with decreasing reserve prices when there are two identical objects for sale and unit-demand bidders (existing literature has dealt with the case of weakly increasing reserve prices). Under decreasing reserve prices bidders may have an incentive not to bid in the first auction, and no equilibrium exists with a strictly increasing stage one bidding function. However, we find that an equilibrium always exists, and its shape depends on the distance between the two reserve prices. The equilibrium exhibits some pooling at the stage one auction, which disappears in the limit as the number of bidders tends to infinity. We also show revenue equivalence between first-price and second-price sequential auctions under decreasing reserve prices. Finally, our results allow us to shed some light on an optimal order problem (increasing versus decreasing exogenous reserve prices) for selling the two objects.

JEL Classification: C7; D44

Appendix

A Proof of Proposition 2

Remember that for each x and y in [x_,xˉ] we use u˜S(x,y) to denote the payoff of a bidder with value x if he bids b˜S(1)(y) in stage one, given that all the other bidders follow the strategy (b˜S(1),bS(2)). For instance, u˜S(x,x_) is the payoff of type x from not bidding in stage one; u˜S(x,γ), or u˜S(x,λ), is his payoff from bidding r1 in stage one.

Proof of Proposition 2(i)

We prove that there exists a unique r˜1(r2,rˉ1) such that if r1(r2,r˜1), then there exists a unique solution to eqs. (16)-(17) and there exists an equilibrium in which each bidder bids according to the strategy (b˜S(1),bS(2)).

Although some details of the proof are cumbersome, its logic is simple. We employ several steps to obtain this result. First, we determine the payoff for each bidder type from not bidding, bidding r1, or bidding βn1,r2(y) for some y[λ,xˉ]. To this purpose, we need to use (5). Hence, we need to derive a bidder’s beliefs in case he loses, as a function of his stage one bid. Second, we show that the system of (16)-(17) has a unique solution. Last, we show (in the Supplementary Material) that the bidding function we obtain is strictly increasing in the interval [λ,xˉ], and that no profitable deviation exists for any type of bidder.

Step 1: Derivation of u˜S(x,x_), u˜S(x,γ) and u˜S(x,y)

We start by illustrating how u˜S(x,x_),u˜S(x,γ) and u˜S(x,y) are derived. To this end, we need to determine the updated beliefs for a bidder who lost at stage one – because he did not participate in the auction, bid r1, or he bid βn1,r2(y). These beliefs are conditional on the information the bidder learns at stage one: his bid at stage one (which we denote with b) and the winning bid at stage one (which we denote with bw). In order to shorten the notation, we set ΓF(γ) and ΛF(λ).

Step 1.1: Updated Beliefs for a Bidder who has not Bid at Stage One, and u˜S(x,x_).

Consider a bidder with type x who has made no bid at stage one. Here we describe his beliefs upon learning bw, and his expected payoff u˜S(x,x_) from (5).

  1. In case there has been no bid by any bidder, an event with probability Γn1 from the bidder’s ex ante point of view, his beliefs are given by the c.d.f. G˜(|no,no) such that

    (30)G˜(s|no,no)=Fn1(s)Γn1if s[x_,γ)1if s[γ,xˉ]
  2. In case bw=r1, an event with probability Λn1Γn1 from the bidder’s ex ante point of view, his beliefs are given by the c.d.f. G˜(|no,r1) such that

    (31)G˜(s|no,r1)=(n1)(ΛΓ)Λn1Γn1Fn2(s)if s[x_,γ)ΛΓΛn1Γn1Fn1(s)Γn1F(s)Γif s[γ,λ]1if s(λ,xˉ]

    About the derivation of G˜(s|no,r1), consider the point of view of, say, bidder 1; the following probabilities refer to the n1 bidders different from 1. For s[x_,γ), G˜(s|no,r1) is obtained from the probability that one of the other bidders has value in [γ,λ] and each other bidder has value smaller than s. This probability is equal to (n1)(ΛΓ)Fn2(s).

    For s[γ,λ], G˜(s|no,r1) is obtained from the probability that at least one of the other bidders has value in [γ,λ], none of them has value bigger than λ, and each of the non winning bidders with value x[γ,λ] is such that xs. Such a probability is given by[20]

    (32)(n1)(ΛΓ)j=0n2Cn2,jj+1Γn2j(F(s)Γ)j

    Specifically, ΛΓ is the probability that a bidder (the winner) has value in [γ,λ] and we have n1 possible ways of picking a winner. If there are j other bidders (from the remaining n2) whose value is greater than γ, we need each of them to have value less than s, and 1j+1 is the probability that our initially selected bidder wins. Remark that

    (33)Cn2,jj+1Γn2j(F(s)Γ)j=Cn1,j+1(n1)(F(s)Γ)Γn2j(F(s)Γ)j+1

    for j=0,1,...,n2. The right hand side of (33) is equal to Cn1,h(n1)(F(s)Γ)Γn1h(F(s)Γ)h, for h=1,2,...,n1 (with h=j+1). Hence (32) is equal to

