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Should we Distinguish Between Repugnant and Non-Repugnant Unreasonable Views?

  • Alasia Nuti EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 22. November 2024
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Abstract

Shmuel Nili’s Philosophizing the Indefensible: Strategic Political Theory is a thought-provoking book, calling philosophers to arms in the effort of containing the spread of ‘unreasonable’ views characterising many contemporary societies. Nili argues that philosophers can play a distinctive role by arguing from premises they reject to show how those presumptions do not lead to upholding the ‘repugnant’ policies their interlocutors back up. This paper focuses on a distinction that is key to Nili’s argument, i.e. that between ‘repugnant’ and ‘non-repugnant’ unreasonable policies. According to Nili, philosophers should be under no obligation to engage discursively in the way he envisions when their interlocutors support policies that are repugnant, i.e. they clearly violate universal human equality. The paper argues that it does not make sense to treat repugnant unreasonable views as normatively different from non-repugnant premises. The repugnant/non-repugnant distinction is untenable and too subject to ‘reasonable’ disagreement to offer concrete normative guidance.


Corresponding author: Alasia Nuti, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of York, York, UK, E-mail: 

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Published Online: 2024-11-22
Published in Print: 2024-11-26

© 2024 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Heruntergeladen am 25.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/auk-2024-2016/pdf?lang=de
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