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Fairness as Justice
Published/Copyright:
May 14, 2016
Abstract
The paper questions Binmore’s identification of justice with fairness and his corresponding focus on bargains to the neglect of conventions, notably of ownership. Section 1 deals mainly with the role ascribed to man’s earliest genetic heritage in shaping fairness norms and the putative effect of such norms on bargaining solutions. Section 2 argues that the scope of fairness as opposed to justice in determining the social order is quite narrow, It sketches a theory of fairness distinct from justice, derived from the principle of treating like cases alike.
Published Online: 2016-05-14
Published in Print: 2006-05-01
© 2006 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart
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- Justice as a Natural Phenomenon
- Fairness as Justice
- Genes, Memes and Justice
- The Genetics of Cooperation
- Binmore’s Humeanism
- Making Sense of Categorical Imperatives
- Justice: Political Not Natural
- Binmore’s Egalitarianism
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- Binmore, Boundedly Rational
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Articles in the same Issue
- Justice as a Natural Phenomenon
- Fairness as Justice
- Genes, Memes and Justice
- The Genetics of Cooperation
- Binmore’s Humeanism
- Making Sense of Categorical Imperatives
- Justice: Political Not Natural
- Binmore’s Egalitarianism
- The Psychology of Justice
- Ken Binmore’s Natural Justice
- On Kenneth Binmore’s Natural Justice
- Binmore, Boundedly Rational
- Natural Justice: Response to Comments