    (n1)(ΛΓ)h=1n1Cn1,h(n1)(F(s)Γ)Γn1h(F(s)Γ)h=ΛΓF(s)ΓFn1(s)Γn1
  3. In case bw=b˜S(1)(z) for some z(λ,xˉ], an event with probability 1Λn1 from the bidder’s ex ante point of view, his beliefs are given by the c.d.f. with value Fn2(s)/Fn2(z) if s[x_,z), with value 1 if s[z,xˉ]. This c.d.f. applies for each stage one bid bb˜S(1)(z) as long as the winning bid has been b˜S(1)(z) for some z(λ,xˉ]; hence we define G˜(s|b,b˜S(1)(z)) such that

    (34)G˜(s|b,b˜S(1)(z))=Fn2(s)Fn2(z)if s[x_,z)1if s[z,xˉ]for each bb˜S(1)(z)

When he decides to make no bid, the bidder’s expected beliefs are represented by the c.d.f. G˜no such that

G˜no(s)=Γn1G˜(s|no,no)+(Λn1Γn1)G˜(s|no,r1)+λxˉG˜(s|no,b˜S(1)(z))dFn1(z)=Fn1(s)+(n1)(1Γ)Fn2(s)if s[x_,γ)Γn1+(ΛΓ)(Fn1(s)Γn1)F(s)Γ+(n1)(1Λ)Fn2(s)if s[γ,λ](n1)Fn2(s)(n2)Fn1(s)if s(λ,xˉ]

using eqs. (30), (31) and (34). Hence the payoff of a type x from not bidding at stage one is

(35)u˜S(x,x_)=r2xG˜no(s)ds

Step 1.2: Updated Beliefs for a Bidder who has Bid r1 at Stage one but has not Won at Stage one, and u˜S(x,γ).

For future convenience, we introduce the following function M, defined for a[0,1] and b[0,1]:

(36)M(a,b)=(n1)annan1b+bn(ab)2if abn(n1)2an2if a=b

Multiplying (ab)2 by (n1)an2+(n2)an3b+...+2abn3+bn2 reveals that

(37)M(a,b)=(n1)an2+(n2)an3b+...+2abn3+bn2

and therefore M is strictly increasing both with respect to a and with respect to b.

For a bidder bidding r1, the probability to win at stage one is

(38)p˜(γ)=j=0n1Cn1,jj+1Γn1j(ΛΓ)j=j=0n1Cn,j+1n(ΛΓ)Γn1j(ΛΓ)j+1=h=1nCn,hn(ΛΓ)Γnh(ΛΓ)h=ΛnΓnn(ΛΓ)

Let p˜ denote the probability that another bidder wins at stage one with a bid of r1. The probability that another bidder wins at stage one with a bid b˜S(1)(z) for some z(λ,xˉ] is 1Λn1. Since p˜(γ)+p˜+1Λn1=1, it follows that p˜=Λn1p˜(γ), that is

(39)p˜=ΛΓnM(Λ,Γ)=(n1)(ΛΓ)j=0n2Cn2,jj+2Γn2jΛΓj

Now consider a bidder who has bid r1 at stage one but has not won. Then either bw=r1, or bw=b˜S(1)(z) for some z(λ,xˉ].

  1. In case bw=r1 and another bidder has won, an event with probability p˜ from the bidder’s ex ante point of view, his beliefs are given by G˜(|r1,r1) such that

    (40)G˜(s|r1,r1)=(n1)(ΛΓ)2p˜Fn2(s)if s[x_,γ)ΛΓnp˜M(F(s),Γ)if s[γ,λ]1if s(λ,xˉ]

    Considering the point of view of bidder 1, the derivation of G˜(s|r1,r1) for s[x_,γ) is similar to the derivation of G˜(s|no,r1) for s[x_,γ), taking into account that bidder 1 has bid r1 rather than abstaining from bidding.

    For s[γ,λ], G˜(s|r1,r1) is obtained from the probability that none of the other bidders has value greater than λ, at least one of them has value in [γ,λ] and wins, and each losing bidder with value x[γ,λ] is such that xs. This probability is equal to

    (41)(n1)(ΛΓ)j=0n2Cn2,jj+2Γn2j(F(s)Γ)j

    From (39) we see that j=0n2Cn2,jj+2Γn2j(ΛΓ)j=M(Λ,Γ)n(n1). Hence (41) is equal to

    (n1)(ΛΓ)j=0n2Cn2,jj+2Γn2j(F(s)Γ)j=ΛΓnM(F(s),Γ)
  2. In case bw=b˜S(1)(z) for some z(λ,xˉ], an event with probability 1Λn1 from the bidder’s ex ante point of view, his beliefs are given by G˜(|r1,b˜S(1)(z)) in (34).

