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Equity Incentives and Crash Risk in China’s A-Share Market

  • Jiahua Xu ORCID logo EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 29. Januar 2019

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between equity incentives and stock price crash risk in China’s A-Share Market, and finds a significantly positive relationship between equity incentives and crash risk. This result holds true when only executives’ incentives are involved, while the significance fades once non-managerial personnel’s incentives are considered, indicating a tendency for managers to manipulate the stock price when their interests are tied to the market value of the stock. This manipulation, however, can cause the stock price to suffer in subsequent years.

Appendix

A Number of firm years on industry sector level

Industrial FieldSectorNumber of observations
CommerceAccommodation industry46
Catering industry21
Retail industry475
Wholesale industry458
ConglomeratesAgriculture75
Animal husbandry56
Architectural decoration and other construction industries103
Diversified industries154
Fishery46
Forestry25
Service industry for agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery7
IndustryAgricultural and sideline food processing industry215
Alcohol, beverage and refined tea manufacturing244
Automobile manufacturing469
Chemical fiber manufacturing139
Coal mining and dressing industry176
Electric machinery and equipment manufacturing804
Exploitation auxiliary activities50
Ferrous metal ore mining and dressing industry30
Food manufacturing163
Furniture manufacturing33
Gas production and supply industry108
General equipment manufacturing434
Industries of petroleum processing, coking, and nuclear fuel processing84
Industry of comprehensive utilization of waste resources28
Industry of electric power and heat production and supply433
Industry of ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing207
Industry of non-ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing346
Industry of non-metallic mineral products335
Industry of rubber and plastic products197
Instrument and meter manufacturing45
Leathers, furs, feathers and related products and footwear industry29
Manufacturing of chemical raw materials and chemical products856
Manufacturing of computers, communications and other electronic equipment1060
Manufacturing of railways, ships, aircrafts, spacecrafts and other transportation equipment224
Manufacturing of stationery, industrial arts, sports and entertainment supplies36
Metal product industry207
Non-ferrous metal ore mining and dressing industry133
Oil and natural gas exploitation industry35
Other manufacturing industries57
Papermaking and paper product industry150
Pharmaceutical industry816
Printing and recording media reproduction industry44
Special-purpose equipment manufacturing530
Textile garment and apparel industry140
Textile industry207
Wood processing and wood, bamboo, rattan, Palm fiber, and straw product industry45
PropertiesBuilding construction industry6
Civil engineering construction industry309
Real estate industry839
UtilitiesAir transport industry65
Commercial service industry182
Ecological protection and environmental governance industry54
Education14
Health41
Industry of culture and arts21
Industry of loading/unloading handling and transport agency25
Industry of science and technology popularization and application services7
Industry of software and information technology services385
Internet and related services226
Leasing industry15
Postal service industry26
Press and publishing industry85
Professional technical service industry57
Public facility management industry92
Radio, television, film, and film and television sound recording production industry72
Railway transportation industry23
Research and experimental development14
Road transport industry200
Storage industry23
Telecommunications, radio and television and satellite transmission services60
Water production and supply industry89
Waterway transport industry176
Total13,681

B meter description

Panel A:

Path of variables in CSMAR

SeriesDatabaseQuery FormTablePath
China Listed Firms Research SeriesCorporate GovernanceBasic InformationEquity Incentive Exercise List01
Financial StatementsBalance SheetBalance Sheet02
Income StatementIncome Statement03
Financial IndicesEarning Capacity AnalysisEarning Capacity Analysis04
SolvencySolvency05
Monographic Study SeriesDiscretionary Accruals and Nondiscretionary Accruals DatabaseBasic DataBasic Data06
China Stock Market SeriesStock TradingIndividual Stock TradingAnnual Stock Price & Returns07
Monthly Stock Price & Returns08
Weekly Stock Price & Returns09
Individual Stock Trading Market TradingWeekly Market Returns10
Panel B:

Variable descriptions in CSMAR

Information from CSMAR (verbatim)
VariablePathField TitleFieldField Description
TLN01Total Number of SharesNstbfof
TLP01Ratio of Total Number of Incentive Shares Issued to Total CapitalProtleuq
EXN01Exercisable/Unlockable Rights for ExecutivesExustkta
CTN01Exercisable/Unlockable Rights for TechniciansCtbstkta
BE02Total Shareholders’ EquityA003000000The sum of all shareholders’ equity items. Used from 1990 onwards.
PPE02Net Fixed AssetsA001212000The net amount of Fixed Assets after deducting accumulated depreciation and impairment. It also includes construction contractor’s temporary facilities, software affiliated with computer’s hardware that cost did not measure separately. Used from 2000 onwards. After 2007, the original fixed assets conforming to the definition of investment properties are calculated as investment properties.
A02Total AssetsA001000000The sum of all asset items. Used from 1990 onwards.
NTR02Net Notes ReceivableA001110000The difference between Notes Receivable and its provision for bad debts. Notes Receivable is notes that are neither due nor discounted at banks yet, including trade acceptance and bank acceptance but excluding the endorsed notes receivable. Used from 1991 onwards.
ACR02Net Accounts ReceivableA001111000The difference between Accounts Receivable and Provision for Bad Debts of Accounts Receivable. Accounts Receivable is amounts should be received by an enterprise from other companies for sales of goods, products, materials, and services rendered, or project settlement. Used from 2007 onwards.
REV03Total Operating RevenueB001100000The sum of all revenue arising from operating business of the company.
ROA04Return on Assets BF050102B(Total profits + Financial expenses)/Average total assets
Denoted by Null if the denominator is not disclosed or equal to zero.
Average total assets = (Beginning total assets + Ending total assets)/2
LEV05Ratio of Long-Term Borrowings to Total AssetsF011301ALong-term Borrowings/Total Assets
Denoted by Null if the denominator is not disclosed or equal to or below zero.
TA06Total Accrued ProfitsTtlacrulTotal accrued profits = net profit - cash flows from operating activities.
ME07Annual Negotiable Market ValueYsmvosdThe number of negotiable share multiplied by its closing price in the year
MTV08Number of Shares Traded in MonthMnshrtrdTotal number of shares traded in the month
MMV08Market Value of Tradable SharesMsmvosdThe number of negotiable share multiplied by its monthly closing price, A Share: CNY, SSE B share: USD, SZSE B Share: HKD.
MP08Monthly Closing PriceMclsprc
rτ09Weekly Return With Cash Dividend ReinvestedWretwd
rm,τ10Weekly Market Return With Cash Dividend Reinvested (Current-Value-Weighted)Wretwdos

Acknowledgement

The author thanks Haina Shi, W. Jean Kwon, Chris Bayer and four anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions, as well as Alexander Goerlt for his editorial assistance.

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Published Online: 2019-01-29

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