Number of Bidders and the Winner’s Curse
-
Ronald Peeters
und
Anastas P. Tenev
Abstract
Within an affiliated value auction setting, we study the relationship between the number of bidders and the winner’s curse in terms of its frequency of occurrence and its expected harm. From a design perspective, we find that both the number of bidders and the level of affiliation are instrumental when choosing an auction format and whether to encourage or discourage bidder participation.
References
Dyer, D., J. H. Kagel, and D. Levin. 1989. “A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis.” The Economic Journal 99 (394): 108–115.10.2307/2234207Suche in Google Scholar
Garvin, S., and J. H. Kagel. 1994. “Learning in Common Value Auctions: Some Initial Observations.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 25 (3): 351–372.10.1016/0167-2681(94)90105-8Suche in Google Scholar
Kagel, J. H., and D. Dyer. 1988. “Learning in Common Value Auctions.” In Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets: Proceedings of the Fourth Conference on Experimental Economics, edited by R. Tietz, W. Albers, and R. Selten, 184–197. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.10.1007/978-3-642-48356-1_14Suche in Google Scholar
Kagel, J. H., and D. Levin. 1986. “The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions.” The American Economic Review 76 (5): 894–920.10.1515/9781400830138.107Suche in Google Scholar
Kagel, J. H., D. Levin, R. C. Battalio, and D. J. Meyer. 1989. “First-Price Common Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior and the Winner’s Curse.” Economic Inquiry 27 (2): 241–258.10.1111/j.1465-7295.1989.tb00780.xSuche in Google Scholar
Klemperer, P. 1999. “Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature.” Journal of Economic Surveys 13 (3): 227–286.10.1111/1467-6419.00083Suche in Google Scholar
Krishna, V. 2002. Auction Theory. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.Suche in Google Scholar
Peña, J., B. Wu, and A. Traulsen. 2016. “Ordering Structured Populations in Multiplayer Cooperation Games.” Journal of the Royal Society Interface 13 (114): 1–8.10.1098/rsif.2015.0881Suche in Google Scholar
Thaler, R. H. 1988. “Anomalies: The Winner’s Curse.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 (1): 191–202.10.1257/jep.2.1.191Suche in Google Scholar
© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Teacher Turnover, Composition and Qualifications in the Year-Round School Setting
- Self–Employment, Wealth and Start–up Costs: Evidence from a Financial Crisis
- Local Information, Income Segregation, and Geographic Mobility
- Leadership in Tax Competition with Fiscal Equalization Transfers
- Measuring the Deterrent Effect of European Cartel Law Enforcement
- Widowhood and Retirement Timing: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Study
- Guaranteed Nonlabor Income and Labor Supply: The Effect of the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend
- Do State Sales Taxes Crowd Out Local Option Sales Taxes?
- Social Network Structure and Risk Sharing in Villages
- Tele-Communications 2.0: The Age of the Internet
- Number of Bidders and the Winner’s Curse
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Teacher Turnover, Composition and Qualifications in the Year-Round School Setting
- Self–Employment, Wealth and Start–up Costs: Evidence from a Financial Crisis
- Local Information, Income Segregation, and Geographic Mobility
- Leadership in Tax Competition with Fiscal Equalization Transfers
- Measuring the Deterrent Effect of European Cartel Law Enforcement
- Widowhood and Retirement Timing: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Study
- Guaranteed Nonlabor Income and Labor Supply: The Effect of the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend
- Do State Sales Taxes Crowd Out Local Option Sales Taxes?
- Social Network Structure and Risk Sharing in Villages
- Tele-Communications 2.0: The Age of the Internet
- Number of Bidders and the Winner’s Curse