When he decides to bid r1 at stage one, the bidder expects to lose with probability 1p˜(γ)=p˜+1Λn1, hence his expected beliefs are represented by the c.d.f. G˜r1 such that

G˜r1(s)=p˜G˜(s|r1,r1)+λx¯G˜(s|r1,b˜S(1)(z))dFn1(z)1p˜(γ)n=11p˜(γ){(n1)(2ΓΛ)2Fn2(s)ifs[x_,γ)ΛΓnM(F(s),Γ)+(n1)(1Λ)Fn2(s)ifs[γ,λ]n(n1)Fn2(s)(n2)Fn1(s)p˜(γ)if s(λ,x¯]

using (40) and (34). Hence the payoff of a type x from bidding r1 at stage one is

(42)u˜S(x,γ)=p˜(γ)(xr1)+(1p˜(γ))r2xG˜r1(s)ds

Step 1.3: Updated Beliefs for a Bidder who has Bid b˜S(1)(y), with y(λ,xˉ], at Stage one but has not Won at Stage one, and u˜S(x,y).

If a bidder has bid b˜S(1)(y) at stage one and has not won, then bw=b˜S(1)(z) for some zy, and his beliefs are given by G˜(|b˜S(1)(y),b˜S(1)(z)) in (34). Hence, the payoff of a type x from bidding b˜S(1)(y) at stage one, for y(λ,xˉ], is

(43)u˜S(x,y)=x_yxmax{r1,b˜S(1)(z)}dFn1(z)+yxˉr2xG˜(s|b˜S(1)(y),b˜S(1)(z))dsdFn1(z)

and notice that the second term in the right hand side in (43) is equal to

(n1)(1F(x))vn1(x)+yxvn1(z)Fn2(z)+xzdFn1(z)if y<x(n1)(1F(y))vn1(x)if yx

Step 2: Derivation of γ and λ: Existence of a Unique Solution for eqs. (16)-(17), and Definition of r˜1

Using (35), (42), and (43) we find

u˜S(γ,x_)=vn(γ)+(n1)(1Γ)vn1(γ)u˜S(γ,γ)=p˜(γ)(γr1)+n12(2ΓΛ)vn1(γ)u˜S(λ,γ)=p˜(γ)(λr1)+(n1)(ΛΓ)2vn1(γ)++γλΛΓnM(F(s),Γ)ds+(n1)(1Λ)vn1(λ)limyλu˜S(x,y)=Λn1(xr1)+(n1)(1Λ)vn1(x)u˜S(x,λ+) for xλ

Hence eqs. (16) and (17) reduce, after some rearranging, respectively to

(44)A(γ,λ)=0,B(γ,λ)=0

with

(45)A(γ,λ)=p˜(γ)(γr1)(n1)(ΛΓ)2vn1(γ)vn(γ)
(46)B(γ,λ)=n(n1)2vn1(γ)M(Λ,Γ)(λr1)+γλM(F(s),Γ)ds

Step 2.1: Definition of λ.

Define τ(λ)=Fn1(λ)λr1vn(λ), a strictly increasing function such that τ(r1)<0 and τ(xˉ)=rˉ1r1>0. Hence there exists λ in the interval (r1,xˉ), which we denote λ, such that τ(λ)<0 for λ(r1,λ), τ(λ)=0, τ(λ)>0 for λ(λ,xˉ].

Step 2.2: If λ(r1,λ), then There Exists no γ(r1,λ] such that A(γ,λ)=0; if λ[λ,xˉ], then There Exists a Unique γ(r1,λ] such that A(γ,λ)=0, Denoted γA(λ).

Given a function h of two variables, here and in the remainder of the Appendix we write hi to denote the partial derivative of h with respect to its i-th variable, i=1,2.

First we prove that the function A is strictly increasing with respect to γ:

A1(γ,λ)=p˜(γ)γ(γr1)+n12f(γ)vn1(γ)+p˜(γ)(n1)(ΛΓ)2Γn2Γn1

From the definition of p˜(γ) in (38), we see that

p˜(γ)(n1)(ΛΓ)2Γn2Γn1=j=2n1Cn1,jj+1Γnj1(ΛΓ)j>0

and, moreover, p˜(γ)γ(γr1)>0 and n12f(γ)vn1(γ)>0.

Now we examine the sign of A(r1,λ) and of A(λ,λ). We have that

A(r1,λ)=(n1)(ΛF(r1))2vn1(r1)vn(r1)<0

and A(λ,λ)=τ(λ). Therefore, if λ(r1,λ) then A(λ,λ)<0 and there is no solution to A(γ,λ)=0 in the interval (r1,λ]; if λ[λ,xˉ], then there exists (A is continuous in λ) a unique solution to A(γ,λ)=0 in the interval (r1,λ], which we denote γA(λ).

