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Hume, Mandeville, Butler, and “that Vulgar Dispute”

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Published/Copyright: July 1, 2019

Abstract

The debate over whether human motivations are fundamentally selfinterested or benevolent consumed Shaftesbury, Mandeville, and Hutcheson, but Hume – though explicitly indebted to all three – almost entirely ignores this issue. I argue that his relative silence reveals an overlooked intellectual debt to Bishop Butler that informs two distinguishing features of Hume’s view: first, it allows him to appropriate compelling empirical observations that Mandeville makes about virtue and moral approval; second, it provides a way of articulating a fundamental criticism of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson on the issue of virtuous motivation. From this position, Hume is able to reframe the question of virtue according to the approbation of the spectator, rather than the internal aims of the agent.

EPA

Hutcheson’s Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections

EPM

Hume’s Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals

FB

Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees or Private Vices, Public Benefits

H

Hume’s History of England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution of 1688

IIBV

Hutcheson’s Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue

IVM

Shaftesbury’s Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit

SBN

Selby-Brigge/Nidditch edition of Hume’s Enquiry

T

Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature

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Published Online: 2019-07-01
Published in Print: 2019-06-28

© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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