Abstract
This paper studies the impact of marital status on job finding in China using the correspondence methodology. Fictitious CVs are sent to job advertisements through an online job board website, focusing on financial and accounting jobs, and the callback rate is measured. We vary the gender and marital status on otherwise identical CVs. The previous literature suggests that being married has a negative impact on the labor market outcomes of females, but a positive impact for males. In contrast, for the Chinese labor market, we do not find a significant effect of marital status on job finding for either gender.
Funding source: National Natural Science Foundation of China
Award Identifier / Grant number: 71950410622
Funding source: Xi’an Jiaotong Liverpool University
Award Identifier / Grant number: 201950
Marginal effects from (homoskedastic) probit regression.
Dependent variable: callback (yes = 1; no = 0) | Accounting | Finance |
---|---|---|
Marital status (married = 1; single = 0) | 0.0095 (0.0140) | −0.0333** (0.0169) |
Gender (female = 1; male = 0) | 0.0262* (0.0139) | −0.0654*** (0.0171) |
Marital status * Gender | −0.0163 (0.0193) | 0.0248 (0.0248) |
Quality (high = 1; low = 0) | 0.0272*** (0.0105) | 0.0253** (0.0126) |
Wage (the average value of the wage range stated by the company in the advertisement) | −0.0000053** (0.000002) | −0.0000039* (0.000002) |
Number of person the firm intends to hire | −0.0003 (0.0013) | 0.00139* (0.0007) |
Company size dummies (omitted: less than 20) | ||
Between 20 and 99 | −0.0307 (0.0274) | 0.0252 (0.0258) |
Between 100 and 499 | −0.0281 (0.0277) | 0.0302 (0.0261) |
Between 500 and 999 | −0.0213 (0.0312) | 0.0106 (0.03) |
Between 1000 and 9999 | −0.0248 (0.0298) | 0.0304 (0.028) |
Above 9999 | −0.0236 (0.0372) | 0.0477 (0.036) |
Company ownership dummies (omitted: private) | ||
State-owned | −0.00792 (0.0317) | 0.0764** (0.0325) |
Foreign | 0.00648 (0.0258) | −0.0214 (0.0339) |
Joint venture | −0.0327* (0.0190) | −0.0265 (0.0229) |
Dummies for expected experience in years (omitted: less than 1 year) | ||
Between 1 and 3 | 0.00314 (0.0172) | −0.0165 (0.0153) |
Between 3 and 5 | 0.0105 (0.0166) | −0.0545*** (0.0177) |
Between 5 and 10 | −0.0143 (0.0175) | −0.109*** (0.0212) |
Above 10 | −0.0211 (0.0312) | −0.076 (0.0891) |
City (Shanghai = 1; Xi’an = 0) | −0.0459*** (0.0111) | −0.103*** (0.014) |
Industry dummies | Yes | Yes |
Number of observations | 3093 | 3170 |
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Note: The table shows the marginal effects on callback from (homoskedastic) probit model estimations. The control variables include industry dummies with categories: financial services and banking; real estate; IT and media; agriculture and energy; trade and transportation; services and education; manufacturing; medical bioengineering.
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Supplementary Material
Supplementary material to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2019-0364.
© 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
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- Erasmus Exchange Program – A Matter of (Relatively) Older Students
- Co-Production in Local Public Service Delivery: The Case of Waste Management
- The Effects of a Parenting Program on Maternal Well-Being: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial
- Letters
- The Impact of Marital Status on Job Finding: A Field Experiment in the Chinese Labor Market
- A Note on the Efficiency Gains from a Refusal to Deal in a Bertrand-Nash Framework
- The Panzar–Rosse H Statistic and Monopoly. Issues on its Use as a Market Power Measure
Articles in the same Issue
- Research Articles
- Erasmus Exchange Program – A Matter of (Relatively) Older Students
- Co-Production in Local Public Service Delivery: The Case of Waste Management
- The Effects of a Parenting Program on Maternal Well-Being: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial
- Letters
- The Impact of Marital Status on Job Finding: A Field Experiment in the Chinese Labor Market
- A Note on the Efficiency Gains from a Refusal to Deal in a Bertrand-Nash Framework
- The Panzar–Rosse H Statistic and Monopoly. Issues on its Use as a Market Power Measure