Step 2.3: There Exists r˜1(r2,rˉ1) such that the Equation B(γA(λ),λ)=0 has a Unique Solution in (λ,xˉ) if r1(r2,r˜1); the Equation B(γA(λ),λ)=0 has no Solution in (λ,xˉ) if r1r˜1.

First we prove that B(γA(λ),λ) is strictly decreasing in λ. Notice that Γ below is actually equal to F(γA(λ)). We have that

dB(γA(λ),λ)dλ=f(γA(λ))γAλ(M2(F(s),Γ)dsM2(Λ,Γ)(λr1)γA(λ)M1(Λ,Γ)(λr1)f(λ)

and we prove that dB(γA(λ),λ)dλ<0. From the previous step we have that

(47)γA(λ)=A2(γ,λ)A1(γ,λ)=p˜λ(γA(λ)r1)n12vn1(γA(λ))f(λ)p˜γ(γA(λ)r1)+n12vn1(γA(λ))f(γA(λ))+p˜n12(ΛΓ)Γn2Γn1

From the proof of Step 2.2 we know that the denominator in the right hand side of (47) is positive.

Therefore dBdλ has the same sign as

f(γA(λ))p˜λ(γAr1)n12vn1(γA(λ))f(λ)×γA(λ)λ(M2(F(s),Γ)dsM2(Λ,Γ)(λr1)+
(48)M1(Λ,Γ)(λr1)f(λ)p˜γ(γA(λ)r1)+n12vn1(γA)f(γA(λ))+K

with K=p˜n12(ΛΓ)Γn2Γn1>0. Moreover,

p˜γ=M(Γ,Λ)nf(γA(λ)), p˜λ=M(Λ,Γ)nf(λ)

hence (48) is smaller than

f(γA(λ))f(λ)M(Λ,Γ)n(γAr1)n12vn1(γA(λ))×γAλ(M2(F(s),Γ)dsM2(Λ,Γ)(λr1)+M1(Λ,Γ)(λr1)f(λ)f(γA(λ))M(Γ,Λ)n(γA(λ)r1)+n12vn1(γA)

which is equal to f(γA(λ))f(λ) times

(49)n12vn1(γA(λ))(λr1)M1(Λ,Γ)+(λr1)M2(Λ,Γ)γAλ(M2(F(s),Γ)ds+γA(λ)r1nM(Λ,Γ)γAλM2(F(s),Γ)ds+(λr1)M1(Λ,Γ)M(Γ,Λ)M(Λ,Γ)M2(Λ,Γ)

We now prove that (49) is negative by showing that the terms inside the square brackets are positive.

  1. The inequality γA(λ)>r1 implies (λr1)M1(Λ,Γ)+(λr1)M2(Λ,Γ)γA(λ)λ(M2(F(s),Γ)ds>(λr1)M1(Λ,Γ)+γA(λ)λM2(Λ,Γ)M2(F(s),Γ)ds, and the right hand side is positive since M1>0 and M2(a,b)=j=0n3(n2j)(j+1)an3jbj is strictly increasing in a.

  2. The term M(Λ,Γ)γA(λ)λM2(F(s),Γ)ds is positive since M2>0.

  3. The term M1(Λ,Γ)M(Γ,Λ)M(Λ,Γ)M2(Λ,Γ) is positive. In fact, from (36) we have M1(a,b)=n1n2an2bn+nn1an2b22n2nan1b(ab)3, and M2(a,b)=(n2)anbn+nab(bn2an2)(ab)3. Therefore,

    M1(Λ,Γ)M(Γ,Λ)M(Λ,Γ)M2(Λ,Γ)=nΛ2n2ΓΛΓ41(n1)2kn2+2n(n2)kn1(n1)2kn+k2n2

    with k=ΓΛ(0,1). We now define

    (50)μ(k)=k2n2n12kn+2nn2kn1n12kn2+1

    and show it is positive for each k(0,1). Remark that μ(1)=0. We now prove that μ(k)>0 for each k(0,1). We find that μ(k)=kn3ν(k), with ν(k)=2(n1)knnn12k2+2n(n1)n2kn12(n2) and ν(1)=0. In addition, we have that ν(k)=2n(n1)kn1n1k+n2, with ν(1)=0, and ν(k)=2n(n1)2(1kn2)<0 for each k(0,1). Hence, ν is strictly decreasing and since ν(1)=0 we can conclude that ν(k)>0 for each k(0,1). This, in turn, implies that ν is strictly increasing, and since ν(1)=0, we obtain that ν(k)<0 for each k(0,1). Therefore μ(k)<0 for each k(0,1), and since μ(1)=0 we can conclude that μ(k)>0 for each k(0,1).

