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Justice: Political Not Natural
Published/Copyright:
May 14, 2016
Abstract
Ken Binmore casts his naturalist theory of justice in opposition to theories of justice that claim authority on the grounds of some religious or moral doctrine. He thereby overlooks the possibility of a political conception of justice−a theory of justice based on the premise that there is an irreducible pluralism of metaphysical, epistemological, and moral doctrines. In my brief comment I shall argue that the naturalist theory of justice advocated by Binmore should be conceived of as belonging to one family of such doctrines, but not as overriding a political conception of justice.
Published Online: 2016-05-14
Published in Print: 2006-05-01
© 2006 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart
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Articles in the same Issue
- Justice as a Natural Phenomenon
- Fairness as Justice
- Genes, Memes and Justice
- The Genetics of Cooperation
- Binmore’s Humeanism
- Making Sense of Categorical Imperatives
- Justice: Political Not Natural
- Binmore’s Egalitarianism
- The Psychology of Justice
- Ken Binmore’s Natural Justice
- On Kenneth Binmore’s Natural Justice
- Binmore, Boundedly Rational
- Natural Justice: Response to Comments
Articles in the same Issue
- Justice as a Natural Phenomenon
- Fairness as Justice
- Genes, Memes and Justice
- The Genetics of Cooperation
- Binmore’s Humeanism
- Making Sense of Categorical Imperatives
- Justice: Political Not Natural
- Binmore’s Egalitarianism
- The Psychology of Justice
- Ken Binmore’s Natural Justice
- On Kenneth Binmore’s Natural Justice
- Binmore, Boundedly Rational
- Natural Justice: Response to Comments
