Abstract
While United Nations Security Council sanctioned peacekeeping minimizes free riding because a universal funding formula is applied to all UN members, there are political constraints on both how much money is available, and which missions the Council will approve. We argue that resulting from these constraints five other international peacekeeping organizational arrangements have come into existence – those through alliances, bespoke coalitions, hybrid between different organizations, location specific and UN Trust Funds. We examine the economic characteristics that frame the requirements for these peacekeeping organizations to come into operation.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- FRAND Licensing of Standard-Essential Patents: Comparing Realistic Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Contracts
- To Commit or Not to Commit in Product-Innovation Timing Games
- Coordinated Minimum Wage Policies: Impacts on EU-Level Income Inequality
- Regulatory Contestability and Cost Pass-Through
- Explaining the Economic Characteristics of Different International Peacekeeping Institutions
- Setting Reserve Prices in Repeated Procurement Auctions
- Public and Private School Grade Inflation Patterns in Secondary Education
- Estimating Labor Supply Elasticities in Korea: The Role of Limited Commitment Between Spouses
- Strategic Brand Proliferation: Monopoly versus Duopoly
- Letter
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- FRAND Licensing of Standard-Essential Patents: Comparing Realistic Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Contracts
- To Commit or Not to Commit in Product-Innovation Timing Games
- Coordinated Minimum Wage Policies: Impacts on EU-Level Income Inequality
- Regulatory Contestability and Cost Pass-Through
- Explaining the Economic Characteristics of Different International Peacekeeping Institutions
- Setting Reserve Prices in Repeated Procurement Auctions
- Public and Private School Grade Inflation Patterns in Secondary Education
- Estimating Labor Supply Elasticities in Korea: The Role of Limited Commitment Between Spouses
- Strategic Brand Proliferation: Monopoly versus Duopoly
- Letter
- Parental Investments During Labor Shocks: Evidence from Vietnam’s Marine Disaster