Now we prove that B(γA(λ),λ)>0 and then examine the sign of B(γA(xˉ),xˉ). Given that B(γA(λ),λ) is a continuous function of λ, if B(γA(xˉ),xˉ)<0 then there exists a unique λ˜(λ,xˉ) such that B(γA(λ˜),λ˜)=0. Since A(γA(λ˜),λ˜)=0, it follows that γA(λ˜),λ˜ is a solution to (44), i.e. to eqs. (16)-(17). We prove that there exists r˜1(r2,rˉ1) such that B(γA(xˉ),xˉ)<0 if and only if r1(r2,r˜1).

Regarding B(γA(λ),λ), since A(γA(λ),λ)=0=τ(λ)=A(λ,λ), we have that γA(λ)=λ; hence (37) and (46) imply that

B(γA(λ),λ)=n(n1)2vn1(λ)Fn2(λ)(λr1)=n(n1)2F(λ)r2λFn2(s)F(λ)F(s)ds>0

where the last equality follows from the definition of λ.

Regarding B(γA(xˉ),xˉ), we have that

(51)B(γA(xˉ),xˉ)=n(n1)2vn1(γA(xˉ))M(1,F(γA(xˉ)))(xˉr1)+γA(xˉ)xˉM(F(s),F(γA(xˉ)))ds

We now take into account that γA(xˉ) is an increasing function of r1 (dγA(xˉ)dr1>0 since Aγ>0 and Ar1<0), and we view B(γA(xˉ),xˉ) as a function (r1) of r1 that is defined for r1(r2,rˉ1). As r1rˉ1, we have that γA(xˉ)xˉ and F(γA(xˉ))1, hence

limrrˉ1(r1)=n(n1)2vn1(xˉ)n(n1)2(xˉrˉ1)=n(n1)2(vn1(xˉ)vn(xˉ))>0

As r1r2, we have that γA(xˉ)r2, hence

limr1r2(r1)=r2xˉM(F(s),F(r2))M(1,F(r2))ds<0

since F(s)<1 for s(r2,xˉ). The continuity of implies that there exists r˜1(r2,rˉ1) such that (r˜1)=0, and (r1)<0 for r1(r2,r˜1). The proof that a unique r˜1 exists such that (r˜1)=0 is long and is reported in Section C in the Supplementary material.

Step 3: b˜S(1) is Strictly Increasing in the Interval [λ,xˉ]

It is immediate to see that b˜S(1) is strictly increasing in (λ,xˉ], and we prove that limxλb˜S(1)(x)>r1 in Section D in the Supplementary material.

Step 4: Proof that no Profitable Deviation Exists

Now that b˜S(1) is well defined, we prove that if a bidder expects that each other bidder follows the strategy (b˜S(1),bS(2)), then no profitable deviation exists for him. Precisely, we prove that the following inequalities hold:[21]

(52)for each x[γ,λ], u˜S(x,γ)max{u˜S(x,)x, u˜S(x,y)}, for each y(λ,xˉ]
(53)for each x[γ,λ],u˜S(x,γ)max{u˜S(x,)x,u˜S(x,y)},foreachy(λ,xˉ]
(54)for each x(λ,xˉ]andy(λ,xˉ],u˜S(x,x)max{ u˜S(x,{x} ),u˜S(x,γ), u˜S(x,y)}

These inequalities are proved in Section D in the Supplementary material.

Proof of Proposition 2(ii)

This proof is largely given by the proof of Proposition 2(i), after setting λ=xˉ, consistently with the remark in footnote 13. Precisely, Gˆ(s|no,r1) in (10) and Gˆ(s|r1,r1) in (12) can be seen as special cases of eqs. (31) and (40) with λ=xˉ and Λ=1. Remark that the probability of winning when bidding r1 is now given by (see (38) with Λ=1)

(55)pˆ(γ)=j=0n1Cn1,jj+1Γn1j(1Γ)j=1Γnn(1Γ)

and in (12), 1pˆ(γ) replaces p˜ at the denominator because 1pˆ(γ) is a bidder’s probability of losing after a bid of r1 given bˆS(1), the analog of p˜.

The proofs that a unique solution to eq. (14) exists and that uˆS(x,x_)uˆS(x,γ) for each x[r2,γ) and uˆS(x,x_)uˆS(x,γ) for each x(γ,xˉ] are special cases of Step 2.2 above, and Steps 4.1 and 4.2 in Section D in the Supplementary material.

Finally, we need to explore the profitability of bidding slightly more than r1 and to prove that max{uˆS(x,x_),uˆS(x,γ)}xr1 holds for each x[r2,xˉ]. Since uˆS1(x,x_)<1 for x[r2,γ) and uˆS1(x,γ)<1 for x[γ,xˉ], it suffices to prove that uˆS(xˉ,γ)xˉr1. Using (13) and rearranging the inequality we obtain

(56)n(n1)2vn1(γ)+γxˉM(F(s),Γ)dsM(1,Γ)(xˉr1)0

In examining this inequality, we need to take into account that γ is the unique solution to eq. (14) given r1. Since (14) is equivalent to eq. (16) (i.e., to A(γ,λ)=0 in eq. (44) when λ=xˉ), it follows that the left hand side of (56) is a function of r1 which coincides with (r1) introduced in Step 2.3 in the proof of Proposition 2(i). From Step 2.3 we know that (r1)0 if and only if r1[r˜1,rˉ1].

Proof of Proposition 2(iii)

The proof of this part (from GTX) has been already presented in subsection 3.2.1.

B Proof for Proposition 3

Proof of Proposition 3(i)

The proof proceeds along these steps. First, we completely describe a strategy profile which we claim constitutes an equilibrium when r1(r2,r˜1). That requires to specify the bidding behavior of each type at stage two, given any possible outcome at stage one. Then, in Step 1 we show that for each possible stage one outcome the bidding behavior we have specified is an equilibrium at stage two. This leads us to consider various cases. In Step 2 (in the Supplementary Material), we show that no stage one deviation is profitable.

Consider r1(r2,r˜1), and let γ,λ be the unique solution to eqs. (16)-(17). Here we prove that the following bidding functions constitute an equilibrium:[22]

(57)b˜F(1)(x)=no bidif x[x_,γ)r1if x[γ,λ]x_xmax{r1,b˜S(1)(s)}dFn1(s)Fn1(x)if x(λ,xˉ]
(58)b˜F(2)(x|no,no)=βn,r2(x)if x[r2,γ)βn,r2(γ)if x[γ,xˉ]
(59)b˜F(2)(x|no,r1)=βn1,r2(x)ifx[r2,γ)b˜F(2)(y˜(x)|r1,r1)such thaty˜(x)is inargmaxy[γ,λ](xb˜F(2)(y|r1,r1))G˜(y|no,r1)ifx[γ,xˉ]
(60)b˜F(2)(x|r1,r1)=βn1,r2(x)if x[r2,γ)βn1,r2(γ)G˜(γ|r1,r1)+γxsg˜(s|r1,r1)dsG˜(x|r1,r1)if x[γ,λ]βn1,r2(γ)G˜(γ|r1,r1)+γλsg˜(s|r1,r1)dsG˜(λ|r1,r1)if x(λ,xˉ]
(61)b˜F(2)(x|b,b˜F(1)(z))=βn1,r2(x)if x[r2,z)βn1,r2(z)if x[z,xˉ]for each z(λ,xˉ], bb˜F(1)(z)
(62)b˜F(2)(x|b,bw)=βn1,r2(x)if x[r2,xˉ] for each bw>b˜F(1)(xˉ), bwb

Remark that, in light of b˜F(1)(x), b˜F(2)(x|no,no) for x[γ,x], b˜F(2)(x|no,r1) for x[γ,x], b˜F(2)(x|r1,r1) for x[γ,λ], b˜F(2)(x|b,b˜F(1)(z)) for x[z,x], and b˜F(2)(x|b,bw) for x[x_,x] relate to off-the-equilibrium play. Remark also that b˜F(2)(x|r1,r1) is constant for x(λ,x].

Step 1: Proof for Stage Two

In this first step we prove that for each possible outcome at stage one, the bidding specified by eqs. (58)-(62) constitutes an equilibrium at stage two. We start by noticing that b˜F(1) generates the same stage two beliefs for losing bidders as b˜S(1). Precisely, by comparing (57) with (7), we see that this property is true if bw=no, or if bw=r1; in these cases the updated beliefs are given by (30), (31), and (40). But the property is true also if bw=b˜F(1)(z) for some z(λ,xˉ], as b˜S(1) is strictly increasing in the interval (λ,xˉ]: in this case the updated beliefs are given by the c.d.f.

(63)G˜(s|b,b˜F(1)(z))=Fn2(s)Fn2(z)if s[x_,z)1if s[z,xˉ]for each bb˜F(1)(z)

which is essentially equivalent to (34) for each z(λ,xˉ], bb˜F(1)(z).

Regarding b˜F(2)(|no,no) in (58), we can argue as for (21), and regarding b˜F(2)(|b,bw) in (62) we can argue as for (24).

In order to consider the case in which bw=r1 (the bidding functions (59) and (60)) we first prove a stochastic dominance relation between G˜(|r1,r1) and G˜(|no,r1).

Step 1.1:G˜(|r1,r1)DominatesG˜(|no,r1)in Terms of the Reverse Hazard Rate.

g˜(s|no,r1)G˜(s|no,r1)=g˜(s|r1,r1)G˜(s|r1,r1) for s[x_,γ),g˜(s|no,r1)G˜(s|no,r1)<g˜(s|r1,r1)G˜(s|r1,r1) for s(γ,λ]

It is immediate to verify that g˜(s|no,r1)G˜(s|no,r1)=g˜(s|r1,r1)G˜(s|r1,r1) for each s[x_,γ). Now consider s(γ,λ], and in order to prove that g˜(s|no,r1)G˜(s|no,r1)<g˜(s|r1,r1)G˜(s|r1,r1), notice that

g˜(s|no,r1)G˜(s|no,r1)=f(s)F(s)Γ(n1)Fn2(s)(F(s)Γ)(Fn1(s)Γn1)Fn1(s)Γn1,g˜(s|r1,r1)G˜(s|r1,r1)=f(s)F(s)Γn(n1)Fn2(s)(F(s)Γ)22[(n1)Fn(s)nFn1(s)Γ+Γn](n1)Fn(s)nFn1(s)Γ+Γn

After defining kΓF(s)(0,1), we can write g˜(s|r1,r1)G˜(s|r1,r1)g˜(s|no,r1)G˜(s|no,r1) as

f(s)F(s)Γn(n1)(1k)22(n1nk+kn)n1nk+kn(n1)(1k)1+kn11kn1

and rearranging the last expression, we see that it has the same sign as

k2n2n12kn+2nn2kn1n12kn2+1

Remark that this is equal to μ(k) in (50) that we know is positive for each k(0,1).

Step 1.2: The Bidding Function b˜F(2)(|no,r1).

Consider a bidder of type xr2 who has submitted no bid at stage one, and has learned that bw=r1. Then his beliefs on the highest value among the other losing bidders are given by G˜(s|no,r1) in (31), and we prove that it is optimal for him to bid b˜F(2)(x|no,r1) as specified in (59) if he expects each other losing bidder with value in [r2,γ) to bid according to b˜F(2)(|no,r1), and each other losing bidder with value in [γ,λ] to bid according to b˜F(2)(|r1,r1) in (60).[23]

In detail, we formulate his bidding problem as the problem of selecting optimally y[r2,λ], with the interpretation that choosing y[r2,γ) is equivalent to bidding b˜F(2)(y|no,r1), and choosing y[γ,λ] is equivalent to bidding b˜F(2)(y|r1,r1). Therefore, for this type of bidder the stage two payoff is

u˜F(2)(x,y|no,r1)=(xb˜F(2)(y|no,r1))G˜(y|no,r1)if y[r2,γ)(xb˜F(2)(y|r1,r1))G˜(y|no,r1)if y[γ,λ]

and

u˜F(2)(x,y|no,r1)y=G˜(y|no,r1)b˜F(2)(y|no,r1)y+(xb˜F(2)(y|no,r1))g˜(y|no,r1)G˜(y|no,r1)if y[r2,γ)G˜(y|no,r1)b˜F(2)(y|r1,r1)y+(xb˜F(2)(y|r1,r1))g˜(y|no,r1)G˜(y|no,r1)if y(γ,λ]

Then notice that b˜F(2)(|no,r1) and b˜F(2)(|r1,r1) satisfy the following differential equations in [r2,γ) and in (γ,λ], respectively:

(64)b˜F(2)(y|no,r1)y=(yb˜F(2)(y|no,r1))g˜(y|no,r1)G˜(y|no,r1)for y[r2,γ)
(65)b˜F(2)(y|r1,r1)y=(yb˜F(2)(y|r1,r1))g˜(y|r1,r1)G˜(y|r1,r1)for y(γ,λ]

and find that

u˜F(2)(x,y|no,r1)y=(xy)g˜(y|no,r1)if y[r2,γ)G˜(y|no,r1)(yb˜F(2)(y|r1,r1))g˜(y|r1,r1)G˜(y|r1,r1)+(xb˜F(2)(y|r1,r1))g˜(y|no,r1)G˜(y|no,r1)if y(γ,λ]

Consider a type x[r2,γ). Then u˜F(2)(x,y|no,r1)y is positive for y[r2,x), negative for y(x,γ), and negative also for y(γ,λ] because g˜(y|r1,r1)G˜(y|r1,r1)>g˜(y|no,r1)G˜(y|no,r1) for y(γ,λ] implies (yb˜F(2)(y|r1,r1))g˜(y|r1,r1)G˜(y|r1,r1)+(xb˜F(2)(y|r1,r1))g˜(y|no,r1)G˜(y|no,r1)<(xy)g˜(y|no,r1)G˜(y|no,r1)<0 given x<γ<y. Hence the optimal y is equal to x, i.e. the optimal bid is b˜F(2)(x|no,r1).

Now consider a type x[γ,xˉ]. Then u˜F(2)(x,y|no,r1)y>0 for y[r2,γ), hence the optimal y is in [γ,λ], as specified by (59). Moreover, we have seen above that u˜F(2)(x,y|no,r1)y(xy)g˜(y|no,r1) for y(γ,λ], hence for x=γ the optimal y is equal to γ.

Step 1.3: The Bidding Function b˜F(2)(|r1,r1).

Consider a bidder of type xr2 who has bid r1 at stage one, and has learned that another bidder has won at stage one with a bid r1. Then his beliefs on the highest value among the other losing bidders at stage one are given by G˜(s|r1,r1) in (40) and we prove that it is optimal for him to bid b˜F(2)(x|r1,r1) as specified in (60) if he expects each other losing bidder with value in [r2,γ) to bid according to b˜F(2)(|no,r1) in (59), and each other losing bidder with value in [γ,λ] to bid according to b˜F(2)(|r1,r1).[24]

Arguing as in the proof of Step 1.2, we can write the bidder’s payoff at stage two as a function of y as follows:

u˜F(2)(x,y|r1,r1)=(xb˜F(2)(y|no,r1))G˜(y|r1,r1)if y[r2,γ)(xb˜F(2)(y|r1,r1))G˜(y|r1,r1)if y[γ,λ]

and

u˜F(2)(x,y|r1,r1)y=G˜(y|r1,r1)b˜F(2)(y|no,r1)y+(xb˜F(2)(y|no,r1))g˜(y|r1,r1)G˜(y|r1,r1)if y[r2,γ)G˜(y|r1,r1)b˜F(2)(y|r1,r1)y+(xb˜F(2)(y|r1,r1))g˜(y|r1,r1)G˜(y|r1,r1)if y(γ,λ]

Then we use (64)-(65) plus g˜(y|no,r1)G˜(y|no,r1)=g˜(y|r1,r1)G˜(y|r1,r1) for y[r2,γ) to find

u˜F(2)(x,y|r1,r1)y=(xy)g˜(y|r1,r1)if y[r2,γ)(xy)g˜(y|r1,r1)if y(γ,λ]

This reveals that the optimal y is equal to x for each x[r2,λ]; and it is equal to λ, for each x(λ,xˉ]. Hence, in either case, the optimal bid is b˜F(2)(x|r1,r1).

Step 1.4: The Bidding Function b˜F(2)(|b,b˜F(1)(z)).

If bw=b˜F(1)(z) for some z(λ,xˉ], then the beliefs of each losing bidder are given by the c.d.f. G˜(|b,b˜F(1)(z)) in (63). Then essentially the argument relative to bˆF(2)(x|no,no) in (21) applies in this case. We find that

g˜(s|b,b˜F(1)(z))G˜(s|b,b˜F(1)(z))=(n2)f(s)F(s) for s(r2,z)

hence (1) reveals that the equilibrium bidding function for x[r2,z) is βn1,r2(x), as specified by b˜F(2)(|b,b˜F(1)(z)). Finally, given bw=b˜F(1)(z), a type x[z,xˉ] expects each other bidder to have value smaller than z, and βn1,r2(z) is his payoff maximizing bid, as prescribed by (61).

Step 2: Proof for Stage One

We need to consider the point of view of a bidder at stage one, given (58)-(61), and prove that it is profitable for him to bid as specified in b˜F(1) in (57), if he expects the other bidders to do so. The proof is in Section G in the Supplementary material.

Proof of Proposition 3(ii)

The proof is largely given by the proof of Proposition 3(i), after setting λ=xˉ. Precisely, regarding stage two, in the main text we have taken care of (21)–(24), with the exception of bˆF(2)(x|no,r1) and bˆF(2)(x|r1,r1) given off-the-equilibrium play at stage one. In particular, bˆF(2)(x|no,r1) for x[γ,xˉ] is the payoff maximizing bid for a type x[γ,xˉ] who has not bid at stage one, given the beliefs Gˆ(|no,r1) and given that the opponents bid according to (25): we find that for such a type it is sub-optimal to bid less than bˆF(2)(γ|r1,r1). Likewise, bˆF(2)(x|r1,r1) is the payoff maximizing bid for a type x[r2,γ) who has bid r1 in stage one. We find that bˆF(2)(x|r1,r1)=bˆF(2)(x|no,r1) (equal to βn1,r2(x)) in the interval [r2,γ) because the equality gˆ(s|no,r1)Gˆ(s|no,r1)=gˆ(s|r1,r1)Gˆ(s|r1,r1) (equal to (n2)f(s)F(s)) holds for s[r2,γ). Regarding stage one, we have proved in the main text that uˆF(x,x_)max{uˆF(x,γ),xr1} for each x[r2,γ). We can argue as in Steps 2.2 and 2.4 in the proof of Proposition 3(i) to conclude that for each x[γ,xˉ], (i) uˆF(x,γ)=uˆS(x,γ), hence uˆF(x,γ)xr1; (ii) uˆF(x,γ)uˆF(x,x_).

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Published Online: 2018-01-19

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